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The promise of democracy,

J.

Mills

as an Enlightenment ideal, has

been

to specifically

transcend the dichotomy of ruler and
ruled by establishing self-rule of the
people

themselves as the normative basis of governance
societies

and the socioeconomic form

this takes

in the

modem world.

Reproduction of

along with associated ideological

constmcts which legitimize such formations,
however, have produced various
understandings of just exactly what

is

conception against another. The Cold

meant by democracy

War between

(1945-1991) brought the question of democracy

the U.S. and the Soviet

to the forefront

debate, and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet
model on

motivated the U.S. to place

its

own

capitalist

as well pitting one

of modem

December

Union

political

25, 1991 has

democracy forward as a model

to

be

exported abroad through agencies like the National Endowment for
Democracy and

emulated thoughout the world. The present study examines
project of the U.S. through the

this

NED,

form of democracy produces

this

democracy-promotion

exploring the various contradictory tensions which

in the context

of an increasingly

capitalist

globalization of the world that
has accelerated in the
post-Cold

21" century.
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INTRODUCTION

The

recent conjuncture of a form
of democracy with the practice
of hegemony ,n

United States foreign policy

is

the focus of the present
study.'

of democracy as a form of
governance previously restncted to
that

IS,

internal state politics-

a pattern of political behavior
either enforced by law and/or
norms within

boundanes— has become
to transform

its

the major ideological

internal political

means by which

importantly, what

makes

this

this regard

in

War world. And, more

conjuncture worthy of a closer analysis,
as opposed to

previous chauvinistic aspirations along
these
(cf.

state

the United States seeks

philosophy into an instrument for
hegemony

international politics in the, presumably,
anarchical post-Cold

success

Specifically, the practice

Sklar and Berlet, 1991-92,

p. 12)

lines, is precisely the relatively

broad

which the United States has obtained

in

while avoiding the necessity of direct and
continuous United Slates military

involvement.^

Webster’s defines democracy as: “1 a government by the
people; esp mle of the
majority b a government in which the supreme
power is vested in the people and
exercised by them directly or indirectly through a system
of representation usu.
:

:

:

involving periodically held free elections” (Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary,
1898/1984, p. 338). Hegemony is defined by Webster’s as: “preponderant
influence or'
authority esp. of one nation over others” (Webster’s Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary
1898/1984, p. 561).
2

One

notable example of U.S. chauvinism

is that expounded in the late 1800s after the
U.S. conquest of the Philippines by the-then senator from the state of Indiana,
Senator
Albert J. Beveridge, in a speech before his senatorial colleagues (cf Beveridge,

Imperialism At

Its

Height, in Barlett,

1

947, pp. 385-8).

1

The success of democratic

transitions in Latin

America during the 1980s, away

from the dominance of
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes,
(O-Donnell,

regimes

et al„

in eastern

is

evidence of this success

1986; Wiarda, 1990). Also, the capitulation
of former communist

Europe and the Soviet Union as the
decade of the 1990s began was

showcased as the highlight of this new U.S.
foreign policy which seeks

democracy

(or,

more

Document, 1992,

precisely, democratic capitalism)
abroad (cf.

p. 1).

but often

were

works

to

political landscape

Freedom House (which

to support U.S. foreign policies),

rated as politically “Free” at the end

33% of the world’s
classified in the

promote

NED Strategy

Currently, the transformation of authoritarian
regimes to liberal

forms of democracy has also altered the

Worldwide, according

to

of many countries

a nongovernmental agency

is officially

65 countries and 50 related

of 1990, four more than

m

p. 36).’

By

territories

1989, with only

5.323 billion people (1990 estimate), or 50 nations and
9

“Not Free” category (McColm, 1991,

in Africa.

territories,

the beginning of

3

The

International Freedom of Expression Exchange Clearing House,
Action Alert
Service writes that Freedom House’s current activities include
surveys and programs
aimed, amongst other things, at: “Promoting an engaged U.S. foreign
policy” (IFEX
web site, <http://www.ifex.org/org/fh/>). Former U.S. U.N. Ambassador Jeane J.

Kirkpatrick praised Freedom

founding

[in

House

for having “demonstrated through decades since its
1941] a most extraordinarily consistent, clearheaded commitment to the

democratic politics in free societies” (Freedom House web site:
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/>). In addition to managing the regional networking
component of USAID's Democracy Network program, its American Volunteers in

Development (AVID) program, its Center for Religious Freedom which
defends “persecuted Christians worldwide”, its Cuba Democracy Project (CDP), and
International

numerous other projects. Freedom House proudly announces
change by proclaiming:

its

support for democratic

With support from foundations, corporations, labor unions, private
donors, and the U.S. government. Freedom House's international
democratization programs are advancing the remarkable worldwide

2

1998, of an estimated world
population of 5.771 billion
people tn 191 sovereign states

and 59 related
"Free” while

territories.

39%

22%

or 81 countries and 44 related
terr.tones were rated as

or 53 countries and

Free” (Karatnycky, 1998,

p. 4).“

And

1 1

related territories

as the

new

were deemed

to

be “Not

century begins. Freedom House's

expansion of political and economic freedom
(Freedom House web
‘^http://www. freedomhouse.org/>.

site

For criticisms of Freedom House’s

Annual Survey and how the Survey is seen
as
supporting U.S. foreign policy by unfairly
glossing over the disparaging human
rights
policies of U.S. allies, see also Scoble
and Wiseberg, 1981, p. 160 and Schoultz
’
January-March, 1980, pp. 94-6. In the 1986-1987
Survey, Raymond D. Gastil
responded to cnticisms which purported that
Freedom House’s Survey of Freedom “is
really a propagandistic attempt to generate
support for American foreign policy or the
capitalistic economic system” by asserting:
“The author would like to take this’
opportunity to assure readers that he serves no such
masters, and that his judgments can
e as unpalatable to many within the Freedom

House organization

as to these critics”

(Gastil, 1987, pp. 80-1).

Freedom House utilizes three categories of freedom: “Free”,
“Partly Free”, and
“Not Free”. Its Survey groups two sets of characteristics
under political rights and civil
liberties. Free and fair elections and their
mechanics are the primary concern of the
Survey s focus on political rights, while freedom “to develop
views, institutions and
personal autonomy apart from the state” characterize the
Survey’s focus on civil
liberties

(McColm, 1991,

pp. 49-51).

4

By

the beginning of 1993, 75 countries and 48 related territories
were designated as
“Free”, or 25% of the world’s estimated population of 5.446
billion people, with 31% of
the population living in 38 states and 12 related territories
falling under the

“Not Free”
1996 survey, out of an estimated world
population of 5.701 5 billion people. Freedom House rated 76 countries
and 44 related
territories as “Free” with 62 states and six related territories labeled
“Partly Free” (i.e.
with some constraints on political rights and civil liberties) while 53 countries and
categorization

(McColm, 1993,

p. 4).

In

its

8

related territories

were designated as “Not Free”

(Karatnycky, 1996,

p. 4).

This

(i.e. in

latter figure in the

which basic

rights are denied)

“Not Free” category, one should

note,

represented a jump from 1990 to nearly

39% of the world’s population. The report does
note a rise in the number of “formal democracies,” with up to 1 17 of the world’s 191
countries and 57 related territories or 61% as compared to 42% or 41 of the world’s
countries just ten years ago. This translates into 3.1 billion people out of a 1996 world

population of 5.7 billion living under “democratically elected governments.” The report
notes, however, that “[djemocracy

is

not

synonymous with freedom,” and, hence.

3

survey classir.es 85 of the world's
192 countries or 44.27% as
Free, another 60
countries or 3 1 .25% as Partly Free,
while only 47 countries or

under the Not Free category. Overall,
the survey concludes
year 2000, “38.9 percent of the world’s
population lives
lives tn Partly Free states,

and 35.5

in

24.45% of all

that at the

states fall

beginning of the

Free societies, 25.58 percent

percent lives in Not Free countries”
(Karatnycky,

1

2000 ).
It

would be an exaggeration

to link all

of these transitions to U.S. actions alone

or even to claim U.S. involvement as the
proximate cause leading to a democratic
transition

m each particular case.

Still,

because

this distinct type

being heralded by Freedom House and other
U.S.

is

substantially from

allied organizations, differs

what are known as “peoples’ democracies”

socialist bloc countries,

and which,

democracy depicted below

in

in fact, is closely

Chapter

4,

it

is

of democracy, which

in

communist or former

modeled upon the U.S. model of

one of the underlying assumptions of this

study that regimes which meet U.S. “democratic” criteria

are, in large

measure,

recipients of prior and/or current U.S. interventionist action
and aid to promote

of democracy abroad.

its

brand

U.S. efforts in this regard thus can be said to constitute a

designates only 76 of the world’s 117 democracies as “Free”, with 40 classified
as
“Partly Free”, and only one
Bosnia— as “Not Free” (Karatnycky, 1996, pp. 4-5).

—

Socialist countries

known

as “Peoples’ Democracies” like the People’s Republic of

China, Republic of Cuba, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, or the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea fall, according to the Freedom House classification, under the “Not

Free” category. Indeed, the

latter three

regimes were

listed

by Freedom House as

members of “The Most Repressive Regimes of 1998” (1998).
As Adam Watson stated in reference to Spartan and Athenian
oligarchy or democracy: “they did

it

support for

because they saw advantage to themselves

in

doing so.” “Similarly the British government in its nineteenth-century heyday and the
United States government today have encouraged democracy in the different sense in

4

pers,s,en. in.ervent.on.s,
and external vanable in
either effecting these
trans.tions or at
least in

.nfluencing the

fo™

they take. Furthemtore,
to the degree the U.S.
does claim

credit for these trans.t.ons
(cf.

Report 1999. 2000.
in

p. 4.

NED

Albright.

SD. 1992.

May

p. 1;

16. 2000).

it

Bush. 1992.

is

p.

A16;

NED Annual

important to analyze this claim

order to examine the spec,
fie impact on the
construction of U.S. policy. Moreover,

utthzatton of passive. non-m,litary
instruments to foster compliance
with U.S. policies

amongst foreign populations recognizes
post-Cold

War world and

Western bloc

the reestablishment of
American

itself or in the

As

of U.S. hegemony

supremacy

in the

(either in the

world generally) requires more than
domination “through

the applicatton offeree in the
world

(1988. p. 198).

that the reconstruction

economy.”

a point

made by

such, one of the questions examined
herein

Augelli and

is to

Murphy

what degree the

U.S. export of democracy abroad
constitutes the ethical aspect of American
hegemony,

given the present conjunction of U.S. economic
and military dominance. As well, the
praettee

of democracy promotion

practice undertaken

exported, and for

raises questions as to whether this

by the U.S.. what type of democracy

whose

a wholly

new

being advocated and/or

benefit?

The nature of these democratic
effecting

is

is

transformations and specifically the U.S. role

them requires an examination of the now

being played by the National

Endowment

for

which we now understand

institutionalized overt role

Democracy (NED),

the

agency

which

m
IS

first

it.
Intervention in internal affairs, to the degree necessary to
ensure that the government of another community is friendly to the intervening
power,
has the effect of integrating the system, of shifting it in practice further towards
the
imperial end of the spectmm” (Watson, 1992, p. 53).
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officially

proposed by President Reagan

in a

June

1982 speech to the British

8,

Parliament.*’ In order to counter
Soviet totalitarianism, he satd

it

was necessary

to

foster the tnfrastructure of
democracy— the system of a free press
unions, political parties,
universities-which allows a people to
choose
theu own way, to develop their own
culture, to reconcile their own

ditterences through peaceful

Enacted into law by Congress

in

means (Reagan, 1982,

November

1983, the

549)

p.

NED

is,

curiously, a privately

incorporated organization which, nonetheless,
happens to be funded by the U.S.

government and subject

to the oversight

and review procedures of Congress.

suggested that this contradictory basis of the

funding on the one hand, while
U.S. government

(Wiarda, 1990a,

its

activities out

when

p.

1

its

50).

its

to their

it

to deflect criticism

from the

programs go awry or prove embarrassing”

But while the supposedly private

of the purview of the American public,

governments and dissident organizations
agency

NED structure is a way to get government

private status “enables

policies and

has been

It

immediate suspicion and

is

its

status

of the

NED may keep

status in the eyes

not so ambiguous and, in

hesitation, especially

when

fact,

it

of other

subjects the

claims to be

The idea of establishing nongovernmental organizations to provide overt funding
to
private sector groups engaged in international programs was first
proposed by the
Johnson Administration

after public disclosure

of private organizations

activities

of the CIA’s covert funding of overseas

in the late 1960s.

This idea was not acted upon

until,

in 1979, the leaders
Political
political

of the Democratic and Republican parties created the American
Foundation (APF) as a nonprofit, bipartisan organization designed to undertake

exchanges with their counterparts abroad.

research proposal to examine

It

was

the

APF which

formulated a

how the U.S.

could support democratic forces abroad and
sought and received President Reagan’s support for these efforts. In his 1982 British
Parliament speech. President Reagan also referred to the examples of the German and
other European parties which had programs to assist democratic forces abroad (U.S.

General Accounting Office, 1984, GAO/NSI AD-84- 121, pp.
General Accounting Office Reports are listed herein by their

1-2).

[NOTE:

All

GAO classification and

found in the Bibliography under the heading: U.S. General Accounting Office.]
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promoting democracy
Parenti, 1995, p. 53;

Weaver and Barnes,

(cf.

Blum, 2000,

is

rests primarily

21, 1998;

on the National Endowment

only one instmment amongst

to effect its policies abroad,
a

May

p. 183).

Because the focus of this dissertation

Democracy (NED), which

1091, pp. 138-40; Grey,

more

many which

for

the U.S. utilizes

accurate assessment of the
overall impact of U.S.

foreign policy on democratic
transitions abroad

would require analyses not only of
these

other agencies, programs, and
practices but as well detailed
comparisons of their impact
in the countries

where such democratic governmental
forces emerge. Consequently,

whatever conclusions herein reached can
only be said

to

be tentative,

partial, limited,

and denved from an examination of only
one instrument of U.S. foreign policy,

NED. As Cohen

notes, the

NED’s budget

viz. the

but “0.2 percent of Amenca’s
$16 billion

is

foreign operations budget and just
0.01 percent of its $300 billion defense
budget”

(2000,

p. 848).

Indeed, he points out, even if the

around $32 million were “increased tenfold,
than 2 percent of the

more than $16

to

NED’s

$320 million,

p. 852).

Admittedly,

this dissertation s conclusions,

this is

this

would amount

to less

m the U.S. budget for foreign operations and

billion

State Department appropriations, and 0.1 percent
of the

(Cohen, 2000,

average annual budget of

$300

billion defense budget”

an acknowledgement of the limitations of

and the reader

is

thus provided with a caveat against

generalizing findings rendered herein regarding the

NED to overall U.S.

foreign

policies.

But what specifically characterizes the current form of U.S. democracy elevated
to the level

of foreign policy, and how does

export democracy abroad?

And how

is this

it

differ

from previous U.S. attempts

to

current form of democracy being exported

7

and/., ^ha, purposes! Does
democracy
,0 forestall or

IS

It

the

in .h,s

fonn contnm suff.ccni con,
radio, ions

even counteract the United
States’ quest

for

world hegetnony? And what

about the export of American
democracy that allows the Chamber
of Commerce,

AFL-CIO, and

seemingly diverse

the Republican and Democratic
parties-organizations with
interests, to

tandem and promote

it

agree on the meaning of democracy

abroad? These questions lend purpose

to,

in

order to work

m

and stake out certain

specific areas of focus for, this study.

It is

important, to begin with, to note that
the intersection of democracy and

hegemony has been examined before

(cf.

Gramsci, 1955; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985;

Doyle, 1986a, Robinson, 1996). The uniqueness
of this study, however,
understanding that these two concepts, democracy
and hegemony,
role

m U.S.

foreign policy (though the latter concept of
hegemony

practice than a fully articulated policy).

And

lies first in its

now occupy
is

a central

more an unspoken

they have been conjoined by American

7

That U.S. world hegemony is a fully articulated policy,
however, can be argued on the
basis of a 46-page 1992 Pentagon planning document
which described itself as
definitive guidance

for fiscal

from the Secretary of Defense’ for preparation of defense budgets
1994 through 1999” (Gellman, March 11, 1992, p. Al). Drafted
under the

supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, undersecretary for policy, the
“Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG) received little publicity, yet declared that the political and
military

mission of the U.S. in the post-cold war era will be “to insure that no rival
superpower
IS allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the
territory of the former
Soviet

Union.” As Patrick Tyler of The

New

York Times

articulates the clearest rejection to date

stated, “the

Pentagon document

of collective internationalism.”

He

continues:

The classified document makes the case for a world dominated by one superpower
whose position can be perpetuated by constructive behavior and sufficient military
might

any nation or group of nations from challenging American primacy”
1992, The New York Times, p. Al & A14). As regards the authority of this

to deter

(March

8,

DPG document. Barton Gellman,
communcated

to

me

in personal

Washington Post National Correspondent,

correspondence the following:

8

foreign pol.cynrakers ,o take
advantage of the

War world and

new

the collapse of the former
Soviet

eond.t.ons prov.ded by the
post-Cold

Union

in

an explicitly overt attempt

replace the anarchical nature of
international politics with a

U.S. leadership.

And though Robinson argues

that

to

“new world order” under

“a transnational elite which

is

the

agent of transnational capital” has
already superceded ruling class
direction from any
particular national state,

what

is

being argued by others

is

that the U.S., acting as a

traditional sovereign state, is pursuing
nothing less than a policy

(Robinson, 1996,

p. 4;

Tyler, 1992, pp.

1, 14).

One of the main

of world hegemony

fronts of this battle

is in

the realm of politics, the orienting
of governments around the world to the
structures of

a capitalist market economy, a subordinate
and apolitical trade union movement,
institutions

of civil society, and western

liberal

democratic forms of governance

(competitive elections, individual procedural rights,
an active role for private-sector
organizations,

opposed

etc.).

Thus, there

to substantive

is

a

move

democracy. In

to process or procedural

this respect, procedural

democracy as

democracy

is

limited to

the political and legal world of voting, due process,
and fair procedures while

[T]he [1992 Pentagon] document was Dick Cheney’s last
Defense
Planning Guidance for the Bush administration. In itself it

represented

the culmination of a formal

mechanism within

DOD to define the

fundamental security interests and strategy of the United

States.

It

was

not a draft or a proposal, but, as the story said, the standard against which
military planners should measure their work. In bureaucratic practice,
the

DPG is the narrative that explains and justifies the choices made in

the

DOD budget.

There would be no requirement for Congress to endorse it,
though the legislative history or committee reports of the associated
budgets might comment.
.

.

.You’re right to say the policy was adopted by publication of

Cheney’s DPG, which required interdepartmental approval (Scowcroft,

9

sukslnnlivc

pmvisnms

.Icnoccy expands

,hc concep, ol .len„.e,aey
U, .nclude ,he (onne.

in a.I.lili.n, l„ e.|nali/,ing
social

.Icnmcracy can

lines l,c

rcrccd

and economic cmulilions.
Snl.slanlive

lo as "rcsnlls-oricnlcd"

dcinocacy,

in lhal

II,

c end icsnil

ol Ihc dcmocialic process
should piodncc a socicly approaching
malcrial c,|nalily. U.S.
cllorls

al

pronn,ling proccinral democracy
ahroad, lo Ihc conirary, arc
nndcrsloo.1

herein as cnconraging U,rm al Ihc
expense ol snhslancc, cxaccrhalinp,
malcrial
inc(|iiiilily in llic

My

process.

hypothesis

Miurowly eonstriieted and
|)artienlar, is

the type

is tlK.l

oldemoeraey

I

wishes

).S.

to export

essentiali/,es an unalterable lie lo
eapilalisi

supported ahroad only insofar as

henellts

it

interests as the

predominant world

does not allow

for particular historical traditions

lor the possibility ol

the

capitalist

I

).S.

abroad

is

economies and,

in

national and eeonoinie

power.' Such a eoneeplion ofdemoeraey

and eusloms

each state’s ohjeelive conditions

in

any

^^iven

to inlluenee its

development; eonsequenlly, the U.S. promotion ofdemoeraey
ahroad

engender resentment toward

this foreign export

heeause

it

is

meant

and not indigenous needs, as has been witnessed most recently

Bakei)
(

in the

iellman on

own

eoimlry nor

demoeratie

will eontinue lo

lo serve U.S. goals

’hOs in Haiti,

in the

Hush administration (Personal eorrespondenee with Barton

November

2b, 2000).

K

One

underlying assumption

eeonoinie

in this analysis is that the aeeentiialion

struetiires, praeliees, laws, etc. in other eouniries

intciesis given the history ol

of eai)ilalist

does benefil U.S, national

uneven colonial and neo-eolonial development which has

resulted in an asymmetrical relationshi|) between a dominant U.S. stale versus
stales

and which, heeause

unable

ol their relative

weakness

i

7 .v-r'/-i 7 .v

the U.S.

all

hegemon,

other

are

terms ol trade, and, hence, ollen are the reeipienis ol disadvantageous
trade regjmes and/or political alliances. I’lirlhermore, unless and iiiilil some world stale
lo set the

transeends the

cm rent

I

J.S.

heg.emon,

it

is

unlikely that any other eapilalisi stale will be

to

Somalia, and Russia.

merely a mask
are likely to

Also,

I

show

will

for establishing

that

because “democracy promotion”

is

often

and continuing U.S. hegemony
abroad, contradictions

emerge between the rhetoric and
practice of this policy thus

raising

generalized doubts amongst the populations
having this “democracy” forced on
them.

For example, multi-million dollar U.S.
aid

(UNO)

in the

1990 presidential election

in

for the

United Nicaraguan Opposition

Nicaragua

in addition to a

simultaneous U.S.

support for a brutal counterrevolutionary
war against the governing Sandinistas found

many Nicaraguans

skeptical of U.S. efforts at promoting
democracy.’^

are not only about the nature of this brand
of democracy but also about

And
its

such doubts

subversion

able to take advantage of “free market” conditions,
given their subordination to the U.S.
their dependence upon it to maintain system
stability and order.

hegemon, and

Notes Cohn:

In 1995, President Clinton called

democracy promotion ‘one of the
democracy needs to be

central pillars of the United States security strategy.’
But
promoted for its own sake, not simply as an instrument to

economic
processes,

interests.”

Not dismissing a U.S.

Cohn nonetheless argues

democracy assistance

One way

to

is

accomplish

further U.S. security or

role entirely in supporting democratic

that such U.S. assistance

can be supported “only if
delinked from furthering U.S. security and economic interests.

U.S. democracy assistance to be channeled through
multilateral and regional organizations” (Cohn, July
9, 1999, p. 4).
this is for

As Weaver and Barnes

point out in regards to the 1990 electoral defeat of the
Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) by the United Nicaraguan
Opposition

(UNO), which was heavily financed with $5.2 million by the NED between 1984 and
1989 and with an estimated $15 million by the CIA plus an additional $5.9 million from
a congressional package approved in October 1989:

The FSLN pointed
Somocistas on

to UNO’s heavy U.S. financing, to UNO’s exUNO’s candidate lists as proof that UNO was simply

new form of U.S. -sponsored counterrevolution....
UNO’s electoral victory did achieve Washington’s

a

goals of

FSLN, defeating uncompromising Nicaraguan nationalism,
and bringing back into power leaders who know their place in the U.S.
unseating the

backyard. That, however,

is

(Weaver and Barnes, 1991,

not the

same

pp. 138-40).
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thing as promoting democracy

and challenge of the notion of
state sovereignty which
forms the basis of current
international law. Moreover, to
the extent that the
to reach their desired targets

demands of capital accumulation

and social conflicts threaten

institutions into the political arena
in other countries,

able to pursue

It

its

it

to spill

is

over from established

unlikely that the U.S. will be

newfound evangelism of promoting democracy
with

currently exudes. Should this

cmsade degenerate, however,

will return to its idealized tradition

prohibits that luxury, lest the

US

fail

it is

as

much

fervor as

doubtful that the U.S.

of isolationism, as the logic of global
capitalism now

yield

its

use offeree replaces or overshadows the

hegemony

to another aspirant.”

Indeed, if the

weapon of democratic propaganda,

the

resulting visage of iron-fisted politics will
cast into doubt whatever democratic

intentions

will

may have

expose U.S.

characterizing

merely
hollow

US

its

interest in

Consequently, selective support for democracy abroad

democratic development as merely self-serving, thus

commitment

rhetorical

shell

existed.

to

democratic principles as primarily

and pretentious, as process democracy

is

—though not

exposed as merely a

without material content.

isolationism in the inter-war years, writes Coker,

derived

much of its

legitimacy in the eyes of the American people from

the wish to keep the country’s virtue intact. Unable to expand any
further once the frontier had been reached, unwilling to follow up

Theodore Roosevelt’s imperial mission which for a brief moment in the
United States’ history had extended the frontier into the Pacific, the
Americans felt ‘trapped in time’. In this supreme moment of
introspection, of ‘sectarian withdrawal’, many Americans felt the need to
maintain their exceptional standing by contracting out of a comipting

world which had

little

or nothing to offer the United States, or the

American people (Coker, 1989,

p. 8).
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In order to begin our
examination

of the U.S. export of democracy,

it

is first

necessary to inquire into the
specificity of the concepts of
democracy and hegemony. In

Chapter

It

is

1 ,

both concepts are defined according
to past and present usages. In
particular,

argued that the term “democracy”
has undergone an historical transition
by which,

under conditions of capitalism,
being undermined.

legitimacy as a valid theory of political
obligation

its

The work of C.B. Macpherson

key contradiction which emerges when
democracy
specifically,

society

finds

It

it

is

one

that pits an

owning

class

this contradiction are

democracy.

patriotism

insist that the

And though

which

present in the state

s

which must maintain a possessive market

to

results

class

which

still drift

to its

fools refuse to believe

it

it

to its legitimacy, attempts to

which Hegel defined

from the

is

doom

its

classified

citizens’ sense

of

as “assured conviction with

citizens’ belief that “rationality is actually

ward off challenges

statement that the “state

will

damage

ruling classes will always appeal to

of Fools can perhaps be allowed to

it

the

mixed with capitalism;

form of government by which they rule be

to its legitimacy,

one

is

reminded of

too serious a business to be subjected to such

buffoonery” [such as a despotism which

“but

bnng out

continuously undertaken by those holding sovereign
power

that political sentiment

truth as its basis”

Marx

to

increasingly difficult to remain politically
obligated to a system that keeps

while continuing to
as a

is

be examined

m order to ensure its ruling position against a dispossessed working

subordinated. In order to forestall any further

mask

will

is

drift

[i.e.

relies

on patriotism

for

its

salvation].

“A

Ship

before the wind for a good while,” he writes,

the approaching revolution] precisely because the

possible” (Hegel, 1821/1967, pp. 163-4; Marx, 1943).
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With regard
that

to the

concept of hegemony, various
perspectives are

of Hedley Bull and Martin
Wight

to that

of Mtehael Doyle and Antonio
Gramsci.

Gramsct's understanding of
hegemony, which
itself,

laid out frotn

rooted ,n the formation of the
state

is

and which focuses on the
intemelations between ntling
classes and subaltern

groups

,n the interplay

between

political society

and

civil society, is

chosen as the

methodological tool by which to
examine the cument U.S. export of
democracy, for
the only approach to

hegemony, of those examined

herein,

which

is

based

in

it

ts

a solidly

class analytical framework.

In

Chapter

2,

an historical examination of the

modem

states

system

is

undertaken so as to provide some
background to contemporary international
relations.
In particular, an examination of
the origins of the

modem

states-system

is

undertaken

beginning with the Realist perspective of
Martin Wight and Hedley Bull. This

is

followed by a delineation of various theoretical
approaches within the discipline of
international relations (IR).

Some of these

approaches take the sovereign

state as their

basic unit of analysis but others, since the
rapid development of globalizing forces
in the
latter twentieth century,

have yielded

to analyses that are global in orientation

and take

the world capitalist system as their primary
level of theorization. These later systems
theorists provide the theoretical tools

which lend guidance

onent the reader to the complex processes which
practice of democracy promotion undertaken

democracy promotion

by

to this dissertation

and help

set the stage for the diplomatic

the

NED,

understanding such

as a necessary behavior on the road to globalization under
U.S.

hegemonic dominance.
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In

built

recogmzmg

that

post-Cold

around a specific theme,

v/z.

War U.S.

foreign policy has a unity of
purpose

“democracy,” “democracy-building,”
and “democracy

promotion,” a genealogical exposition
of prior attempts by the U.S. to
promote

democracy abroad

upon by

is

necessary to show that

this is

the U.S. Specifically, in Chapter
3,

history of U.S. relations with Latin

1

not a wholly

will focus

America and

new

policy embarked

on the example of the long

the Caribbean and the persistent
U.S.

interventionist behavior in those regions
under the guise of promoting “freedom
and

democracy.” This history will demonstrate

by which
In

to

guide

Chapter

its

4,

that the U.S. has

much

practical experience

current efforts to promote democracy
thoughout the world.
1

focus on the origin, structure, and grant-funding
practices of the

NED itself and analyze the specific nature of the form of democracy
how and

for

what purposes

funding in order to assess
focused activities of the

activist intellectuals

it is

its

exported, and examine particular instances of

NED in many areas of the world, in particular in

who

many

political affairs

NED

impact on building democracy abroad. Because of the
funding

otherwise might be inclined to acquiesce to local anti-U.S.

and/or anti-capitalist oppositional forces,
pacifying

being exported,

it

is

foreign populations through

implicit that the

its

direct

NED is succeeding in

involvement in the internal

of other countries. For example, despite the highly publicized open

admission by U.S.

officials

of millions of dollars

leader, Vojislav Kostunica, supported

in

NED aid, the Serbian opposition

by many thousands of citizens claimed

against incumbent President Slobodan Milosevic in the

September 2000

elections, eventually forcing Milosevic
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rump

state

victory

of Yugoslavia

in the

from office on October 6 with

Kostunica ascending to the Presidency
(Lancaster, September 19,
2000,

September 20, 2000; Dobbs, December
In Chapter 5,

I

11

critique the latest attempt

through the export of democracy abroad.

democratic

state is the best

under U.S. hegemony

Its

certain aspects

development

is

I

p.

by the U.S.

of global

its

hegemony.

capitalist

;

to

maintain

its

hegemony

question whether the western liberal

of the world or whether

could upset

At Erlanger,

Al)

form for the realization of continued

in the rest

own contradictions that

examine

2000,

,

p.

this

capitalist

form of the

accumulation

state

produces

In this concluding chapter,

development since

WWII

I

and the effect

having on the relations between the so-called
“developing nations”

a-vis the so-called “developed nations.”

the world market

m the

1990s,

I

As

this

vis-

well, with the accelerated globalization
of

examine established

international

economic bodies

assessing their role as regards the objective of
supporting and/or maintaining U.S.

hegemony. Utilizing a Marxian
of capitalist production as

it

class analysis,

I

then construct a basic theoretical model

operates within the current global market and analyze, on

the basis of this model, the likely concomitant effect

on the U.S. export of democracy

in

general within the ever-developing contradictory influences that are
both bringing the

world together

in a

web of economic

ties

while simultaneously exacerbating economic

cleavages in the process.
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democracy and hegemony

I.

Democracy Concep tnaHypH

To

conjoin in one sentence the
concepts democracy and

contradiction, for while notions
of freedom are conjured

our

own

histoncal epoch),

its

by

hegemony
the

first

negation emanates from the second.

is

a

concept

And

(at least in

while both

concepts refer to a specific type of
political order, hegemony has
more often been
associated with a state’s external
relations, while democracy has
been conceived

histoncally as an endogenous state
practice, a fact which heretofore
has both facilitated

and circumscnbed the nature of “democratic”
states interact either violently or

pnmanly by

[which]

is

the term

able to ‘lay

though economic might and

hegemony

down

to refer to

argues.

1992,p.

utilized

intellectual capacities

authority in a system
the law’ about the operation of the system, that
is to

determine to some extent the external relations between

member

state,

or as

is

states,

while leaving

some scholars usually reserve
authority by a single power, he
that

hegemony to describe the exercise of this
The difficulty there is that in fact the authority can be

powerful individual

the degree that

“some power or

them domestically independent.” Though he notes
the term

To

through diplomatic means, the stronger—
determined

battlefield strength,

Watson uses

states’ interactions.’^

exercised either by a

often the case by a group of such states” (Watson

15).

The distinction between internal and external realms is a common dichotomy
by state theorists which both allows and delimits which forms of behavior are

considered appropriate, in their view, to each realm. Whereas this debate
in
international relations once centered on theories of human nature
and then shifted to the
condition of anarchy and the distribution of power in the states-system, both
otherwise

subsumed under

the concept of “structure”,

Wendt (1992) has recently moved the
debate onto the question of “process” involving the interaction of participants in the
system and the learning attained thereby.

He

argues that there

is

no

essential feature to

the anarchical condition of the states-system such as to give rise necessarily to self-help

and power politics

in the international arena.
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have necessarily effected the
form

in

which

victories

resulted— has usually dominated

.he relationship and thereby
established a relationship of
hegemony.'^ Democracy, on
the other hand,

is

said to exist in so far as
political authonty arises
from an uncoerced

affirmation by a majority of
citizens-at least of all those
eonsidered to be citizens.

Previous writers have postulated
a similar dichotomy as the
one stated above-v,z„
the relationship between
freedom and order (Lowe, 1988; Forsey,
1974; Gorovitz, 1967;

Commager,

1966; Heimann, 1947; and Eden, 1948).'^
Indeed, students of politics will

most assuredly be confronted with
IS

a reconciliation of these

two

in

this latter

dichotomy, as

it

is

said that all of politics

one form or another (though some would
claim, as do

certain religions and philosophies,
that both are unattainable without
justice)." But to

say that democracy and hegemony are
analagous to freedom and order
undelineated abstraction of the
they,

i.e.

latter

is

to mistake the

concepts with the specificity of the former
when

democracy and hegemony, are conceived

as practices. Various kinds

of states

throughout history have elaimed to serve the
goals of freedom and order as does nearly

“As

a legal construct,” write Kegley and Wittkopf,
“states are assumed to possess a
relatively permanent population, a well-defined
territory, and a government possessing
sovereignty (that is, supreme authority over its
inhabitants as well as freedom from
interference by others)” (Kegley
Wittkopf, 1981/1989,

&

p. 36).

Other recurrent dichotomies along these lines include the
relationship between
liberty and equality (Hadley, 1925/1969; Nielsen,
1985; Robbins,

1977; Paul, Miller,

and Paul, 1985), liberty and justice (Day, 1987; Smith and Murphy,
1965;
1982) and freedom and equality (Dixon, 1986; Sjostrand, 1973; Oddo,

Bollier,

1979).

Der Derian

posits the relationship of order to anarchy, arguing that
international

societies,

institutions, and regimes having been historically constructed
“out of the
desire for order and the fear of anarchy.” International theory and
critical investigations
both share this recognition yet differ over “the degree to which anarchy
is

conceived as

the threat and order as the task; or put less charitably,” he states,
“whether the will to
order produces the very effect of anarchy” (Der Derian, 1995,
p. 4).
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every slate today. But the
particular political practices
undertaken by different kinds
of
states to achieve these
goals not

only vary

in their

approaches but likewise

in their

specific conceptualizations
of these goals, hence the
specificity of democratic or

hegemonic

state politics as

opposed

to, for

example, anstocratic or confederation

pohtics-each of which seeks freedom
and order

in the abstract

state

through different

definitively ordered practices.

Both democracy and hegemony when
conceived
certain specified relationships
that give

cogency

as ordered practices thus
relate to

to their particularity.

For example, a

notion of equality characteristically
sets off the concept of democracy
from
alternatives,

its

including— as per Aristotle’s constitutional
schema— monarchy,

aristocracy, polity, tyranny or oligarchy.’^
In fact, as far as Aristotle

was concerned,

democracy, along with tyranny and oligarchy,
was a deviant form of governance.

Democracy was
of the

common

for the benefit

Hansen
ideals.

a deviation

good,

i.e.

from polity,

for rich

for the

and poor

alike, but

of the men without means”

states:

demos

or masses ruled not in the interest

only for their

(Aristotle,

own

335-322 B.C.E./1984, Bk.

demokratia was both a political system and a
Second, the ideals singled out by the Athenian democrats
were
“First,

{eleutheria) and equality (isonomia and other

meaning “equal”) (Hansen, 1989,

advantage,

compounds with

set

i.e.

Ill,

Ch.

of political

liberty

isos, the adjective

p. 3).

Anstotle’s focus on various constitutions for comparative
political analysis is
indicative of a particular reverence the ancient Greeks had for
constitutions,
believing them to be the foundation of society’s happiness or misery.
As one noted

somewhat

Greek historian

stated:

principal factor

which makes

it is

from

“Now

in all political situations

for success or failure

is

we must

this source, as if from a fountainhead, that all designs

only originate but reach

their fulfilment” (Polybius, c.

302-3).

19

understand that the

the form of a state’s constitution:

and plans of action not

200-118 B.C.E./l 979/1 986 pp

V...

para.

literally

.279a32-.279b4,

taken to

mean

p.

by a particular social

rule

democracy comes from

,90)." Indeed, for ,he
Greeks

a combination

class, the

in genera,,

denrocracy was

poor masses. The etymology

of the Greek words demos

(the people)

and

kratia (authority) and literally
translates as ‘power of the
people.’"* “Democracy.”

'’-‘-an
Polybius
Po,y™‘r,c
(c.too'nrB
200-118 B.C.E.) also delineates six
kinds of government, but for
Polybius
these SIX forms naturally develop
in a cycle of political revolution
with kingship
anstocracy, and democracy rightfully
describing the virtuous forms of
government
while
rule, minonty or oligarchic rule,
and mob rule aptly descriptive of their
defective and degenerative forms which
leads to a transition to a different
form As
regards democracy. Polybius states:
“In the same way a state in which
the mass of
ci izens IS free to do whatever
it pleases or takes into
its head is not a democracy.
But
where it is both traditional and customary to
reverence the gods, to care for our parents
’
to respect our elders, to obey the
laws, and in such a community to
ensure that the will
of the majority prevails— this situation it
is proper to describe as
democracy ” It is
interesting to note that Polybius states that
the best constitution is “one which
includes
elements of all three [i.e. kingship, aristocracy,
and democracy] species.” for. he adds
this has been proved not only in theory
but in practiee by Lycurgus. who was
the firs’t
to construct a constitution, that

of Sparta, on

this principle” (Polybius c

200-118

B.C.E./l 979/1 986, pp. 303-4).

When

Cleisthenes

(c.

572

founder of their democracy*,

- c.

485 B.C.E.), thought by Athenians to be the principal
implemented his reforms, Martin notes, “he made the

first

preexisting villages of the countryside and the
neighborhoods of the city of Athens
(both called ‘demes,’ demoi) the constituent units
of Athenian political organization.”
The demos were the people who resided in these units, which
were mostly country
villages.

The wealthy landowners

resided mostly in the city, though many had country
houses as well. “Organized in their demes, the male citizens
participated directly in the
running of their government: they kept track in deme
registers of which males were
citizens and therefore eligible at eighteen to attend the
assembly to vote on laws and
public policies.
Concludes Martin: “Cleisthenes’ rearrangement of the political map
of Athenian government meant that local notables no longer could
easily control

election results just

by exercising influence on

the poorer people in their immediate

area.” Furthermore, “the idea that persuasion, rather than force
or status, should
constitute the mechanism for political decision making in the emerging

Athenian

democracy

fit

well with the

spirit

of the

intellectual

during the late Archaic age. That

changes which were taking place

is, the idea that people had to present plausible
reasons for their recommendations corresponded to one of the period’s new ways of
thought” (Martin, 1996, pp. 87-8).
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-O h„. no
BC

E./I 984,

Bk.

Ill,

Ch.

viii,»

para. 1279bl6
^
F
1 o, n
1 y 1 ).
p. 19H

Thatt such a conception of
ti-.

i

CleLhL^“

that

B.CE.,954/,98“frp:r^^^
™

m7tToo)*rt''r “r‘

states’ that

Solon

(o'

640:^558

8^7)

by mixing the constitution well.”

Sninni

7

XII Para

,

In

drawn from the

B.C.’e.),

‘‘^"'“'acy

entire

body of citizens he

2^'’-323/1962/1984,

i?73b«
'

furt’hered the cause ’ofthe^”
turtnered
of the common

Book

li

e

II^

Aristotle to the effect that Solon
people through three populist
measures“the

'“ans on the security of the
person of the debtor

created t'r
Citizenship,
ns :

f

particuL'7 777''ir"'

netting up courts

M

hi" h

the extension to any person
7T
2) “the7?'
of the right

than

n

[whicM
's

exercise of

to take legal action in behalf of

"''"'’^.”"^'““‘^‘'

“
advancement of
ro7;7eS;
enabled any citizen, regardless
of social status, to contribute

power.

It

en orcement of Solon’s laws by
initiating legal action,” and,
3) “the
appeals procedure, ephesis, and of
a

r.he

oa77r

(Ostwald, 1986,
pp^
ere left untouched

new

opular

to the

institution

of an

court, the he!iaia, to hear appeals
[which!
>he arbitrary admimstrati™ of
justice

14-15). Noting that Solon’s reforms
of the administration of justice

by Cleisthenes, Ostwald states that the
identification of Cleisthenes
as the one who instituted democracy
in Athens “can, however, be
justified only as a
retrospective inference drawn from
effects to origins. The ongms
themselves, as
descnbed by Herodotus and Aristotle, show
that Cleisthenes’ aim was not to
place the
decisive power of governing the state
(kratos) into
ameliorate conditions that had

first

the hands of the demos, but rather to
brought about tyranny in Athens and had
resulted in

political stnfe as soon as the Peisistratids
had been expelled
was, in other words, no ideological democrat
but a practical

in 5

1

1/10 B.C. Cleisthenes

statesman and politician

concerned with eliminating the roots of internal
conflict from the society
lived” (Ostwald, 1986, pp. 15-6).

in

which he

In his funeral oration, Pericles points out
the numerical essence of democracy as well
its meritocratic virtue as follows;
‘“Our constitution is called a democracy because
power IS
the hands not of a minority but of the whole
people. When it is a question
of settling disputes, everyone is equal before the law;
when it is a question of putting
one person before another in positions of public responsibility,
what counts is not
as

m
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democracy does no. hold

.n.e in our

own day-a,

leas, no, off, c, ally

adnrihed by ,he

world's mos, self-idenl.fied
democracy, ,he U.S., excep, on
rare occasions-

demons,ra,es ,he his.oncal ai.era.ion
,he concep, has gone .hrough,
especially under ,he

condhions of capi,alisnr
examined, since Ihe

shift

“

The merger of democracy wi,h
capi.ahsm mus,

away from

.herefore be

,he hislorical Greek origins
of democracy has

particular implications for the
present study.

The
In his book.

Crisis

of Political Obligation

The Political Theory of Possessive
Individualism: Hobbes

to Locke,

C.B. Macpherson examines ,he foundalions
of liberal-democralic iheory as found

works of Hobbes, Harringlon, Locke and

two seventeenth-century English

membership of a

because of poverty’
II,

revolutions.^'

’

him

all

wriling within the context of

Locating the “essential ingredient” of

particular class, but the actual ability

one, so long as he has

Book

ihe Levellers,

in ihe

which

the

man

possesses.

No

be of service to the state, is kept in political
obscurity
(Pericles, quoted in Thucydides, c. 460-404
B.C.E./l 954/1 985
it

in

to

Para. 37, p. 145).
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Major General Smedley D. Butler quoted from a U.S.

military publication. Training

Manual No. 2000-25, which stated: “The United States is a republic,
not
Democracy is a government of the masses.. .results in mobocracy...the

a democracy.

attitude toward
Communistie...the attitude toward law is that the will of the majority
shall
regulate, whether it be based upon deliberation, or
governed by passion, prejudice and

property

is

impulse... it results in
Butler, 1935, Part

I,

demagogism,

license, agitation, discontent, anarchy” (quoted in

p. 9).
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As the left wing of the English bourgeois revolution of 1640-1660, the Levellers
fought against the remnants of feudalism but also resisted the rise of capitalism.
With a
large following amongst the London poor, the Levellers represented
those groups being
tom asunder in the transition to capitalism. Their political program, radical for its day,
included the demand for the separation of church and state, together with demands for
religious tolerance for Catholics, Jews, and atheists, as well as

22

demands

for annual

bo.h .he practical struggle
and the theore.tcal
jus.ifica.ton of the
seventeenth-century

European revolutionary upheaval

in the

new

belief in the value and
“nghts” of the

individual (who, to the major
theorists of the time,

was chteny

propertied male), a belief most
clearly emphasized in

the white European

Hobbes and Locke, Macpherson

detects in their conceptions
of the individual a central
problem which, winie

correspondtng subs.an.tally to the
actual relations of a market
socte.y, has nonetheless

come

to

undermine the legitimacy of
liberal-democratic theory. The

the “possessive quality”

propnetor of his

own

which conceptualizes the individual
“as

difficulty

hes

in

essentially the

person or capacities, owing nothing
to society for them.”

Freedom, as “the” human essence, was
conceptualized

in the negative sense as

“freedom

from dependence on the will of others”—
freedom being a function of possession.
Society was seen as constituted on a
contractual basis and consisted of
relations of

exchange between proprietors.

Political society, thus

“became

a calculated device for

the protection of this property and
for the maintenance of an orderly
relation of

exchange” (Macpherson, 1962/1988,

p. 3).

Seventeenth-century concepts of freedom,

nght, obligation, and justice were consequently
shaped by this overriding concept of

possessive individualism.”

And

while this concept of possession gave

strength in the seventeenth century,

it

became

its

liberal

theory

source of weakness in the nineteenth,

and, has failed, according to Macpherson, as a
foundation of liberal-democratic theory
in the twentieth century.

This transformation, states Macpherson,

assumptions of possessive individualism no longer correspond

male
Freedom,” 1997).

elections, universal
Irish

suffrage,

is

not that the basic

to the conditions

of

and the redistribution of wealth (“The Levellers and

23

its

market society; they sti„

and

try to discard these

do-even though

sonte hbeta, theorists
do no. tecogntze this

assumptions. No, the real
trouble, Macpherson
argues,

the social context changed
with the emergence of
“working-class

the ntneteenth century,

which

suffrage-a concession

organization and

change

is

mass mobilization of the working class.“
Reflecting

rimes, the symbolism, of equality,

been

it

of un.versal

this poh.ical

adopted the rhetoric and,

which democracy presupposes,
while

the dispossessed, e.g. social
security benefits.

when Macpherson’s book was
to

firs,

effectively

And though

(as

of 1962

published) the possessing (capt.alis.)
class has

maintain effective control over political
power

increasing necessity to rely on deception
to maintain

its

in

much of the

control

is

Following the U.S. Civil

to the U.S. Constitution

vote.

m

effectively

(1860-65), the ratification of the fifteenth amendment
1870 legally ensured Black American males with the
right to

gained the right of suffrage.

On

Citizenship Act

was passed by Congress granting

territorial limits
23

of the United States citizenship

to the U.S. Constitution in 1920,

June

all

2,

1924, the American Indian

non-citizen Indians

bom within

As one commentator wrote
political

The

War

With the passage of the twentieth amendment

women in the U.S.

still

world, the

undermining any adequate basis for a moral
justification of liberal democracy.

''

at

of substantive content, though
concessions, however temporary,
have also

won by

been able

,

the possessing class through
the

m order to maintain their rule, the possessing class

denying

poh.tcal articulacy”

politically expressed today
in the right

won by the dispossessed from

that

is

the

regarding the present relationship between wealth and
power in the world, particularly as played out in the World Trade Organization:

—

The Group of Seven (G-7) the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Japan,
Italy and Canada
had a gross national product of close to $20 trillion in

—

1997. That

64 percent of the world’s production coming from
.8 percent of the world’s population. Of the top
500 corporations in the world, only six are from countries outside the
is

countries with only

1 1
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key con.rad,c,,o„ which
emerges when democracy

s

.ha.

be.ween a possessing

marke. socie.y

class,

is

nnxed with capdahsn,,

iherefore.

wh.eh mus. main.a.n .he exis.ence
of a possessive

.o preserve i.s posi.ion,

and a dispossessed working

class,

.he acquisi.ion of .he demoera.ic
franchise and hence a poli.ical
voice,

is

which, w,.h
increasingly

skeplical of Ihe liberal-democra.ic
lheo .7 of poli.ical obligalion.'"
Essenlially,

U.S

Europe, Canada or Japan.

Of Ihe 100 larges, banks in .he world all
impenahsl counines. As of 1997 Ihe
imperialis. coun.ries
exported close to $5 tnllion and
imported a similar amount—controlling
the vast majority of world trade.
In the same year, the oppressed
countnes were m debt to the tune of
$ 2.2 trillion to the imperialist banks
and governments of the world. The
are from .he

pnsoners
doors

m the WTO.

among

underdeveloped countries are truly

The

WTO processes are carried out behind closed

the rulers of the organization,

whose proposals are brought
General Council. The governments of the
Third World basically sit
outside waiting to hear what the G-7
proposes (Goldstein, December 9
to the

,

The most notable instance of official deception
by the U.S. government was its
increasing, yet undisclosed, involvement
in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam
War
revealed by the “Pentagon Papers” released to
The New York Times by psychiatrist
government employee Daniel Ellsberg

and

in 1971.

As

the

Columbia Encyclopedia (Sixth

The study revealed

a considerable degree of miscalculation,
bureaucratic
arrogance, and deception on the part of U.S.
policymakers. In particular,
it found that the U.S. government
had continually resisted full disclosure

—

of increasing military involvement

in Southeast Asia
air strikes over
Laos, raids along the coast of North Vietnam, and
offensive actions by
U.S. marines had taken place long before the American
public was

informed (2000 <http://www.bartleby.com/65/pe/PentPap.html>).

Flathman points out
of a

that

the practice of political obligation

is

not a necessary part

political order. Political societies

sometimes achieve a degree of order and
uniformity of behavior by force, deception, and manipulation; other political
orders are
marked by a degree of order and uniform behavior owing to the habitual, unthinking
conformity of their subjects.” Flathman’s conception of ‘political obligation’, as a
conscious political order not characterized by force, deception, and manipulation,
implies a normative concept. As such, he argues, “in point of fact reason and choice are
an integral part of the practice of political obligation” (Flathman, 1972,
pp. 64-5). As
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Macpherson foresaw

1962 a continuous

in

crisis

of legitimacy on the political
horizon

for the liberal-capitalist
state.

To

unravel this contradiction,
Macpherson examines the social basis of
liberal

theory which

for granted,

IS

his/her

this

founders, including Hobbes,

and notes

own

freely able to

slave).

its

the Levellers, took

that all shared the recognition
that each person’s capacity
to labor

property,

hand over

It IS

Hamngton, Locke and

is

alienable,

and

is

a market

commodity which each man

to others for a price (thus distinguishing
the

this characteristic

is

worker from the

of labor as alienable that prompts
Macpherson to label

kind of society a “possessive market society”
(Macpherson, 1962/1988,

p. 48).

Furthermore, once one’s capacity to labor becomes
a generalized commodity, then

market relations begin to permeate
being

in seventeenth-century

all

social relations. This

form of society came

into

England, and the acceptance of this society, rooted
in the

notion of possessive (white male) individualism,
by the main political theories of the

time

is

due

(i)

to their shared recognition

What makes

a

man human

of the following basic assumptions:

is

freedom from dependence on the wills of

others.
(ii) Freedom from dependence on others
means freedom from any relations with
others except those relations which the individual enters
voluntarily with a view

to his

own

interest.

he writes elsewhere, having an obligation to do X is not the same as being under
to do it, and that acting to discharge an obligation is not the same as
being
compelled. If compulsion has the force of necessity the question of justification simply

compulsion

has no place.

One does

not do X, he suffers or experiences

it.”

And

then, as doing an action involves discharging an obligation, there

well-grounded decision on

Though Macpherson

B ’s

part to

is

further:

logical

“Insofar,

room

do the action or not” (Flathman, 1976,

for a

p. 77).

considers the Levellers to be part of the newly emergent

bourgeoisie, others take a different view which sees them as the

emergent working class or

proletariat (cf.

Brockway, 1980,
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first

p. 98).

segment of an

capacities, for
(.V)

which he owes nothing

O'™

person and

to society

Although the tndividual cannot
alienate the whole of his
property

own person, he may alienate his capacity
to
(v) Human society consists
of a series of
vO Since freedom from

tn his

labour.

market relations

the wills of others

is what makes a man
human each
indivtdual s freedom can nghtfully
be limited only by such obligations
and rules
as are necessary to secure the
same

freedom of others.

(vii)

Political society is a

human

contrivance for the protection of the
individual’s property in his person
and goods, and (therefore) for the
maintenance of orderly relations of exchange
between individuals regarded as
propnetors of themselves (Macpherson,
1962/1988, pp. 263-64).

These seven assumptions, argues Macpherson,
remain indispensable

to liberal

theory, but no sufficient principles of
obligation can be derived from them
today

because there are two conditions of a valid
theory of political obligation that can
no
longer be fulfilled by the current state of
possessive market societies.

First,

Macpherson

argues, a valid theory of political obligation
(without relying on Nature or the will of

God) “must be

able to postulate that the individuals of whom
the society

see themselves, or are capable of seeing themselves,
as equal in

fundamental than

all

the respects in

which they are unequal.”

some

is

composed

respect

more

In the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, this fundamental notion of equality
consisted of the equal

subordination of everyone to the determination of the market
and

rightful or inevitable

by

virtually

everybody

its

acceptance as

until the nineteenth century.^^

Under

these
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The

“effective use of ‘obligation’ to guide conduct,” states Flathman,
“presupposes a
considerable degree of commonality in the society or social group and contributes
to
stable patterns of conduct.”

“Commonality and

he maintains, “are threatened
unreflective conformity to particular legal rules and the general rule [i.e. ‘an
established rule to the effect that there is an obligation to obey the laws and other
stability,”

by

authoritative

commands of the

state’ (p. 48)].

conviction of the value of these rules

is

They

are best maintained

continuously renewed through

when

the

critical

examination of their content and the consequences of accepting and obeying them
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conditions, argues Macpherson, “there
all

men

orderly

to a political authority

human

relations,

was

a sufficient basis for rational
obligation of

which could maintain and enforce

the only possible

namely, market relations” (Macpherson,
1962/1988, pp. 272-

73).

The second condition of a
cohesion of self-interests,

government, sufficient

among

valid theory of political obligation

all

those

who have

By

p. 273).

“there be a

a voice in choosing the

to offset the centrifugal forces

(Macpherson, 1962/1988,

is that

of a possessive market society”

restricting political voice to a possessing
class in

the zenith of market society in the seventeenth
century, an adequate cohesion of

centnpetal forces existed to decide periodically, without anarchy,

who

should have the

sovereign power, thus providing a sufficient basis for an autonomous
theory of
obligation of the individual to a constitutional liberal

This condition, like the

working class

industrial

capitalist relations

that point,

(first in

became

class consciousness and

first,

the

was

state.

fulfilled until the nineteenth century

Europe and the U.S., though

later replicated

when

wherever

dominant mode of production) developed an autonomous

became,

in

Maepherson’s words,

“politically articulate.”

working “[m]en no longer saw themselves fundamentally equal

inevitable subjection to the determination of the market,” for the market

overwhelmingly benefitting the possessing

class.

in

was seen

The evolution of market

p. 63).

While

idealistic in his focus,

political obligation attempts to avoid legal positivism

says

it

is)

by arguing

that societies

28

as

society thus

to the

Flathman’s interpretation of

(i.e.

which operate upon

At

an

had produced a class which by the nineteenth century “could envisage alternatives

(Flathman, 1972,

the

that

law

is

whatever the ruler

a basis of political obligation

do

system” (Macpherson, 1962/1988,

p. 273).

As

such, the

autonomous theory of political obligation was
no longer

first

conchtion for an

fulfilled, for the

working

class

did not see themselves as fundamentally
equal to the possessing class. The
inequality of
the system

m fact relegated the working class to a subordinate position in

society.

Similarly, the second condition of a
cohesion of interests could no longer apply once
the

working class claimed the democratic franchise
class to yield

on

its

for itself, thus forcing the possessing

monopoly of power. With two

classes in opposition, both

now

with

a political voice, the previous assurance of
a cohesion of self-interests such as to

periodically decide, without anarchy,

,

who

should have sovereign power was no longer

27
,

tenable.

As

a result, the possessing or capitalist class, since the
nineteenth century, has,

by implication, had
components

to deceive subject populations

—or

about the true nature of capitalist democracy

over political power

at

home and

working class

at least their

in order to

maintain control

colonialism abroad so as to generate possessing class

cohesion on the international level in the advanced market

combination of monarchy with democracy was not
wrested paramount control over western

lost

societies.

Indeed, the failed

on the Americans as they

capitalist relations

from Britain during and

so without constraint upon reason and choice. [For an in-depth analysis into his

“formal-procedural theory of authority”, see Flathman (1980).]

Disunity of the dispossessed, however, would continue to fragment working-class
political

power

in the U.S. so long as

women,

Africans Americans, Native Americans,

Asian Americans, and others remained disenfranchised

—

victories

twentieth-century struggles which further exposed the weakness

eroded support for

liberal

which awaited

(if

not limits) of and

democracy. The weight of centuries of gender- and

racially-

biased laws and cultural attitudes will likewise hinder working-class unity into the

unforeseen future.
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28

following

WWIl,

internally

and externally, has since gone on
unabated as does numerous military

The search

for countless

“enemies” to U.S. democracy, both

28

Coker wntes

that “Churchill

was

much

era not so

quite right to interpret the arrival of
the

American

a threat to British power as the conclusion
of one phase in the histoiw of
he English-speaking peoples and the beginning
of the next” (Coker, 1989, p. 40).
However, we see a much more contested perspective
from Canadian sociologist John A.

Geopolitical exhaustion played a decisive role in
[Britain’s] decline.
Britain was faced in the modem world by
Germany, a geopolitical rival

beyond appeasement. The waging of two world wars
resulted in
of external balances and inability in 1945 to protect
itself against

the loss

America’s almost bmtal insistence on becoming the world’s
leader (Hall
1997, p.

8).

Gamble (1981/1994) notes
the United States

began

“uneasy relationship” between Britain and
consequence of the first world war which led to the

that the

in 191 7 as a

deterioration of Britain’s traditional naval prominence, the
undermining of her financial
strength, and Britain’s inability “to establish and maintain
the conditions for a liberal
world economic order.” Reconciling itself to a subordinate role to the
U.S., particularly
after the new order emerged in the 1940s, Gamble explains;

The negotiated transfer of hegemony which took place between
two Great Powers was unprecedented and by no means smooth.
at

many points

interests,

these
Britain

American demands and fought for its own
and the preservation of its Empire (Gamble, 1981/1994
pp 27resisted

8 ).

And Woodcock in his Who Killed the British Empire? (1974) remarks that “the
United States has consistently applied pressure tending to the diminution of the Empire
from the time of the Washington Treaty [of 1922] fifty years ago” (p. 329).
James (1994) notes the American usurpation of Britain’s position

in the

Middle

East beginning in 1945 with the American rejection of the British proposal to have the

Turkish army placed under

American

orbit,

by the CIA,

to

its

command,

the luring of Ibn

Saud of Saudi Arabia

into the

followed by the American takeover of Operation Boot, renamed Ajax

overthrow Iranian leader Mussadiq and replace him with Shah

Mohammed Reza Pahlevi

in 1953,

Egypt and the Suez Canal

in the 1950s.

and the removal of Britain from influence over

As

contrasted with Britain’s traditional

dominance of the Middle East, James writes: “Now it was being hustled out, humbled,
and forced to comply with the wishes of the United States, which seemed poised to
usurp

its

old position” (James, 1994, pp. 568-77).
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.nterventions, assassinations,
coups d'etat, wars, drug smuggling,
etc.
St. Clair,

(cf,

Cockburn

&

1998; LaFeber, 1993; Blum,
1986, 1995; Colby and Dennett,
1994; Gelbspan

1991; Kwitney, 1984; Stockwell,
1978; and Agee, 1975). In the twentieth
century,

deception

at

home

(e.g. the

Tonkin Gulf “attacks”,

the Pentagon Papers, Watergate,

Iran-Contra) continues to undermine the
moral justification of liberal democracy."

of the three causes

Mann

(1988) assigns for the decline of Britain’s role in
cause— “murder by other powers”— of which he
says:
social scientists tend to downplay the
importance of the second [cause] because
most
are uncomfortable at handling
geo-political and military power ” As to the
specificity
of this murder”, Mann writes:

world

affairs,

Amid

It

is

the second

we can find a few murderous acts committed by the
rising power, the United States, against
Britain. The terms of
entry
into the Second World War and the terms
of the settlement of 1945-6
were both designed to weaken British post-war power.
Thus
these events

US

US

now had

goods

equal access to the Empire; thus the crippling burden
of dollar
debt in 1945 was to be paid for by the import of
US goods; thus the US

on the convertibility of the sterling. In 1946 a rush to
convert
sterling holdings into dollars depleted Britain’s
gold and dollar reserves
and caused a crisis. Convertibility was suspended in 1 947 after
insistence

a

demonstration, satisfactory to American eyes, of sterling’s
vulnerability.
This was calculated to finish off Britain’s remaining global rivalry

to the

United

States.

Power on

the

It

was not nice behaviour, even

make

if

it

was typical of a Great
(Mann 1988 pp

(as Britain itself had earlier been)

212-215).
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On August

1964, alleged attacks (later discounted) by North Vietnamese gunboats
against U.S. destroyers were reported as motive for U.S. retaliatory bombing
against
5,

North Vietnam. President Johnson used the alleged attacks to greatly escalate U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War. Two days later, on August 7, the U.S. Congress

approved the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which provided the President with
authorization to take whatever means deemed necessary to repel such “attacks” against
the United States and thus began the momentous escalation of the war which led to over
fifty thousand U.S. casualties and millions of Vietnamese casualties (cf Well, 1994).

The Pentagon Papers were a 7,000 page
completed

in

January 1969 analyzing

during the period from

by

WWII

the U.S. in Southeast Asia,

13, 1971,

The

New

to

how

1968 led

little

top-secret Defense

the decisions of four
to a

Department history

U.S administrations

deeper and more intractable commitment

of which had been previously made public.

York Times began publishing a
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series

On

of articles exposing these

June

Meanwhile, the success of national
independence movements abroad

(e.g. in

Africa and

Asia) undermines possessing
class cohesion on the international
level. Consequently,
the domestic possessing class
in the advanced market
societies has acted to further

increase

its

use of deception, or at the very

to effectively

least,

obfuscation.” The goal, of course,

is

keep power out of working-class hands.^'

p pers which heretofore had been kept from public knowledge.
Immediately, the Nixon
Admimstra ion s Justice Department asked for, and
was granted, a court order blocking
further publication of the senes based
on what they felt was an immediate threat
to U.S.
national secunty. This was the first attempt
ever made by the Federal Government
to

mpose

a pnor restraint on the press in the name
of national security. The Supreme
Court eventually ruled that the government
cannot block publication of a controversial
story before the public even sees it (cf
Sheehan, et al., 1971).

On

June 17, 1972, the office of the Democratic
National Committee
Watergate Hotel
Washington D.C. was burglarized by a

m

in the

White House special
investigation unit referred to as the “Plumbers”,
set up by President Nixon and the
Committee to Re-elect the President (CREEP), because their
job was to stop the leaks to
the press from the Nixon White House by investigating
the private lives of Nixon’s
cntics and political enemies. Five members of the
Plumbers were arrested during the
Watergate Hotel break-in and their subsequent trial led to
revelations exposing a secret
taping system m the White House, legal battles over
“executive
secret

privilege”, firing of the
special prosecutor, the near-impeachment of President
Nixon, and Nixon’s early
resignation, amongst other controversial and/or criminal
allegations.

The Iran-Contra affair involved the covert selling of arms to Iran (through
Israel)
by the Reagan Administration against his stated policy of neutrality (and
thus resulting
in release of American hostages in Iran), utilizing the
profits fi'om these arms sales to
fund a civil war in Nicaragua in direct violation of the 1984 act of
Congress, the Boland
Amendment, which forbade United States agencies from giving aid to the Nicaraguan
contra rebels. As R.W. Apple wrote in The New York Times'. “Governments,
meantime, have continued

to conceal and,

on occasion,

The Iran-contra
was conceived and carried out by the Reagan
Administration in total secrecy, and no one involved blew the whistle any more than
anyone had done so during the months and years as the nation stumbled ever deeper into
the Vietnam quagmire” (Apple, June 23, 1996; cf Kombluh & Byrne, 1993).
affair,

almost certainly

to prevaricate.

illegal,

—
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Career

CIA

officer,

Ralph McGehee, a 25-year employee of the CIA,

stated

how

government deception works:

I

want

is

to reveal to those

and what

it

who

actually does.

still

...

believe in the myths of the

My view backed by 25
32

CIA what

years of

it

U.S.

expenence

is,

residency.

quite simply, that the

CIA

is

the covert action

Most of its money, manpower, and energy go

operations that, as

arm of the

into covert

we have

seen over the years, include backing
dictators
and overthrowing democratically elected
governments. The CIA is not
an intelligence agency. In fact, it acts
largely as an anti-intelligence
agency, producing only that information
wanted by policymakers to
support their plans and suppressing information
that does not support
those plans. As the covert action arm of
the President, the CIA uses
disinformation, much of it aimed at the U.S.
public, to mold opinion. It

employs the gamut of disinformation techniques from
forging documents
to planting and discovering “communist”
weapons caches. But the major
weapon in its arsenal of disinformation is the ‘intelligence’
it feeds to
policymakers. Instead of gathering genuine intelligence
that could serve
as the basis for reasonable policies, the
CIA often ends up distorting
reality, creating out of whole cloth
‘intelligence’ to justify policies
have already been decided upon. Policymakers then leak
this

intelligence to the
that President

that

media

to deceive us all and gain our support. Now
Reagan, in his Executive Order of December 4, 1981, has

authonzed the Agency to operate within the United
can only worsen” (McGehee, 1983, p. xi)

States, the situation
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One aspect of this contest over control of the modem state can be seen in the
discourse of political obligation. Lister (1997) notes that “an
increasingly influential
duties discourse

WWII]

is,

in various guises, supplanting the

social rights paradigm.

Most

dominant postwar

importantly,” she writes, “both the

[i.e.

new

postright (in

particular neo-conservatives) and communitarians have deliberately
challenged the
rights discourse so as to shift the fulcrum of the citizenship paradigm

which dominates

contemporary

politics in the

UK and the US.

.

..”

Citing two such examples (Lawrence

Mead’s Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (1986) and Michael
Novak’s, et al.’s. The New Consensus on Family and Welfare (1987)), Lister states that:
Both emphasize citizenship obligations over rights and both appeal to the common
good in identifying as the prime obligation engagement in paid work by welfare
recipients to support their families” (Lister, 1997, pp. 18-19). It is interesting to note in
these neoconservative admonishments of the poor regarding welfare recipients’ failure

what they consider the poor’s political obligations [viz. get a job] the
absence of any reciprocal political obligations for the wealthy. Janoski argues that
“chronic avoidance of obligations is puzzling because not only do rights require
to adhere to

obligations for their fulfillment, since no right

make

exist without an obligation to help

must also constrain each person’s bundle of
make any system of rights workable.” And yet, he notes, “little

the right exist, but obligations

citizenship rights to

known
to be,

may

the

is

about what citizens in advanced-industrialized countries believe their obligations

and what factors lead

to those beliefs” (Janoski, 1998, pp. 53-4).
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Thus, the dilemma

matunng of market
voice,

which

is

we

are faced with today, argues
Macpherson,

society has cancelled that cohesion,

among

all

we

a prerequisite for the deduction
of obligation to a liberal state from

cannot simply reject these assumptions
without

market society

that “the

those with a political

possessive individualist assumptions”
[McPherson’s seven (see above)].
states,

is

Thus, “[ejither

itself.

which case our theory

is unrealistic,

we

or

at the

And

same time

yet,

he

rejecting

reject possessive individualist
assumptions, in

we retain

them, in which case

valid theory of obligation” (Macpherson,
1962/1988, p. 275).

As

it

we

is

cannot get a

today, he says,

we

have stuck with the possessive individualist
assumptions and thus have remained
without a valid theory of political obligation.
If Macpherson

nonacceptance of the

advanced market

liberal theory

is

right about an increasing

of political obligation by the working classes of

and particularly the U.S., then on what basis can and
should

societies,

populations in other countries accept this form of
capitalist-democracy

Administration refers to

it,

or, as the

Clinton

market democracy?^^ By what means can the U.S. hope

convince other populations of the

vitality

attempt to answer these questions,

to

of “made-in-America” democracy? To

we will

next need to focus on the concept of

hegemony.

Cohn

writes that “the Clinton administration

was

the first to use the term ‘market
democracies.’ However,” she adds, “this definitional linkage of free market policies
with
political

democracy

often

more

Economic globalization,
widen the gap between rich and poor, and this can
exacerbate crime, corruption, and instability, thus undermining efforts to build
privatization,

and

is

theoretical than real.

free trade tend to

34

Hesemony Conceptual izeH
The speciHc fomi

m which

order manifests itself as

example, from confederation or union)
origins, the

word hegemony stood

authority, especially

preponderance
the world or

through /iredommmicc. In

for “leader"

of one nation over

among

(as distinct, for

its

Macedonian

and meant preponderant inlluence or

others.

Medley Bull prefers the term of

to describe the unilateral behavior

of great powers in particular areas of

particular groups of slates; moreover, he
recognizes that such

behavior contributes
constitute

is

hegemony

hegemony

to international order.

for Bull.

Yet, not

all

forms of preponderance

Instead, the unilateral exploitation

of preponderance

takes three forms for Bull: dominance, primacy,
and hegemony. Dominance, Bull
argues, applies to the relationship in which a great

sovereignty—

treats smaller states within its

international society. Specifically,

great

power

it

power

domain

as second-class

“is characterized

against the lesser states comprising

of the universal norms of interstate behaviour

its

—without exercising imperial

by the habitual use of force by a

hinterland,

and by habitual disregard

that confer rights

and independence upon these states” (Bull, 1977,

members of

p. 214).

of sovereignty, equality

Military intervention and

occupation are prominent aspects of this sort of behavior. At the opposite extreme

dominance

is

what Bull

refers to as

primacy. Primacy

is

to

exercised by a great power

over lesser states “without any resort to force or threat of force and with no more than
the ordinary degree of disregard for

Though not

specific

norms of sovereignty,

equality and independence.”

on what constitutes “the ordinary degree of disregard” of

democratic institutions. As a

impact on a country's

result,

political

U.S. democracy programs

may have

democratization processes” (Cohn, July
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9,

a negative

1999,

p. 3).

—
intemat.onal norms. Bull does
note that “some degree of
disregard of these nonns
charactenstic of all international
relationships” (Bull, 1977,
p. 214).
specificity

that

it

“is freely

conceded by the

latter

disproportionately large contribution which
the great

is

power

p. 215).

dominance and pnmacy which characterizes the

relations of great

resort to force

IS

make

to the

Between the extremes of

characteristic of dominance, so too in

powers over

hegemony

and the threat of foree, but unlike with the former,

is

lesser

there a

this exercise

of force

not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and
reluctant.” Instruments other than

force are preferred

power
it

is

of the

able to

achievement of common purposes” (Bull,
1977,

hegemony. As

to

lesser states w.thin the

group concerned, and often expresses
the recognition by the

‘

regards the

of a relationship of primacy. Bull
equates the position of the great
power

one of “leadership”, arguing

states is

As

is

is

by the

great

power

in this

resorts to force “only in situations

hegemonic

relationship, and the great

of extremity and with a sense

that in

incurring a political cost” (Bull, 1977, p. 215). Thus,
although the great

ready to violate norms of sovereignty, equality and independence
of lesser
nonetheless recognizes that such norms or rights exists and hence
violations of them

by “some

specific overriding principle.” Quoting

Schwarzenberger, Bull concludes that “hegemony
(quoted in Bull, 1977,

is

is

doing so

power

states,

is

it

forced to justify

its

Georg

‘imperialism with good manners’”

p. 216).

Martin Wight writes of hegemony

in a

manner

similar to Bull’s though without

the distinctions in reference to the ancient states-system of Hellas.

“From

the sixth

century [B.C.E.] [the Greeks] seem to have thought of [the Hellenic city-states system]
as having a natural leader or ‘president’, and they had several terms for this concept
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prostates tes Hellados,

hegemon" (Wight, 1977,

of the Persian invasions

at

p. 65).

But with the unparalleled

the beginning of the fifth century, “a

more

stress

collective

conception appeared,” notes Wight, such that
Greek “hegemonial theory was linked

with a generally egalitarian assumption about the
members of the states-system.” This

egahtanamsm, he argues, was shown not only by
Amphictyonic constitution

member polls and

a constitution

the survival of the archaic

which pledged a mutual respect of each

a duty of defense against violators

—but

also

by “the absence of a

hierarchic conception of international society” (Wight,
1977, p. 65).” That the Greeks
did not have any term corresponding to ‘great power’ sets off ancient
Hellas from the

modem

states-system. Likewise, argues Wight, the apparent inability of the Greeks
to

develop a theory of the balance of power, a system of diplomacy, and public
international law accounts for the absence of a sense of an equilibrium of power to act

as a foundation or constitution of international society in ancient Hellas (Wight, 1977,

p. 66).

In his

work on Empires (1986a), Michael Doyle

imperialism and, like Bull and Wight above,

of control over a

restricts

state’s external relations. “Control

distinguishes

hegemony

hegemony from

primarily to the

of both foreign and domestic policy

characterizes empire; control of only foreign policy,

hegemony” (Doyle, 1986a,

The reason

to

first

for this distinction

drew

Spartan

attributed

by Doyle

p. 40).

Thucydides who, he argues,

this distinction, noting Sparta’s “allies,” despite their subjection to

hegemony during

The term “Amphictyonic”
Greece

is

domain

who formed

the Peloponnesian War, exercised a considerable

refers to the league of the twelve leading states

“a league of good neighbours” (Trend, 1951,
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p. 170).

of ancient

degree of domestic autonomy-unlike
the imperialized “allies”
subject
Athens (Doyle, 1 986a, p. 40).

The

distinction

Doyle makes between the two concepts
helps him

different spheres

of control while giving

intrusive

primacy

to

to

demarcate the

to imperial over

hegemonic

control. In this regard.

impenal control involves both the process
of control and

its

outcomes

achieved either formally (directly or indirectly)
or informally through
influence over the penphery’s environment,
political

Control

IS

articulation, aggregation,
decision making, adjudication, and
implementation, and usually with the
collaboration of local peripheral elites. The
scope of the outcomes covers both
internal and external issues
who rules and what mles (Doyle, 1986a, p. 40).

—

The intimate involvement of the
affairs

of the subordinate

interest articulation

great

states as

power

in the

domestic

—

as well as

foreign-

denoted above by the great power’s control over

and aggregation, decision making, adjudication, and
implementation

contrasts sharply with Doyle’s notion of hegemony which
denotes control over external
34

policy alone.

He

demonstrates the differences

in the

purview of each concept with

reference to the fifth-century conflict between Sparta and Athens, which
in

some

detail since

it

relates to the present focus

will explore

I

on the export of democracy

to

enhance

U.S. hegemony.

In the case

of Athens, Doyle notes

that its

empire developed,

first,

by enslaving

the populations and colonizing the land of captured cities; second, coercion and force

were

utilized to

keep rebellious

states within the Delian

League and;

third,

Athenian

34

Interest articulation is the act

either all or part

of giving utterance or expression

of a community.

Interest aggregation

is

to political

needs of

the act of galvanizing and

organizing individuals for the purposes of collectively advancing shared political
interests.

Together, these activities are sometimes referred to as lobbying.
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emissaries supervised the
payment of tribute and the poheies of
the weakest

though force and the threat offeree
characterized
allowed

its allies

this imperial rule,

Athens nonetheless

have legally independent, formally
sovereign governments, though

to

generally requiring democratic
assemblies.

members by mfonnal

imperial means.

As

Still,

it

such, Athens ruled the Delian
League

“nonetheless detennined both their

foreign relations and their significant
domestic policies” (Doyle, 1986a,

Two

And

cities.

p. 56).

primary means sustained Athens’ informal
empire including,

firstly,

military intervention and, secondly, “the
mixture of popularity and unpopularity
which

Athenian democratic imperialism evoked among
subordinate citizens.” Though

economic exploitation and imperial
that

political restrictions

Athenian imperial control was “preferable

internal threat

provoked hatred, Doyle argues

to the external threat

of Persia and the

of oligarchy.” Moreover, though Athens benefitted
from naval

seizures of land, and restrictions on trade, the

members of the Delian League

exchange several benefits, including “integration

into the

tribute,

received in

Athenian market, Athens’

suppression of piracy, and other imperially provided, international
‘collective goods’”
(Doyle, 1986a, p. 57).

Still,

the fact of political dependence on Athens

m “the local proxenoi, the informal

was ever present

leaders of the democratic faction and the appointed

representatives of Athenian interests” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 58).

In contrast to

Athenian imperial control, Sparta’s dominance over the

Peloponnesian League did not require the payment of tribute by subordinate
did Sparta impose the jurisdiction of its courts over

commerce of its
rhucydides’

allies

—

comment

activities

that Sparta

its allies

sure
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its allies

nor

affairs or regulate the

which characterized Athenian

made

states

rule.

Doyle docs note

were oligarchies

which docs

imply a certain degree of control
over domestic affairs-bul Doyle
downplays
aspect of Spartan control claiming
that

it

“had no effect on

its allies’

this

domestic societies

other than to guarantee their preexisting
oligarchic constitutions ” Moreover,
he implies
that this Spartan

requirement over the internal form of
government of its

so unusual, for “oligarchy was the
traditional form of society
Greece, particularly

(Doyle, 1986a,

among

p. 59).

As

the cities that were

regards this

allies

was not

in early ftfth-century

members of the Peloponnesian League”

last point,

Doyle appears

to

be reaching here

in

order to support his distinction between Athenian
imperialism and Spartan hegemony,
for the fact that oligarchy

League

carries

was

the traditional form

no more supportive weight than

of government of the Peloponnesian

to note that

form of government of the Delian League members.
retained a right to participate in

their

own

the

the fact that Sparta’s allies

Still,

decisions of the Peloponnesian League and to keep

military forces does indicate a significant degree of Spartan
noninvolvement

when compared
More
hegemony
and

all

democracy characterized

to

Athenian control over

its

specific to Doyle’s distinction

lies

Delian League members.

of Athenian imperialism from Spartan

not in Thucydides’ observation that the three motives of security, honor,

self-interest

drew the Athenians out from

their city to

expand and protect

their

empire, for Sparta too possessed these same motives, though not the same opportunities.

What was

particularly unique to the Athenian empire, however,

described as the Athenians’ “adventurous

spirit’’,

which Doyle

democratic constitution of Athens and to the socioeconomic
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was what Thucydides

attributes to

fact that

both the

Athenian

impenalism benefitted the
Its

citizens of Athens.''

The Athenian

state

drew strength from

“[hjighly participatory democracy” argues
Doyle. This system, he writes,

m which each

[free propertied male] citizen is
both statesman and soldier,
produces an ideology of action, a ferment of
policies, an attitude of aggressive
problem solving—the spirit of adventure that
Thucydides described as being
behind Athenian expansion. Since there is no
mediation between the state and
the citizen, the state being the people
assembled, what each citizen proposes or
votes for m the assembly is both for himself
and for the public (Doyle, 1 986a,
p

Private [free propertied male] passions, reflecting
both material and ideal interests, not

only inspired Athenian imperialism but were

also, in turn,

shaped by the public honor

conferred on these undertakings. Consequently, Doyle
concludes, the Athenian empire

was not only of and by

the people, but also for the people

the free propertied male

[i.e.
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citizens] (Doyle, 1986a, p. 66).

Cartledge notes that: Like all ancient Greek states, the Athenian democracy
did
and would not have wanted to, recognise the modem theoretical notion of the
‘separation of powers’ of government and public administration. In the Athenian

demokratia of the

fifth

political praxis the

not,

century B.C., both in constitutional theory and in everyday

demos (People) exercised

the kratos (sovereign power) in all three
spheres of legislation, executive action and jurisdiction.” He attributes the institutional

basis of this civic ideology to the reforms of Ephialtes and Perikles carried out in the
late

460s and 450s B.C.E.

So complete, says Cartledge, was

the association of

citizenship with the taking part in the administration of justice in ancient Athens, e.g.

serving as a judge and juror on the annually recmited panel of 6,000 dikastai

“who

need the various People’s Courts”, that “in 423 Aristophanes {Clouds 206-8)
could make one of his comic characters pretend not to recognize a map of Athens
staffed at

because he could see no dikastai depicted on

it”

(Cartledge, et

al.,

1990, pp. 42-4).
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“[I]n today’s terms,” says Cartledge,

‘community’. Classical Athens,
regard to

common

bonds of solidarity

“Athens would

fail

to constitute a relevant

in Phillips’ (1993) estimation, scored highly with

history and shared values, widespread political participation, strong
(civil society,

voluntary associations, family, property rights,

mitigation rather than elimination of class stratification, sufficient separation of private

from public domains). But these admitted successes were achieved only by means, and
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In this description

of the Greek

state,

observers, including Doyle, of the
large

of ancient Greek society. Whereas

we

should note the absence

number of slaves which provided

Wood

economy of democratic Athens (Wood

by combining the labor from
argument

that

the

backbone

& Wood note the dispute among

contemporary historians of the actual size
of the slave population and
to the

made by many

& Wood,

1978, pp. 36-7), de Ste.

slavery, serfdom, and debt

such “unfree labour” “was the main

way

their significance

bondage-makes

in

Croix-

a convincing

which the dominant

propertied classes of the ancient [Graeco-Roman]
world derived their surplus, whether

or not the greater share in total production

1981, pp. 52, 135, 173).

Greek

state, the

As

such,

is still

it

was due

to unfree labour” (de Ste. Croix,

correct to say that a large part of the ancient

democratic polis, was comprised of non-citizens, albeit
perhaps not

non-citizens were slaves.

As

to the significance

of slavery and other forms of unfree

labor to the ancient democratic polis, one must
note
first

articulation

of the concept of personal freedom

dependent labor force

in classical

Greece.

“words were then created or adopted
Alternatively, the

Woods

It is

M.

I.

Finley’s argument linking the

to the rise

only after

of slavery as the main

this fact,

to express that idea” (Finley,

own

tells us, that

1968/1972,

p. 308).

may have

bom among the Greeks

experience of dependence and liberation, not simply in contrasts to the

dependence of others.”

at the

he

suggest that the concept of personal freedom

“followed upon the liberation of native labour” and hence “was
out of their

all

Still,

the latter do admit the likelihood that “the idea of

severe costs, of excluding and exploiting

small minority of male citizens.

No

doubt,

all

women

and slaves for the benefit of a

closely knit communities almost always

breed an opposition of insiders and outsiders, but on these grounds
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it

would be hard

to

individual freedom

was invented

though recognizing

that the

by the

relations

in reference to the condition

democratic polls, like other

of labour.” However,

states,

“was created and shaped

between appropnators and producers and
served as

with the problems generated by the
social division of labour,” the

on

to

argue that

“it is far

a

means of dealing

Woods

nonetheless go

too simple” to view the polis as merely
an instrument of the

ruling class designed to extract labor and
protect the property of the ruling minority.
the contrary, they argue, the democratic
polis

“was

as

much— if not more— a weapon

for the subject classes in their struggle
against their rulers, and that

had reason

to resist the political principle”

Croix echoes
writes,

this

(Wood

On

& Wood,

it

was

the rulers

who

1978, pp. 39-40). de Ste.

conclusion as regards the Greek democratic experience
which, he

gives the whole citizen population extensive and enforceable
legal rights, and

so gives the humbler and poorer citizen an opportunity of
protecting himself against

any

rate the

p. 141).

more extreme forms of ill-treatment by

It is

restricted,

perhaps this realm of enforceable legal

which earned

for

at

the powerful” (de Ste. Croix, 1981,

rights,

however limited and

Athens a degree of popular legitimacy and recognition of its

vitality.

Note should be made here of the

similar exclusion of women from

many

scholarly accounts of the social basis of the ancient Greek state and particularly

women’s exclusion from

the affairs of the polis.

Spelman (1988)

necessity to recognize the distinction between a “free” female

to the status

set

of “citizen” conferred on her husband

Athens up as a moral-philosophical standard,

to imitate...” (Cartledge, et ah, 1998, p. 9).
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—whom

let

also points out the

—considered

as such due

Aristotle referred to as

alone as a practicable model for us

“woman”

opposed

as

to those

slave status. This distinction

females

is

whom

it

is

she

IS

sueh due to their

between male and female

is

important only for

irrelevant” (Spelman, 1988,
p. 42). This distinction further

supports Spelman’s argument that

woman

to designate as

important for understanding Aristotle’s
conception of

the well-ordered state, as “the
distinction
citizens; for slaves

he huled

“it

can never be the case that the treatment of
a

has only to do with her gender and nothing
to do with her class or race. That

subject only to sexism tells us a

free or slave,

and so on. For

her,

lot

about her race and class identity, her being

being subject only to sexism

other facts about her identity” (Spelman,
1988,

p. 53).

made

is

Spelman

possible by these

also points out that

Aristotle’s exclusion of the female slave from the
status of woman did not likewise
translate into

any superiority of her male counterpart, as the male slave was
deprived of

any authority over the female slave,

for as Aristotle uses the

“maleness signals the superiority a man has over a
is

he

a natural ruler. This

is

means

that

woman

term “male”

only

if the

in his Politics,

male

in

question

one of the marks of inferiority of a male slave

is that

not a better specimen of humanity than his wife” (Spelman,
1988, p. 43).

Given the foregoing discussion of the limited extent of exactly who constituted
“the people” in ancient Greek society,

contemporary reader
simply the

spirit

And, likewise,

asked to believe

is

thus with

in its

some

reticence that the

“adventurous

spirit”

which

is

perchance

of imperialism, which imbued the propertied classes of ancient Greece.

in

our

in turn, cast a blind

fills

is

it

own

times, imperialism does benefit those in the metropole

eye to the needs of those

in the periphery

whose

who,

labor surplus daily

the coffers of the imperial treasury. Writers like Thucydides and Doyle appear to

be drawn by

this

apparent

dynamism of the Athenian
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city-states,

which

reflects

more

the

class position

of both

men

than the objective nature of
the system

Nevertheless, this writer will
concede that indeed there
the part of many Athenian
citizens, as

not share Doyle’s judgement
etiology.

from

on

its

many of the

was

ancient writings

tell us,

beneficent nature and will reserve

political participation,

however, are devastating

democracy and contrary

to

to a

modem

though

on

1

comment on

do

its

mling classes of the Athenian

distinguished

them from

On the

theory of

any discussion of political obligation which

depends on factors other than brute force and
enslavement.

the

a desire for expansion

The consequences of such exclusions
of large segments of the population

participatory

that

m quest, on.

settler-states

Still,

there remains the fact

possessed a degree of freedom which

their contemporaries.

contrary, Sparta’s domestic society resembled
a military camp.

two figurehead kings,

real political

power

Below

rested with the aristocratically-controlled

senate (gerousia) which directed the assembly of
citizen-soldiers and played a role in
electing the ephors, the ruling public officials of the
Spartan state.

Below

perioeici, the conquered peoples of the Peloponnese
and foreigners

who had

the Peloponnese,

all

of whom lacked

At the base of the Spartan
helots,

political rights

state lay the previous

who were conquered by

of participation

this

were the

settled in

in Spartan policy.

Greek inhabitants of Messenia, the

Sparta in the seventh century B.C.E. (Doyle, 1986a,
p.

69).

These distinctions

is

in the respective

domestic societies produced what, for Doyle,

the crucial difference distinguishing Athens from Sparta and Athenian imperialism

from Spartan hegemony, namely:
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the difference in “spirit”
between the
innovative, Sparta passive,

two

isolationist.

civilization, Sparta

With reference

Athens was aggressive
Athens was capable of extending her
rivals.

was not (Doyle, 1986a,

to imperialism

p. 70).^^

and hegemony

in general,

impenal metropoles can be distinguished
from merely

by

virtue

of two features,

first,

large,

Doyle concludes

that

populous, or rich countnes

transnational extension and, second,
political unity.

Furthermore, such metropoles must have
peripheries under their

rule.

On

the contrary,

[p]ohtically unified states that possess
superior quantities (relative to their neighbors)

of the conventional resources of power— large
populations, substantial armies, wealth—
but lack the differentiated society needed as
a foundation for transnational extension
can, nonetheless, establish hegemonies”
(Doyle, 1986a, p. 75).^^ Doyle

what he means by a

differentiated society”, though

stratified society like the

And,

Greek

city-states

one presumes

it

to

is

unclear as to

be a

class-

he admires.

of Doyle’s praise of Athenian “spirit,” it was Athens which suffered
Sparta in 405-4 B.C.E. thus ending the Peloponnesian War (cf Sagan

yet, for all

final defeat to

’

1991, p. 126).
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Doyle makes no

explicit definition

of what he means by a “differentiated society”,

but in other references in this work, he refers to “socioeconomic differentiation”
as a
basic element of empire (Doyle, 1986a, p. 344), speaks of the “conquering tribe”

which

“becomes

socially differentiated and centrally directed in order to retain empire”

(Doyle, 1986a, p. 106), and says that “[tjribal societies were both highly
undifferentiated and thoroughly integrated. They lacked a centralized state
political life

—

the

of the society was not differentiated from

its social life, nor was it
organized in a central coercive institution...” (Doyle, 1986a, p. 132), and perhaps the
most explanatory definition he provides is when he speaks about the primary weakness

of the

tribal societies

of the west, which, he claims, did not lack

internal unity, “[rjather,

primary weakness was a lack of social differentiation and thus their small scale.
Social roles were mixed together, familial ties shaped commerce and religion, and

their

political leaders were, indistinguishably, both public
p. 89).
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and private figures” (Doyle, 1986a,

More
should note

pointedly, as regards the Greek
experiment in democratic imperialism,
one

its

relatively short duration.

and 475 B.C.E., as Persia was
defeated

From

the rise of Athenian

power between 480

m Europe and the Delian League was

established in 477, to the imposition
of Athenian

hegemony

in

457 with the

incorporation of Boetia, Locris and
Phocis into the Athenian alliance system
and the

uniform introduction of Athenian coins,
weights and measures on top of the previously
established tnbute payments which
continued to be exacted, to the
its

full

implantation of

empire between 448-445 B.C.E. following
the Peace of Kallias which decisively

thrust Persia “out

of the Hellenic states-system” (Wight,
1977,

expansion to include up to 400

Athenian power
before

at

in

404 B.C.E.

cities

by 425, ending

in the eventual collapse

after the Spartan defeat

the battle of Aegospotami

p. 88), to the

of the Athenian

empire’s

of

fleet the

which ended the Peloponnesian War, only

year

a

mere 76

years had passed, and of those, stability characterized
the export of Athenian democracy
for, at

most, only 41 years. But even here, as Doyle notes,
“[r]ebellions and defections

were frequent
Thucydides”

—

Naxos, Samos, and Mitylene are only the major revolts discussed
by
to

which we must add “the horrifying repression of Melos” (Doyle,

1986a, p. 58) and, not to forget, the two temporary oligarchies which took
over Athens
39
Itself in

With

411 and 404.

the Spartan defeat of Athens in 405/404 B.C.E. and, hence, the collapse of the

empire,

should be noted that for the next 81 years, as Sagan notes, Athens
enjoyed amazing stability for, he states: “No class or social brutality, from either
latter’s

it

oligarchs or lower-class economic radicals, broke the civil peace.” Calling this period

from 403-322 B.C.E. “The Golden Age of the Radical Democracy,” Sagan argues:
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As

to the causes

of Athenian

instability

which

led to an increase in defection

violence and ended with the
dissolution of the empire,
attributes these

developments

it

is

interesting to note that

to “the near-equality” in
material culture

allied subordinates. This
“near-equality” in material culture,

perception of social and economic equality

and the Greek

settlers

of Ionia,

Sicily,

among

the

and Thessaly

and

Doyle

of Athens and

Doyle argues,

its

led to a

Greek islanders of the Aegean

to the effect that

a feeling persisted

that

Athenian rule reflected no natural (or technical)
superiority but was a control
exercised by those who “should” have been
equal (Doyle, 1986a,
p. 58).

That

this feeling

of alienation between the Athenians and their
subject populations

have stimulated the subsequent turmoil
forget the actual policies

is

not to be downplayed; indeed, one should
not

which produced such estrangement, such

Athenian taxes which engendered resentment so strong

ended

in the slaughter

of the Athenian

criticized the “excessive

that, as

Doyle

is

notes,

similar to that of Plato

styles

of music which then led

were no standards of right and wrong. As a consequence, argues
of what constituted good and bad music was

man” who had

heavy

democracy” of Athens. This excess, Plato

began with the mixing of different

ordinary

as the

it

was

of

often

left

up

who

Plato, the

to the subjective taste

It

was

judgement

of “the

And

also the greatest age

of philosophy ever, giving us Plato and Aristotle, and, therefore, the
basis of 2,500 years of Western thought (Sagan, 1991, p. 11).
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The

to the claim that there

“the arrogance to set himself up as a capable judge.”

a remarkably vibrant democratic era.

in

tells us, first

music, Plato argues, only

It

toll

settler-garrisons.

Doyle’s conclusion on Athenian instability

Laws

may

was an
i

engendered effrontery (Plato, 427-347
B.C.E./1970/1988, Bk.

To

authority

licence

was

not

and assurance
Ill,
II, secs!
secs.

700-1,

the degree that a general feeling
of equality~or “near-equality” in “the
material

culture” as Doyle puts

it—develops

either attempting to arrest this

reality

conform

to the ideal.

in societies, a state is thus faced
with the choice

development

or, to the best

The Athenians chose

extent possible,

make

of

the

the former course of action-and

lost.

In contrast to Doyle, Wight, and Bull,
Gramsci’s conception of hegemony

which

will

be utilized

the only approach to

is

study because of its explanatory

hegemony which

is

utility, in that

it

is

based in a solidly class analytical framework—

not limited either to (1) state-to-state behavior or
(2) to control over a state’s external

behavior.

of the

on

in the present

On the

contrary, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony

state itself and, hence, is a

Italian History” (1929-35),
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subaltern groups.

on juridical or
“results

society

Gramsci distinguishes between ruling

classes and

.

bases

52).

As

their historical unity not

—

though these are important

from the organic relations between

formula for the

rooted in the formation

necessary strategm of any ruling group. In his “Notes

Ruling classes, he argues, maintain

political

{PN,p.

is

regards this

+

more fundamentally,

[1] State or political society

latter distinction,

state as “political society

but,

Gramsci

civil society, in
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simply

at

and

it

[2] ‘civil

one point provides a

other words

hegemony

protected by the armour of
coercion” (PN,

p. 263).

But elsewhere he deliberately

distinguishes between the two
concepts of state and civil society,
reserving for the state

a role as representing “the
coercive and punitive force of
juridical regulation of a

country” (PN,

p.

rationalisation

1

2) to

conform
IS

267). In this sense, the state

(PN,

p.

economic

structure.

complex of practical and

c ass not only justifies and maintains
active consent of those over
it

whom

Civil society,

private

cultural

12).

,

on the other hand,

it is

state, therefore

theoretical activities with

which the

ruling

dominance, but manages to win the
rules {PN, p. 244).
its

ensemble of organisms commonly called

the dominant group exercises throughout society”
(PN, p.

within civil society that subaltern groups reside.

And, subaltern
state

“is the

The

the ethical content of the state based in moral
relations resulting from the

hegemony “which

It is

an ‘“educator”', “an instrument of

247), with “organisational and connective”
functions (PN, p.

civil society to the

the entire

is

of their

classes, if they are to

become

the ruling classes

—

i.e.

to

form a

own— must subordinate or eliminate the established ruling classes while

simultaneously winning the active or passive assent of other subaltern
groups or

This process

is

allies.

thus one of a transformation from subaltern to hegemonic/dominant

groups and involves the two phases

enemies which are

to

of, first, establishing

autonomy

in relation to the

be defeated and, secondly, receiving active or passive support

from other subaltern groups. This struggle

is

played out in the

eventually involves direct conflict with the state itself and

its

field

of civil society but

vast repository of juridical
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See Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks [referred
35/1971/1987).

Due

to the prison censors,

to throughout as

PN] (1929-

Gramsci would sometimes use the word

50

oercive instraments.

In the

case of the nascent Italian bourgeoisie
in the era of the

mediteval communes, Gramsci
notes the Italian bourgeoisie’s
failure “of uniting the

people around itself (PN, 53).
Likewise, the bourgeois.e’s
support

m the national

Risorgimento

failure to solicit

widespread

both delayed and moderated the
outcome

in Italy

of the subsequent revolution.

The key
bases

to

Gramsci’s analyses and the methodological
criterion on which he

much of his own

study

is

his understanding

that the

supremacy of a social group manifest(s) itself in two
ways, as
domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”.
A social group
dominates antagonistic groups which it tends to

“liquidate”, or to subjugate

perhaps even by armed force;
It IS

with regard to

intellectual

this

second aspect of “leading” kindred and

and moral leadership’”

understood. His focus

leads kindred and allied groups {PN,
p. 57).

it

rests, in large

that

is

“dominance

is to

be

measure, on the question of political obligation
to

Lenin for

duly noted (cf PN, pp. 357, 365, 380), yet

and Murphy (1988),

groups with

Gramsci’s use of the term hegemony

which concerns Macpherson above. Gramsci’s debt
“leadership”

allied

that Lenin’s focus

was

in a revolutionary alliance” (p.

restricted

1 1

8).

I

more

this

understanding of

would argue, with Augelli
to the task at

hand,

viz.

The context of Lenin’s argument

about leadership was a polemic written against the Menshiviks who, he argued,
would

abandon the peasantry and leave the task of the bourgeois revolution

...

solely to the

41

bourgeoisie itself

Such

tactics,

Lenin argued, would

‘group’ in place of the marxist term ‘class’.
as possible and leave

it

up

I

result in the working-class party

shall utilize

to the reader’s insight to

Gramsci’s terms as faithfully

determine the difference.
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The bourgeois revolution

against feudalism,

the state bureaucracy of the feudal state,

is

i.e.

against the

power of landlords and

a revolution which replaces feudal
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finding .(self -dissolved’ in
bourgeois democracy in the sense
that the proletariat will

not succeed

in

placing

its

imprint on the revolution”
(Lenin, 19(15/1972, p. 58)

"

More

pointedly, Lenin stressed the arming
of the proletariat to accomplish this
revolutionary
task, for,

he noted: “In the Hnal analysis
force alone

political liberty

and the class struggle” (Lenin,

1

settles the great

905/ 972,
1

p. 30).

problems of

As

such, Lenin

“continued to assume that the consolidation
of power was ultimately a matter of
armed

which places

force

his concept

during a revolution” (Augclli

of hegemony

& Murphy,

in

“a very restricted historical phase,

1988, p.

1

1

8).

The

significance ofGramsci’s

contribution, however, lies in his understanding
that the necessity for leadership
does

not end with the taking of state power.

He writes:

monarchical and landed estate rule with the rule of the
capitalist class, the bourgeoisie,
in which commodity production is the
predominant mode of production and where
wage-labor replaces serfdom and the corvee or the system
of labor rent. Recognizing
Itself as a social class, the bourgeoisie fights for
freedom of trade and competition,
security of property and fruit of enterprise, free play in
energies,

markets, profit. As
the historical task of the bourgeois revolution to
overcome the
absolutism of the feudal era and to procure for capitalism, as the
new economic system,
legal recognition and social acceptance in the framework
of the bourgeois-liberal state

Otto Rtihle stated:

It is

'

order

— The

success alone of the revolution, which consists in the creation of
the
capitalist economic order

and the social order appropriate

to

it,

determines

its

nature as a bourgeois revolution”

(Ruble, 1924/1970/1974).

“The big bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the factory owners, ...” Lenin argued, “...
owing to their class position they are incapable of waging a decisive struggle against
tsarism; they are too heavily fettered
into a decisive struggle.

They stand

by private property, by
in too great

capital

and land

need of tsarism, with

its

to enter

bureaucratic,

and military forces for use against the proletariat and the peasantry, to want it to
be destroyed. No, the only force capable of gaining ‘a decisive victory over tsarism’, is
police,

\he people,

i.e.,

the proletariat and the peasantry, if we take the main, big forces, and

distribute the rural and urban petty bourgeoisie (also part of ‘the people’)

between the

two. ‘The revolution’s decisive victory over tsarism’ means the establishment of the
revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry'" (Lenin,

1905/1972,

p. 56).

52

A

social group can, and
indeed must, already exercise
“leadership” before
inning governmental power
(this indeed is one of the
principal ronditions for

W-

xerd™'?”
“iead"\:

•“

:7^^zrs7s;'

As Gramsci
hegemony

i<

points out in his “Study of
Philosophy” (PAT), this concept of

represents a great philosophical
advance as well as a politico-practical
one,

for “it necessarily

supposes an intellectual unity and an
ethic

conception of reality that has gone
beyond

common

conformity with a

in

sense and has become,

only

if

within narrow limits, a critical conception”
(PAf, pp. 333-4). Intellectual
unity and
political ethics are thus the

two poles around which hegemony

is to

be constnicted and

expanded.

Such
intellectuals

intellectual unity

who

of a particular social class

is

perform an essential mediating function

various subaltern groups and the ruling classes.
Gramsci

humans

are not intellectuals, rather he

social function

is

in the struggle

is

referring to those

and hence form a professional category

who

between the

not saying here that

who perform

this

some

immediate

in that their task is that

intellectual elaboration. Intellectuals are thus
“organizers

conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas”

the specific task of

of

and leaders”, “‘specialised’

in

are able to distinguish

concretely “the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice
nexus” (FN,

p. 334).

For

Gramsci, every social group which has an essential function in economic
production
creates organically

one or more

recognizes that certain

as

above class

interests

organic intellectuals

strata

traditional

’

of intellectuals attached

it.

And though he

professional intellectuals tend to portray themselves

and thus as having an

who

to

truly unite a social
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inter-class aura about them,

group by giving

it

it

is

the

“an awareness of its

own

function not only in the
economic but also in the social and
political fields” {PN,

Wnting

PP. 3-5).

in the 1930s, he argues
that in the context of the
existing state, “the

intellectuals are the

social

dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exercising
the subaltern functions of

hegemony and

political

government.” Their task involves the
generation of a

spontaneous’ consent given by the
great masses of the population to
the general
direction

imposed on

coercive

power of the

social life

state

by the dominant fundamental group” and
the use of the

“which

‘legally’ enforces discipline

on those groups who do

not ‘consent’ either actively or
passively” (PN, p. 12). This equation
of “force and

consent,” the “‘double perspective’ in
political action and state
the double nature of the Machiavellian

maintenance of state

Centaur”-the two

power— are taken by Gramsci

life.... corresponding to

essential elements in the

from Machiavelli who instructed the

Prince to use both law and force, for though
the former was natural for the control of

men,

it

often proved inadequate, and hence the

should likewise be

at the

latter,

which was necessary

for beasts,

Prince’s disposal (Gramsci, 1926-37/1957/1983,
p.

Ibl)."*^

A would-be ruling class must develop beyond an economic-corporate state
through an ethical-political hegemony in

of the

state.

In this regard, a social group

immediate and narrowly

civil society before

must

first

it

can achieve domination

consolidate itself around

selfish “corporate” interests before

it

can

move

on.

its

own

Thus

in

addition to championing the ideas and aspirations of the particular social
group and

would-be ruling

class,
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States Machiavelli:
to indicate that a prince

the other

is

“The parable of this semi-animal, semi-human teacher is meant
must know how to use both natures, and that the one without

not durable” (Machiavelli, 1532/1935/1952, Ch. 18,
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p. 92).

hegemony

also presupposes account
be taken of the interests
and the tendencies

formed-, n other words, that the
leading group should
maKe
make^acn
sacntices
ficL of an
a economic-corporate
kind (PN, p. 161).
Thus, as with the Jacobins

in the

represent “the revolutionary

French Revolution, the fundamental
group must

movement

as a whole, as an integral
historical
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development.”

This leading group must represent
“future needs as well, and, once

again, not only the needs of those
particular physical individuals, but
also of all the

national groups which had to be
assimilated to the existing fundamental
group” (PN,
78).

Sacrifices and

compromises, however, have

observed, “for though

hegemony

is

their limits

ethical-political,

it

which must be

p

strictly

must also be economic, must

necessanly be based on the decisive function
exercised by the leading group in the
decisive nucleus of economic activity” (PN,

But while protecting
class [that social group

for

Its

own

expansion,

Moderate Party

its

p. 161).

fundamental economic basis,

it

which has achieved domination of the
i.e.

an ever more extensive ruling

in Italy after 1848,

Gramsci notes

class.

is

the duty of the ruling

state apparatus] to

push

In the case of the

that their policy

of “transformism”

involved the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved
by methods which
varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements
produced by allied groups—

and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and
seemed
irreconcilably hostile. In this sense political leadership became
merely an aspect
of the function of domination—decapitation, and annihilation often
for a very
long time (PN, pp. 58-9).
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The Jacobins (named for the monastery in which these political activists met;
Jacobins was the Parisian name for the Roman Catholic Order of Preachers, otherwise

known

as the

Dominicans

after its

founder Dominic Guzman, aka;

St. Dominic) were a
comprised mostly of bourgeois elements, which heavily
influenced the French Revolution of 1789.

radical political club,
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Gramsci attnbutes
the

1

9th century

curred,

this policy

movement

of the Moderates

to the

making of the Risorgimento

for Italian political unity)
possible in the form in

this policy indicates

how

ineffective leadership

The term “passive revolution” was taken
by Gramsci from
conservative thinker Vincenzo

avoided, since

central aspect

it

was

Cuoco who argued

a destroyer

of the

‘traditions’

is

the early nineteenth-centuiy

that revolution

on which

of the

monarch—played

to a state

groups

“must

at all

costs be

civilisation is based.”

of passive revolution was therefore the
implementation of “reforms

In the case

up

it

based on force alone.

order to prevent revolution on the French
model” (see footnote #1

a

which

as revolution without a
revolution’, or as ‘passive
revolution’” {PN, p. 59).

Furthermore,

by

(i.e.

Italian

1

in

PN,

in

p. 59).

Risorgimento, the north Italian state of
Piedmont

the function of a ruling class.

The

The

fact that leadership

was

led

left

and not a social group, Gramsci writes, was
because the nuclei of several

in favor

of the new

their interests to

liberal order,

dominate but not

upon themselves

to in fact lead.

who were

their persons;

This fact

heavily nationalistic, merely wanted

more

importantly, none of them took

is significant,

noted Gramsci, for

unified social group which led other groups, but rather
a state

which should have been leading”— i.e.
latter’s disposal

the

which

passive revolution in Italy from 1860 to 1900 involved

first

was not

“‘led’ the

Moderate Party— “and was able

an army and a politico-diplomatic strength” {PN,

it

p. 105).

it

a

group

to put at the

In effect,

the incorporation of

individual political figures from democratic opposition parties into the conservative-

moderate
After

1

‘political class’,

which was against any intervention of the masses

900, whole groups of leftists passed over into the moderate camp.
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in state life.

What

is

key

for the present study,

however.

,s

the faet that a state led a
struggle for renewal.

As

Gramsci notes.

O^

which these groups have the funetion
ofdom.nation”
wi
W thou
hout that
tha of leadership
dictatorship without hegemony.
The hegemony
wi be exercised by a par, of
the social group over the
entire group,
:

the latter over other forces
in order to give
etc. on the Jacobin”
model {PN, p. 106).

The

liberals

of nineteenth century

disposition of most

reluctant to

Italy are thus

NED-supported

act— as many

ai”y

power

to the

movemenh

embryonic of the psychological

pro-capitalists today, in that

failed to act during the

Cold

monetary, military and political backing
of a strong
resources to bear against any would-be
opponents.
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radicahse

most would be

War— were

state

it

not for the

which can bring power and

it ’

In the present

case of examining the export
of U.S. democracy abroad, reformist

duals and groups within
targeted countries,
contemporaneously referred to as

"comprador
the

1

elites”

amongst many marxist and dependency

990s with the U.S. leading a worldw.dc
movenent

“democrats”, play the role of the Italian
Moderate Party

of liberal democracy

in their

own

countries."'^

The

m tlte decade of

theorists or,

for cap.tahst

in that they

democracy, as

seek the imposition

role ofleadership or

hegemony.
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In

an August

1999 radio interview with Gennadiy
Andreyevich Zyuganov
President Boris Yeltsin’s replacement
(the fifth prime minister
18 months) of Prime Minister Sergey
Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, the
9,

concemmg Russian
c

ange

m

Russian Communist Party leader derisively
stated;

As

for [newly-appointed

Prime Minister Vladimir] Putin, there is no
between Putin and Stepashin. Both are from
Leningrad;
both are from the same democratic gang,
both unreservedly support
Yeltsin and his policy; both are from
power-wielding
real difference

ministries; neither

has any experience of the economy; neither
has any party or
base, or any solid support anywhere. Both
are forced

movement

to serve a

is

In Bulgaria, the

which

man who

not in control of himself (Buntman, August
9, 1999)(italics are mine).

main

calls itself the

recipient of

NED aid is the anti-communist political coalition

United Democratic Forces whose members are referred
to
“Hoods Against Democrats” by Robert D. Kaplan

colloquially as “democrats” (see
the

December 1998

Atlantic Monthly).

Or

in

“The Case Of Yugoslavia: Why The
Democrats Failed by Miljenko Dereta in Uncaptive Minds
(Summer-Fall 1997, vol. 9,
nos. 3-4) published by the Institute for Democracy
in Eastern Europe (IDEE), an NED
recipient. One of the most virulent denouncements
of western-sponsored “democracts”
can be seen in Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s speech
to the nation on
October 2, 2000, in which he asserted:
see

’

A grouping has

for a long time

under the guise of opposition

now been

present in our midst which,

political parties

of democratic orientation,

represents the interests of governments which are the protagonists of
pressures against Yugoslavia, and especially against Serbia. That

grouping appeared in these elections under the name Democratic
Opposition of Serbia. Its true head is not its presidential candidate.

head for

many

Its

years has been the president of the Democratic Party and

collaborator of the military alliance which
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waged

a

war against our

1-owover,

is

reserved for Ihe U.S. whielv

ihrm.gh organizaiions l.ke .he

NkD

prov.de the direction, the means, and
provide the watchdog or enforcement

w,ll

ftmctio.i to

see that such transitions occur as
planned, are stabilized, and arc not
temporary

phenomena. Consec|ucntly, democracy
promotion
ethical-political basis t.pon

as a practice becomes, in effect,
the

which Ihe extension of U.S. hegemony

is this

era of

globalization rests.

country.
In fact,

for as

He

could not even conceal his collaboration with that alliance.
our entire public knows of his appeal to NATO to bomb Serbia

many weeks

organized

in this

as necessary to break

manner

its

resistance.

The grouping

for these elections therefore represents the

armies and governments which recently waged war against
Y ugoslavia. ... At this moment ahead of the run-off elections, because
the Democratic Opposition of Serbia doubts it can achieve the result
it
needs, leaders of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia with money
introduced into the country are bribing, blackmailing and harassing
citizens and organizing strikes, unrest and violence in order to stop

production,
Affairs,

all

work and every

activity (Federal Ministry

Yugoslav Daily Survey, October

2,

of Foreign

2000 Belgrade

<http://tanjug.co.yu/Arhiva/2000/Oct%20-%2000/03-10e04.html

>).

This was followed by another strident speech denouncing Yugoslavia’s pro-democratic
leaders as “traitors” following ex-President Milosevic’s reclcction as head of the

Yugoslavian Socialist Party on November 25, 2000 in which he “described those who
sought his removal as ‘paid Western spies’ who are aiding the ‘occupation’ of the
country (“Defiant Milosevic Re-Elected Party Leader”, Associated Press & Reuters,

November

25, 2000,

CNN.com

<http://europc.cnn.eom/2000/WORLD/europc/l 1/25/

yugoslavia.miloscvic. 02/index. html>).
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In a

1994

report, the

GAO noted that “there is no central U.S. pohcy

regarding

U.S. govemnientwide democracy
program, no overall statement of
U.S. policy

regarding U.S. objectives and strategy
for democratic development,
no specihc and

common

definition

of what constitutes a democracy
program, and no

specificity

regarding the roles of the foreign affairs
and defense agencies in promoting
democratic

processes” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83.
1994,

p. 1).

However,

in that

same

report, the

following policies, programs, and area-specific
activities instituted by different
U.S.
foreign policy agencies to promote democracy
abroad were detailed and indicated that
the

USIA, AID, DOD, and

and were

in the process

the State

Department each had implemented such programs

of shifting resources and organizational support
towards these

efforts.

U.S. public diplomacy programs funded through the
U.S. Information Agency

(USIA) consists of foreign information programs,

international broadcasting, and

publicly funded educational and cultural exchanges including
the Fulbright Exchange

Program, the

Edmund

S.

Muskie Program, the Mike Mansfield Program, Voice of

America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio and

TV Marti,

East- West Center, the North/South Center, and the National

(GAO/NSIAD-96-179, 1996,
promotion

activities

Worldnet TV, the

Endowment

pp. 14-19). Estimated expenditures on

between 1991 and 1993 amount
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to

$936 million.

for

Democracy

USIA democracy-

“Democratic development” constitutes,
since 1993, one of the four

where the U.S. Agency

for International

mam areas

Development (AID) now concentrates

its

programs, with direct support of
activities ranging from “the
conduct of elections
administration of justice, enhanced
participation of beneficiaries

to the

m development

programs, and the management of
municipal govermnent ” Between
1991 and 1993,

AID

spend $703 million

to

promote “democratic development” abroad
(GAO/NSIAD-

94-83, 1993, pp. 11-13).

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD)
Secretary of Defense for

established

Democracy and Peacekeeping

Office of the Assistant

its

in July

of 1993 with the purpose

“to develop, coordinate, and oversee the
implementation of policy and plans for matters
related to the

promotion of democracy and democratic values.”
As of 1994, the DOD’s

Office of Democracy identified the following
programs and activities as having

“democratic development elements”: Military-to-Military

Initiatives in Africa,

including the African Regional Military Assistance
Program and the African

Democracy Support Program; CINC and Nunn-Lugar

initiatives,

including

humanitarian/civic assistance; Expanded International Military
Education and Training

Programs, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies

at

Garmisch, Germany;

Military-to-Military/joint contact teams; and Professional military education
exchanges.

Between 1991 and 1993,

the

DOD spent $166 million on its activities of “promoting

democracy and democratic values” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994,
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pp. 14-19).

The U.S. Department of State’s
democracy promotion

activities include

‘•conducting diplomatic initiatives
and exercising statuatory authonty
for program
direction or for assisting in
administering programs funded
initiatives also include
contributions to

Department redesignated

Bureau of Democracy,

its

by other agencies.

The Asia Foundation.”

In

1

Its

996, the State

Bureau of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs as the

Human Rights,

and Labor and charged the new
bureau with

coordination of U.S. government policy
and programs for democracy
promotion abroad.
Slate Department officials estimated
that between 1991 and
1993, State spent $431

million on “democracy promotion ”
abroad. State officials point out that
these figures

do not include the U.S. contribution
activities.

United Nations or for

to the

State officials also indicate that

its

its

peacekeeping

expenditures on international narcotics

matters and on anti-terronsm activities
“could arguably be attributed to democracy

promotion” (GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994,
pp. 19-21).
Specific legislation authorizing U.S. assistance
for democratic development

is

contained in the following legislative Acts:
•
•

United States Information and Educational Exchange Act
of 1948, as amended;
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of
1961, as amended;

•

Foreign Assistance Act of 1 96 1 as amended;

•

National

,

Endowment

for

Democracy Act

•

The Asia Foundation Act (1983);

•

International Security and

•

Support for

•

Urgent Assistance for Democracy

•

National and

FREEDOM

( 1

983);

Development Cooperation Act of 1 985;
East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1 989;

Community

in

Panama Act of 1 990;

Service Act of 1 990; and

Support Act (1992).
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Why

such a practice of promoting

capitalist

democracy abroad should come

about under present historical
conditions and exh.bit a certain
degree of success requires

an examination of the historical
development of the
evolved from

its

modem

states-system as

it

has

genesis in the development of the
nation state to the currently

unfolding global capitalist system
complete with supporting practices and
institutions,

which likewise have generated

their

own

antisystemic tensions.
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II.

FROM WESTPHALIA TO GLOBALIZATION

Globalizat.on and the cun-ent backlash
against
the context in

which the U.S. attempts

to export its

1990s and into the twenty-hrst century.'^

It

is

its

brand of democracy abroad

true that the

focus on globalization and, indeed,
the end of the Cold
for the forces

NED and

the

of globalizing the rule of capital

corporate-dominated form

to ensue.

economic goals of capitalist globalization

is

in the

NED predates the current

War was a
But the

necessary condition

political

program of the

are closely intertwined.

Operating under the catchword of “liberalization”,
the forces of organized capital
seek
to dismantle national controls to trade
so as to

movement of capital. While

allow for the free and unhindered

uniting peoples from

all

over the world

in

one giant

marketplace for the relatively easy extraction of profits
and movement of goods,
capitalist-oriented globalization

is

this

simultaneously causing growing disparities in

income, wealth, and living conditions which have created
firestorms of protests against
those implementing

From

it.

the staggering leap in U.S. foreign direct investment
to
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Burbach, Nunez, and Kagarlitsky see globalization, not as part of
the extension of
U.S.

hegemony—which

global

economy under

they assert

capitalist

is

in decline, but rather as “the integration

of the

hegemony.” Occurring simultaneously with the

accelerated pace of technological advancement, the end result, they assert,
is both an
increasing concentration of money and capital in the hands of the rich and

powerful”
misery and marginalization for ever-increasing numbers of the
world’s population.” To survive, they assert, capital must move globally, but in so

which

“is leading to

doing,

it

is

leading to global disorder and instability (Burbach,

et al.,

1997, pp. 53-4).
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Protests against the

WTO,

the

World Bank, the IMF, and

occurring around the world for the
globalization, for example,

last

the

G8 Summits have been

several years. “Street parties” against

were celebrated

in
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35

cities across the

globe during the

G8

over two tnllion dollars

at

market value

,n

1998 from over $51

/. b.Ilion ,n

(Scholl, July 1999, p.
40; “U.S. Direct Investment
Position Abroad...,”

1966

March

12,

1999), to the spread of eleetron.c
and fiber-optic technology and
satell.te transmiss.on

systems and the proliferat.on of
increasingly inexpensive personal
computers linking up
into a

web of global communication

networks, to the expansion of world
exports of

merchandise and commercial services
trade growth accelerated in 1997...,”

to nearly

March

seven

trillion dollars

19, 1998),

globalization^r the tying

together of the national economies of
the world-is causing

Summit

in

Bimingham from May

15-17 of 1998.

by 1997 (“World

many

to

wonder

if the

days

Some of these protests

witnessed
thousands of landless and homeless people
in Brasilia, and similar actions
in Sydney, Toronto, Prague

O symbols being burned in Hyderbad,

marching against the WTO
and elsewhere. Recent actions against
globalization include protests against the
WTO
at Its meeting in Geneva on November
17, 1999; protests of over 40,000 at the
WTO’s
Third Mmistenal meeting in Seattle— the
so-called “Battle in Seattle”— from November
30 through December 3, 1999 with similar protests
dunng this same time period around
the world m Holland, Canada, Columbia,
Bolivia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and elsewhere;
protests of over 30,000 in Washington, DC
from April 15-17, 2000; protests on May 31,
2000 of IMF austerity programs by 80,000 people in Buenos

Aires; protests of 50,000
persons in Millau, France against globalization and in
support of Jose Bove and his ten
collaborators on tnal for the tearing down of a McDonald’s
restaurant in the town, as
the U.S. -based restaurant was said to symbolize the
American dominance of and main
force behind globalization; and protests of over
25,000 persons at the July 21-23, 2000

G8 Summit in the K>aishu-Okinawa region of Japan which included not only
anti-WTO
slogans but as well calls for the removal of U.S. military bases
from Okinawa. Newer
targets for anti-IMF, anti-WTO, anti-World Bank, and
anti-G8 protests include the U.S.
Republican National Convention in Philadelphia from July 31 to August
3, 2000 where
over 430 protesters were jailed; the U.S. Democratic National Convention

in Los
Angeles from August 14-17, 2000; the September 6-8 United Nations Millenium
Summit in New York city; and the September 26-30, 2000 55‘” annual conference of the
IMF and World Bank in Prague. In addition, many web sites have sprung up on the

internet in opposition to this capitalist-oriented globalization including,

amongst

<http://www.al6.org/>, <http://www.globalexchange.org/wbimf/links.html>,
<http://www.50years.org/>, and <http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/main.html>.
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others,

of the

nation-state are numbered.-'
TIu.s, global.zat.on, in
contrast to tradit.onal

international rclat.ons ,IR)
theory, inconrorates the
pohtical. economic, social,
and other
international

internal

domains

and external

sovereign

states.

demarcation

(cf.

in a

system which violates the

units,

where those

traditional

units arc understood to

demarcahon between
be independent

Indeed, where theory assumes
a priori this basic intemal/extemal

Waltz 1979), then whatever can be
said of the international
system

usually excludes national or internal
forces and developments and
the impact of these
internal forces

on the system

itself.

Once

international system, then a condition
of

similar and tend to remain so” (Waltz,

1

the state

is

taken as the basic unit of the

anarchy^where “the

979,

p.

1

units are functionally

04)-is postulated

as the characteristic

nature of the international environment.
“Self-help” and “balance-of-power”,
taking
into account the differences

m capabilities amongst states, become the defining actions

of the

With

international system.

becomes

this basic, so-called “Realisf’,
understanding,

characteristic to assert that the “enduring
anarchic character

politics accounts for the striking

sameness

in the quality

it

of international

of international

life

through the

millenia” (Waltz, 1986, p. 53) or to suggest that
“the nature of international relations

has not changed fundamentally over the millennia”
(Gilpin, 1981,

p.

21 1) or to claim

48

Direct investment
states Dicken, “is defined as the investment by one firm
another with the intention of gaining a degree of control of that firm’s
operations.
,

in

‘International’ or ‘foreign’ direct investment is simply direct
investment which occurs
across national boundaries, that is, where a firm from one country buys
a controlling
investment in a firm in another country or where a firm from one country sets up
a

branch or subsidiary company in another country” ( 992, p. 87). Foreign Direct
Investment is channeled primarily through transnational corporations; in fact, he argues,
the TNC is the single most important force creating global shifts in economic activity”
(Dicken, 1992, p. 47).
1
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that “[i]ntemational
politics

is

the realm of recurrence
ami repetition” (Wight, 1966a,
p.

26).

But the existence and effects
of globalization continue
international system at the

dawn of the

to

transform the

twenty-first century and thus
call into question

long-held beliefs in IR theoiy which
either deny such a transfonnation
of the states-

system

Waltz, 1979,

(cf.

The

system.

p.

95) or

fail to

account adequately for change
within the

persistence of the realist perspective
of international relations

understandable given that international
theoiy as taught

Western Europe

for

most of the

system which arose out of the

1

last

century located

its

in the

is

United States and

origins in the European states-

648 Peace of Westphalia following the
Thirty Years

49

An

ar.

alternative

view marks the origin of the states-system
with the 1454 Peace of

Lodi and the Most Holy League of Venice which
“founded the
first

system of collective security” (Wight,
1977,

notes.

It

was

p.

1 1

1).

Italian

Concert and the

However, as Martin Wight

the 1648 Peace of Westphalia which denotes
“the legal basis of the states-

system (Wight, 1977,

p.

1

13).

The

states

of this new

political

system were qualified by

the establishment of standing armies, the use of
conscription, the professionalization of

diplomacy with the establishment of foreign

means

to finance war. “In retrospect,” states

offices and the systematic arrangement of

Wight

Westphalia was believed to mark the transition from religious
politics, from ‘Christendom’ to ‘Europe’, the exclusion from

to secular

49

Wight

states that “international theory

may be supposed

to

be a tradition of

speculation about the society of states, or the family of nations, or the international

community.

Noting

of this kind was formerly comprehended under
Law,” Wight writes of the paucity of international theory and pejoratively
asks: “What international theory, then, was there before 1914?” (Wight, 1966a,
p. 18).
that “speculation

International
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mtemational

politics

Roman Empire by

of the Holy See, the

effective end of the llolv
the virtual recognition of
the sovereignty of its

United Provinees [of the
Neth^T^’n and the
Netherlands)
Swiss Confederation to the family
of independent

T

of"'" ‘"""nee of power
(Wight

I977"p in}

The existence of “a multitude of
sovereign

minimum

condition ofastates-system” (Wight,
1977,

asserts, is satisfied

this

1

states," writes

p. 129).

Wight, marks the

This condition, he

by the 1414-18 Council of Constance,
which

is

why Wight

chooses

4 1 4- 1 8 date as the origin of the
states-system rather than the
conventional

1
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Peace of Westphalia. “At Westphalia,”
he writes, “the states-system does
not come
existence:

“modem

it

comes of age” (Wight, 1977,

p. 152).

Specifically, as

Wight

into

notes, the

secular sovereign states-system arose
from the ruins of the medieval

international papal

monarchy,” which

itself

was

the bridge between the

Roman empire

and modernity. Indeed, the prior framework
out of which the present states-system
arose

was not

“international” in nature, argues Wight, but
rather “ecumenical,” for the

Church provided the anchor around which the Middle
Ages,
relations pivoted.

The event which demarcates

the previous unity

which Christendom provided

Constance” [1414-18] whose “chief aim.. .was

—and

divided Latin Christendom into two

its

peoples and their

the alienation of several nations from

“is clearly

marked by the Council of

to heal the Great

later three

Schism” which “had

—obediences under

rival

popes”

(Wight, 1977, pp. 131). With the dismantling of the universal
government of the

papacy, national churches arose

(later to

be replaced by kings) which henceforth

conducted their relations with each other and the papacy on an equal basis through
the
diplomatic instrument of the concordat (Wight, 1977,
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p. 28).

From

its

birth at

Constance, the sta.es-system
developed,

firstly,

with the adoption of the
principle of

CUJUS regie ejus reUg.o in the
1555 Treaty of Augsburg whereby
each

man was

to

adhere to the rel.gion of his
prince.™ This principle not
only promoted the idea of
difference

among

the several principalities in

Germany

opposition to the dictates of the
Church and the Holy

but,

more

importantly, stirred

Roman Empire

Europe. Construction of the states
system was further consolidated

throughout

at the

Treaty of

50

As

of the Protestant Reformation, the
German princes’ claim to dictate a religion
came to be known as they,« reformandi,
and gave rise to the maxing
CUJUS regw ejus religw. where the idea was
that the one who had the power
had the
nght to say which was the right religion,
which at the time was a choice between
Catholicism or Lutheranism {New Catholic
Encyclopedia, 1967, V. I, p. 1040). With
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, this
maxim received a more formal kind of imperial
sanction with the establishment of the
principle of cujus regio illius et religio:
“the
lord of the land shall be also lord of
religion. And accordingly territorial
limits became
religious limits within which the inhabitant
had to profess and practise the faith imposed
on him by the ruler” {New Catholic Encyclopedia,
1967, V. XIV, pp. 886-888- New
Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, 1 9 1 3/1996,
part

to their subjects

’

<http://www.knight.org/advent/cathen/07256b.htm>.

The 1555 Peace of Augsburg was concluded between Holy
Roman Emperor
Charles V (1500-1558) and the princes of the Lutheran
southern German principalities,
which, emboldened by the Protestant Reformation initiated
by Martin Luther, sought
autonomy for their states. The 1552 Peace of Passau allowed the
Lutheran states the
exercise of their religion, and this was reaffirmed in the
1555 Peace of Augsburg {New
Catholic Encyclopedia, 1967, V. I, p. 1040). However, and
as indication that
not to be the final battle on the matter, Schiller noted:

this

Whatever may be said of the equality which the peace of Augsburg was
have established between the two German churches, the Roman

to

Catholic had unquestionably

Church gained by

was

it

was

still

the advantage. All that the Lutheran

toleration; all that the

Romish Church conceded
Very far was it

a sacrifice to necessity, not an offering to justice.

from being a peace between two equal powers, but a truce between
sovereign and unconquered rebels (Schiller, 1901, p. 17).
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a

was

Westphalia

in

1648 ending the Thirty Years'
War/' Besides effectively excluding
the

papacy from future treaty-making,
the Westphalian
an international society

in that the practice

treaty also

marked

the beginning of

of resident diplomacy appeared,
rules of war

were developed, along with rules
of trade and commerce, ideas
of a balance of power,
and the idea of multilateral negotiations."
Yet
in

1712-13

it

was not

until the

Congress of Utrecht

that the present states-system
gets fully articulated, having the
following

charactenstics: “first, sovereign states;
second, their mutual recognition;
third, their

accepted hierarchy; fourth, their means
of regular communication;

fifth, their

This religious war was fought between
Protestant German princes against the
Catholic sovereigns of the Austrian Habsburg
empire. Begun in 1618, the war officially
ended on October 24, 1648 with the signing in
Munster of the Peace of Westphalia

1648 Peace of Westphalia enlarged upon the 1555
Peace of Augsburg by allowing
Calvinist states, in addition to Lutheran and
Catholic states, to practice their own

The

As such, the Peace of Westphalia ended the Holy Roman
emperor’s wish to
hegemony of Catholicism thoughout the empire. Indeed, the
empire itself
fragmented into a number of virtually independent states.

religion.

restore the

Noting the description given the Peace of Westphalia as
“marking an epoch in
European history,” a disagreeable Wedgwood writes that the Peace
“is supposed to
divide the period of religious wars from that of national
wars, the ideological wars from
the wars of mere aggression.” This “demarcation,” she
asserts, “is as artificial as

such
Aggession, dynastic ambition, and fanaticism are all
alike present in the hazy background behind the actual reality
of the war, and the last of
arbitrary divisions

commonly

are.

the wars of religion

merged insensibly into the pseudo-national wars of the future.”
she notes that [t]he war hastened the development by leaving the princes
only power to whom the disorganized people could turn,” Wedgwood is unable to

And though
as the

link this shattering

of dynastic empire and the feudal system it rested upon with a
growing diversity in freedom of speech and thought reflecting the growing diversity of
private capital in competition, along with the growing dominance of the new capitalist
mode of production (Wedgwood, 1938/1969, pp. 501, 505).
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framework of law; [and]
(Wight, 1977,

p.

sixth, their

means of defending

their

eomnton

interests”

129)”

Taking issue with Wight, Rosenberg
(1994) argues

that

Wight’s periodization of

the origin of the stales-system
tn 1414 “is constraeted not
as a htstorieal explanation
of

how

modem

the

system arose but as a bare dating of
when one of its descriptive

attributes appears” (p. 44).

Moreover, rather than an

internal transformation,

argues that the division of feudal Europe
into discrete political entities
fact.

Wight’s theory, he argues,

such that

system”

It

is

“firmly locked inside the familiar

is

Rosenberg

an external

realist straitjacket”

“sees only what appears to be the timeless
mechanics of an anarchical states-

(p. 44).

Alternatively, writes Rosenberg, if we view
the international system

not as a separate, autonomous realm, and
thus dispense with realist assumptions,
then

we must

look precisely to the type of societies involved
in this transformation, to their

“core institutions and practices comprised in
their material and political reproduction”
Instead of taking a condition of anarchy as our
starting point,

(p. 45).

look

at

“what

is

distinctive in the social forms

of modernity”

(p. 46).

we must
The

instead

“historically

specific structures of social relationships involved in
their stable reproduction over

time

is,

argues Rosenberg,

transformation. Moreover,

how we must proceed

we must

to

understand societies and their

“rehistoricize the study of international relations

by

identifying continuities between domestic social structures and geopolitical
systems” so
as to see the states-system as part of “a wider social totality”
(p. 55).

Hedley Bull

To accomplish

limits the essential aspects of the states-system to three;

sovereign states; 2) a degree of interaction

among them,
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in respect

1) a plurality

of

of which they form a

this,

Rosenberg elaborates a h.stoneal

dominant

capital, st relat.ons

states-system from

its

nraterialis,

explanation winch focnses on
the

of production which distinctively
separates the

feudal predecessor. Marx’s
insight from the third

modem

volume of

Capital regarding the relation of
workers to the owner of the means
of production

provides the basis for Rosenberg’s
method. Quoting Marx, he notes:
It IS

always the direct relationship
of the owners of the conditions of

P^^onto the direct producers. ..which reveals the innermost

secret,

the hidden basis of the entire
social structure, and with it the
political
torm of the relation of sovereignty and
dependence, in short the
corresponding specific form of the state”
(Marx, Capital, Vol.

quoted

in

If Marx IS correct,

any

Ill ’

Rosenberg, 1994,

he notes, then

in

conceiving of the

social formation for that matter, then

dimension— in

“we need

modem

which distinguish

to understand

modem

how

its

political

of a piece with the basic

societies” (Rosenberg, 1994,
p. 57). Rather

than delving here into what a historical
materialist perspective would look
inquiry will be explored separately below, but
detail the traditional realist understanding

In this regard,

states-system

‘their

we

at

present

we must

such an

flesh out in greater

of IR before alternatives

their

common

to

it

interests”, as

the novice states of Europe shared a foremost concern over
their

in

international society has as

common

like,

are presented.

return to Wight’s sixth and last characteristic of
the present

means of defending

Hedley Bull emphasizes

’

international system, or

this case, the sovereign states-system
itself— is

social stmctures

Ch 47

p. 51).

The Anarchical Society,

its

starting-point the

interests in the elementary goals

“[t]he

own

indicates that

stability.

maintenance of order

development among

of social

it

life” (Bull,

states

As
in

of a sense of

1977, p. 67).

system; and 3) a degree of acceptance of common mles and institutions, in respect of
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Specfically. the
include,

first,

modem

states-system shares three
principle goals which, Bull
argues,

the preference of a society
of states over “such altemattve
ideas as that of

a universal empire, a
cosmopoittan

Hobbestan

state

rules

beings, or a

of nature or state of war. as the
supreme normative principle of the

political organization

minimum

community of individual human

of mankind” (Bull, 1977.
pp. 67-8). Secondly,

states share certain

of coexistence which include the
limiting of violence solely

slates tn the act of war, limitations

to sovereign

on the causes, conduct and
geographical spread of

war, and mies governing the interaction
of states-e.g.pacms„„, servanda
(the

keeping of agreements) or reh,s sic stantibus

(their

annulment under changed

conditions). Likewise rules of coexistence
include those governing the control
or
jurisdiction of each state over

its

own

persons and

territory,

including the central

pnnciples of respect for each state’s sovereignty,
nonintervention, and equality

enjoyment of the rights of sovereignty. Thirdly,
a complex of rules
regulates cooperation

among

states

beyond what

is

exists

in

which

needed for mere coexistence. These

include mles facilitating cooperation in political,
strategic, economic and social areas,
that

IS,

mles of presenptive behavior appropriate

international society in

to “goals that are a feature

which a consensus has been reached about a wider range of

objectives than mere coexistence” (Bull, 1977,
pp. 67-70).

room

for

of an

agreement on basics among the nascent

states

To

the degree that there

of Europe

was

in the eighteenth

century points to a certain shared identity in their composition.
In addition to these

two

Realist,

and complementary, accounts of the origin of

the states-system, several alternative traditions held

which they form a society

(Bull, 1977, p. 233).
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sway

in

western IR scholarship

which

either essent.alized the
sovereign dontinance of, he
state, argued against the

limitations

whieh

its

fundatnental r,nits-i.e. sovereign
states-

posed

to

transfontnng

the system, or postulated
the mutual interdependence
of sovereign states xvithin a

system of recognized rules and
norms.’" "The primao' questions
of international
theory,” asserts Martin Wight,

“coneem

the nature of international
society and of

international law” (Wight, 1966b,
p. 92).” Addressing the
then-prevailing perspectives

on these questions, Wight (1966) and
Bull (1966; 1977) delimited the
range of thought
in

western international relations (IR)
scholarshtp to three competing

traditions.

Al the

extremes arc the Hobbesian and Kantian
traditions which are irreconcilable
on the
questions of international society and
international law such that the Hobbesian
or
realist tradition

“describes international relations as a state
of war of all against all”

while the Kantian or universalisi tradition
"sees
potential

community of mankind”

at

work

(Bull, 1977, p. 24).

in international politics

On

this

a

Hobbesian view

54

Essentialism,

as Resnick and

Wolff point

out, is a specific presumption which
“holds that any apparent complexity
a person, a
relationship, a historical occurrence, and so forth—
can be analyzed to reveal a

characterizes

many

simplicity lying at

presumption

shown

to

causes.

...

that

theories in that

—

it

core. In relation to conceptualizing causality,
essentialism
among the influences apparently producing any outcome,
its

is

the

some can be
occurrence while others will be shown to be essential
The goal of analysis for such an essentialist theory is then to find and
express

be inessential

this essential

cause and

to its

its

mechanism of producing what

is

theorized as

its

effect”

(Resnick and Wolff, 1987, pp. 2-3).
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“A

society of states (or international society) exists,” states Bull,

states,

conscious of certain

common

“when

a group of

common values, form a society in
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”
(Bull,
1977,

and

the

Wight uses the terms ‘society’ and ‘community’ interchangeably because,
[sjociologists have not agreed on a satisfactory distinction in usage between

p. 13).

he argues,
the

interests

words” (Wight, 1966b,

p. 92).
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inteinational society

is

“a nction or an illusion ”

and rules which states—
the real

political units

and the basis of international
obligation

is

It is

that

proceed from those Passions,

cannot

know

“till

1651/1980, Part

I,

till

they

only the

have agreed

sin,

p. 93).

p. 187).

principles

to regard as obligatory;

is

the doctrine,”

Neither the des.res nor

argues Hobbes, nor even
their ”Ac,,ons.

know

a

Law

that forbids

they have agreed upon the
Person that shall

Chapter XIII,

sum of the

purely contractuaf Tins

argues W.ght, ”of legal
positivism” (Wight, 1966b,
passions of humanity are, in
themselves, a

“

The Hobbesian

make

them” which they
it”

(Hobbes,

tradition thus denies the

existence of international society,
proclaiming instead that within the
international

anarchy, the ultimate unit of
political society-and hence the
limit of any possible

society-is the
IS

the unreal

state.

By contrast,

the Kantian tradition claims thal
“Ihe society of states

thing-a complex of legal

fictions

and obsolescent diplomatic forms
which

conceals, obstructs and oppresses the
real society of individual
civitas

maxima" (Wight, 1966b,

politics

p. 93).

from the Kantian perspective

“lies not in conflict

the period

p. 25).

of recuperation from the

last

the

Hence, the essential nature of international

the transnational social bonds that link
the individual

or citizens of states” (Bull, 1977,

men and women,

And while

among

states” but rather “in

human beings who

the

are the subjects

Hobbesian views peace as only

war and preparation

for the next,” the

Kantian

seeks perpetual peace in the ideas of world federalism,
advocating that without a
federated league of nations the unchecked right of
nations will only lead to a “perpetual

peace

in the

On

grave” (Bull, 1977,

p. 25;

Kant, 1795/1983,

p. 117).

the question of international law, the Hobbesian tradition
sees this as

constituted purely

on

a contractual basis

which
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is

obligatory only so long as adhering to

in.en,a.iona, ,aw

is

expedient ,o s.a.e interests.
Free to pursue

,ts

goals

relation to

other states without moral
or legal restrictions and
subjee, only to the rules
of prudence

and expediency, the Hobbesians

assert that the sole basis
for

international anarchy lies
wholly within the realm

of the

moral behavior

in the

state itself and in its

own

self-

assertion in the international
arena. Outside of the state
lies a condition of
anarchy, of

“warre of everyman against every
man.”

And

in this external

condition, writes Hobbes,

“nothing can be Unjust.” ‘The
notions of Right and Wrong.
Justice and Injustice have
there no place.

Injustice.

Where

there

is

no

common

Power, there

is

no Law: where no Law, no

Justice and injustiee, writes
Hobbes;

are Qualities, that relate to

men

in Society, not in Solitude.

It is

consequent also to the same eondition,
that there be no Propriety
no
Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct; but
onely that to be every’ mans
that he can get; and for so long,
as he can keep it (Hobbes,
1651/1980
Part I, Chapter XIII, p. 1
88).

The Kantian, however,
system of states and

Only

its

is

enjoined by moral imperatives to seek
“the overthrow of the

replacement by a cosmopolitan society”
(Bull, 1977,

m a cosmopolitan society, the Kantian holds, can the rights of

hence the rule of law, be

all

full

development of man’s natural capacities”

of the commonwealth’s powers on arming

devastation caused by war, and,

still

26)

individuals, and

fully guaranteed. In the “already
established nations,”

observed, “progress toward

by “expending

p.

is

Kant

hampered

itself against others,

more, by maintaining themselves in constant

readiness for war” (Kant, 1784/1983,
pp. 35-6). Hence, for the Kantian, not only

community of humanity

by the

the central reality in international politics but, moreover,

the object of the highest moral endeavor.

The consequences of this
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position for

is

the

it

is

mtemational law, therefore, impose
a duty on the Kantian
to sustain coexistence

and social intercourse among

Existing between these

two extremes,

to ignore

any

rule that seeks

states.

a third tradition of thought
in international

relations scholarship “describes
international politics in terms
of a society of states or

international society” (Bull,
1977, p. 26).

Hugo

Grotius

(1

Known

as the “father ofintemational
law,”

583-1645) divided law into two
categories: natural law and
volitional

law, which, out of the

latter,

arose the subclassiHcation of the
law of nations {jus

gentium). States Grotius:

But just as the laws of each state
have in view the advantage of
by mutual consent it has become
possible

that state, so

that certain laws
should originate as between all states,
or a great many states- and it is
apparent that the laws thus originating
had in view the advantage, not of
particular states, but of the great society
of states. And
this is

called the law of nations,

whenever we distinguish

of nature (Grotius, 1625/1646/1957,

The Grotian

what

known, “does not see

domestic society; but

it

p. 13).

5), tradition, as

international society as ready to supersede

notes that international society actually
exercises restraints upon

members” (Wight, 1966b,

p. 95).

Thus

against the Hobbesian or realist tradition,

the Grotians contend that states are not engaged
in simple struggle,
their conflicts with

is

term from the law

or internationalist, or rationalist (cf
Clark, 1996/1999, p.

this perspective is

its

that

one another by

common

rules

and

...

but are limited in

institutions.” In contrast to the

Kantians or universalists, however, the Grotian tradition accepts
“the Hobbesian

premise

that sovereigns or states are the principal reality in international
politics”—

rather than individual

On

human beings

(Bull, 1977, p. 26).

the question of international law, the Grotians are closer to the Hobbesians

than to the Kantians in their contractual view of international obligation; however.
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unlike the realists, they
hold that states “are

bound not only by ™les of
pmdence or

expediency but also by imperatives
of morality and law” (Bull,
1977,

p. 27).

And

because of their state-centric
perspective, the Grotians disagree
with the Kantian moral
imperative on the necessity to
overthrow the system of states
and replace

it

with a

federation of free states or
cosmopolitan society, opting instead
for “the requirements
of

coexistence and co-operation in a
society of states” (Bull,
1977,

The

three approaches described

Grotian-were delineated

above-the Hobbesian,

the

need

Bull.

to counter the

the late 1960s

debate then raging

at the

manner of retelling the
Wffiver, in fact,

1 )

2)

list

mid-1970s by the

British

These three approaches were developed

growing Marxist challenge

and early

the Kantian and the

as the prevailing traditions of
thought in western international

relations scholarship in the late
1960s to

Wight and Medley

p. 27).

’70s. but as well

it

was

to traditional

part

IR

theorists Martin

partly in response to

IR theory

in the

of the behavioralist-traditionalist

time,“ Indeed, “great debates” have
been the conventional

history of international relations in the
West.

Neumann and

a series of four such debates as follows:

realism versus idealism

—

1 940s;
behavioralism versus traditionalism— 1960s;

Stated Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1980):

At present, as attempts to build a general theory of international relations
in the West have apparently been abandoned[,] this
abandoned direction
has coincided, oddly enough, with the shift to behaviouralism.
The
choice of level of abstraction or generality and the role played by

models

in the analysis

West

of an

historical situation are basically

nature, but international relations theorists in the
to lack a global sociological

of a sociological

West appear

at

present

account of the nature of social phenomena

general, comparable to that furnished
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by Marxism-Leninism

(p. 9).

in

in

3)

interparadigm debate between
realism, interdependence
theory and neo
Marxism

4)

confrontation between rationalists
and reflectivists spurred on
by the

-mid-70s; and

ntinental

the

postmodern” and “poststracturalist”
philosophies-

late

1980s

(1997, pp. 8-9).

Since the 1980s, after the
Foucaultian and Derridian critiques
swept through

western academia calling into
question the centered subject while
even,
killing off the author entirely
(cf. Foucault, 1979/1984),

have

their

work

attributed to

some

any particular school of thought

in

some

cases,

scholars prefer not to

or, rather, prefer the

nomenclature “postmodern” or “poststructuralist”.
As one survey of new “masters” of
International Relations put

it:

Usually,

someone working in IR aims at some kind of
coherence
same time as striving to make complex and
novel moves across
established lines. All theorists

make

at the

personal choices and the ability to
is not secured once and for
all

an integrated academic persona(lity)
by picking a ‘position’. The traditional
retain

presentation of IR in terms of
‘paradigms’ or ‘schools’ obscures this since
the writings of complex
authors are often cut up and treated in
separate sections.

Only those who

unequivocally into one box will be treated as whole
persons and
most writers do not see themselves as operating within
one of the boxes.
As an academic
one would therefore learn more from tracing
other unboxable persons in their trajectories
through the discipline
fit

(Neumann and

By

focusing on

W ever,
2

how meaning

have been produced, and not
construction of what they

eds., 1997, p. 2).

is

constituted,

least

[i.e.

IR

how

how dominant ways of conceptualizing

the ‘academic’ writings of IR participate in the

theorists] take as their independent object:

international relations’,” these reflectivist theorists seek not to
gain a better perspective

Wffiver states that this fourth debate remains either unnumbered or is referred
to by
some as the "third" debate and cites the following sources: Lapid 1989; Neufeld 1993;
and Holsti 1993 (Wasver, 1997, p. 8).
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on

international rela.tons, for,
tndeed,

security

which they seek

traditional

clanmng

rellectivist writers opt out

that their debate is not

character”

(

Wtever,

is

how

in

exactly this c,uest for objectiv.ty,
control and

to jettison. In thetr attempt
to avoid the ideological
traps

IR theory, these

aspect to be studied

is

of the paradigmatic debate

one of incommensurability but
rather

the debate

Neumann and

is

1

997,

p. 22).

emphasize interpretation and intersubjectivity
between
and actors which both constitute such
phenomena and,

Argues Devetak regarding the postmodern
Walker, and James Der Dorian,

who

that the important

“shaped by the self-understanding
about

Warver,

of

its

In this respect, reflectivists

institutions,

norms, regimes,

in turn, are constituted

theorists, including

etc.

by them.

Richard K. Ashley, Rob

arose in the mid-1980s to challenge
traditional IR

theories:

Instead of taking for granted issues of
epistemology (knowledge claims)
and ontology (claims about being or thinghood),
it was now seen as
essential to investigate

competing

‘traditions’

how

such issues had been dealt with by the
of thought (Devetak, 1996, pp. 180-1).

That the formal western discipline of IR has
been transformed since the

department of international relations was established

Aberystwyth

in

1919

that, substantially,

IR

is

at the

University of Wales in

unquestioned, in a formal sense. Some, however,

still

first

remains essentially dichotomized as

it

may

argue

has been since 1916

following the publication of Lenin’s Imperialism: The Highest
Stage of Capitalism,

between defenders of the

capitalist order

antagonists. Nevertheless,

many

strains

and their socialists and communists

of thought have developed on either side of the

economic question during the ensuing years of the twentieth century with much overlap
both in theory and practice amongst both practitioners and theorists. Indeed, the
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developing globalization of
the capitalist economy has
prompted
International Political

capitalist

Economy

and Marxist traditions.

many IR and

(IPE) theons.s to utilize
theoretical methods from
both

And whether we

consider Lenin’s

New Economic

Program, Keynes advocacy for the
socialization of investment,
FDR’s stimulation of
aggregate demand
perestroika, or

much more
to

(itself

based upon Keynes’s theoretical
insights), Gorbachev’s

Deng’s reforms of Chinese

practical in

its

late

explanatory paradigms to help

in the

mid-1970s certainly reflected the need

make sense of changing world

events, but

1980s and early ’90s, following the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the

regimes

in eastern

Europe,

’70s and early ’80s

much of the

by

for

the

socialist

faddish interest in the radical theories
of the

waned while those who continued

deemphasized the Leninist or vanguard

to adhere to these theories often

political aspects

of these theories. Indeed, argue

Burbach, Nunez, and Kagarlitsky (1997),

Marxism-Leninism, erred fundamentally in asserting
that a new order
could be ushered in by taking control of the state,
thus transforming the
economy and society from above.

To

is

use of different theoretical models.
The increasing adherence

dependency and Marxist theories

new

agriculture, etc., the real world
of politics

the contrary, they argue:

A new order cannot appear unless beliefs and values are changed in civil
society— at the grassroots level— so

that the state becomes a responsive
apparatus rather than the principal agent of transformation
(1997, p. 3).
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Still,

with the rapid pace of
globalizing forces from
lelceommumcations^ and

transport to the spread
of .he transnational as opposed
to the inultina.ionnl
corporation

and

to the

growth and

the International

relative

autonomy of a multitude of
international regimes from

Monetary Fund (IMF) and

Development (IRBD), otherwise
known
Organization

either

(e.g.

is in

International

as the

(WTO), many contemporary IR

World Bank,

”

Thus,

it

is

for Reconstnietion

to the

and

World Trade

theorists argue that the
state-centric focus

the process or has already
been eclipsed

Robinson, 1996)

Bank

by forces superordinate

to the state

with a renewed relevance that
one of the persistent

questions in IR theory should focus
on the level of analyis.
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The

revolution in communications technology
has allowed for the instantaneous
mfomation and finances on an unprecedented
scale. “One of the advantages
of digital cash, writes Mikkelsen (Summer
1 998/99), “is that
transactions could take
p ace without the need for banks to intermediate in
transfer of

international transactions. Instant

of money would not only encourage the
development of a free worldwide
rnarket, by removing the present
significant barriers to transacting, but
also reduce the
abi lity of governments to impose
taxation and disclosure obligations
on banks (such as
withholding ta) (p. 14). “Twenty-four hours
a day,” notes Burbach, Niinez, and
agarhtsky, “365 days a year, trillions of dollars
in capital are transferred by
electronic
processes ffom one point of the globe to another.
In effect,” they argue, “capitalism and
technology are collapsing time and space”
transfer

(1997, p. 13).

The

UN Conference

on Trade and Development World Investment Report
1999
estimates the existence of about 60,000 transnational
corporations (TNCs) currently
extant, with no less than 89 percent of these
companies headquartered in the “Triad”
consisting of the European Union countries (principally
France, the UK, Germany,
Sweden, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium), North America
(i.e. the U.S. and
Canada^ and Japan (Ch. 3, pp. 6-8). “Overall,” states the report,
“stability
predominates within the world’s largest TNCs” with “[ajpproximately
85 per cent of
the top 1 00 TNCs list
dominated by firms that have been in the top 1 00 ranking
during the past five years with a substantial part of these TNCs
originat[ing] in the
European Union, United States and Japan.” In 1997, states the report. General
Electric
.

.

.

held the top position as the largest non-fmancial

Company and

TNC

then Royal Dutch Shell. Only two
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followed by Ford Motor

TNCs

from developing countries

IheLgeloMnalysis

in

Intemal CTal Relations Rernn,i,i.„.i

Existing as a subHeld in the
discipline of political
science, international
relations underlying focus

is

the species

homo

sapiens and

its

niembers’ interaction

with their material environment
and with each other. While
sharing with other areas
of
political science a

of power, IR has
terms

at

assumed

concern with

human behavior predicated on

traditionally restricted itself
to analyzing

interests defined in ten,
is

power

as defined in military

the nation-state level of
analysis. Domination in the
militaiy sphere
to guarantee control

over rules of behavior

in other spheres.

Thus,

was

it

was the

use of diplomatic and military strategy
to attain power which
preoccupied many IR
studies (cf Kissinger, 1964). Such
a view can be traced back to
Thucydides and "The

Mehan
to

It,

Dialogue” where the operative principle,
or “safe rule” as the Athenians
referred

was

and to

“to stand up to one’s equals, to
behave with deference toward one’s
superiors,

treat

one’s inferiors with moderation”
(Thucydides,

B.C.E./1954/1985,

p.

made it into
Daewoo

460-404

407). This principle need not apply only
to the behavior between

countnes, however; indeed, the Athenians were
“not so

the

c.

much

frightened of being

the top 100 in 1997 and these were Petroleos
de Venezuela

Corporation (World Investment Report 1999,
1999, Ch.
Dicken (1992) states his preference for:

3,

(PDVSA) and

p

1)

the term transnational corporation’ to the more
widely used term
multinational corporation simply because it is a more
general, less
restrictive, term. The term multinational
corporation’ suggests
,

operations in a substantial number of countries whereas
Transnational
corporation’ simply implies operations in at least two countries,

including the firm

s

home

country. In effect,
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all

multinational

a

conquered by a power which
rules over

power

attacked and defeated by

IS

B.C.E./1954/1985,

analysis”

p. 402).

its

Hence,

others,..., as

own

in

of what would happen

subjects” (Thucydides,

our analysis of power

c.

if a ruling

460-404

in IR, the “level

of

a significant factor which
will affect both the type
and the extent of the

is

conclusions

we

reach.

In deciding

on a

level

of analysis, one’s underlying
theoretical approach must
be

scrutinized for possible clues.
In this respect, theoty

is

action, as well as a proposed
explanation for the causal

phenomenon

or a set of facts.

And

as

Hempel

to give direction to a scientific
investigation”

a guide to study and hence
to

mechanisms responsible

stated, “tentative

(Hempel, 1966,

for a

hypotheses are needed

p. 13).

Notes the Imernet

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Hempel:
argues that

impossible to derive observational
statements from a
For example, Newton’s theory of
gravitation cannot
determine the position of planets, even
if the initial conditions are
it

is

scientific theory.

known,

for Newton’s theory deals with
the gravitational force, and thus
the theory cannot forecast the
influences exerted by other kinds of
force.
In other words, Newton’s theory
requires

provisoe, according to

Hempel

—which

an explicit assumption—

assures that the planets are

subjected only to the gravitational force.
Without such hypothesis it is
impossible to apply the theory to the study of
planetary motion. But this
assumption does not belong to the theory. Therefore
the
position of

planets

not determined by the theory, but
plus appropriate assumptions
is

it

is

implied by the theory

<http://www.utm.edU/research/iep/h/hempel.htm>.

Our

level

of analysis

assumptions

we

m the study of IR is arguably thus a consequence of the theoretical

hold about

how

the world works. But whatever theory

is

chosen as a

guide to study. Singer points out that certain key elements
must be present

corporations are transnational corporations but not all transnational
corporations are multinational corporations (pp. 47-8).
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in the

model

.four subsequent ,eve,
of analysts

one

,s

prove useful

is .0

eorrecly analyzing Ihe real.ly

dealing with. First, the
theory must “offer a highly
accurate JescripHon of the

phenomena under considerat.on ”
Second,
explain the relationships

among

the

the theoty must possess
the “capacity to

phenomena under

investigation ”

theory should “offer the
promise of reliable prediction"

(S.nger,

1

And

third, the

96 1 pp. 78-9). As
,

such, the methodological
assumptions, constmcts. terminology,
experiences,
utilize are variables

of the world. That
say

is real

etc.

we

which determine our epistemological
and ontological conceptions

is,

how we come

to

have knowledge of the world
and what we can

or existing independently of
the

mind

will affect our subsequent
analytical

approach and conclusions.
In this respect,

we must

first

focus on the term “International
Relations” or

“International Politics,” for these terms
prejudge the field of inquiry to an
extent by
calling attention to only those
aspects of human behavior

repercussions.

As Young

stated, “the

which have “inter-««na;i-al”

very notion of international

...

subsumes the

postulate of the nation-state as the
fundamental unit of world politics” (Young,
1972, p.
126).

While

states as legal entities are

synonymous with

empires in that they make decisions and enforce
rules for

have become principle actors

opposed
state

and

to rulers

its

term

world

Roman and Greek

their inhabitants, nation-states

politics only within the last

300

years.

As

of ancient empires or feudal nobles who claimed
ownership of the

benefits for themselves either due to divine sanction,
hereditary right, or

conquest, the

who

in

ancient

modem

nation-state claims

its

authority from the consent of the governed,

likewise participate in the benefits derived from the operations
of the
nation-state

itself

state.

The

suggests a growing coincidence over time between states as
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legal cm,,ies

and ,he psychological
idcminca.ion of people

icrrilory- (Kegley, Jr.

and Wi.lhopf, 1985,

p. 74,.

will, particular
pieces

Now whe.her this

of

shared

psychological identification
rests primarily on the
basis of cthn.eity, a
shared language,
cultural

homogeneity,

territorially

subjugation by dominant
classes

however,

is

is

open

to further study;

what eannot be denied,

the faet that national
entities continue to play
a major role in the

mtemational arena as the
populations

demarcated fixed boundaries,
or simply collective

who

collect, ve representatives

control state power.

of statistically significant
domestic

The study of IR,

therefore, focuses the field

of

inquioi so that research concerns
itself with relevant
aspects of cross-national
politics

such that regularities and general
tendencies of behavior can be
observed. Nonetheless,
if our level

of analysis

is

fixated solely

unitary and purposive actors,
then

From 1945 and up through

we

on the

nation-state,

will tend to limit

IR

and

if

to the

we

define nations as

study of foreign policy.

the early 1960s, most of the
texts published in IR

qualified as studies in foreign policy,
and specifically U.S. foreign policy.

of these

texts, asserted Singer, “[n]ot

prism of the American national
spleen)

is

only

interest,

directed toward the Soviet

is

And

in

most

the world often perceived through
the

but an inordinate degree of attention
(if not

Union” (Singer, 1961,

p. 84).

Nonetheless, this

state-centne level of analysis provided
political scientists with various
approaches to

studying international behavior including
historical description and analysis,
especially
the study of diplomatic history (e.g.
Albrccht-Carrie, 1958); legal analysis concerned

with analyzing various legislative provisions of
countries, the

treaties they entered into

both with other countries and International
Governmental Organizations (IGOs)
Sherr, 1986);

numerous balance-of-power

(e.g.

studies which examine the coalescence of
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coun,en-a,ling coalitions
to check countries
embarking on hegcntonistic
policies (e.g.

Newnran, ,968); and analyses
which focused on
being of prime importance

(e.g.

Snyder,

et al.

official dccision-ntakers

of countries as

1962; or Janis, 1982/1983).

This preoccupation with the
nation-state as the primary level
of analysis in IR

can be charted from

of Westphalia
of IR

is

in

its

origins in the aftermath of the
Thirty Years’

1648 up

necessary, for, as

As

to the present.

Wightman

War and

the Peace

Such an histoncal review of the
development

stated;

human societies are subject to change, they
reveal their
charactenstics not simultaneously,
but successively over
all

them

time.

fiat is

not to see them

at all.

To

see

A snapshot view will miss the sense of

and movement; it will fail to distinguish
what is old from what
new, the elements of continuity from
the appearance of change
(Wightman, 1984, p. 23).
ircction

IS

Prior to 1648, political unity in Europe
consisted either of a universal empire,
a

monolithic

state,

divine order.

or separate city-states

Law

in

whose

rulers

denved legitimacy

each of these forms was derivative from

Roman

as part

imperial law

which, while universal, had existed side by side
with local jurisdictions. Due

of centralization
from province

in the

Roman

to province. This practice

of local jurisdiction continued with Rome’s
in feudal

Europe. With the triumph of

m medieval Europe, legitimacy of the universal order gained divine

sanction with the

It

to the lack

Empire, interpretation and enforcement of law had
varied

conquerors and dominated political thought
Christianity

of a

appeared as

Pope

as

God’s representative on earth (Mansbach,

if knowledge

et al.,

1976, p.

of the Mayan or Incan Empires or universal empires

9).

in

China, India, Africa, and the Arab World were largely unknown to the
Europeans and
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hence posed no threat and
presented no opportunit.es

economies (Finlay

& Hovet,

1975,

to their agricultural-based

p. 271).

However, as Abu-Lughod
(1989) has recently demonstrated,
to the

European world-economy which
came

number of world-economies or

to

dominance by

Indta,

and China. The .nteract.on
between these

regions “stretched through the
Mediterranean into the

1989,

Ocean and through

Malacca

to reach

Abu-Lughod, “when Europe gradually
‘reached

empty space

was

the Strait of

Red Sea and Persian Gulf on

into

China” (Abu-Lughod,

Without the existence of these various
preexisting world economies,

p. 12).

asserts

the sixteenth century,
a

trade systems which, in the
thirteenth century, joined
the

Middle East (including North Africa),

the Indian

there existed prior

rather than nches” (Abu-Lughod,
1989,

the “Fall of the East”

p. 12).

it

would have grasped

In fact, she concludes,

it

which preceded the “Rise of the West.”
Rather than viewed

as a simple takeover of a prior

characteristics

out,’

of European

economic system or

culture,

predominance can be attributable

to

Abu-Lughod

attributable solely to the internal

argues, Europe’s subsequent

two paradoxical

developed by the thirteenth century were

later

forces;

1)

“pathways and routes

‘conquered’ and adopted by a succession

of European powers,” and 2) “the new European
approach

to trade-cum-

plunder. .caused a basic transformation in the world
system” (Abu-Lughod, 1989, p.
.

36

1

).

More

specifically,

Abu-Lughod

writes that

it

“was not so much

the Portuguese

takeover of the ‘old world’ but the Spanish incorporation of
the ‘new world’ which had
a decisive influence on

why

Europe’s world economy became the center of world

gravity in a decisive manner”; moreover,

it

provided “the windfall of wealth that

eventually were spun into industrial gold” (Abu-Lughold, 1989,
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p. 363).

In this sense.

the wealth derived from
the plunder of silver and
gold from the Amertcas
provided the

pnmttive accumulation necessary
for Europe’s industnal
revolution, and
“IS

why European

scholars have ,n the

century” (Abu-Lughod,
1989,
It IS

last

this,

she says,

analysis been ftxated on the
sixteenth

p. 363).

nonetheless true that following the
Thirty Years’

War

in

1648, fairly well-

defined nation-states resulted from
the casting off of feudal
traditions and their

replacement with

territoriality

state.

right

statist

and the centralization of legitimate
authority and military power

Legitimation

of each

tendencies and administrative
capabilities that emphasized

was based on

state to

make and

the doctrine of sovereignty
which

execute laws within

its

own

in the

championed the

territory.

Beyond

these

borders, however, existed “an international
system of shared authority and decentralized

power” (Mansbach,

et ah,

1976, p. 17). The feudal economic base which
had tied

agricultural production in the countryside
with the craft guilds organized in the
feudal

towns was replaced by the domination of
mercantilism and the notion
interests

of the nation transcended individual or group

interests.

America by Europeans and the opening up of the world
market,
the

first

wave of European imperialism with

power through

that the

economic

With the discovery of
the context

was

set for

absolutist states seeking to increase their

the acquisition of gold and silver.

The

related theoretical cataclysm

resulting from the Protestant Reformation and the
Enlightenment aided in this economic

transformation by separating the political system from the dominant
influence of the

Roman

Catholic Church.

And

as the closed guild system gave

way

to

manufacturing in

the realm of production, so too in the realm of thought did free competition
gain

expression in the fomis of religious liberty and freedom of conscience, noticeable
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advances capitalism had
over feudalism (Marx

Legitimacy based

in

divine sanction thus gave

&

way

form of a social contract, and
nationalism, or the
State,

became

Engels, 1848/1948/1998,

to polittcal att.horiiy
presented in the

of supreme loyally

doctritte

to the

the unifying rallying call.

Afier the Peace of Westphalia,
besides the Dutch and British

hegemonic leadership over Europe
respectively,

p. 29).

no

in the

who

exercised

seventeenth and nineteenth
centuries

state politically, militarily,

and culturally dominated Europe

attempt by France under the leadership
of Napoleon

at the

until the

beginning of the eighteenth

century. But his defeat at Waterloo
enabled the 181 5 Congress of
Vienna to achieve a
quasi-institutionalized acceptance of a
“balance” offerees
In this respect, states’ internal
politics

became

regard that Britain’s

hegemony

arrangement provided

to other

in the nineteenth

form of a “balancer” to counter hegemonic
stability for the

European

state

European powers.

century

threats to the

actors together until 1914 and the outbreak
of

the European powers.

subject to international sanction
if

domestic policies encouraged hegemonistic
threats
this

among

is

It

is in

said to have taken the

European states-system. This

system and held

World War

1.

its

principal

In the interim,

however, the

nineteenth century witnessed the creation of independent
states in South America along

with the colonization of Africa and Asia in the

upon which power was constructed

in

latter quarter

of the century. The basis

both of these movements rested on the

establishment of territorial borders formally represented by
nation-states.^^ Thus, by the

Although the colonization of Africa and Asia resulted in states which were formally
it must be noted that many of these state boundaries
transgressed and divided traditional tribal and/or ethnic areas.
referred to as nation-states,
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end of WWI, the recognized
legitimacy of nation- states
gave impetus

to the

organ, zation of the League
of Nat.ons. Lacking
enforcement power and
credibility due
.o the refusal

whtch

of the U.S.

to join,

however, the League was
unahle to

WW„. W„h the defeat of the Axis
powers,

led to

aner the second world war
gave way

and

their attempt to coalesce

fonnally as independent
constituted a significant

the

to a bipolarity

states.

of states and

cotrelat.on of forces

who were now emerging

The establishment of the
United Nations

symbol of this post-war paradigm,
and. unhke

Though promoted

their

new

as a

members

(i.e.

it

in

its

1945

predecessor,

the United States and the

community of sovere.gn

nominal independence were,

nations, this mult, pi, city

should be noted, more form
than

substance as they were subjected to
the constant control and
manipulation by

superpower sponsors. And from
still-prevalent orientation

this history

toward the

and within

state as the

conHict

between the two great
supenrowers

and control the fomter
colonies

UN had the two major post-war powers as

Soviet Union).

the

halt the

this

modem

their

framework, the

primary level of analysis remained

fixed for a large part of the twentieth
century.

The

distinguishing characteristic of the

post-WWII

period, however, was, and

continues to be, the overwhelming
qualitative transition in military power
associated

with the development of nuclear weapons.
As nuclear stockpiles proliferated, national
boundaries become obscured and insufficient
walls behind which to hide. The security

provided by the temtonally-inscribed boundaries
of nation-states offer
in this

new

era characterized as a “balance of terror”, a

President John

Kennedy

Defense Robert

S.

in a

1958 speech and

McNamara and

later

little

protection

new concept mentioned by

expounded upon by

his Secretary

others (see, for example, an article by Albert
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of

Wo,,,s.e„.en.,e..HeOenc.eB.anceorw...o™^
'

959,. Hence, rehance
on

d was .nean, .o defend,

power

is

increas.n,,, rendering
.rrelevan, ,ha. which

the na.ion-s.a.e.
Similarly, while
diseases from Acc|nirod

viz.

.nrmunodeficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) and Ihe Wes, N,le
and Ebola viruses
know no
slale bonndar.es lo
which Ihey are res.ricled,
environmenlal des.rnclion
from polhn.on
and deplelion of
non-rcpienishable resources
culs across national
boundaries and

national concerns.

As

With perhaps

such, the tragedy of the

less disastrous

however, technological
revolutions
transportation, and

commons becomes

consequences
in areas

albeit

the

common

more far-reaching

of commun.cations,

tragedy

effects,

produCon,

most especially the development
and rennemcn, of
computational

tools-specincally the computer,
the Internet, and the
World Wide Web-render the
geographical and cultural differences

in the

world increasingly more
manageable.

Construction of large centralized
production

facilities

have been rendered unnecessary

with increased efficiency and
advances in transport, the

latter

which can no, only

quickly supply a company’s or
an individual’s needs but,
moreover, such products can
accurately be tracked via the
internet while they are in route.
Diffusion of production
facilities

along with rapid and reliable means
of communications and transport
thus

establishes a

web of resources

diversity therefore, in theory,

able lo meet the needs of a global
market.

becomes

Global

less a tool for jingoistic
manipulation as peoples

61

The concept of the tragedy of the commons
resource, usually referred to as a

common

refers to the depletion or degradation
of;
property resource, to which people have free
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come

to identify with

areas of the globe.

and

relate their interests

Human

cultural boundaries

exchanges and concerns
begin

on a scale unprecedented

unified actton to address
global concerns

To analyze and understand
only then

level

,n thetr infancy,

of analysts

change

in

world

at the

with the well-being
of others

a

in

human

to cut across national

history.

And

the development of
these

new

and

the necesstty for

becomes more pronounced
and

new paradigm

in different

factors

possible.

which were

arose in the 1950s-1960s
seeking to place the

global level. This change
in analytical approach
renected the

pol.tics

which saw

the ascendancy

of a global intemat.onal
system

in

place of the Eurocentric system
which had lasted from the
Peace of Westphal.a until

WWll. And

the

pnmary determinant of this change
was

technology (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff,
sysreiiis

,keory argued that the observer

Jr..

1981,

the global diffusion of

p. 137).

The

practitioners

always confronted by a system
or

is

of gene™/
its

sub-

systems and though the cluster of
phenomena to be observed can range
from the minute
to the universe itself, the
choice

of whim or

caprice.

of which phenomena

Systems theoty,

therefore,

to focus

on cannot be a function

“assumes the interdependence of parts

in

determinate relationships, which impose
order upon the components of the
system”

(Dougherty

& Pfaltzgraff, Jr.,

1981,

p. 141).

Systems, Holsti pointed out, are

distinguished by: a) boundaries which
designate the line between interaction and

environment beyond which

political units

have no environmental

environmental conditions pose no political
political units in the system; c) structures

and unmanaged access.

by Garret Hardin

that

It is

was

affect; b) the

main

affect

and

characteristics

of the

of power and influence or persisting forms of

a concept derived from a 1968 article in Science
magazine

entitled

simply “The Tragedy of the Commons”.
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dom,na„. and subordinate
relationships within the

systent; d) contnron

forms of

nteraction (e.g. diploma,
to, trade, types
of nvalnes. and
organized violence or
warfare); and e) expl.ci,
or implicit rules, customs,
and values which govern
relat.ons
(Holstt, 1967, pp. 28-29).
Inputs and outputs are
the

whtch

interact in a

system.

Some

key components of
systems theory

contmuous feedback loop whtch
allows

of the

inittal

for self-adjustment

approaches which developed
from

this

by

the

systems-onented

perspective included Parson’s
Action System (cf Parsons
and Sh.ls, 1951), Structural-

Functional Analysis (Levy,

Jr.,

1952), Input-Output Analysis
(Easton. 1953, p. 129),

and an ecological systems
approach

The systems

level

practice, stated Singer,

the impact

it

(e.g.

Sprout

& Sprout,

1971).

of analysts permits the
examination of IR as a whole.
But.

in

lends to “lead the observer
tnto a position which
exaggerates

of the system upon the national

of the actors on the system” (Singer,
1961.

downplayed among systems

level theorists

actors and, conversely,
discounts the impact
p. 80).

who

Autonomy and choice

are thus

tend to gravitate toward a

deterministtc orientation which
emphasizes structure over

its

more

internal units (cf. Waltz,

1979). Moreover, if we postulate
a high degree of uniformity
in the foreign policies of
national actors, then the scant

lead us to

assume

that “statesmen think

(Morgenthau, 1960,
differences

among

room we allow

p. 5).

for divergence

and act

in ternis

homogenized image of our nations

state actors

may

of interest defined as power”

The systems-oriented approach

states or in their internal

amongst

thus often discounts or denies

workings and “concludes with a highly

in the international

system” (Singer, 1961,

Structural approaches alone, therefore, tend
to be static and
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empty and provide

p. 82).

little

or.ow c,.n.e occ.
do expla,n cHange, they
.end
Thus faced wi.h .he
Which leads
of.he

.0 de.em.in,s.n

s,a.e as .he

.He ,„.en.a.,ona,
s.s.en.

.He e.e... .Ha. .He.

largely .0 be wholly
de.em.inis.ic.

func.ionalis. cons.rain.s

of .he sys.en.ic level
of analysis

and .he reduc.ionis.
.endency

inhere,.. ,n .He

primary level of analys.s.
IR .heoris.s con.inued

paradigms wh.ch can un.ie
bo.H s.ruc.ures wi.h
human
still

To

provide a coheren. explanation
of social relations

,0

prac.ices, and

a. .he

dominan. view

seek ou.

new

hence cho.ce, and

in.emat.onal level. Three

aspects are necessa^, for
.he vahdi.y and hence
usefulness of such a framework.
Kirs.,
the genera, theory should
be logically cons.s.en,
wi.h

explainable in relation .0 .he
validate the

totality.

knowledge cla.ms of.he

its

parts

and every

Second, there must be some
theory.

And

third,

way

par.

.0 .es.

should be

and

any such general theory of
IR

must possess, as Maclean argues,
“an adequate account of
change” (Maclean, 1981,

p.

47).

Two

related and yet opposing
globalist paradigms

which became prominent

in

the ,970s in western IR
scholarship are theories which
have developed mainly ou.srde

of American academic thought.
And both of these theories have reluctantly
been
accepted into the American field of
IR owing only to the inadequacy
of much of the
prevrous analyses. These two alternatives,
and often conflicting paradigms,
are

Dependency Theory and Imperialism, and both
have

historical roots

which are much

older than the current academic interest
in them. Comparing and assessing
the central
tenets of these

two

theories’ propositions will help elucidate
their respective level

analysis.
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Before venturing into a
contrast between
Dependency and

Iniperiiilist theories,

however, some general
remarks about global, st
theories must be made.
As Viotti and

Kanpp.

( 1

987) point out, there are both
Marx.sts and non-Manrists

globalist paradigm.

capitalist

global

system as

What

unites them, however,

the.r starting point or

pom, cal economy-

,p.

who

is

who work

witb.n the

that these theorists
-see the

world

focus on dependency
relattons within a

399). Moreover, they
assert, global, sts are
gutded by four

key assumptions;

1

)

Global context^-Globalists
argue that
levels of analys.s-the indiv.dual,

to explain

behavtor

at

bureaucratic, societal, and

between societtes— one must
first understand the
overall
global system wtthm whtch
such behavior
analysis—“Only by tracing the

tstortcal
S

I

particular

economic system works

and societies but

at the

to the benefit

The key

of the system
and

capitalism. This

is

of some individuals

Mechanisms of domination-“[G]lobalists
assume

’

states ’

that particular

exist that

developing and that contnbute

to

keep Third World states from
worldwide uneven development ”

Economic factors— “[GJIobalists assume

that economic factors are
absolutely cntical in explaining the
evolution and functioning of the
world
capi ahst system and the
relegation of Third World states
to a subordinate
position” (pp. 399-400).

these four assumptions in mind, an
examination will

Dependency and

first

be made between

Imperialist theories and, following this,
an analysis of an alternative

globalist paradigm.

World Systems Theory,

Dependency theory
and, as one

of the

historical factor

expense of others.”

mecimmsms ofdommaUon

Beanng

stracture

historical evolution

possible to understand its
current structure.
ining characteristic of the

system as a whole

4)

all

takes place.”

2)

3)

any and

bleen states

would expect,

Afnca, and Asia where

is

will

sometimes referred

be presented.

to as the theory

of underdevelopment,

the underdevelopment refers to areas in
Latin America,

traditional colonial ties

have continued

the formal independence of these previous
colonial states.

96

in different

fomis despite

Most of the thought on

dependency ,heo^
for

,ee„ developed hy Ln.in
A.nenca„s

dependency Iheoo: ong.nat.ng

will, ,he chief

Un,.ed Nafons Econonric
Connniss.on

wi.l, ,„e

ong.na, argn.nenls

econcnisl, Raul Prebisch.
of, he

for La, in A,ner,ea

(ECLA, aRer

WWIL

Prebisch pictured a divided
world consishng of a ccner
of industrialized countnes
and a

penphery of underdeveloped

countries. Prebisch argued
that underdevelopment

caused by unequal terms of trade
which led

remedy

to a decline in
it

exchange earnings. To

these effects, Prebisch
asserted that governments
in the periphery
needed to

subsidize the development of
the, r

own

infrastructures, enact
protect.ve tanff measures

and gear domestic production
toward import

same

was

substitution (Chilcote,
1981, p. 12). At the

ttme, Prebisch called for
external funding from the
industrialized developed

countries in order to buttress
domestic capital formation needed
for development.

Prebtsch

s

lament (1971)

financial resources

is sttll

relevant today concerning the
insufficiency of such

and the heavy deb, burden
accompanying such

transfers.

The amount

of financial resources transferred
has been inadequate and
the burden of the corresponding
service payments excessive.
...

In

combination with the deterioration of
the terms of trade, they [i e
heavy
service payments] have had a highly
prejudicial effect on the
mobilization of domestic resources and
on investment (Prebisch 1971
pp. 234-5).

Central to Prebisch’s and later dependency
theorists’ arguments, therefore,
that desarrollo or

development

food and raw matenals)

in the periphery (the

is stifled

by

is

primary producing countries for

control from the center (areas of industrialization

consisting of both developed market economies
and centrally planned economies).

by “development,” dependency

theorists

the dependency theorists argue,

is state

mean

capitalist

development. What

is

And

needed,

planning and reform to promote autonomous
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nanona, developnaen,. Th.s
naove^en, would ,a.e ,he
fonu of a Cass all.ance
„e.ween
.he nadona, bourgeois,
and .he nrasses ,o oppose
donunaUou fron.
,he .ndus.nalized

eemer while supporting

eapi.alis.

development

in the

(Sunkel. 1972; Furtado, 1963).
In.ental development
the

same conditions of uneven
development and

underdeveloped penphery
is

faeed with similar
problems, for

tradit.onal colonialism
are

found w,.hi„

countries also.

Hence

development

seen as a remedy to “mtemal
colonialism” (Gonzalez
Casanova. 1970)

is

the forma.ton of a national
bourgeots.e and domestic
capitalist

and “poles of development”
(Perroux. 1968; Andrade.
1967). Thus, the central
question

of dependency theory
Hettne. 1984. p. 75).

is:

“Is capital.sm possible
in the

The answer

penphery?” (Blomstrom and

affirmative if one believes in
the neo-classical

is

theory of trade which operates
under the rubric of “comparative
advantage” (cf Rostow.
1

960).

Such a perspective argues

for an international division
of labor operating under

the assumption that

any two nations will benefit if each
specializes in those goods that it
can
produce relatively cheaply and exchange
for goods that it can produce
only at a higher cost.... Thus, when trade
is unfettered by nonmarket
forces or politically imposed barriers,
all nations stand to share
in the
benefits and to grow more rapidly than
they would when
faced with

barriers to free trade (Kegley,

The problem, however, claim
are

sometimes known,

is

that the

industrialized countries. This

is

Jr.,

and Wittkopf, 1985,

the dependentistas, as the adherents
of this school

terms of trade and most of the profits benefit only
the

due

to technological progress in the center

reduces costs and hence increases profits, but

goods sold

in the periphery

due

p. 172).

to “the

which

this rarely leads to price reductions

on

high degree of monopolization of the factor and

goods market there” (Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984,
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p. 41).

This

in turn leads to the co-

opting of labour unions
in the center which
could use their strength
and hence

bargaining power to claim
their cut of the iincreased
profits resulting from
the

and workers profit in the
center, and the former
can maintain the unequal
terms of trade
over the periphery as long
as workers in the
center receive their share
of the spoils.

Some wnters have emphasized
as Baran and

a neo-Marxist
mtenrreta.ion of dependency
such

Sweezy (1966) who argue

that corporate capital
controlled

by

multinational corporations has
replaced finance capital
controlled by banks as the

dominant form of capital
accumulation

in the

world today. Baran and
Sweezy

emphasize the division of nch and
poor countries based on the
extraction of a suiplus by
multinational coiporations with
profits repatriated to the
nch countries. Frank echos
this

idea of commercial

underdevelopment”
historical product

satellite

p.

1

8).

in

monopoly

which he argues

theory of the “capitalist
development of

that

“underdevelopment

of past and continuing economic
and other

underdeveloped and the

now

The agents of penetration

multinational corporations

demand and

in his

who

large part the

relations

beUveen the

developed metropolitan countries”
(Frank, 1966,

in the Third

World

in

Frank’s schema are

seek to satisfy capitalism’s need for
external sources of

profitable investment outlets.

cultural imperialism,

is in

What

results is teclinological

and a transfer of profits from the periphery

dependence,

to the center. Thus, in

contrast to the developed economies, “the
development of the national and other

subordinate metropoles

is

framework (Frank, 1966,

limited

p. 23).

by

their satellite status” within a capitalist

world

Cardoso contended with Frank’s development of

underdevelopment thesis which alleges

that the national bourgeoisie
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is

unable to

mulate capital and offers
instead his view of
“associated dependent
development”

W.CH a,.es

.Ha.

.0 .He pe„e..a.io„

(Cardoso,

,

Ho..,eois-ae™oc.a.ie .evoH,.,o„s

of .He i„.en.a..o„a,
capHaHs. sys.e.

973). Capi.a, acc„„u,a.io„

because indus.riaHza..on
bu. for consu™p.,on

in.ema.ional

.He

in .he

by .he

d, vision

,s

unable

.o

penpHe, a. „.po.,H,e

.H.e

penp,... econonHes

co^ple.e

i.s

cycle ,n .he penphery,

Third World produces
goods no. for „ass consun,p.,o„

local bourgeoisie.

of labour by

Nonelheless. ,He s.ruc.ure
of .he

nrul.ina.ional conrorabons
allows

pan of dependen.

ccononries .o benefi. fronr
produc.ive inves.nren..
Thus, .hrough .his .ype
of gradual
developnren., Cardoso favored
.'refonnis. polices and
an evolu.ionary ra.her
.Han a
revolulionaor approach .0
developnren.”(Chilco.e,

1981, p. 47).

Dos San.os

offers an

allemalive 10 Frank’s emphasis
on surplus ex.rac.ion and
argues .ha. in.ema.ional
relalionships after

WWII

‘•technological-induslrial

penpheo^.

crea.ed a

new form of dependency

dependence” which conditions

charac.erized

by

internal structures in the

Foreign capital controls the
marketing of exported products
which

maintains the dominance of the
traditional landed bourgeoisie
in dependen. countries.

The conservation of agrarian or mining
export

structures generates a link

between

metropolitan areas and more advanced
economic centers that extract surplus
value from

more backward

sectors.

Thus, the “unequal and combined
character of capitalist

Frank has since switched his adherence
from Dependency Theory to World-Systems
Theory with initially, his The World System:
Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?
edited with Barry Gills (1993) but
most recently with his work ReOrient: Global
Economy m the Asian Age ( 998), the latter which
challenges
1

the Eurocentric origins of
world-system asserting instead that Europe’s
subsequent domination of the
world-system did not occur until the eighteenth
centuiy and was preceded by an
Afroeurasian world-economy which revolved around
China.
the

modem
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development
Santos,

at the international
level is

May, 1970,

What

,s

,n

an acute fonn” (Dos

p. 234).

suggested

eapttalisnr develops

reproduced internally

in these

pnmanly on

views, as in nearly

the basis

all

dependency theory,

is that

of the exploitation of
countries rather than
on

.he explo.tation of workers.
Moreover, dependency
theory understands
industrial

development to be dependent
on export earnings.
periphery

is

Industrial

development

in the

thus undenn.ned by
balance of payment
deficits due to developing

countries' inab.lity to

compete

in a

monopolized international
market, control the

repatnatron of foreign profits by
multinational corporations,
and break free of their

dependence on foreign

Dependency,

capital to finance
development.

therefore,

promotes the idea of inferiority
of the periphery by

suggesting that Latin Amenean,
African, and Asian countries
depend technologically

and financially on centers of
industrialization and finance.
Hence, the level of analysis
in

dependency theoiy

is at

the point of the circulation
of commodities, market relations,

and the unequal exchange of surplus
value. But as one

critic writes:

In this light capitalism always
appears impossible to attain, for
one
seeing things through the perspective
of the underdog
capitalist

never seem to make

it

who

can

imperialistically big (Johnson,
1983, p. 84).

Regarding the current analysis of the NED,
the dependency approach

motive for the U.S. export of democracy, for

Amenca

is

if the countries

fails to

provide a

of Asia, Afnca, and Latin

are permanently dependent on what
happens in the core industrialized

countnes and, hence, are permanently disabled
and unable
core countnes either

in the

either to

compete with the

production and export of commodities or

cycle of capital accumulation, then

why

in

completing the

should the U.S. even bother with promoting a
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populist soiinciing
political sysicm,

namely “dcnocrncy”,
alluncd

lo Ihc cicman.ls

of

U.S. capital accumulation,
ifthese countries are
locked into a
i
system from which they

cannot escape?

P

why

1

lor Ihc

IXpcmIcncy

Ihcorisis, asserts

Johnson,

is lhal

they c|ncslion

the connirics in the
periphery aren’t i.nperiahst,
and the answer (hey
arr.ve

points to their domina.ion

hy intperiahsm (Johnson,
PJ83,

p. 85,.

at

Johnson, as a

representative of the Imperialist
school ofthonght, therefore,
ohjeets to an ahsenee
of a
l.islorieal .naterialist

clepentleney,

explanat.on of social relations
represented hy the concept
of

and hence objects

to the ,tcrcn,le,,,,su,s

imperial, St paradign, holds,
’hnnsl he n.aintained

protlnetion/appropriation” (Johnson,
rests its

1

983.

p. 8h,.

level

empires, bnt

the level and

h

is

its

modem

in

for gold

IR has

its

1

)

which

he explored helow.

Greek and

forms date from the period of
mercantile capitalism.
(he guest by European

which Magdoff(l978) divides

end of nneenth century
S

will

roots in (he

and silver and other sources of raw
materials,

industrial capitalism, a |,criod

moment of

the theoty oflmperialism

winch corresponded with the
establishment of colonies and

powers

of analysts. Analysis, the

ntethodology „„ a historical
materialist analysis which
Impcrtalism as an alternative
paradigm

Roman

at

’

to (he

beginnings of

into three phases:

to 65(f- marked by Europe’s
overcoming of the
ippmg blockade of the Ottoman Empire,
opening up of the Americas to
1

p under, particularly of gold and silver resources and
the use of cannon
to take over trade routes previously
dominated by Asians and
Africans;

power

2)

650-to late eighteenth century^ emergence
of British dominance on the
seas with the “political triumph of
commercial capital” resultant
1

upon
which brought on the English revolution in
addition to
establishment of plantation “white-settler colonies”
which built

the

class struggles

the

up demand

for British

utilization

manufacturers “to meet the needs of the settlers” as
well as the
of slave labor on sugar plantations in addition to
“the boom of
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“

p°-s;rnd'poIiratdo^
3)

late

eighteenth century- 1870<;

based on merchant
capital

to

tn

PP- ^^3-4); and

r^’

one blsedmi

war, control of

“'r'"'

the Industrial
Revolution and the rise
of ind"

European powers penetrated
into colonLi in^"
materials and food
production and in,n
productton in co Jal
'

control over raw

in land;

extending the use of
moneyTnd Ixch'anotrim"
‘mposttton of forced
labor and recruitment
of a labor force deneni
‘’'=""''’>'''’8
competitive native industry;
®
creating a
rt
fostering of new elite
including
groups as political
d
mperial powers; imposition
oftLculttIre”ofZ"°T''^''r''
metropolitan centers, along
with racism and other
socioDsvchnln„
’aractenstics of minority
rule” (Magdoff, 1
foreign
978, pp. 1 06-7)

T

nL

*

t

..

was

tn this third stage

i

of impenahsm, wn.es
Magdof, whereby ”Europea„
nations

spread their control...from
35 percent of the globe’s
land surface

n

1

878”

(p.

1

08).

As

such, argues Chilco.e
(2000), this

in

1800

new impenahsm

to

67 percent

in the

eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries which was
advanced initially by Bn,
am and then
later

by

the United States:

signified a shift from

dominance over trade to control
of industrial
transformation associated with
the indus.nal revolution

and thTpih of
urope toward manufactunng
which necessitated extraction
of raw
matenals
the periphery and
expansion of the world market
(p. 14).

By WWI,

notes Magdoff, the
“near-completion of the

was accomplished “among
earth controlled

WWII,

it ts

by

territorial division

of the world”

the leading capitalist
nations (from the 67 percent
of the

the Europeans in 1878 to
84.4 percent in 1914” (p. 108).
After

the successful “challenge

by the United

States to the financial

hegemony of

Britain” which distinguishes
this period (Magdoff,
1978, p. 109) although tmperialism

was continued anew by

transnational and multinational
contora.ions

who

exerted their

influence “beyond the national
borders of the dominant nations”
(Chilcote, 2000, p. 14).
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W,.h .he nse of „.anufacU.„ng
and .he expans, on
late nine.een.h

cen.ury

new

,n.o .nd..s.nah.a.ion

hy .ho

.narke.s were needed
for produe.s, for
ovenrrodne.ion and

undereons..nrp.ion in .he
don.es..c nrarhe. were
sa.d .o sp.,r .he
.novenren. of eap..a,

and henee i^pena, con.rol
.o foreign nrarhe.s
(Hobson, ,902).

Two

Marxis. wn.ers

Hilferd.ng (.9.0/, 98,) and
Len.n „9.0/.982), .ooh
exeephon ,o Hobson's Cainrs
of

underconsumphon
,0 o.her par.s

monopoly

as .he cause

of Bn.ish .n,pena.
expansion

of .he wor.d and ins.ead
argued

.ha. capi.aiism

capi.aiism wi.h finance capital,
,ha,

employed by

industrialists, as its basis.

poLtical implications of this

monopoly

is

had reached a new s.age
of

cap.ial controlled

Lenin expanded

.his

s.age of cap.talism as

argued was ,he apex of cap.talis.
development

in .he nine.een.h
een.ury

.ha.

would

by banks and

argument and saw .he

imperMism, which he

set .he s.age for .he
eventual

transition to socialism.

The theory of Imperialism has

its

roots in

development of this thought by Lenin
and

others.

Marxism and

As

the subsequent

Linkla.er notes, recent years have

seen a “more balanced view of .he
strengths and weaknesses of
Marxism” which “has
replaced the stereotypical representations
of the doctrine which once prevailed.”

Concerned with developing a

critical

theory of international relations,

clearly evident in efforts to construct
a political

which analyses

[sic]

“impact

its

economy of international

is

also

relations

the interplay between states and
markets, the states-system and the

capttahst world economy, the spheres of
power and production.” Moreover, Linklater

argues that Marxism’s relevance for international
relations has increased since the

ending of'the age of bipolarity and with the heightened
impact of globalization,”

he writes, Marxism

is

“intrigued by the processes which are unifying the
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for,

human race—

by globaliza,.on

main driving

,n the

contnton parlance-and
rightly ide„,,ne[s]
capital, sn, as the

force behind the
unprecedented level of
international interdependence”

(1995/1996, pp. 119-120)“

The melhodology behind
Marx’s understand.ng of
socio-h.storical
dialectical ,n orientat.on
while his epistemology

outlook.

Marx’s whole purpose was

to

combines

dialectics with a
.nater.alist

reality

external being. In what

wh.le reserving the

Maclean

refers to as the

“empirico-analytic tradition,” one
sought to “distinguish between
object, ve
non-objective, evaluative statements”
(Maclean. 1981.

view, asserts Maclean,
significant

is that

it

is

develop a theory of social
change, for he

sought to resolve Ihe dualism
between consciousness and

mdependence of consciousness from

relations

p. 54).

facts,

and

The consequence of this

both disallows “the poss,bility
of coping with

change” on the one hand while
postting the construction of
socal

independent of persons activities
within

it”

on the other (Maclean,

1

98

1

,

reality “as

p. 54).

In this

63

In an interview published in the

Chicago Tnbune on January
5. 1 879, Marx spoke of
emafional relattons as ansmg between
workers when asked by the reporter
“What
has socialism done so far?” “Two things,”
he replied.
in

Socialists have shown the general
universal stniggle between capital
and labor. .and consequently tried to bring
about an understanding
between the workmen in the different countries,
which became more
.

necessary as the capitalists became more
cosmopolitan in hiring labor,
pitting foreign against native labor not
only in America, but in England,
France, and Germany. International relations
sprang up

workingmen

at

once between

m the three different countries, showing that socialism was

not merely a local, but an international problem,
to be solved by the
international action of workmen” (Marx, January
5, 1879, Chicago
Tribune) (italics mine).
64

See Chapter 5 below “The Imperative of the Market
& Its Democratic Cover” for a
discussion on the distinction of Marx’s dialectic from that
of Hegel.
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respec., ,he ,nd, vidua,
ex.s.ed

«,e world bu.

was no, of ,he world,
and wb„o soca,

realdy was seen as natural
and unchang.ng,
practical questions
ofcbange were couched
tn

mechanical and deterministic
terms. The
epistemological dilennna
which Marx
sough, ,0 correct, therefore,
was the contradict.on
between tdealism and

mechanistic

materialism.

Marx’s

starting point for the
process

understanding that

engage

in material

natural objects of

satisfy

human

all

societies

production.

little

must reproduce themselves
and

The

practical

aim of this

this requires that
they

activity is thus to transfonn

these needs, like the
abilities required to
satisfy them, are

themselves historically produced
and transfomied. Thus, by
production, -what
is

always production

at

p. 85).

confirmation of man [and

28).

And humans,

life activity itself

animals....

Only

mean,

Matena, production, or the
-practical

construction of an objective world,
the manipulation of
inorganic nature,

own

is

a definite stage of social
development-production by social

individuals” (Marx,
,857/,953/,973.

the species as his

his

or no use in their original
form into a condition where
they can

And

needs.

of change and the
means of change was

woman]

as a conscious species-being;

i.e.

being or himself as a species-being”
(Marx,

unlike animals, are not one with their

1

a being

who

treats

843a/1964, pp. 127-

life activity, for

which “distinguishes man [and woman]
from

the

is

it

is

conscious

the life activity of

for this reason is his [or her] activity
free activity” and thus an object
of

his [or her] will and consciousness
(Marx, 1843a/1964, p. 127). Reality, therefore,

“not merely objective datum, external to
people, but

consciousness” (Maclean, 1981,

p. 55).

is

shaped by them through

At the same time. Marx maintains
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is

that there

does always exist a
natural material
sub-stratum

lotheaetivityofhumaneonscousness.

Cognitive action, therefore,

."2

it

«i.«,
Change

i,

it

and

in this

“

“ '“"ttotitg""''

*"

,

process change themselves.
Staled Marx,

mys“e?pm;,hTra;l^al»^

The search
abandoned

for a deterministic
causality based

for a perspeettve

which sees causai.ty

individuals upon nature
(Chilcote, 1981
Historical

on the laws of nature

change from

,

p.

as directly related to
the actions of

184 ).

this perspective is the
result

society s forces ofproduction
and

its

itself is thus

of connici between a

relations ofproduction.
While the fomier consist

of the sum of the material conditions
of production including the raw
materials,
machines,

etc.,

as well as the

human beings

themselves, with their knowledge
and

experience, the latter are understood
as the relations between

human beings during

process of production and the exchange
relations of the material products
Together, the forces and relations of
production form the
constitutes a society’s

tools,

economic stnicture which

development.
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is

the

in a society.

mode ofproduction which

the delemiining factor in historical

From

a diaiec.cal

perspeCve. the forces and

with each other and changes

relations

of product.on

the fomrer require
adjustments in the

latter.

interact

But,

Marx

argued, society heretofore
has been organi^ed into
classes conform.ng to
people’s
relationship to the

means of production, and those

,n

a class society

who

benefit from

obsolete productton relations
will not voluntarily
relinquish their privileged
positions.

The consequent struggle between
the defeat

state

of the contending

from

class or the

overthrow of the previous
ruling

this perspective acts in the
interests

class and ensures that

class.

the different classes
in society thus results
either in

all

of the economically dominant
ruling

other societal interests are
subordinated to those of the ruling

Under capitalism. Marx and Engels

committee for managing the

common

Engels, 1848/1948/1998. p. 11

bourgeoisie but in no

The

class.

way

,.

asserted, the

affairs

“modem

state is

but a

of the whole bourgeoisie”
(Marx

&

In this respect, the state
mediates the interests

reconciles class conflict.

As Lenin

of the

outlined Marx’s idea of

the state, he noted;

The

state is the product

and the manifestation of the
irrecoticilability of
state arises when, where, and
to the extent that
the class antagonisms cannot be
objectively reconciled. And
class antagonisms.

The

conversely, the existence of the state
proves that the class antagonisms
are irreconcilable (Lenin, 1917/1971,
p. 8).
Class, therefore,

hence

is

the basic unit of analysis from a Marxist
perspective and

m the theory of impenahsm, but its meaning is void unless one is familiar

the elements

on which classes

rest.

For example,

in the capitalist epoch,

understand the relationship between wage-labour and

capital.

or,

more

specifically, those

who

one must

Capitalism,

simplifies class relations pitting the bourgeoisie or owners
of the

with

Marx

stated,

means of production

appropriate the surplus labor in the form of surplus
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value as well as .hose
capi.ahs.s („,ercha„.s os
nsoneylendess)

who

psovi.e fos

co,K,i.ions of ex,s.e„ce
for ,hc funhan.en.a,
class process-agains,
,hc ranks of .he

. Cass of lahorers, who hve on, so

prolcana. or

work only so long as

1

.he.r labor .ncreases
capl.al”

long as .hey n,.
work,

(Marx

& Engels,

anri

who

Hnr

1848/1948/1998,

p.

5)." Under capdalisnr,
,he value of a conrnrodi.y
produced exceeds .he sun,
of .he

value of labour-power and
nreans of produCon
consruned
possible only because .he
exchange value of labour-power
Ihc

means of produclion. Unless
no surplus value

value,

is

sell Its

created.

Thus

labour-r
-power

in capitalism thus
arises out

of the

is

IS

This

is

less .ban i.s use value
in

the only

.he source

its

exchange

commodity whose use
of all value. The

class

fact .ha, .he prole.aria,
is lirs, forced ,o

labour-power to the bourgeois
owners of production

subsist,

is

the use value of labour
-power exceeds

adds value ,o other commodities
and, consequently,
confromation

in Ihc process.

for a

wage

in

order to

and secondly, the workers must
produce more value than they
are paid

in

wages. Thus conHicts over the
intensity and conditions of
work characterize the
antagomstic class conflict of capitalist
production and structure the technical
and social
aspects of that production (Bottomore,
et

Marxian perspective, as

a result,

al.,

1983, p. 266). The level of analysis
from a

must always concern

itself with the

mode of

production.

To

understand the political economy of
capitalism,

with commodities from the

moment

we

must, therefore, begin

products are exchanged one for another.
These

65

For a

explanation of “fundamental” and “subsumed”
class processes as well as
distinctions between various types of capitalists,
see Chapter 5 below “The Imperative
of the Market
Its Democratic Cover”.
fuller

&
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products exchanged are
contntodh.es ,n so far as
they represent a
relationsh.p between
two persons or conrnrnntt.es.
The thing or product thus
represents

the relat.on between

producers and consumers

who

are

no longer, as

in feudal, snr.
un.ted in the

Economics, therefore, deals
not with th.ngs but
with

same person.

relat.ons

between persons and. in
the last resort, between
classes'
ses, vet
yet these
the^p rpiatirx
relations always are
attached to things and
i

appear as things.

While commodity production
brought together
propertyless workers w.th

property-ownmg
as the basis for

capitalists,

its

it

possessed certain .ntemal
contrad.ctions which Marx
saw

transfomration. Capitalists
engaged

order to accumulate capital.

As

living of the masses, for
this

would mean

therefore, will

m commodity production in

such, capitalists do not
seek to raise the standard
of
a lower rate of profit.
Surplus capital.

always be used for the purpose
of increasing

profits.

This process of

accumulating capital, however, led
toward the increasing
concentration of the means of
production and
turn, as

command over

Marx pointed

out,

labour-power

widened

m the hands of a few capitalists, which in

the basis for large-scale
production.

By

the late 19th

century, the tendencies to greater
concentration of capital, and hence
larger-scale

production, developed to the point
where monopolies formed which
subjugated free

competition to capitalist monopoly. The
results of this inherent
contradiction between

monopoly and

the subjugation

of the fundamental

characteristic

of capitalism of free

competition were “cartels, syndicates and
tmsts, and merging with them,” wrote
Lenin,
“the capital of a dozen or so banks
manipulating thousands of millions” (Lenin,

1916/1982,

p. 88).

Monopoly,

therefore, contradicts free competition,
and
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by repressing

.he .a„er

sets the stage for the
trans.t.on

fro. cap..a„snr

production, turning
laissez-faire capitalism into

its

to a

higher syste. of

opposite.

Capitalism must ever strive
for the accumulation
of capital, but the
qualitative
leap in large-scale
production along with the
tremendous concentration
of capital

erected a bamier to the
continuation of capital
accumulation on the national
market
alone. Surplus profits,
therefore, had to be
exported abroad

“backward countries” (Lenin,
1916/1982,
basis for the qualitative leap

socialization

now

p. 63).

Thus,

it

is

to,

what Lenin

monopoly which fonns

m the socialization of production,

the

and the focus of

concentrates on integration of
this process on a
global scale. The

tremendous significance of this
socialization of production,
wrote Lenin,
Capitalism

called, the

is that:

m its impenalist stage arrives at the threshold

complete socialisation of production.
capitalists are dragged, as

social order

were, into a

it

from complete

In spite

new

of the most
of themselves, the

social order, a transitional

free competition to

Production becomes

complete socialisation

social, but appropriation

remains

private
The social means of production remain
the private property of a few
The general fr^ework of formally
recognized free competition remains,
but the yoke of a few monopolists
on the rest of the population becomes
heavier, more burdensome and
intolerable (Lenin,

1916/1982,

p. 25).

War, therefore,

m the stage of imperialism is the only means to break through

the obstacles of continued capitalist
accumulation and export of capital and

commodities and

to set a

new framework

for accumulation.^^

War becomes

a necessary
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In his classic defense
to the contrary

of the pacific nature of capitalism, Schumpeter
(1951) argues
and asserts that modem imperialism is merely a
residual effect from the

precapitalist autocratic state. “Imperialism,” he
argues, “is atavistic in character”
(p.
84).
capitalism’s detrimental aspects including “export
monopolism”, the use
offeree to break down customs barriers or to secure
control over foreign markets, or

Modem

overt colonization and the suppression of native
labor, are

all

the product not of the

and centra, eletncn.

to the

workings of the whole
systen, ntore so than

at the earlier

stages of capita, acetnnulatton.
Thus, the poiittca,
d.vts.ons between
countries hccotne
itnportan, in the sense
that states, winch
represent the power
and
interests

of different

ntling Casses, must
mediate the potential co„niet
of ruling Cass interest.
This conHict

can take the fonn either of
.nter-capitalist rivalry or
nva,^ between
pre-capitalist state.

territonal divis.on

distribut.cn will

It

is

Whatever fonn

the rivalry takes,
however, will rcstdt in the

of the world among the
great

become

a capitalist t.nd a

capitalist

powers, and production and

centralized in tn.enta,
capitalist monopol.es,
trusts or cartels.

thus in this fundamental
histoncal materialist thesis
where the Imperialist

paradigm disagrees most with the
Dependency
asserts the paras, tic nature

nat.onal capital.

of capital on labour

Thus imperialism

theorists, for the lutpcrialis.
school

in

general and no, merely between

refers not to the “oppression

and ‘exploitatton' of

weak, impoverished countries by
powerful ones” but “to the process
of capitalist

ACCUMULATION on
the theory

a world scale in the era of

of imperialism

market created by

that

is

MONOPOLY CAPITALISM, and

the investigation of
accumulation in the context of a world

accumulation” (Bottomore,

et al.,

1983, p. 223).

The

present but, rather, of past relations of
production.

he social structure, m individual,
psychological habits of emotional reaction...
must
padually disappear” with the fuller development
of capitalism (p. 85) Modem
mipenahsm, he argues, is “a heritage of the autocratic
state, of its stmctural elements
organizational fonns, interest alignments, and
human attitudes, the outcome of
precapitalist forces

which the

early capitalism” (p. 128).

autocratic state has reorganized, in part

by the methods of

“A

purely capitalist world,” he writes, “can offer
no
soil to impenahst impulses.” Indeed,
Schumpeter argues, “we must expect

fertile

that anti-

imperialist tendencies will

show themselves wherever capitalism penetrates the
economy and, through the economy, the mind of modem
nations” (pp. 90-91).
“[MJodem pacificism,” he writes, “in its political foundations if not its

derivation,

unquestionably a phenomenon of the

capitalist

world”

(p. 92).

is

Dependency school, by bas.ng

i,s

enhre theorcical argunKn,
on ,he .echnologica. and

nnancal dependence of La.in
Anaerica. Africa, and
As, a on comers of
,ndns,nal.a.ion
l.ke ,he

capital

Un.,ed Stales or Great Britain,
thus mainta.ns the
ntysttfication of the power
of

and technology as the remedy

production and appropnation

is all

to ‘•development,”
while the class contradiction

of

but ignored. States
Johnson,

They

distract attention from
the essential Mantian
concept (and
matenahst point) that labor power
alone is the creative force
of social
hmtory and of technology and
capital), while capital
is but a mere fonn
social relations, a product
itself of that labor
power (Johnson, 983
1

In this respect, the

analysis and

its

dependency perspective

is

criticized for its

overemphasis on external determination

p

underemphasis on class

to the neglect

of offering

matenalist explanations of the
sociohistorical relations which
exists.

Underdevelopment, therefore, cannot be
forces a uniform

mode of production on

structural struggle

it

countries in the periphery.

between classes must be examined

accumulation on a world scale structures
relationships,

totally attributed to capitalism

in particular.

territorial classes into

must not be forgotten, as Marx pointed

history but they do not

make

it

historical-

While

the drive for

subordinate

out, that

people “make their

from the past” (Marx, 1852/1978,

p. 595).

its

dominance and reproduction”

and development of capitalism

which

It

interacts.

The

of capitalism on the Third World appropriated
“other modes of

production and/or division of labor, dominant classes,
or religious beliefs to
guarantee

own

just as they please” but rather “under
circumstances

directly found, given and transmitted

historical imposition

The

which

facilitate or

(Chinchilla, 1983, p. 160). Hence, the pace

will vary according to other

The contradictions engendered by
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modes of production with

these conflicting

modes of

production and the process
of change ntust be understood
therefore not as
evoiutionisnt but as dialectical
and interactive. Thus
n. articulattng

production as the basic level
of analysis,
conflictual relationships

internal contradictions

secondly, focus,
ng on

it

is first

necessa^

in the forces

modes of production

hnear

modes of

to be cognizant

between different modes of
production and with

emanating either

a

of

their

own

or relations of production.

as the primary level of
analysis

is

And

done

in

order to understand the matenal
basts and work.ngs of the
basic unit of analysis in

Marxian thought which

is

class or class alliances.

In recognizing relations

beholden to monopoly
arising out

capital,

of dependency as a product
of stmctural heirarchies

one understands the material
basis

for this situation as

of the struggle between the
contradictions of social production
and private

appropriation which “one must be
able to link up the ideological
theses within the social

sciences with specific class needs
91).

Only from

Marx’s

at particular

moments

in histoiy”

this material contradiction,
asserts Johnson, “can

political conclusions about the
historical

need

(Johnson, 1983,

p.

one understand

for socialist revolution”
(Johnson,

1983, p. 93). Lacking this basic materialist
understanding, the dependenlislas propose
ideas of socialism which tend to isolate
the local dominant classes thereby
isolating

workers while encouraging “petty bourgeois
violence” which have

remains untouched
the direct result

little

in the

intellectuals into isolated acts

of guerilla

short-term effects and “monopoly capital
(imperialism)

end” (Johnson, 1983, pp. 95-96). And these conclusions
are

of the depemlenlislas positing

their level

of analysis

market and exchange relations and the circulation of commodities,

114

at

the point of

capital,

and labour.

In analysing nation
to natton relations,
therefore,

tite

ideologieal theses

of the

dependency school concludes
as follows;
First, the

United States (monopoly
capital) denefuh on
countries
(eot.petit.veeapitairfor^heVo?h;^o::t:^

a

t

^

Amcncan countries depend on
the United
States for finance capital
and technology, given the
historinl r
i

v

oftmperialis^-seontroloverthenteantfV::;*^^
0.rd, the United States and
Latin Anterican eountnes
(interXt; of,
one another, given the international
division of labor and the
system of
capital production (Johnson,
1983, pp. 87-88).

Had
dependency

they located their level of
analysis in the
theorists

mode of production,

the

would have reeognized the
determining eontradietion of
soeialized

production and private appropriation
and thus of the parasitic nature
of eapital on labour
in

general and not merely between
national capitals.

analysis, they

would have been able

From

this materialist level

to reverse their scientific
theses,

of

which justifies

continued imperialist domination,
and linked them with the historical
needs of the
proletariat, to read as follows:

First, the

given

Its

United States

is

control over the

independent of Latin American countries,
means of production, its own labor forces,

and

control over capital accumulation;
second Latin American countries
are independent of the United
States, given their productive,
creative
potential to construct their own historical
process; and third, the United
States and Latin American countries
are independent of one another
its

based on each other’s relative position of
autonomy within the
international division of labor, and so on
(Johnson, 1983,

p. 88).

From

this

society’s

matenahst understanding, derived by basing one’s

mode of production and

level

of analysis

analyzing the contradictions which therein

in a

arise,

Marxists claim to be able to posit a coherent theory of IR
which understands the
imperialist nature

of monopoly capitalism thus avoiding the dependency

fixation with surplus value

exchange which has
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left

them “unable

to

theorists’

combat the very

relations they explicitly

hope

to eliminate: the

appropnation of capital” (Johnson,
1983,

Many of these debates between

impenahst relations of
production and

p. 90).

the

Dependeney sehool and

the

Impenahst

school tmpacted upon the
development of World-Systems
theory whtch

of Immanuel Wallerstein’s

TJ,e

Modern World Sys.en,

as an altemat.ve globalist
paradigm,

is

first

arose out

(1974). World-Systems theory,

primarily a response to the
stntctural-

functtonahst approach dominant
in the U.S. from the
1940s through the 1960s which
postulated a universal model of
societal development

known

as

“modemization theoty”,

Countetposing traditional “undifferentiated”
societies with a hm.ted
number of
institutions (oriented

pnmarily around family and kinship)

to

modem

industrial

“differentiated” societies-with
differentiated institutions, both
public and private,

being the key to development and
societal survival-modernization
theory held that
socteties

have already or

Lack of development

all

will shortly develop through
a similar developmental
process.

in Third

World

societies

was thus “simply

the result of ‘historical

backwardness’.” Once traditional societies
overcame their backwardness by revamping
thetr

social structures, cultural values, and
political institutions,” then “these
societies

would be

in

a position to take advantage of transfers
of industrial technology from the

West and

to

begin improving their economies” (Shannon,
1989, pp. 4-5).

modernization theory was the necessity

to

West and, with Western educational and

copy

institutions

Key

of the advanced

to

states in the

technical assistance and training, speed up the

process of development. The motivation for Western
industrial societies to actively
participate in this

program of assistance

communist influences

in these

to

developing countries was

in part to

“backward” countries. States Shannon:
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counter

“

If

modeniization was nol encouraged
and shaped by Western
nstng discontent that derived
from the breakdown of
trad
systems and institutions and
from
increased expectations

efforts

ue

long the

Communist-inspired

rlolril^

Wel; 9i;p
i

dictatorships hostile to the

bl

While criticism of modernization
theory was varied and
included
its

ahistoncal approach,

Its

assumptions of orderly change and
preference for

World-Systems

tt,o

its

castigation of

lack of concern with the
particulanties of different
socteties,
stability, the

major criticism by

theorists dealt with modernization
theory’s attnbu.ion of the
problems

and lack of development in the
so-called backward countries
as an
to these societies’ preference
for traditional institutions.

modernization theory’s

To

internal factor

owing

the contrary, argued

erities:

such a view ignored several centuries
of cultural contact, trade
colomzation, and political-military
intervention by Europe and (later)
by
the United States. Hence, satd
the critics, these countries
stopped being

true tradittonal soctettes well
before the twentieth century. Rather,
they

had been changed into new kinds of
societies that fit neither the
traditional nor modem categories
of modernization theory (Shannon
1989, pp. 6-7).

’

Histoncal backwardness in developing
nations was thus the result of a system
of
exploitation emanating from the relatively
developed industrialized societies in the

world system.
Influenced by the work of Fernand Braudel
(1981, 1982, 1984) and the concerns

of French

historical thought associated with the

Wallerstein

but

was

was unable

world-system

Annales school and

its

journal,

initially interested in the colonial structures as
they applied to Africa

to

account for general attributes of this situation without focusing on the

itself.

After jettisoning states as an appropriate unit of analysis in his
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concluded

that tlic

world-system which had
arisen out of Europe

sixteenth eentury and
spread aeross the globe

hispuTToses.

He

states:

-1

was

in the

the only nsefni level
ofanalysis for

had one type of unit
rather than units whhtn

units.

I

eould

explain ehanges in the
sovereign states as eonseeptent
upon the evolution and
interaetion

of the world-systenr, Wallerstein,
on what he

felt

was

in

074, p.

7,.

This decision then led

Inn, to focus ,n

a fundanrental discontinuity
or break ,n the historical
process which

protluced this world-system.

occurred

1

The “rupture”

in the historical
process,

he concludes,

Europe

in the

long sixteenth centum: and

that involverl the
,ra„sfon,u„ion

of a
of production, that of fettdai
Europe ‘a7rr,ders^^^“0"omic
Ancien Regime") into a cptalitatively
differen
!
iffcrent social
system (Wallerstein, 1980,
‘"'’a

pp. 7-8).

The signincance of this

historical watershed, states
Wallerstein,

,s

matched only by “the

so-eallcd neolithic or agricultural
revolution” (Wallerstein,
1974, p. 3)."

As opposed

to

the previottsly existing
rsolated world-empires or
world-economies which perchance did

trade with

one another, Wallerstein postulated

which originated

Amcrtca but

later

in

the

sixteenth eentury Europe and

expanded

modern world-system.

to incorporate

In this sense, a

development of a world economy

was

linked initially with South

most areas of the world thus forming the

world-system

a soeial system, one that has boundaries,
structures,
rules of legitimation, and coherenee.
IS

Its life is

member groups
made up of the conflicting

forces which hold it together by tension,
and tear it apart as each group
seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage.
It has the characteristics
of
an organism, in that it has a life-span over

which

its

characteristics

67

Carlo Cipolla dates this agricultural revolution from
the eighth millenium B.C.E. and
it, along with the eighteenth
century Industrial Revolution, “created deep
breaches in the continuity of the historical process”
( 1962/1964, p. 29).
states that
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change

in some respects
and remain slable in other, n„„
structures as be.ng at
different times strong
or weak in .
tntemal logic of its functioning
(Wallerstein. 1974.

,r

p

In addition, he adds,
a

world system has an
^extensive division of
labor” winch

merely functional-that

economtc
1974,

,s.

occupational--but geographical.
That

is to say, the

”is no,

range of

tasks ts no, evenly
distnbuted throughout the
world-system” (Wallerstein,

Moreover, ”,he Cass.cal

p. 349),

meaningless,” he argues,

when one

conception of the state and
social order.”

As

its

lines

of d.vis.on within social
science are

studies a social system
as opposed to a ‘liberal

relat.on to func.onal and
geographical sectors of the

a consequence,
world-systems theoty calls for a
“unidisciplina^

approach” as opposed to a
“multidisciplinaty approach”,
thus muting the

of

efforts

anthropology, economics, pohtical
science, socology, and
history (Wallerstein.
1974,
11

p.

).

Historically, the

modem

world-system

is

the only such world-system
and

incorporates a “set of relatively stable
economic and political relationships
that has

charactenzed a major portion of the globe
since the sixteenth century”
(Shannon, 1989,
pp. 20-21). This

new

type of social system which emerged

is set

histoncal antecedents by the particular
nature of its political
capitalist

economy organized

understanding,

the

it

is

economy which

its

is

into an interstate system"’ (Shannon,
1989, p. 22).

the particular

modem world-system

apart from

way

in

from previous

“a

By

this

which exploitation occurs which distinguishes
societal formations.

Whereas accumulation of

surplus previously had been extracted by political
coercion through taxes, tribute,
slavery, and other

means usually by

a hereditary aristocracy
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who

controlled the state,

by

contras,

accu^u.anon of surplus under
capnaUsn,

of .he nreans of produCon.
The

,s

undena.en by

role of .he s.a.e
under .his

.be pnva.e owners

new econonnc

sys.enr

bdTes loV; t'rf
.ennsofe.eha„rar/p^rp:^^^

(^al^"
This

new

sys.en,

,s

-'^ntrises

a capi.abs. sys.enr because

i.

is

based upon

‘‘(I)

proH. maximizing

and .he search for eonrpe.ihve
advantage through efficiency.
(2) .he quest
cap.tal accumulation,

for

conhnual

and (3) the exploi.afion of
labor by .he owners of
.he means of

production” (Shannon, 1989,

p. 23).

Its

fundamental imperative, however,

accumulation for the owners of the
means of production” (Shannon,
1989,

-is capital

p. 28).

Moreover, as Hopkins explains, the
most fundamental theoretical
claim of worldsystems theory

is

as follows:

the articulation of the^rrocmes
of the world-scale division and
Integra , on oHabor and Ihe
processes of state-formation and
deformation
(the latter in the twin context
of interstate relations
It IS

imp^enum)

that constitute the system’s
formation

and relations of
and provide an account

most general level, for the patterns and
features of its development’
(hence, of the patterns and features
of modem social change).
at the

The

of the two sets of processes necessarily
the network of relations among
political

articulation

m

results, in the theory
’

formations (states, colonies

being patterned like the network of
relations among productionaccumulation zones (core-periphery), and
vice versa (Hopkins, 1982,
etc.)

12 ).

In addition to

modem

world-system

its

capitalist

is that

of which has been able

it

is

p.

economic organization, the other basic aspect
of the

comprised of competing sovereign nation-states,
none

to eliminate its counterparts. Indeed,
writes Wallerstein:

modem world-system that a world-economy
has survived for 500 years and yet has not come to
be transformed into a
It IS

the peculiarity of the
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79

(Wallers, ei„.

Precisely because of the
multiplicity of states in
the system. Wallerstetn
argues, has

capttalism flourished. This
large ••arena- allowed
economic factors to operate
beyond
.he control of any single
political entity. -This
gives capitalists a freedom
of maneuver
.ha, is stntcurally based.

„

has

made

possible the constant
economic expansion of the

world-system, albeit a very skewed
distribution of its rewards”
(Wallerstein, 1974,

p.

348).

Besides nation-states, other
components of World-Systems
theory include

economic zones,
World-Systems

social classes,

and status groups. Borrowing
from Dependency theory,

theorists utilize the terms

core

semi-periphery”, and “periphery”
to

,

categorize the world social division
of labor. These terms, states
Hopkins, “designate

complementary portions of the world-economy
and only denvatively
political division” (Hopkins,
1982, p.

1

economically and politically dominant
the

1).

Core

states are

states in the

Japan are understood

to

initially

have attained core

in the

IS

power

is

superior to the other

confined to Europe, the U.S. and

status in the twentieth century.

At the other end of the world-systems spectrum
what

understood to be

specialize in manufacturing the

well, core states’ military

economic zones of the system. Although

its

world-system which have access to

most advanced technological processes
and thus

most sophisticated goods. As

pertain to

referred to as the periphery. Relatively

weak

are those states

in terms

and colonies

of military power,

in

states

periphery are technologically deficient and engage in
more labor-intensive

production. Consisting of most states in South and Central
America, Africa, and Asia,
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•‘production for export

connnod.ties”

was concentrated on raw

in these states
for“n,ost

ntaterials an<l agricultural

of the ntoden, era”
(Shannon, 1989,

p,

25 ).

Existing as a mid-point
between core and periphery
states, and winch
also act to
ntediate hetween these
two extremes, are what are
known as semi-peripheral
states.

Exhibiting a mixture of
more-or-less technological
sophistication

mechanisms
political

hem

a degree

of autonomy envied by

world-system maintains

With regard
classification

production

relative to their core/periphery
counterparts, the
organization-both

and military-of these
semi-peripheral

status in the

in

to social classes,

of differentiating

means of production.

states (e.g. Brazil

and Argentina) grants

states in the pertphery,
though their subordinate

their

dependent status on the core

stales.

world-systems theorists follow
Marx’s

social groupings according
to their relationship to
the

In contrast to

world-empires which preexisted the

modem

system where the basic distinction
was between those who controlled
the

machincor and those
distinction “is

who did

not,

under the

capitalist

slate

world-system, the basic

between those who own the means
of production and those who arc

denied ownership” (Shannon,
1989,

A

modem

world-

final social

p. 27).

cleavage which world-systems theorists
recognize

is

that

of status-

groupings “whose solidarity derives from
cultural identification” based on factors
such
as “religion, language, race, or
ethnicity” which, in the

modem

organized into nations or peoples governed by
a single

state.”

groupings for world-systems theory

is

era,

have “become

The significance of these

that these identifications

have often “prevented

global class solidarity of both the capitalist class
and the proletariat” (Shannon, 1989,
pp. 27-8).
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While world-sysle^s theory

constitutes a relatively

new

perspect.ve by which to

analyze intentational
relations, one of its
ntost pronnsing
studtes (Boswell

Dunn. 2000)

relates direetly-if

democracy from
dissertation.

In

that being

only as postulating an
altetnat.ve conception
of

promoted by the

theorists analyze antisystemic
social

and they postulate ”a

modem

NED-,o

theonzing the prospects for
wha, they

whtch have overcome the worst
spiral

& Chase-

the , bests of the
present

call -global

and labor movements from

fonrrs

1

democracy,” these

848

to the present

of dominat.on including
slavery and colon.alism,

of economic expansion and

social progress

by which the

world-system has expanded and
intensif.ed to become the
global pohtical

economy of today” (Boswell

& Chase-Dunn, 2000, pp. xi-xii).

Rejecting teleological claims
which postulate the inevitability
of progress,

Boswell and Chase-Dunn

utilize structuralist

and materialist theories

in light

of the

impact of cultural factors and
individual decisionmaking to
formulate a response to

what they see as “the current ideological
hegemony of neoliberalism”
world economy as

their level

(p. xii).

With the

of analysis, they recognize certain
systemic trends and

cycles which have molded the world-system
over the long-tenn.

acknowledge “the impermeability of the global

As

well, they

capitalist system,” asserting that
the

various attempts of communist or socialist
states to break out of the system
were “never
feastble

m practice” (pp.

3-4). Nonetheless, they argue that the
parameters

system are not impervious

mies governing global

to social action

capitalist relations

of the world-

from below as witnessed by the change

in

over the past 500 years including the

abolishment of slavery, the liberation of colonies, and
the winning of democracy
various areas of the world. However, they warn, individual
action
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at

in

the state level

is

not sufficient to generate
permanent change in the
world-system; on the contrary,
they
write, “institutions

and relations

at

the global level must
be chainged in order to
foster

equality and end exploitation
in every state”

(p. 5)

Boswell's and Chase-Dunn's
conception of global democracy
has a dual
characteristic in that

integrated world

it

advocates for “democratic
institutions governing
the ever more

economy”

management and

while, at the local level,
they call for “economic

social administration as
well as politics and the
state

democratic participation.” In
individual

human

rights, without

Moreover, they argue, “nghts
polity, are also

social justice

this regard, they assert,

fundamental

to

which democratic

economy, and

in the

5-6).

to

“[d]emocracy includes

civil

and

institutions are meaningless.”

links

between the economy and the

any conception of democracy

and equality” (pp.

open

Consequently, they

that

can actually produce

reject the

simple notion which

equates the mere presence of popular
elections with democracy. Without
economic

democracy, they argue, what

results are “highly unequal,
class-divided societies”

governed by “an elected polyarchy.” This
currently

exists in the United States

[National]

Endowment

for

and

Democracy

is

is

the form of democracy, they
assert, which

promulgated world-wide by the U.S.

as the political basis for the neoliberal

globalization project” (p. 6).

Rejecting the necessity for state ownership of the
means of production to

achieve their goals of meeting basic social needs,
sustainable development, social
justice,

and peace, they nonetheless believe

that the actions

through the twin processes of market competition and class

of workers worldwide can,
conflict, contest the

standards and rules of the current capitalist world order. The
accumulation of capital
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aiongs.de

its

cycles of expansion and
s.agnai.on -‘produces
a spiraling growth
nr

production forces

that,

however unevenly, always

offers periods w.th
the possibihty

of

.nrproving people's lives(p. ,0). Adnntting that
an alternative response
to cap.tal.st
globalization could well be
led by forces of
national chauvinism
which “can easily

devolve into racism and
xenophobta,” they argue

that

,t

is

for this reason that
the

-contemporary transnat.onal dnve
toward heightened
explo.tation can only be
checked
by what they
refer to as “transnational
pohlics ” In particular, they
argue:

Global labor standards,
environmental regulations, and
women’s rights
form a smgle starting point.

Through

or and allied

movements can

direct

institutions

of global democncv

market competition away from

cheaper wages and toward
increasing human productivity.
In world

The

present study with

democracy abroad

its

focus on the

NED and the export of a U.S.

m an attempt to secure U.S. hegemony in the

post-Cold

and into the 21» century, draws
selectively from each of these
globalist

brand of

War world

theoretical

paradigms. Historical materialism
provides an understanding of the
animating aspects

of both

societal

historical

and material development and the
underlying

epoch of capitalism.

matenahsm

dialectical tensions in the

In addition, Gramsci’s further
elaboration of historical

as presented in Chapter

1

provides insight into the necessity for
a would-be

ruling class to provide leadership
without simply relying on the use offeree
so as to

engender a socio-political moral ethic
exerting sufficient

to

hegemony necessary

Dependency theory’s

distinctions

win legitimacy

for

its

for

its

reproduction and continuity.

between core and periphery
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programs and

rule, thus

And

while

are useful in categorizing

asym,nelries of power and wcalll,
imcrnal.onally,

occurring between states

fails to

aeconnt for the

,,s

new

undorslanding ofcxploi,a(ion
as
processes associated with

globalization winch are beginning
to bring pockets of
wealth to these traditionally

neglected areas in the Third World
winie exaccrbat.ng disparities
of wealth within core
soeicttes themselves, albeit the
major

economic divide

ilcvciopcd and developing nations.'’"

On

still

rests

between the so-called

the other hand, the broad
international

systemic context presented by World
Systems theory, positing a trtdy global
systen,
currently capitalist in orientation,
provides the fundamental framework
for analyzing the

evolution and integration of the world
capitalist
social classes, states, status groups,
their effect
States, the effect the overall

upon struggles both within and between

movements which

global capitalist system. Because the
capitalist

throughout the system, the level of analysis

it

act to alter current constraints

mode of production

this writer agrees

(1999) that World Systems theory’s implicit assumption

process

is

of the

dominant

posits for international relations theory

of the global economy. However,

movements opposed

the interdependencies of

system has recursively on these struggles,
while

highlighting the antisystemic

rests at the level

economy and

to capitalism are “necessarily part

with Halliday

that all antisystemic

of a broader emancipatory

conveys too much of a unity on them “and commonality of direction”

(pp.

68

To

this starting point list

should be added the fight against racism as well

69

Dependency theory has

historically catalogued

how much

of the asymmetries
from the internationalization of capitalism has played out and been understood
by many, especially by those theorists from the world’s periphery whose countries have
resulting

suffered the most from core domination of developing economies.
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306-7). Moreover, as Halliday
points out,

many
the
y of me

soci-,Im„
social
movements
,

since the mid-

1960s were “anything but
emancipatory” including:

RjaThf ^r, 'irrad^^^

Indeed, Halliday’s central
critic.sm of World Systems
theory

whole world

the

is

inextricably cap.taltst in
onentation.

that the Soviet

Union and

world system.

If there

conimumsm “were
cap.taltst states”;

pos.ts, for

example,

Hasten, European satellites
were part of the capitalist

of the same world-wide movement
as those opposed
if there

in conflict

dint

assertion that

has only been one system,
then oppositional forces to

however,

of the Soviet Union

one side were, by

part

its

The theoty

is its

to

were indeed two world systems
during the existence

with one another, “then those
opposed

of this opposition, supportive of the
system

to the

system on

in the other.”

In this

case, he writes:

The

antisystemic’ movements within the
established ‘antisystemic’ were
therefore ‘prosystemic’: this, indeed,
was what the historical function of
the opposition movements in the East
turned out to be. In a systemically
divided world, two negatives make a positive
(Halliday, 1999, p. 307).

The

state-capitalist nature

of the Soviet Union has been argued by many
including

Resnick and Wolff (Summer 1993), with the

central aspect

of this

latter critique

pointing out that the social surplus failed to be
appropriated and allocated by the direct
producers.

often

this

On

this basis, the

accumulation of surplus by the

mimicked processes of accumulation

wnter agrees with

this analysis,

those countries which followed

its

it

is

in the

state

and

developed capitalist

its

managers

states.

And

while

nevertheless arguable that the Soviet Union and

lead represented nascent, though ultimately
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unsuccessful. a„en,p,s ,o
,uove beyond ,he cap.u,|,s,
world syslcnr. thus
providing
hisloncal experience fronr
wluch ,o draw upon. With
.heir collapse,
however, even ,he

remaining nominally communis,
regimes have, more or

less,

opened up

,heir societies

.0 market-based eeonom.cs,
operating under the principles
of prof., maximization
and

pnvately-appropriated extraction of
surplus.

Wnting on
and

their

the nature of revolutions-i.e.

the ultimate antisystenric

movement-

impact on the world system.
Halliday proposes a
seisn.ologic analogy wluch

underscores the systemic level of
analyis for IR. “[RJevolutions,”
he

states:

occur in particular places, as
do volcanoes and earthquakes,
but we can
only understand these specific
explosions by looking a, broader
contexts
and structures within which the
revolutions, their causes and
their
contexts, are located. An
earthquake or a volcano tells us
to look at
underlying stmetures and faults
in the earth’s surface
as a whole, not just
^
at the site of the explosion
itself
(

And though

not

all

antisystemic

of Halliday’s analogy

is

1

999, p. 3

movements

that analyses

Q).

are revolutionary in nature,
the key aspect

which focus only on individual countries

to

explain change or potential changes
“will miss the ideological, or
economic, or power
political context” in

which such

crises occur. Neither, he warns,
can the international or

systemic level be the sole focus, for “this
will not explain
they do, nor

why

why

states

pursue the policies

such policies have the outcomes they have.”
With a broader

internationalised perspective” that encompasses
socioeconomic and ideological
structures, then not only will

we be

able to understand the particular forces that
generate

revolutions, but, as well, and contrarily, such a wider
perspective will also help to

explain “why, given the vast range of potential causes,
domestic and international, there
is

not

more upheaval

in societies than there is” (pp. 310-11).
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What

is

proposed by

Hanida, wi„,

his se,sn,„logic

displacement of the

analogy ansing on. of his
sUuly of .voh.hons
.s no. ,he

state, bu, rather ,ts
redefinition:

states are to

be seen not as

undifferentiated legal-.errt.orial
entities, nor as units
that operate ,n an
abstract
international system, bu. as
the eoercive and
admtnis.ra.ive en.it, es that
polt.iea, and
social forces both challenge
and appropriate” (p. 3

1
1

).

this respect, states
are sites

of

contention, and changes within
them affect the constitut.on
and stability of the
international system.

And jus. as

punishment occur within
social bases

of their

coercive and administrative
practices of reward and

states as

dominant classes seek

rule, so too at the level

of the global

to perpetuate the

capitalist

econonne and

system are there

constraints along with benefits
and rewards in addition to
punishments meted out in

order to maintain and extend the
system.
In addition to his
reconceptualization

between the socio-economic context
and
the socio-economic aspects of a
regime,

underpins

it,

and

at the

which

stress the

distinguished from that which “bases

latter

we

state,

Halliday argues for linkage

of ideology or

culture.

should “also look

at

Thus

in

its

examining

the ideology that

preconditions, internal and external, for
that stability”

Yet, he notes, approaches

The

that

of the

(p.

importance of ideas and culture must be

account of change on the role of human will.”

does not follow from the former, he argues.
To the contrary, he writes:

Ideas, culture,

314 ).

and language

may be part not of the domain of human
volition and of meaningful collective action,
but rather of that which
contextualizes and constrains: individuals are bom
into a world of
realities they cannot change, and these include
the culture,

religion,

language, the texture of social meaning that envelops
them. These are
constraints as important as social and economic structure.
When they

change, they can, equally, be part of that convulsion of the system
that
takes individuals and social groups along with it (Halliday,
1999, p. 313).
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Lastly, in his reassessment
ofintemattonal relations
theory and approaches.

Hall, day argues for the
incorporation

movements, he wntes. challenge
ones

that

make

of soc.al movements and

states both internally

classes. Social

and externally, and the
successful

revolutions “are fontted ,n
an international context.”

transnational forces

The hroadc,

which actually make revolutions
prompt Marxists

to posi, “classes

as both internationally
constituted and internationally
aot.ve” while hkewise
prompting

behaviourahsts

to

view such events as “affected
by, and

in turn affect, the

conduct of

others, through demonstration
effects and a range of
transnational linkages.” Both

approaches, argues Halliday, pose a
conception of IR “that displaces
the primacy of
states

and seeks

to locate individual
revolutions, or political
processes in general, within

a broader context of transnational
action"

always break down the barriers between
writes:

“1789 challenged 1648,

1

(1

999,

states

p. 315).

and

Revolutionary situations

societies. In this regard. Halliday

848 challenged 1815. [and) the
twentieth-century

revolutions repeatedly defied schemes
for the maintenance of
international order.” The

permanence of transnational infiuences engendered
by revolutions
though “the

stability

of societies presupposes,

only be

m question.”

practice,

time,

political

and social

Here the factor of a dominant ideology must not

1

999,

p. 3

1

6).

from outside by an

Values and ideology thus

the constitution of transnational social groups and
classes
interest,

of the

instilled within particular societies but as well
“reinforced

appearance of naturalness” (Halliday,

some

inter alia, a favourable international

economic climate, and the reinforcement, by shared
practices of the country

persist for

who

refiect

exhibit a convergence of

shared values and ideology due to the simularity of conditions
produced by

transnational forces.

The same

transnational forces constitute similarities in values and
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aleology for the donr.na.ed
as well, including workers,
peasants, and

.ntellecluals.

Halliday notes, however, that
while social groups and
classes nray be satd to
have a

convergence of interests -.n the sense

that their secunty,
prosperity

considerable extent dependent on
international conditions.

.

.

entail that classes

[this]

and wealth

ts to

a

does not. however,

have a transnational identity or
consciousness” (1999,

p.

317).

Pointing out that the possessing
classes, the bourgeoisie,
have been globalizing their
interests since the

Second World War, he

notes, to the contrary, that
the dominated

classes— including both service and
part-time workers which

are a product of

transnational forces in the late twentieth
century-have been less able to put
forward
their interests internationally, “for
the dominated,” he argues,

“do not have the

investments, the material incentive, to
articulate an international interest
that the

dominant do.”

In this respect, the

“dominant have more resources-money,

air tickets,

conference centres, [computers,] administrative
support, time itself— than the

dominated.

IS

In the ensuing conflict

between transnational and national

forces, Halliday

cautious to remind the reader that “[sjocial
movements act in a context of states and,

in the

in

’

longer run, serve to reinforce

states, internally

and externally” (1999,

acknowledging the ground on which such movements

asserts that such changes

which are produced

p.

318). But

are played out, he nonetheless

in revolutionary periods

cannot be

explained “by a logic of states, balances of power and idees
regues’" nor by such logic

can their impact on the international system
argues.

Only

itself be explained.

To

the contrary, he

a dual perspective, incorporating both state and society, can encompass

the international dimensions of revolutions” (Halliday, 1999,
p. 319).
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The “inescapable comex,”
ntodem world_.nciud.ng
deologies,

is.

in

which

societal conHicts are
played

om

the

revolu.ions, conHic.s
between states, social
classes and

he wtates. a combined and
uneven process. Drawing
on Tro.sky-s

formulation of the laws of
uneven and co,nbined
development (cf Trotsky,
1932;

1931/1969) which respectively
pointed out

make

how backward

leaps to catch up ideologically,
technologically,

etc.

countries are compelled
to

with their relatively

developed counterparts while
simultaneously combinhig
different stages of

development

in this leap forward,
Halliday notes that

context which explains

economic

activity,

“how

ideas,

it

is this

and forms of conflict,

l.ke

broad contradictory

fom,s of technology or

could be transposed to contexts
very different from that

they onginated” (1999.

p. 320).

In

in

which

concluding that “the combination
would prevail over

the unevenness,” Halliday
states that this Marxist
approach to the laws which

ant.c.patcd a “world revolutionary
cataclysm”

(i.e.

the combination) failed

due

to “the

fragmentary character of states, the
spatial and political distributor
of that unevenness”
(

1

999, pp. 320- 1

).

This unevenness

is

particularly exacerbated in the
current period of

capitalist globalization, as evident
with the

on a global

scale.

ever-w.dening gaps between rich and
poor

Globalization impacts on the level of states
as well as the

socioeconomie and ideological

levels.

Writes Halliday:

States and eommunities exist in a world
increasingly unified by
economic and social processes, by both transnational
formation and by
the pressure on societies to conform with
each other with an increasingly
unified, and unequal, world. Part of this
transformation involves the

reproduction of separate political and economic forms,
the ‘nationstates’, but part involves the reproduetion
within each society of the
tensions and conflicts characteristic of the
(Halliday, 1999, p. 321).
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modem world

as a

whole

In

recognising the accompanying
giobalizaiion of social
conll.Cs as a consogucncc
of

the production of

arc

first

,l,c

global systen,

itself, llalliday ,s
<,uick to

note that such contlicts

located and fought out within
particular states, although
he

not contradict the fact that

it

is

a global

phenomenon”;

after all,

the

most potent threats

the present

it”

1

999,

p,

32

1

is

universal-lUerally

Indeed, nationalist forces
present one of

).

to the present global
capitalist

campaign by the U.S.

“does

he writes,

“na,ionalism...by definit.on the
most self-regarding of ideologies,

no country can be without

re, narks this

to introtluee

its

system

that

may

eventually thwart

brand of democracy within the
borders

of other countries.

While the strength of Marxian analyses
“located

politics

and social behaviour

within a global context, that of,
he spread of an uneven but
increasingly globalised
capitalism,” llalliday nonetheless
faults

Marxism on two counts:

of the endurance of states, and the ideologies
associated with
this globalisation a direction, a
teleology, that

and supersession by another

political

would

it”;

I)

“in the depreciation

and 2) “in ascribing

lead necessarily to

its

to

destruction

and social formation” (1999,
pp. 321-22)

1 he present analysis rejects any
teleological understanding either of the

democracy-promotion

activities

of the U.S. or of the antisystcmic movements which

such interference in the affairs of other states
engender. General tendencies and
exposition and analysis of the particular practices undertaken
within their historical
context, however,

this regard.

do provide explanation and

insight into the varying forces at

Moreover, one of the basic underlying assumptions of this study

socioeconomic,

political,

continues to operate

is

and ideological contexts

in

which the

NED

is

work

in

that the

has arisen and

as the creation and tool of a particular national social formation,
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V<z.

the

USA.

In this respect,

while certatn tendencies
explored below point

direction of the supersession
of these efforts

away

front national
states

sohdtfication of a tntly
transnattona, elite direettng
such efforts,
i.

-s

.he particular circutnstances

the world system

the ideological fonn

I. is

we now

with

look

a,

this

hegemony

its

involvement

,n

and the possible

argued herein

its

that

dotntnance

in

democracy-promotion

but as well to set the
agenda and dtreCon.
ineluding

democracy promotion

takes in

its

implementation.

exposttion and understanding
of present tntemational
relations that

previous U.S. efforts

long involvement

is

wh.ch the U.S. currently
enjoys with

which necessitates no, only

activities to secure its

it

in the

in the

to

promote democracy abroad by
focusing on

regions of Latin

U.S. has most successfully
tmplemented

Amenea and
its

the Caribbean, areas in

hegemony under

freedom and democracy.
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its

which

the

the banner of promoting

m. PAST US. ATTEMPTS TO
EXPORT OEMOCUACV

"

t.rfureTs“,rrr"“

EAT.X AMERICA

,N

^

“7''' “ “
counto^’s most agile
milimrJce-re'MarL'cr
^ Marine Corps.
1 served
commissioned ranks from sernnH lir.
>
A''d
during
penod I spent mos of

member of our
in all

t

•ha.

t

^

b
Bus, ness, for Wall Street
and forle b",7er^I„
capitalism (Butler, 1935-36,
p. 8).

—Marine Corps Major General Smedley

D. Butler

action and twenty times
decorated
the Ph,l,pp.„es. Honduras

'

^

Under fire
^

Smedlev Butler
and Ch.^aTnd
all
awarded the Congressional Medal
of Honor.

1

1

t

mounded

to the

for this

is in

in

1823 Monroe Doctnne,
claiming

truth

Historically,

to

speak for

an aggressive

hegemonistic position which denies
any particulanty or relative
autonomy
multiplicity of countries

to the

which comprise South, Central and
North Amenca.

however, U.S. domination of the
Americas has oftentimes proved

smgulanty of voice by the U.S.
though these countnes

still

be true

to

in fact, at least as a matter

this

of practice. And

remain largely under the influence of
U.S.

control, they

nonetheless have asserted their relative
independence from U.S. dictates within the
thirty years or so either

cutting their

Hence,

it is

own

by challenging U.S.

is

last

leadership in the United Nations or by

deals with the former Soviet Union,
China, Cuba, and other countries.

more accurate and

less

presumptuous

with that of “U.S.” foreign policy as

change

in

niericans to be twice

U.S. foreign policy pronouncements
have been presumptuous

of the countnes which make up
the Amencas,

^

^ racketeer for

i

Throughout the Cold War, and
indeed going back

all

™

sho77'“

I

have done

to replace the

here.

concept of “American,”

However, such a descriptive

unlikely to occur in practice, because one of
the essential aspects of U.S.

foreign policy has always been

expansionist tendencies,

it

its

expansionist tendencies.

And when

a country has

requires a corresponding language to point toward the
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expans, on, s, goals sough,
wh.le sin,ul,anoo„sly
incorpo.ahng .hose elcnen.s
of .he new
.err,.ones and peoples
whieh can be ass,n.ila.ed
and vigorously coun.ering.
suppressing

and

wnhng on. of exis.enee .hose
aspeo.s wh.eh

needed

.0 carry

Doenne wh.eh declared
Perk.ns, 1941/1946).
,n Pres,den.

who

submi.

W,lso. s

m

1

of .he 20.h cen.ury,
expansion, s. ienninology
hecanre,

.urn

Wilson’s words, a

.0 a„.hori.y .0

War Message,

in

have a voice

no.e .ha.

of .hose
Presulen,

457) which, following .he elec.ion
of FDR

Baric, 1947, pp. 551-2; see
also Pike,

in

FDR did pledge .o

.naugural address of 1933 and did

for .he righ.

own Govemmen.s” (W.lson,

in .his in.erwar period

isola.ionism/nonin.ervenlionism,

70

p.

democracy,

“Good Neighbor Policy” of
nonin.erven.ion (cf

Good Neighbor PoUcy,

One should

figh. “for

in .heir

Baric, 1947,

932, go. .ransla.ed again in.o .he

1995).

Such was .he case wi.h
.he Monroe

.he Anrencas off-linri.s
.0 fur.her European
colonixa.,on (cf

A. .he

Woodrow

Roosevel., The

™

ou. such expansionis.
goals

.end .o undcrnine .he
.deologieal un,.y

commi.

of presumed U.S.

be a “good neighbor”

in his

Ihe U.S. lo a policy of
nonin.erven.ion a. .he

A cogen. example of such expansion.sl

language can be seen in Presidenl
group of Melhodisls of how he had
agonized over Ihe
Aspos.lion of Ihe Philipp.nes claiming lo
have prayed lo “Almighly God” every

McK.n ey

s

desonphon

lo a

nigh.

And one

nigh, lale

o ake them

all

il came lo me ihis
way...lhal .here was nolhing left for
us lo do bul
[ihe Philippine archipelago], and
lo educale ihe Filipinos, and
uplifl and

cv.hze and Chnsl.amze ihem, and by God’s
grace do .he very
as our fellow-men for

besl

whom Chris, also died. And ihen

we could by ihem

I wen. lo bed, and wen.
lo sleep
and slepl soundly...” (Christian Advocate,
January 22, 1903, New York' quoled in
^
Bailey, 1040/1946, p. 520).
’

The U.S. purchase of Louisiana

in 1803, East Florida in 1819, the

1853 Gadsden
867 purchase of Alaska in addition to earlier and subsequent
forcible
acquisitions or divisions of territory were all
arrangements with either European state
powers or the government of Mexico, territories bought,
sold, conquered, or divided
which save for the seldom honored Indian Treaties never
Purchase, and the

1

—

seriously consulted the

opinions of nor recognized as binding the rights of the
indigenous

tribal

occupants of

these lands.
71

Wilson was alluding

to those citizens

who

U.S. recognized.
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followed the authority of those leaders the

December ,933 ,n,er-American
conference

Montevideo. Uruguay. But.
as ,bkc

notes: ••From the very
beginn.ng, however, the

when

,t

came

to

much

the

U.S. pres.dent denro.rstrated
that

nonintervention he would
pursue a Talleyrand-like
course of

trickstensm; he would

very

new

show

same thing

that nonintervention

was

a policy

as intervention” (Pike,
1995,

meaning fundamentally

p. 173).

Such was the case

in

U.S. refused to recognize the
nationalist government
of Ramon Grau
San Martin and acquiesced when
Fulgencio Bat.sta overthrew
Grau in January of 1 934
and replaced him with Carlos

Mendieta as President, whose
government Washington

recognized within five days of the
coup

d'etat.

Pike also notes that

FDR's

noninterventron policy acted similarly
to the previous U.S.
interventionrs. policy in
other ways as well, as. for
example, FDR's stationing of
warships
Cuban waters as a

m

show of strength and U.S.

resolve or the U.S.'s retention
of military forces in

Guantanamo Bay. Cuba and
intervention had ended but

in the

still

it

Panama Canal Zone. Concludes

persisted;

Pike. •'Yankee

and Latin Americans understood
they might

very well derive advantages from
two diametrically opposed policies
cards nght

(Pike, 1995, pp.

onset of the Cold

War with

communist menace which

1

73-4).

Changed conditions

after

if they

played the.r

WWll, however,

at

the

the Soviet Union, called for a
poliey of •‘containment” of the

in turn further necessitated a
policy

to protect those countries fighting

communism

of global interventionism

through the establishment of a U.S.-

dominated international governing body, otherwise
known as the United Nations. And,
for a short while with regards to Latin

America, U.S. President John

proclaimed the “Alliance for Progress” which ostensibly
sought
democratization

in Latin

America through socioeconomic

of communism” (Wiarda, 1990a,

The

theoretical

to

Kennedy

to “assist

aid and thus inhibit the spread

p. 104).

bedrock of the Alliance

of perspectives which came

F.

for Progress

was rooted

in

an amalgam

be known as modernization theory (see Chapter 2 above).

Associated with individual scholars such as Walt W. Rostow (The
Stages ofEeonomic
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Gro»,„: A Non-C„„,
Econo,nic Gco.„.,

1

Manifesto,

1

965), D. McCielluncI

960). B. Hosoii.z (Soaolog.cal
Aspects of
,

The Achieving Society,
1901),

o, al

niodemizaoon theory charactenzcd
Weston, Europe and
North An,erica-tho

World”-as

F.rst

so-cal,cd

-the centres of modernity,
innovation, industrializahon.
dynantic

entrepreneurship, achievement,
rationahty, democracy
and freedom.”” With
ntodenrization theory hlaming
Latin American
underdevelopment on powerful,

entrenched oligarchs, “inherited,
long-standing
inattention to

Hawed

economic and

character

traits,

inertia, corruption,

social problems,” and a
culture noted

medieval cultural

writes that the Alliance for
Progress

traditions,

and defective

and careless

by “a pattern of
instittttions.”

became widely upheld and
accepted

Park

as policy

72

Slater further elaborates on
modernization theory as follows:
I^n

contrast, the countries

of Africa,

Asia and Latin Amenca were
defined
by the preva cnee of traditional
culture, undeveloped divisions
of labour
the lack of utilization of their
own resources,
over-population, pre-

emocratic structures, and the
predominance of rites,
primitwe customs. Above all, they
were

rituals

and

characterized in terms
lack of capital, technology,
entrepreneurship, advanced social

oUack—

and

political institutions

and

modem

values.

In the early 1950s, a
prominent
argued that the United States had
interests in the welfare of
foreign peoples that went beyond
national security and commercial
prosperity; we want these people to
have some participation in the good
material things of life which we enjoy
in the United States. Viner
(1952:
1 76) commented
that ‘we want the common man
and his wife and his
children to have not only Coca-Cola and
chewing gum and ice cream,
not only modem plumbing, automobiles,
refrigerators and

US academic

electric

lighting, but also

good health and good diet, good education’ ...
and ‘the
benefits and virtues ... of political democracy
and social security’. The
West was constmeted as the model and prototype for
the non- West
the
future destination for traditional societies
willing and able to make the
transition to modernity. As one political scientist
prescicntly observed in
the 1970s, a little over a decade before the term
‘end of history’ became

so famous,
...

‘

—

this ideal

‘the idealized vision

type

is in

which the passengers
their legs (Cruise

effect the

of modernity has an American face’
end of history, the temiinal station at

modernization can finally get out and stretch
O’Brien 1979: 53)’ (Slater, 1997, p. 642).
to
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because „s op.nn.s.ic ou.look
-captured ,he nrood of
the
.rad,„onal

.i„,e

and expressed ,he

American sense of mission The m.ssion, presumably,
was

Amenca and

,o go nuo Larin
roc, ou, these long-stand.ng
problems. -Fundamentally,though. Path

notes, -that m.ssion

remained what

it

had been throughout the
postwar period: defense

of the noncommunis. world(Parh, 1995, pp. 217-20).
Hence, U.S. intervention
,n the
Domtnican Repubhc tn 1965, called
tn.o question
modemiaa.ion theory and, as Park
notes, “together with mili.aor
coups in Brazil in 1964 and
Argentina in 1966 darkened
the assessments of the
Alliance for Progress during
the remainder of the

decade and

infused them with a sense of
disillusionment” (Park,
1995,

Saturday Review

in

1

970, Senator

to the Alliance for Progress
as he

the alliance has fatled.. .”

economic disappointment,” “a
October

17,

Its

In an article in

Edward M. Kennedy added,
perhaps,

wrote

the final stake

“For the vast majority of Latin
Americans

that:

The Senator wen. on

.

p. 224).

social failure,”

to characterize the
failure as

and “a

political failure”

“a major

(Kennedy,

1970,pp. 18-19). Park summarizes:

putative failure

was

less a result

momenlous

of Latin American events than of

cultural and political changes
within the U.S., which sharply
curtailed the liberal agenda and
also reduced the public’s already

notoriously short attention span for
things Latin American. The
consensus that had upheld the Alliance
for Progress early in the

Kennedy

administration failed pnmarily because
of those changes, but the decade
also witnessed a growing challenge
to modernization theory by a
new

paradigm, which brought into doubt the
theoretical underpinnings of the
Kennedy program and undermined confidence in its
ultimate
success

(Park, 1995, p. 204).

This

new paradigm was

Gunder Frank

called

Dependency Theory. Based on

the writings of Andre

{Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution,
1969), Samir

{Accumulation on a World Scale:

A

critique

of the Theory of Underdevelopment, 1974),

Fernando Henrique Cardoso and E. Faletto {Dependency
and Development
America, 1979), and, perhaps most especially,

Development

Amin

to

in

Latin

Raul Prebisch {Change and

Latin America s Great Task: Report Submitted to the
Inter-American
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De.e,on„.e,„

.97,), dependency theory saw
deve.opnron, and
underdevelop,nen.

two aspects of ,he satne h.s.onca,
process which gave nse
and led ,o an .mernational
d.v.sron
as

oflabor,

As Dependency
by the Alliance

viz.

,o

European co.onizahon

the process of capitalist
development.

theory displaced
Modernization theory, the policies
promoted

for Progress

were soon

forgotten, and in the
,970s

dunng

the so-called

•‘decade of the generals” (which
had actually begun with the
CIA-backed Brazilian coup

cVem of

1964). bureaucrattc-authoritarian
regtmes headed

ruled in most every Latin

Thus whether

FDR’s Good Neighbor

milttary governments

American country.

was

it

by

the

Monroe

Doctrine, Wilson’s “fight for
democracy”,

Policy, “containment”, or
JFK’s Alliance for Progress,

all

of

these policies had a corresponding
language which attempted to
maintain U.S.

hegemony. And while the U.S. made
inroads
Western Europe

after

into Africa, Asia, the

Middle East and

WWH, nowhere has its hegemonistic desires had a

more

prolonged, enduring, and brutal history
than with the countnes of Latin
America.^^

nowhere other than

m Latin America has the U.S. acted with so singular a

And

public

purpose of acting under the guise of promoting
“freedom and democracy.”

Following the independence movements of
most South American countries
the

m

first

quarter of the nineteenth century, the U.S.
responded with the

1823 which publicly declared Latin America
off-limits

to further

in

Monroe Doctrine

European

colonization while implying that, in effect, as
political scientist Michael Parent! notes,
the United States

would be

the sole political and colonizing

World, and that the western hemisphere was
influence....

A year after the Doctrine’s promulgation, [Secretary of State]

Adams informed

South American liberator Simon Bolivar

must not be interpreted

as authorization for the

Allen Haden, an observer of U.S. foreign policy

second world war commented

much of the

to

power in the New
be an American sphere of

that:

in

“Latin America

application of foreign policy can get

48).
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weak

to

that the Doctrine

be insolent with the

Latin America in the period of the

is in

its first

effect a laboratory in

which

workout...” (Haden 1945 p

plague America with
miseo^

m the name omerly

And. indeed, misery for Latin
America came
.O maintain U.S.

hegemony

in the region

in ihe fonii

of U.S. interventionism

which allowed easy access

for U.S. investors

and extraction of the region’s
vast quantities of raw
materials. Thus before
the Open
Door Policy was proclaimed
regarding China in
1899. the U.S. had intervened
over 20
Itmes in Latin American
countnes as far north as
Mexico in 847 and as far south
as
Chile in 1891.
1

One

classic

example of U.S. intervention

career of William Walker”
(Houston, in Walker.
filibuster

who, acting

in Latin

1

Anienca

860/1985.

p.

1

),

is that

the

American

in a private capacity, in
the seven year period from

death by a Honduran firing squad
California”, then proclaimed the

m

1860,

first

853

till

his

Mexican department of Sonora “free”
while

ventures failed, attempted four
times-killing

managing between

Chief Executive of the Republic of Nicaragua)

down

1

proclaimed himself “President
of Lower

designating himself as “President
of the Republic of Sonora” as
well and,

control of Nicaragua (even

of “the strange

1

1

2,000 people

855

to

1

857

in the

to

when

those

process-to take

have himself elected

in an attempt to further U.S.
boundaries

through Central America.’" The rage
of U.S. citizens

to

become

“filibusters” or

“freebooters” following the successful
filibustering action of Sam Houston
in prying

74

Greene writes:

Webster traces the noun filibuster to the Dutch vrijhuiter
{vriz, free; buit,
booty) and gives this definition: “A freebooter
or soldier-of-fortune

who

aids a revolution in a foreign country in order
to enrich himself;

applied to buccaneers in the West Indies,

commerce

who

first

preyed on the Spanish

South America, and later to such adventurers as followed
to Cuba, and Walker to Nicaragua, in their
expeditions of
conquest” (Greene, 1937, Introductory Note).
to

Lopez
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away Texas

fron,

Mexico

follow, „g Che subsequent

,836, and afier ,he U.S.
sncceedod

war w.Ch

cha,

coun,^ over

.a.ing halfof

Mex, CO

Che annexation of
Texas endnrg in
i

.he

,

848 Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo,
-was acceptable

rndhon Anrencans,” Houston
argues, “as long as
n,ess,an,c duty to spread
denrocracy.”

rhetonc to fighfing communism,
then

And he
[i.e,

it

to a large part

could be

of the

thirty

so, nehow justified

confinues, -[,]f „ow

,n the ,9th century]

we

we

by our

address our

addressed

it

to

fighting ignorance, colonialism,
the shameful inability
of ‘effete and decadent’
races to

govern themselves properly-anything
Walker, 1860/1985,

p.

I),

that stood ,n the

way of Progress” (Houston,

So supportive of fihbuslenng
was

the

American public

in

in the

m,d-nineteenth century, that even
the faded attempts by
General Nareiso Lopez ,o
“hberale” Cuba and offer it ,o the

Americans

when

the Spanish executed

him and

when Lopez’s second attempt

in

1

his

850

band on

Law of

1

to flee

him

the status

his third attempt in

failed to insptre the

and welcome him and instead forced
him
with violating the Neutrality

virtually assured

back

p. 308).

As

to convict

1

Indeed,

.

to rise up

where he was charged

was so sympathetic toward

the fihbuslers that three successive
juries disagreed. Prosecutions
in

Ohto,” wntes Barley, “met with similar
failures”

85

Cuban population

to the U.S.

8 1 8. “public opinion

1

of a hero

New York

and

Lopez (Bailey, 1940/1946,

regards the widespread belief in the
fundamental legitimacy of American

expansionism, Representative Anderson of
Missouri spoke

for

many when he

Let no technical impediment be thrown
in the way of our
Americanizing Central America. Humanity,
philanthropy, and
Christianity, demand that it shall be done
at no distant day. Such
Manifes^t destiny; and why should we be
afraid to proclaim it

is

stated:

our

to the

world?

Wave upon wave of immigration

will roll in upon that country,
wars, ignorance, superstition, and anarchy,
will be supplanted by peace, knowledge,
Christianity, and our own
until, ere long, its internal

The term “Manifest Destiny” was invented by John L. O’Sullivan,
leader of the
Young America movement in the 830s and 840s. O’Sullivan coined
the
1

1

“warrant for the country’s westward expansion” (Wills, January
31,1 999,
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term as

p.

1

5).

Heaven-bom
January

10,

institutions” [Cong. Globe.
35

Cong 2 sess n 200
1859] (quoted in Batley,
1940/1946, pp. 294-5)

Pro-slavery rn.erests in the
Southern U.S. states, “satisfied
of, heir nrabd.ty to carry
slaveor rnto Kansas [by the
1 850s], were
then prepared to
concentrate thetr labors
on
Central Amenca...” (Walker,
1860/1985, pp. 364-65).“
The repeated attempts at

colonizing Nicaragua presented
advantage for the U.S.
government as well which could

deny any backing
newly

“1, berated”

relatively pacified

for Walker's adventures
should they
state into the

and passive

In his account

Union should

to

Yankee

of his 1854-57 war

fail

wh.le readily accepting
any

the subject population
prove to be

rule.^^

in

Nicaragua, Walker several
times makes

it

a

pornt to rndicate that the U.S.
government failed to back him in
his adventures and even
acted to thwart his activities;
but that such pronouncements
of U.S. disinterest in

expanding rnto Central America were
not widely believed

is

indicated by Walker’s

own

explanation below:

Often,

has been semi-officially
announced that the United States
government was determined to force
open the road across Nicaragua;
but
as no justification for so violent
an act on the part of the United
State’s
has been presented, it must be
presumed that such declarations are
intended merely for popular effeet.
In fact the American authorities,
by
It

an arbitrary act offeree, interrupted
the only effort which, since
December, 1856, has promised suceessfully
to restore the passage across
Nicaragua to citizens of the United States
(Walker, 1860/1985 pp 365’

66 ).

The Demoerats, who were
their platform

strong in the Southern states, put themselves
on record in
efforts ‘to regenerate’ Nicaragua The

of 1 856 as approving Walker’s

Bntish not unnaturally

felt that this prince of filibusters
was but ‘the advance guard of
Manifest Destiny, and that he was engaged in a covert
attempt to secure territory for
the United States
Central America, in violation of both the letter and
the spirit of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty” (Bailey, 1940/1946, p. 294).

m

Whether

[filibustering]

was wrong or

right

was a question answerable only

after the

had failed or succeeded. Successful, he was a hero; unsuccessful,
he was an
outlaw contemned by all of his fellows” (Greene,
1937, p. 27).
filibuster
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The American diplomatic

historian, Dexter Perkins,
liowcvcr,
,

forthcoming about the U.S.
govenimcnfs

atliiiide

IS
i

much more

towards Walker’s lilihuslering
as

indicated below:

The

filibustering expedition

of William Walker, his
seizure ofihc
goveimment of Nicaragua, the
tolerance and Hnally the
reeog,
on
a corded him by President
Pierce and his advisers'
all seemtd
at unscnipulousness
and covetousness had more
to do with American
policy than anything else.
There had been ihc Mexican
War lesTlI n
decade before; there had been a
bullying policy toward
Mexico almost'
i

mlw

years of Whig rule (and Ihcse
not
imDeccThler^T
impeccable),
and now "i*^™
there was the toleration
of this rulhicss if

unotticial,

impenahsm

(Perkins, 1941/1946,
p. 104).

The legacy of William Walker,
Central America

as the pattern

writes Houston,

and paradigm

that

is

for

he

is

American

remembered

all

intentions.”

Houston

over

continues:

here

not a schoolchild

who doesn’t know his name and his story.
Parents for generations have been
frightening children to sleep with
s

name. He has become the core around
which
been created (and all countries define

their national

his

myths have

themselves by their national
myths): the heroic and successful
struggle of the people of Central
America against the arrogance and power of
the North Americans— as
they see t— has sustained them through
all the years of other
American
interventions since Walker’s first and
“unofficial”
i

one.

internal

enemies

external

enemy has

are,

they

know

traditionally

for certain

Whoever

their

from which direction their

come (Houston,

in

Walker 1860/1985

p. 9).

And though

the U.S.

government did not always openly back such private colonial

ventures in the 19th century, the opposition to
direct U.S. intervention

century has forced

it

plausible deniability

to

it

reexamine the path of private
provides. But

government policymakers had
and support

all

initiative

in the

20th

and the security cloak of

of this rethinking on the part of U.S.

to wait, for in the nineteenth century the public

for outright imperialism

was then
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in its

heyday.

clamor

In .he aftemnath

of the 1898 Spanish Amencan
War, Teddy Roosevelt's
"B,g

Sttck” policy led to multiple
military interventions
mostly in Central America
and the

Canbbean

in

Cuba, Honduras, Dom.nican
Repubhe, Nicaragua,

.he newly-created state of
Panama^wh.eh gained

U.S. contnvance and gunboat
diplomacy so

tts

Haiti,

Mex.co and

in

independence from Colombia
wtth

that a canal

could be built link.ng both

oceans and reducing the travel time
for transoceanic shipping.’*

With the election
tntervention in Latin

to the presidency

of Woodrow Wilson in
1912, U.S.

America continued, though

it

now occumed under the auspices
of

protecting constitutional government
in the hemisphere and
“making the world safe for

democracy.” But

lest

intervention in Latin

anyone believe

America

that support for

in the past,

democracy was

the basis of U.S.

one need only be reminded of the
words of the

much-decorated Major General Smedley
Butler of the U.S. Marine Corps
who had a
completely different perspective of
just in fact whose interests he
was protecting when

he recapitulated his past military exploits
I

helped
14.

boys

I

thusly:

make Mexico and especially Tampico safe
make Haiti and Cuba a decent place

helped

to collect

revenue

for

American

oil interests in

for the National City

Bank

helped in the raping of half a dozen
Central
^encan republics for the benefit of Wall Street. The record
of racketeering is
ong. I helped purify Nicaragua for the
international banking house of Brown
rothers in 1909-12. I brought light to
the Dominican Republic for American
sugar interests in 1916. I helped make

companies

way

in. I

Honduras “right”

m

1903. In China in 1927
unmolested.

I

helped see to

it

for

American

fruit

that Standard Oil

went

its

During those years,

I had, as the boys in the back room
would say, a
was rewarded with honors, medals, promotion. Looking
back on
might have given A1 Capone a few hints. The best he
could do was to

swell racket.
it, I

feel

I

I

operate his racket in three city

districts.

We Marines operated on three continents

(Butler, 1935-36, p. 8).

By the treaty of December 10, 1898, Spain relinquished sovereignty over Cuba and
ceded the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam to the U.S. The U.S. took
possession of
Wake Island on January 17, 1899 while the Samoan Islands were divided up between
the U.S. and Germany later that same year. The Hawaiian Islands had
just previously
been annexed by the U.S. on July

7,

1898 (Bailey, 1940/1946, pp. 466-530).
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As

Parent, notes, “[sjome

saw no contrad.ction between
Wilson’s professions and

General Snredley’s
statenrent-.nclud.ng
Parent! argues, -.o

much

a par,

bnng

Woodrow Wilson

the energetic blessings

hinrself.

of capitalism

In the.r v.ew,”

to Lat.n

America was as

of the nat.on’s sacred m.ss.on
as was dissem.nating
Christianity and

constitutionalism” (Parenti,
1971, p. 18).

Twenty-s.x years of constant
interventionism from 1914-34,
which included,

amongst

others, the

1

9-year occupation of Haiti,
the

Dominican Republic, multiple
interventions
1

in

1

8-year occupation of the

Panama including those of 1918
and

925, and the e.ght-year occupation
of Nicaragua (this

military occupation into that
country
the U.S. presidency

by the

U.S.),

by Franklin Delano Roosevelt

were ended with the ascendancy
in

1933.

replaced military diplomacy with
dollar diplomacy as his

towards Latin America continued to

Somozo
that

in

Nicaragua and Trujillo

FDR’s Administration sought

install,

in the

being the third such

latter

FDR, however, only

“Good Neighbor” policy

arm, and foot the

bills for

Dominican Republic. Yet

to rely

more on

to

it

despots like

should be noted

liberal trade policies than the

constant use of force and intervention
which had characterized previous U.S. policy
on
the Latin

American

continent.

The Caribbean

WWII saw the U.S. Navy occupy Jamaica,
the

Bahamas. As

well, in

order— at

also experienced U.S. interventionism
as

Antigua, Trinidad, Bermuda,

least offrcially— to

influence in the region, the U.S. shortly before

its

St. Lucia,

curb Nazi activities and

entry into the

war

in

and

German

December 1941,

had begun establishing military missions throughout
Latin America to serve as “liaison
agencies between the military establishment of the United
States and those of Latin
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Amencan

countries, and mission personnel

became

advisers to the Latin

American

military” (Meditz and Hanratty,
1989, p. 249). This U.S, military
assistance program to
the region laid the basis for
subsequent programs designed
to ensure U.S.

hegemony

in

79

the region.

This fifteen year period of relative
non-rnterventionisni from 1933
asrde from those necessitated

President

by WWII) was transfonned once

Truman took over after FDR's

peoples

who

to the

40

years.

And

aid “to support free

by anned minorities or by outside

pressures” (Truman, quoted in Ambrose,
1971/1979,

Number 68 which

(i.e.

again, however, as

for the ensuing

Truman Doctrine which vowed U.S.

are resisting attempted subjugation

Council Resolution

1947

death in 1945 and institutionalized
what would

be the cornerstone of subsequent
U.S. foreign policy

whether one refers

to

p.

150) or National Security

delineated the view that the conflict with
the

Soviet Union involved “the fulfillment or
destruction not only of this Republic but
of
civilization itself

(NSC-68, 1950/1975,

p.

51) or whether one merely uses the original

lerm of containment as formulated by George
Kerman (cf Kennan, 1947,

of these policies pointed

it

to basically the

back wherever possible.

same

goal: containing

communism and

rolling

80

In short, the U.S. launched itself on a holy
crusade against

Fejes points out the “control of communications,

mass media” was an important element
America.

p, 575), all

first

point-to-point,

in the establishment

and

later the

of U.S. power in Latin

[FJirst film, then

newspapers and magazines, and lastly radio broadcasting
were integrated into the media structure of the United States. By 1945, United States
hegemony in hemispheric communications was complete” (Fejes, 1986, p. 4).

Kennan himself has maintained that he only called for ‘political’ containment of the
Soviet Union and not ‘military’ containment or, what is referred to as, rollback. Taking
blame for his policy recommendation’s misinterpretation, Kennan states; “I should
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C0.™,n,nisn, whether against
Stalin and the Sov.e,
Union and the threat posed
to

Westen, Europe or aga.nst
presutnahly Soviet

allies ,n Lain,

Anrencan or other

parts

of

.he glohe or even n, err,
ally w.thin the U.S.
itself aganrst those
eharged w.th aiding and
,

abetting the “eonrmunist
nrenaee” as eharged by the
then junior senator from

Wisconsin. Joseph R. McCarthy

ways

not only forestalled

In consequence, this
unfortunate trajectory in

much demoerat.e development,

but oftentimes worked diametrically
against
In the case

(Williams, 1959/1972.

diplomacy

p. 2,.

particularly in Latin An.erica,

it.

of Cuba, American diplomacy,
rooted

what William Appleman Wilhams
referred

in

anticommunism, contained

to as “the fundamental
elements

Specifically, he noted four tragic
elements

m Cuba which could be generalized to most of

relations with the countries

of Latin America

many

of tragedy”

of American

the United Slates’ subsequent

in that they entailed-v/z.
I) vastly

asymmetrical power between the U.S. and
the governments

it

dealt with, 2) the failure

have explained that I didn’t suspect them
[i.e. the Soviet Union]
of any desire to launch
an attack on us. This was nght afier the
war, and it was absurd to suppose
that they were
going to turn around and attack the United
Stales. I didn’t think 1 needed to
explain that
but I obviously should have done it”
(Kennan, April 1 8, 1 996).

As

the U.S. State Department states
regarding the 1954 Senate censure of Senator
Joe

McCarthy:

The hunt

for subversives started during the

by congressional committees

that often

investigation to harass people with

m February

war

abused

whom

itself,

their

and was furthered

powers of

they differed politically.

Then

1950, an undistinguished, first-term Republican senator from

Wisconsin, Joseph McCarthy, burst into national prominence
when, in a
speech m Wheeling, West Virginia, he held up a piece
of paper that he
claimed was a list of 205 known communists currently working
in the

State Department.

McCarthy never produced documentation

one of his charges, but

for a single

for the next four years he exploited an issue that
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or inability ,o use

tha,

power

,o create a realtty in
these other c.tUttres

with professed Anteriean
ideals of democracy and
freedom

whtch correlated

attd respect for
self-

detemrination and the modentiza.ton
of the economy.
3) the abandottment of those
reformist elements in other
countries

who

did support the goals
of Amertcan

democracy, and 4) a reactionary
behaviour exhibited towards
any refonn movetnent

which conststently played

tnto the

hands of the most extreme
radicals

tn other countries

(Williams, 1959/1972.
pp. 3-4). Thus the underlying
roots of this U.S. behavtor
rooted
in

anticommuntsm meant

virulent

that

American response

claiming

it

any efforts

in that the

for

reform

in these

countnes were met wtlh a

U.S. countered most genutne
efforts

was “communistic” and then

acted to oust the refonners.

onginal expansionist motivations
of the U.S. were very

much

As

present,

at

such,

i.e.

fact (in the

to speak,

this drive

which, on the one hand, did have
some basis

in

sense that there were active, though
very small, relative to the dominant

political parties operating in each
country.

Amencan

tlie

the drive to

extend U.S. power and hegemonic
inriuence. However, during the
Cold War,
took on a different clothing, so

refom, by

Communist

Parties operating in

most Latin

countries as in the U.S. as well), but
which, on the other hand, was only

another chapter to be added to the continuing
saga of further expansion and extension
of
U.S. domination. Taken individually, accounts
of U.S. intervention sometimes
reveal a coordinated and encompassing plan
to suppress

movements aimed

juxataposed together, however, U.S. efforts to establish
and extend

he realized had touched a nerve

in the

its

reform;

hegemony

American public

<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/60.htm>.
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at

fail to

Illuminate an all-around
general functional mission
which chciracterizcs U.S.
foreign
policy.

As

tn

other regions of the world,
so too

panicular .nstruments to aid
,n
the

most

,ts

to

coordinate and develop unified

Latm America,

the U.S. needed

pohcy of continued henuspheric
douuuance. One of

effecttve, at least .nttially,

American States (O.A.S.) created

,n

of these iustrtunents was
the Organization of

in

Bogota, Colombia

pan-Amencan

in

1948 which was

set

up so as

pohcies. Latin American
nations had

already committed themselves
a year earlier in 1947 to
the Inter-Amenean Treaty
of

Reciprocal Assistance

Its

members

to

(i.e.

the Rio Treaty) which

provide mutual assistance

post-WWII context of the Cold War,
with

its

this

in the

was

a mutual defense pact
committing

event of aggression; specifically,

in the

meant communist aggression.
The O.A.S.,

provisos which allowed for the
U.S. to intervene in Latin
American states to

protect the peace” sanctioned U.S.
imperialist policies under an
ostensibly Latin

American controlled organization thus allowing
the U.S.
taking unilateral measures or abandoning

The Rio Treaty was followed by

Amencan secunty

in

Good Neighbor policy of nonintervention.

the Mutual Security Act of 1951
which solidified Latin

in

Guatemala and the sending of U.S. and Latin American

troops to the

Dominican Republic

O.A.S. as

member states were

international

avoid the appearance of

U.S. hands. Subsequent U.S. meddling—
like the 1954 overthrow

of Jaeobo Arbenz Guzman

its

its

to

communism

in

1965— were both

given legal sanction by the

cajoled into issuing a resolution which declared
that

constituted outside intervention in the hemisphere which

required strong countermeasures— specifically, in these
cases, permission for the U.S. to
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.ntervene ,o protect Guatemala
and the

Domimcan

Republic frotn fallmg under
the

treacherous sway of communism.

But “communism,”

in particular in the
case

of Guatemala

in

1954, amounted

only to a land redistribution
program instituted by the refom,
-minded Arbcmt
building on an earlier reform
program initiated shortly after
uncultivated land from farms of
over 300 hectares

compensation

especially with the land

the largest

And

owned by

as

was

the case with

in

Specifically,

on the basis of their

most of the big fanns and

the U.S. corporation United
Fruit

amount of cultivable land

,

distributed to peasants, with

to those suffering expropriation
to be calculated

land’s declared taxable value.

owned

was

WWII “

in 1951

Company-^which

Guatemala-the owners would receive

the least compensation percentage-wise
since they had reported their land’s
declared

taxable value at far lower rates than

considered in

later

its real

worth. Incensed, at what would
be

years a mild reform program in the region.
United Fruit reacted

Arbenz government, commenting shortly before
CIA-backed coup d’etat on U.S. Secretary of State
Dulles’s anti-communist
resolution adopted at the 1954 Tenth InterAmerican Conference in Caracas, Venezuela,
characterized U.S. policy as amounting to “cataloguing
as ‘Communism’ every
manifestation of nationalism or economic independence,
any desire for social progress,
any intellectual curiosity, and any interest in progressive
. 1,

the 1954

or liberal reforms” such that;

any Latin American government that exerts itself to bring
about a
program which affects the interests of the powerful foreign

truly national

companies,

in

whose hands

the wealth and the basic resources in large part repose
in Latin America, will be pointed
out as Communist; it will be accused of being a threat to
continental security and
making a breach in continental solidarity, and so will be threatened with
foreign
intervention.
Connell-Smith notes that even though Toriello was given an ovation for

standing up to what was widely interpreted as a pretext for U.S. intervention,
only
Mexico and Argentina abstained on the U.S. -backed resolution the rest of the Latin
American countries fearing a cut-off of U.S. economic aid (Connell-Smith 1966

—

pp

162-63).
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..d,

„K ,d. M,

...
_

p.Uic-..l.,„..

...„ ,. ...„„

,.,

„s

been taken over by communists.
“But.” as Gabriel Kolko
observed,

“' Etsenhower wanted a mere

raZ"T

coud"

" d"

Tr na:.r;n:: reSre^t^^'^r 7
comparable

to those in

Guatemala, and tl

d7p"n U s7or7'l

’’7™"’'

srsriirnir"-”'’^
The

resulting CIA-controlled
invasion thus followed and
within

persuade the Guatemalan army
(many of whom had close
transfer

power

to Castillo

two weeks was able

ties to the

to

oligarchy) to

Armas, the leader of the invasion

force whom United Fruit
had personally selected.^
Neither the alleged communist
Arbenz nor the small

Guatemalan communist party (which
never numbered more than four
thousand persons)
chose

to light.*''

Kolko

notes, “merciless”;

The subsequent

terror

of the new Armas regime, however,
was. as

7" 7

* "“^pended, a majority
of voters disenfranchised, and
thousand persons arrested and an
unknown number killed. The new
regime abolished the post- 1945 reform
legislation, and United Fruit had
its huge
estates returned. As the pre-1944
order was fully restored and the
government

""

n

at least

As
hoping

Schlesinger and Kinzer (1982) describe
Arbenz:
an oligarchic society” (p. 49).

1954
cc

“He was

a nationalist

to transform

on the CIA

that a Presidential

Commission

issued a top secret report calling

be ‘an aggressive covert psychological, political
and paramilitary
organization more effective, more unique and,
if necessary, more ruthless than that
to

employed by the enemy’” (Weiner, August

29, 1993, The

New

York Times).

In a secret

document prepared by the CIA and Armas, communists
were singled out
for either Executive action” (i.e. murder)
or imprisonment or exile. Under the subject
heading “Guatemalan Communist Personnel to be disposed
of during Military
Operations of Calhgeris” (the code-name for the disposal
operation). Category
I

listed

58 people for disposal while Category II listed 74 people for either imprisonment
or
exile (Doyle and Kombluh, “CIA and Assassinations:
The Guatemala 1954
Documents. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No.
4, Document
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4).

sank mlo corruption, Guatemala
became the leading exantple
of the kind of
hemisphere the United States
sought to create (Kolko,
1988, p. 105).“

Aside from

its

opposition to land redistribution
schemes, the U.S. also

maintain a tight control over labor
movements
important to any

state,

and especially

in Latin

in a capitalist

America. Labor relations arc

economy where

division between the classes,
between those with capital

of production and those

owners

in

exchange

themselves,

etc.

who must

for a

Thus

wage

soiiglil to

there

who own and

is

a stark

control the mean:

necessarily sell their labor-power
to the business

order to eat, pay rent, maintain
and reproduce

in

the U.S. government monitors
very closely labor relations
and

85

CIA

historian Ni^sk Cullather in his
1994 in-house secret account of the
1954 coup in
that the political repercussions
from the coup saw “Guatemala’s
political center... vanished from
politics into a terrorized silence.
Political

Guatemala wrote

activity

simply became too dangerous as groups
of the extreme right and left, both
led by
mi itary ofricers, plotted against one
another.” In the mid-1960s, the
“United States
responded by sending military advisors and
weapons, escalating a cycle of violence
and
reprisals that by the end of the decade
claimed the lives of a U.S. ambassador,
two U.S.
rnihtary attaches, and as many as
0,000 peasants. In
1

1

election, persuading another generation
of young
intrigues and violence. Increasingly,

974, the

Guatemalans

Army stole

another

to seek

change through
Indians and the Catholic Church—
which had
formerly remained aloof from politics-sided
with the left, isolating the Army

right

on the

far

(Cullather, 1994, pp. 90-91)
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Labor-power, not

as Marx stated in Wage-labor and Capital,
the worker’s
sold to the capitalist in exchange for a wage
in the form of money.
In exchange for a specified wage, the
worker expends her/his labor under the direction
of the capitalist for a specified period of time, i.e. “so
much money for so long a use of

commodity which

labor-power.”

labor,

is,

is

As Marx

writes; “Labor-power, then,

is a commodity, no more, no less
measured by the clock, the other by the scales.” Why
does the worker sell this commodity? Simply put, states
Marx, “in order to live.”
Labor, or the actual exercise of human productive powers
to alter the use-value of
commodities and thus to add value to them, cannot be bought and sold in
the same

so than

is

the sugar.

The

first is

sense

labor-power can be bought and sold. The worker sells the power to labor
under the
direction of the capitalist or his agents in exchange for a wage,
but she/he does not sell
her/his labor. Moreover, it is important to understand that the
sell of labor-power to the
that

capitalist for a

and

capitalist

the

wage precedes production and the emergence of a value in the product,
mechanism by which surplus value is appropriated in the

that this is the basic

mode of production.

worker

If the capitalist fails to exact

more productive value from

of production than he pays the worker
then the capitalist will reap no profits.
in the process
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in the

form of a wage,

seeks .0 innuence and
onernimes control the labor
relations

Wiarda

other countries.

As

notes,

^

"'owment
launch a Marxist-Leninist
revolution or seize control of u
which would be detrimental
to American foreign
pohcy imerS"'T^^^
preventing such Communist
takeovers of unioLoven^emsXo
^t

to

Tf

large part entrusted to
the

T

American labor movement
(Wiarda

This U.S. ant.-communist
labor program was

War when

Stalin’s armies

were completing

communist

up

their takeovers

western Europe was devastated
from the war,
time, large

set

its

at

7“^

the beginning of the
Cold

of Eastern Europe and

infrastructure in shambles.

parties existed in France,
Italy, Greece and
other

countries, and their unions were
well organized.
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The U.S.

At the

European

feared that these parties

would come

to

government

enlisted the

power

,f

they did not circumvent this
developnient

Hence, the U.S.

American labor movement, funded by
“CIA money and

sometimes CIA personnel,”

Communist

"

and provide

to bolster

trade unions.** In large part,
the

financial

move was

and material support

to

non

successful, for the U.S.
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IS

interesting to note in the initial
organization of this anti-communist
labor
Europe the role played by ex-Nazis
and other intelligence operatives

program

m

perations set up

m Italy,

Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, as well
as

which were

in ostensibly neutral
countries

such as
basis of so-called "stay-behind
“to undertake resistance operations
or sabotage against Soviet

Sweden and Austna were organized on
unils

The

Greece, Germany, Britain, Turkey,
Portugal, Holland
the

avowed

troops”

he event of a Soviet invasion of Western
Europe. In fact, the head of the
German
unit was none other than General
Reinhard Gehlen, Hitler’s chief intelligence
officer on
viet and East European affairs.
Gehlen, who directed the stay-behind
units in Europe

Waffen SS Colonel Otto Skorzeny, a fierce Hitler
loyalist. Together, they arranged
for
the training and equipping of five-man
cells known as “Werewolves.”
units

“had access

to

buned depots of food,

other liquidation devices.”

These Werewolf

radio equipment, weapons, explosives,
and

And like the medieval lore for which they were
these stay-behind units were to operate as
normal citizens by day while

named

“meting out

death and destruction to their enemies under
the cover of darkness” (Lee Martin
A
1997. The Beast Reawakens. New York, NY;
Little Brown Publishers
pp 24) These
operations were instructed to link up with the
“Romanian Iron Guard, the Vanagis of
Latvia, the Croatian Ustase, the Organization
of Ukranian Nationalists, Polish quislings,
and an army of Russian defectors led by General
Andrei Vlasov...” (Lee, 1997
p 23)
Similar European-wide stay behind units were set up
by the CIA after the war.

names

With

“GLADIO,” “Column

88,” “Gray Wolves,” and
the “Gehlen Operation” or
simply "the Org", these operations recruited heavily from
former SS officers,
like

Mussolini’s secret police, and from other fascist organizations.
In addition to their
extermination and destruction campaigns, their methods also
included the making of

payments

to unionists, identified

by

AFL

operatives as “potential scabs,” the

organization of goon squads to attack strikers, and collaboration with
the Sicilian mafia
(Gibson, Richard. 1992. “CIA Leaders and the NEA-AFT Merger
Plans.”

ACTIV-L

listserv, the Activists

From

Mailing List).
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Godson

writes that in the immediate

of channels
unionists

to

who

post-WWII

period, the

AFL “utilized

a variety

provide moral, material, and organizational support to European trade
were resisting engulfment by and within Communist-dominated labor

organizations” (Godson, 1976,

p. 104). To aid in this endeavor, the AFL, in 1944,
created two multi-million-dollar organizations, the Free Trade Union Fund (FTUF) and
the Free Trade Union Committee (FTUC) in order “to fight the Russians and rebuild

democratic trade unions”

in

Europe.

As

Scott notes;
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FTUC

The

became

while war was

slili

lire official foreign
policy vehirlf'nfil.n c
raging and communisis
were slill allies

in

I

e anti-Nazi
arNSuL'"'"'
underground

communism

I

-^ !^
1

of aid were
anti-communist socialists

(Scott, 1978, p. 194).

In 1945, the International
Federation

dominated by refonnist

,

w^r wl’

resistance, the dispensers

deliberately selective, funnelling
assistance to
and making life difficult for
those who were suspected

With

r

of Trade Union*; tTFTTi\

socialist leaders

bete"

of sympadti
^
^ ^

,

1

•

wa ^^ed I'h

u j

1

Ire

nf

1

r

r

communists, as participants in the
WWII victory, “enjoye^eno™
prtti“g7a^
rnany workers saw little reason
to oppose the Communisis.”
Fearful of Eufopean trade
"’‘= ^FL reasoned that
the rank and file would
ikewL“4^e
wise see little
hn'rreason not to elect and appoint
Communists to positions of power
d accept them as brothers” (Godson,
1976, p. 105). In a move
lo divide the

Secretariats (ITS),
secretariats

AFL

refused to

which were autonomous

become

associated with the

WFTU

’

Trade
subsidiaries of the IFTU. In so
doing the

WFTU, encouraged the developmenf of
atdt-communist unions in Europe, and
continued lo press the dangers of
communis[
infiltration and control of trade
unions.
As one of the methods used
ant

lo provide

-communist labor groups, “the

moral and psychological support
to European
AFL issued a continuous stream of policy
resolutions

nd statements stressing the tyrannical
nature of communism and the fate
that befell
"’\Communists came to power” (Godson,
1976, p. 107). Also, in 1946
[he monthly publication of the
International Free Trade Union Ne^^>s
in
nghsh, French, German, and Italian. In
addition to featuring AFL resolutions
and
policy statements. Godson notes, “the
publication carried analyses and details
of the
suppression of free trade unionism in Communist
countries and in such noncommunist

7

’

•

dictatorships as

Spam.” In addition to publications, the AFL also
brought
anti-communist European labor leaders to the
United States in the

a

number of

1940s, while
leaders “repeatedly visited most of the
European countries and gave numerous
speeches (Godson, 1976, p. 109). Food packages
were also shipped to non-communist
trade unions
Europe by the AFL. While in Germany, these packages
amounted to an
essential program of material assistance, due
to the devastation caused
late

AFL

m

by war in France
“they were a further demonstration of the AFL’s
support for the democratic elements,”
especially, notes Godson, for those anti-communist
workers in the mining regions
“where Communist militants received assistance from the
Communist party” (Godson,
1976, p. 1 10). Another AFL initiative was the organization of a
series of Marshall Plan
trade union conferences which, states Godson, “were
catalytic in the processes that
eventually split the

symbolic

WFTU.” One London

effects, in that

it

conference, notes Godson, had important

“gave the stamp of trade union approval
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to the

Marshall Plan,

government
(but

bu.lt

up “the Chris.ian-Dcmocratic
trade unions

non-Communis.)

equal to or exceeded

unio.i

movement

Communist union

with Marshall Plan

aid, the

decidedly capitalist

in structure

as a check

in

France

in Italy

to the point

strength” (Wiarda,

I

whore

hhOb,

and the Socialist
their strength

p,

19).*'’
1

was

Along

economies of Western Europe recovered
and remained
and the non-communist trade unions
“were able

on the Communist unions and

to prevent the possibility

to serve

of Marxist-Leninist

revolution in Western Europe.”
Consequently, Wiarda concludes,
“American foreign

policy goals were thus served” (Wiarda,
1990b, pp. 119-20).

It

officially established a

abor a role

in the

pennanent administrative organization to ensure
organized
ERP [i.e. the European Recovery Plan, a.k.a. the

execution of the

Marshall Plan], and

marked the first time that both the AFL and the
CIO participated
meeting of trade union organizations.” By the
late 1940s, it should
be noted, “the CIO was m the process of expelling
Communists from its ranks”
(Godson, 1976, pp. 1 12-14). Largely on this
anti-communist basis were the two unions
to merge into the AFL-CIO m
1955 (cf Morris, 1967, pp. 57-8). With this merging
of
the two largest union groupings in the United
States, states Scott, dominant union
opinion regarding foreign policy “was that the
United States must act decisively to
prevent the extension of communism in the world,
in order to protect the economic
and
strategic military security of the country”
(Scott, 1 978, pp. 1 97-8). Also, believing
that
France was the key to the control of Western Europe in
the immediate postwar period
(due to the prostration of Germany and the defeat
of Italy), the AFL utilized funding
through the FTUC to weld together the anti-communists
labor groups into the Force
Ouvriere (FO), as a counter to the communist-dominated
Confederation Generate du
Travail (CGT). Not only was financial assistance provided
to these French anticommunist labor activists, but, as well, office equipment including
typewriters and
mimeograph machines— was provided to FO offices throughout France. Also,
in a
it

m an international

—

campaign

FTUC
was

to “neutralize

what

hired “strong-arm

called,

it

men”

believed to be
to

Communist

terror

work alongside dock workers,

professional and occasional dockers”

who

and intimidation,” the
so that

when

a strike

refused to join the strike would

be protected”. “Thus,”

men
89

states Godson, “the Communists would have to tangle with
experienced in the techniques of violence” (Godson, 1976 p 121)
/•
r
»

.

.

For an insightful account and subsequent consequences of Office of Strategic
Services (OSS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) collaboration with the Sicilian

Mafia and Corsican gangsters

to limit the political gains

Communist

parties after

breaking up

leftist political rallies,

Heroin

in

WWII, from

of the

Italian

and French

recruiting thugs to battling union strikers to

see

McCoy

Southeast Asia (1972).
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(especially Chapter

1),

The Politics of

Because ofthis success, (he CIA
expanded
1950s when nrany

late

new

their

cITons to the

I'hird

World

in the

nations emerged by throwing
ofl thcir colonial
oppressors,

and when prospects for additional
Cuban revolut.ons threatened
(he Western

Hem, sphere with

own

the prospect of Marxist
regimes in what

’’backyard.” Utilizing the

Free Labor Development

AFL-CIO. a program

(AIFLD) was estabhshed

structure with the purpose

was considered

called the

Amer ican

1961 inside the

in

of supplanting communis, union
strength

with generally nonpolitical nnions
which would operate according

model of collective bargaining.'” Passing
main

office in

Washington D.C.,

capital city in Latin America.

init.ally as

field offices

the U.S.’s
Ins.itute for

AFL-CIO

in

other countr.es

to the

American

an educational institute with

were quickly

set

up

in virtually

movements— were

This close association between the

still

the

CIA prompted

“often

work on

CIA” (Wiarda, 1990b,

AFL-CIO and

120)

p.

Victor

Reuther, then international affairs director of
the United Auto Workers, to charge

1966

that the

AFL-CIO’s department on

Central Intelligence

Agency and

international affairs

that “the

was involved with

AFL-CIO and some of its

its

every

Not only did the funding come from the
CIA, but

the pcrsonnel-the labor atlaches sent
to the American embassies
abroad to
creating anti-Communist labor

union

affiliates

in

the

‘have

permitted themselves to be used by the Central
Intelligence Agency as a cover for
clandestine operations abroad’” (Reuther, quoted in
Morris, 1967,
labor

then

movement

AFL-CIO

Lovestone.

By

as represented

p. 7).

The

split in the

by Victor Rcuther’s remarks were directed primarily

President George

Meany and

his “global affairs operational

man”

at

Jay

the end of 1966, the split over organized labor’s foreign
policy practices

The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886. The Congress of
Industrial Organization (CIO) dates from 1935. The AFL organized
craft and trade
unions and ignored the conditions of unskilled and semi-skilled, i.e. ‘industrial’,
workers. After the CIO emerged as a national federation of industrial unions in the mid1930s, the AFL responded by working to enhance the economic status of both trade and
industrial workers. In 1955, the two labor federations merged into the AFL-CIO.
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turned into a rupture as
Walter Reu.her, Vtctor’s brother
and then pres, dent of the
UAW, ‘•announced his union would
henceforth follow a course
independent of AFL-

CIO polices.”

This was followed a year

later, in

1967, with Walter Reuther’s

resignation from the vice-presidency
and the Executive Council
of the

AFL-CIO

(Morris, 1967, p. 9).

Organized as a training

had with

institute, the

AIFLD

operated to sever

ties local

unions

fraternal

AFL-CIO

unions and international
confederations. Indeed, dunng
the 1960s the
itself severed its ties with
the International
Confederation of Free Trade

Unions (ICFTU) and the International
Labor Organization (ILO). As
Hirsch and
Fletcher document, the AIFLD,
in conjunction
with

its

regional offices of six

International Trade Secretariats
(ITSs), “established a network
of subagents in the ranks

and leadership of unions throughout
the continent” [of South
America].... “The
strategic value

of this network,” they point

out,

was

to operate “as a fifth

column,

waiting with cobra fangs to strike out,
to poison, and where possible,
to destroy popular
attempts to terminate transnational
corporate domination...” (Hirsch
and Fletcher, 1977,
pp. 7-8). Also, because of the pro-capitalist
ideology of many

which prevented them from being able

to identify

AIFLD

union officials

with the stark material and social

conditions which their counterparts in the
Third World faced,

many of their

attempts to

supplant communist dominated unions there
proved unsuccessful. Moreover, once

was found out

that

CIA

World,

this

AIFLD

assistance,”

was often

funding was behind the

activities

the kiss of death to the local labor

and “the labor group

that received

it

of certain unions in the Third

movement

was

destroyed as a result” (Wiarda, 1990b, pp. 120-1). Often,
the

mobilize reactionary forces and did succeed

many

areas of the Third World. But

more

in

that accepted

discredited and often

AIFLD

did help to

overthrowing left-wing governments

often, “the

AFL-CIO

all

in

but ruined the local

labor movements, thereby stimulating more pro-Communist and
anti-American
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it

senument, which was wha,
the program was designed
(Wiarda, 1990b,

As
understand

prevent in the

the

by

this

place”

anti-communist orientation of the
AIFLD, one can

AFL-CIO. then and

government whenever

it

afterwards, for years, sided
with the U.S.

invaded another country, or
engaged

the Third World, or supported
aid to the

Somoza

in

subversive activities in

dictatorship or the dictatorship
in El

Salvador, or backed repressive
regimes in numerous other
countries.

apparent

f.rst

p. 121).

indicated

why

,o

why the

labor

movement here

in the U.S.

has so

little

also

It

power and

becomes

inftuence, for

they have indeed been compromised
by both their ant,-commun,st activities
abroad and

by the corresponding need not
the average union

is

home

member’s knowledge of such clandestine

Fletcher note: “The

of the world,

appear too radical on the

to

AFL-CIO process

highly fragile because

understanding, or consent of the

And, as regards

front.

activities,

Hirsch and

of penetration, with labour apparati

it

the

late

major corporations acting through
U.S.

Chamber of Commerce,

parts

AFL-CIO”

(Hirsch and Fletcher, 1977, p. 12). In
return for the AFL-CIO’s assistance

of U.S. industry, although by the

most

operates almost totally without
the knowledge,

members of the unions comprising

secure capitalism internationally, unions

in

initially

were able

to organize

helping to

in

many branches

1960s and 1970s, as organized capital-i.e.
the

their political fronts (e.g. the Business
Roundtable,

the National Association of Manufacturers,
the Business

Council, and hundreds of other industry and
trade associations)— fought back with the

misnamed “Right-to-work”

laws, union strength greatly deteriorated and
union

membership greatly diminished. Consequently,
labor and the capitalist state,

i.e.

between organized

the representatives of organized capital

U.S. governmental policies, began to
castigate their union officials as

this relationship

split as

many rank and

file

who

members began

mere pawns of corporate America; indeed,

recognition by workers of the real

dictate

the growing

power of corporations behind governmental
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to

policies

led lo an ousting

of class collaborationist union
leadership

replacement by more militant,
anti-corporate

The

in the -90s

and their

activists.

election of new leadership in
the

AFL-CIO

in

October 1995 led by John

Sweeney, Richard Trumka, and Linda
Chavez-Thompson thus may presage
period of militancy in the ranks
of organized
labor in the U.S., though

to

determine whether the

One should
leadership

new

leadership will alter the

note, however, a report that

was

one of the

to reject the heretofore annual

$9 million for such

activities (stated in a

speech by

Endowment

first

1

CPUSA

too soon

activities abroad.

new

AFL-CIO

to the

of

Vice-Chair Jarvis Tyner

at

996). Nonetheless, as one of the
four

Democracy (NED) and

for

new

,s still

it

actions taken by the

payment by the CIA

the University of Massachusetts
on October 30,

core partners of the National

AFL-CIO’s

a

the

NED’s major

grant recipient (averaging approximately
$6 million dollars in grants annually
from

1990

to 1999), the

such payments.
policies in the

AFL-CIO

Still,

1

is still

compromised by

the

dependency developed from

an indication of the lighthack against
class collaborationist

3 million

member union was

graphically illustrated just three months

before the union’s convention in August
of 1995 when, for the
the sitting
his

It

AFL-CIO

“yeoman

is

president.

service against

Lane Kirkland

communism”

in

also noteworthy that in April 1999, the

Medals”

to

former

AFL-CIO

Poland”

time

in its history,

by the Wall Street Journal

August of 1995), was driven from

for

office.

NED presented “Democracy Service

President Lane Kirkland and to former Polish
President

and Solidarity Union leader Lech Walesa “for
rule in

(praised

first

{NED Annual Report

their roles in the

1999, 2000,

demise of communist

p. 7).

Another recent indication of the renewed surge

in labor

organizing

well as the response of corporate America to what they
see as a dangerous

in the

U.S. as

new

militancy can be seen in the successful victory in August 1997 by
the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters against the United Parcel Service. As The Boston Globe
described

it;

Atlanta-based United Parcel Service settled a contentious
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1

5-day strike

by

1

85,000 Teamsters

late

businesses and cost the

Monday, ending

company $650

August 20. 1997. “UPS accord seen
Globe,

p.

A

I

).

Since the successful

a dispute that

hampered thousands of

million or more” (Diane
Lewis.

lifting

strike,

Teamsters, other unions.”

Wednesday

’

Ue Bo.,on

however. Teamster President
Ron Carey was

expelled from the union by a
three-judge federal panel which
found Carey responsible
for a

scheme

to funnel

$850,000

in

union

money

to his union election

campaign, even

though the government supeiwised
the balloting and taxpayers
paid $17 million for the
election.

Some see

this as a

Republican and rightwing vendetta
against the new

Teamster militancy, especially given the
unequal focus on campaign

James
in the

P.

1

Hoffa,

Jr.,

irregularities

of

the loser in the 1996 Teamster
election and subseqently the
winner

998 court-mandated

election,

who

is

seen by

many

as a trojan horse for business

unionism (Gaboury, October 25, 1997, People’s
Weekly World).

The

labor upsurge of the Teamsters, however,
only encouraged delegates to the

21st Constitutional Convention of the

remove

the anti-communist clause in the

of the Communist Party from
bodies.

AFL-CIO

full

AFL-CIO

September of 1997
constitution

participation in the

Such action sends a bold message

coming off in

in

AFL-CIO

to corporate

America

to

unanimously

which barred members
or

its

subordinate

that the gloves are

labor’s fight for the basic interests of all working
people. This

new

militancy represents a milestone development in the
AFL-CIO’s effort to renew and
reenergize the U.S. labor movement, though

it is still

too soon to determine

how

long

it

will endure.

It is

impossible within the confines of this thesis to go over

all

the other

instruments and instances of U.S. intervention in Latin America.^'
For example,

we

91

For a thoroughgoing account of U.S. covert
in

using the Cold

War as

America from WWII
by Nelson and David Rockefeller

activities in Latin

to the early 1990s, including the extensive role played

a cover to expand their vast financial and mineral-rich land

holdings in South and Central America, to the funding and usage of missionary societies
Amazon and elsewhere to obey national governments

to educate tribal natives in the
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would have

to look at the U.S.

Panama and

the U.S.

Army

Southern

Command (SOUTHCOM)

at

Fort Gulick in

School of the Americas (SOA)

at Fort Benning in
Columbus, Georgia (provisions of the
1977 Panama Canal Treaty
forced the SOA’s

move

to

Georgia from Panama

the countnes of Latin

m

1984) which provide military and
police training

America and examine how

countennsurgency and “interrogation”

“communist” menace) served
arose in that region.'^'
in

to shore

[i.e.

to

this training (particularly
its

torture]

methods aimed

at fighting the

up many of the subsequent
dictatorships which

We would also need to look at several new

forms of intervention

Latin America including the use of
the air-waves as seen by the
propaganda tools of

Radio and

TV

International

Law.

Marti which are beamed into Cuba,
this

latter a violation

Telecommunications Union mles and hence

In addition,

we would need

also

of the

m violation of International

examine recent U.S. intervention programs

operated under the auspices of “drug interdiction”
in Bolivia, Brazil, Pern,
Colombia,
etc.

which often are disguised attempts

(which claimed jurisdiction over
widespread use of terror,

torture,

to route out leftist insurgents in
these countries.

temtory) and to fear “communism,” and the
and occasional genocide to promote U.S. economic

tribal

and development policies, see Colby and Dennett,
Thy Will Be Done (1995)
Also, see Penny Lemoux, Cry
the
People: The Struggle for Human Rights in
of
Latin
America {\9^2) fox an account of U.S. persecution and
murder of missionaries in Latin
America who aligned themselves with the peasantry and
workers. See also William
Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, US Global Interventions
Since World War 2
(1986) for a grim account of the role played by the CIA “in overthrowing
governments,
interests

perverting elections, assassinating leaders, suppressing
revolutions, manipulating trade
unions and manufacturing ‘news’” in more than 50 countries
since World War II.

Pnor

to 1963, the

Southern

also that the School of the

Command was known

Americans

is

as the Caribbean

often referred to

by

Command. Note

the term given

it by antiand Catholic priest Father Roy Bourgeois as the “School of the
Assassins.” Designated originally since its opening in 1946 as the
U.S. Army

SOA political

activist

Caribbean Training Center in Panama, its name was changed to the School of the
Americas in 1963 under JFK’s Alliance for Progress. On December
2000, in an
15,

attempt to distance itself from public criticism and repeated protests, its name was
again
changed to the Defense Institute for Hemispheric Security Cooperation with command
shifting

from the U.S.

Army

to the

Department of Defense.
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As

Stan Goff, a retired 20-year
veteran of the U.S. military

Special Forces

m

Colombia,

well

it

is

1992 and

known

members of the armed
of the urban centers.
the

more signiHcant

who

who

trained

Colombian

served in seven Lattn American
countries, stated: •In

that those

who

forces, the police,

profit the

most by the drag trade are

government

officials

But dnigs are only the pretense

and the big businessmen

for intervention,

Goff notes,

for

factor is the “billions of dollars
in markets for U.S. products
in

Colombia and Latin American nations” which

will require ‘'the continued
bleeding

those nations' economies through
external debts
institutions.” Referring to a

June 1999

owed

to

Amencan-dominated

of

financial

OAS meeting where Clinton administration

representatives proposed an American-led
multinational military force “‘to intervene
in

threatened environments’” to “‘protect
democracy’” in Latin America, Goff writes;

Colombia will be the foothold for this force, because
it is under the most
immediate threat. The guerrillas are the foes of
democracy, of course.
And the government of Colombia is the nominal
democracy. They have
elections. Only a tiny fraction of the
population has the means to recruit
and promote candidates, and terror is part of the
political

machinery. But

they have elections (Goff, July 29, 1999).

The most egregious and systematic human
this

hemisphere,

argues Goff, are hidden by what he calls “the
democratic facade” by

which U.S. interventionary
directly or

rights violations currently taking place
in

activity is justified.

by proxy or by other

indirect

But many of these interventions—either

means— are

already familiar to most.

And, of course, there are the more notable examples of U.S.
interventions such
as the 1973 overthrow of the democratically elected Marxist
government of Salvador

Allende Gossens which came to power in Chile

in 1970.

While the case of Chile also

reveals the U.S. government’s past preference for dictators and repressive
regimes in the

93

An example
Laurie

Anne

of this can be witnessed by the guilty plea on January 27, 2000 by
of Colonel James Hiett, the fonner head of U.S. anti-drug

Hiett, the wife

operations in Bogota, to drug charges in a scheme to smuggle $700,000 worth of heroin
into the United States

from her husband's post
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in

Colombia (Hays, January

28, 2000).

hemisphere (as exemphf.ed by ,he
Pinochet regime wirich sncceedeci
Allende and which
institutionalized

widespread torture and government-sponsored
murder)-a preference

which was paramount

m the

1970s-the example of Chile

also demonstrates that the

U.S. could never accept “the verdict
of democratic politics in any nation
where anti-

Yankee sentiment was overwhelming,”
because,
seeing not only

economic

its

local investments lost but also

legislation elsewhere in the

Kolko especially notes

regard,

was

that

as

Kolko

notes, there

is

a “fear

of

encouraging anti-United States

hemisphere” (Kolko, 1988,

m Chile, the coalition

p.

221). In this

fighting against the U.S.

ceritnst as well as leftist, revealing
that the historically

dominant

emispheric trend toward nationalist economic
strategies certain to constrict,
not exclude, U.S. investment was more
vital and dangerous

if

than ever. Indeed,

the very nature

of this nationalist vision created a hemispheric
consensus that
was politically still far more widespread and effective,
and therefore threatening
conventional Left ideologies. Had it survived,
the Chilean example would
have posed an unprecedented, grave challenge to
Yankee hegemony. Allende’s
failure to neutralize the military immediately
was his decisive error, however,
and that, too, was a moral all those of similar
persuasion were certain to
understand” (Kolko, 1988, pp. 221-2).
tlian

Other more recent examples of U.S. intervention
region include the Contra

War against Nicaragua

invasion of Grenada in 1983,

Panama

in 1989,

to protect its

hegemony

'

in the

in the early ’80s as well as the

and Haiti

in 1994.

Of particular interest

of late has been the indictment, extradiction, conviction, and
imprisonment of
governmental leaders, including General Manuel Noriega of Panama and
Chief Minister

Norman

B. Saunders and Minister of Commerce and Development Stafford
Missick of

the Turks and Caicos Islands, actions which violate the principle of
sovereignty

embedded

in the

foundation of international law and the
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modem

states

system (Meditz

and Hanrany, 1989,
pp. 579-80).’^ These exan,ples
of in.ervem.on only scratch
the
surface of the constant,
extensive, and oftentimes
brutal policy of interference
and

by the U.S.

intervention

Wha,

,s

in Latin

suggested here

is

America.

that this U.S.

pohcy

in Lat.n

Amenca

one which seeks continued
hegemonic dominance over the
regton.

is

Its

its

is

not

new and

resources, and

peoples, and acts as a testing
ground for hegemonic schemes
launched elsewhere in

the world. Furlhennore,
this

exploiter of the region,

which then

is

a policy

was followed by

led to a period

which

at first asserted a

a period

U.S. right to be the sole

of private “filibustering”
imperialism,

of blatant military interventions and
outright imperialism,

and which since 1934 and especially
since the onset of the Cold War
witnessed the U.S. attempt to mask
like the O.A.S., the

(NED) while

AIFLD,

its

in

1945 has

interventions tlirough hemispheric
instruments

and, presently, the National

Endowment

for

Democracy

ultimately relying on the military
structures in each country to secure

continued U.S.

hegemony and

consistently claimed

it

was

Latin American subordination. And,
finally, the U.S. has

intervening in Latin America to promote
the cause of

“freedom and democracy.”

Currently serving a 40 year sentence in a U.S.
federal prison, Noriega failed to
convince U.S. courts that the 1989 invasion of Panama
violated international treaties
and principles of customary international law. In United
States ofAmerica v. Manuel
Antonio Noriega (U.S. District Court of Southern Florida,
1990, 746, Fed. Supp. 1506),
the Court ruled that Noriega, as an individual, lacked
standing to challenge violations of
international law; only sovereigns could. And since the
new Panamanian regime of
Guillermo Endara (installed and strongly backed by the U.S.) did not
issue a protest on
Noriega s behalf, the Court refused to entertain the question of whether
international
treaties

R.

had been violated by the U.S. military action

1990/95. pp. 412-14).
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in

Panama (Slomanson, William

Since the 1980s, U.S. policy
has sought

to

move away from

support of

dictatorships in Latin America,
especially following the
revolution in Nicaragua in

1979. Such dictatorships were
seen as easy targets for

The policy has thus been

to support

leftist

revolutionary agitation.

regimes which have democratic
elections,

understood as elections between two
or more market-oriented

and

to fund, not

Latin

Amenca,

govemment-to-govemmei,t

as

was

originally proposed

Dennett, 1995, p. 665). But does
this

(i.e. capitalistic)

aid. but rather directly
private initiatives in

by David Rockefeller

mean

parties

that the U.S.

has

in

1963 (Colby and

some

lost

control over

these Latin American governments?
Not necessarily, for while democratic
politics
(albeit capitalist in

form) are once again allowed to be
practiced, the U.S. has sought

retain ultimate control

militaries.

over these regimes through extensive

ties

to

with the region’s

Thus, the training and supplying of Latin
American military personnel

through the U.S. Southern
order to develop close

ties

Command

and the School of the Americas

is still

pursued in

with the ultimate arbiters and guarantors
of political power

in

these countries.

And

as recent events have attested to in Haiti,

where the democratically

elected,

eight-month-long, government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide
was charged with moving too
far to the left (French, 1991,
p.

A 10), he was removed hastily through a U.S.-backed

coup d’etat on September 30, 1991 (Norton, 1991,
pp.
the

first

freely elected president

vote, he apparently

of Haiti

in

And even though

over 186 years and had

won

over

he was

67%

of the

had pushed the parameters of what the U.S. considered acceptable

Both Saunders and Missick had been lured
agents

1, 8).

when they were

arrested in 1985.
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to

Miami, Florida by U.S.

DEA

politics

in

beyond reasonable give and

take.

His subsequent installation
back into power

October of, 994 (aPer Clinton
replaced Bush as U.S.
pres.dent) by U.S. nnli.ary

.ntervention (referred to as
“Operation
after Aristide agreed to a

Uphold Democracy”) was
implemented only

prominent U.S. role

pronrise not to run for reelection
in

1

in Haiti

and also after securing Aristide's

995 (which he was kept

to)

May

(Fineman,

1

1998, The Los Angeles Times).

Moreover, U.S. congressional action
(the

Cuban Democracy Ac, of 992) and
1

Solidarity Act of

1

in the

1990s with both the Torricelli

the Helms-Burton Ac, (the

denying U.S. visas to executives of foreign
companies

gains of the

m Cuba.

nationalized

Castro

s

In addition, the

U.S. citizens after the

1

in trade

but also by

or have

to negate

any popular

U.S. citizens-including Cubans

959 revolution-to sue

by the Cuban government and

this prior

engage

Helms-Burton Act seeks

to sue foreigners

government from U.S. companies or

Given

that

Cuba

95

Cuban Revolution of 1959 by allowing

who became

Liberty and

996) has attempted not only to tighten the
U.S. embargo on Cuba by

prohibiting foreign subsidiaries of
U.S. companies from trading with

investments

Cuban

Law

for property

who

abandoned or

use property seized by

citizens.

and present history of U.S. intervention, current U.S.

promote democracy abroad become uncomfortably

efforts to

suspect. Still, questions

must be

95

The

Torricelli

Law was denounced

in the

UN General Assembly on a vote of 59 to 3

with 71 abstentions in

November of 1992.
The Helms-Burton Act was denounced by

the Organization of American States
June of 1996 and condemned by the European Commission. On
the Inter- American Juridical Committee of the Organization of
American States unanimously declared that the Act “is not in conformity with

by a vote of 32 to 2
September 6, 1996,

in

international law.”
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posed as .0 whether

this policy

of supporting restrained
dcntocracies wtll work

continued U.S. donttnanee
of the region or wii, lead
only

hence

to further challenges
to U.S.

hegemony

as the

in Latin

more

in the

post-Cold

War

and

familiar cases of Guatemala.

this

U.S. history of

America have no doubt tnfluenced
present

NED to promote democracy abroad

ensure

to further disillusionntent

Cuba, Chile and Nicaragua have
demonstrated. Lessons from

promotmg democracy

to

world.

efforts

by the

We will now tun, to

an examination of the nature
and form of this brand of U.S.
democracy being exported
abroad along with an analysis of
its grant-fund.ng
activity from
half of existence.
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its ftrst

decade and a

IV.

ORK.IN,

Some
Ins

S

I

RUCTIIRK,

people

liiink lhal

& CRAM

II,

ere

is

I'

UNI)IN(; PRAC TICKS

different

n-oiiBh the enrrent
al

I

effort

how many

ways

differences Uiere

there ire of comhi

hy the U.S. to promote deniocracy
abroad was

the ledcral level in 1983 by
National Scenrily Decision
DociinienI 77,

.aws 98- 64 and 98- 66 to
1

1

I

)

NKI)

o„ly one deniocracy and
only one olinarcl.v

no( inie, and therefore one
should not forget
arc hetween constitutions
and how many
,s

OK HIK

a„thori/,e “Project l7enioeraey,”
a

it

'

initiated

took Public

program which would

hind projects supporting democratic
insliintions abroad through the
United Stales

Information Agency (USIA), the United
States Agency for International
Development

(USAID), and the U.S.
National

Hndowmcnl

for

million dollars for the

NSDD

pp. 3-4).

State Department and
2) grant a

Deniocracy (NKD)

NED’s

liscal

in

two year authorization

November 1983 and

for the

appropriate 18

year 1984 operations (GAO/NSIAD-84-I2I

77, signed on January 14, 1983, and entitled

1984

“Management of Public

06
I

ursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, the United

States Information

Agency

(USIA) was integrated into the Department of State
on
The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG),
now part of USIA and
winch includes the Voice of America (VOA) and
surrogate broadcasting,
October

1

1 ,

999.

has become a

separate federal entity.

The United

(USAID) has remained

a separate agency,

April

999, the

States

Agency

for International

though the 1998

Development

legislation stipulated that

on

USAID

Administrator would report to and be under the direct
authority and foreign policy guidance of the Secretary
of State. As such, USAID, for
the first time, became an independent statutory
agency within the Executive Branch of
the U. S. government as of April
1, 1999 (Foreign Affairs Reorganization Fact Sheet
1 ,

1

December

30,

1

998).

important to note that the authorizing legislation did not officially
“create”
but, rather, merely recognized the existence of the
Endowment as a private,

It is

the

NED

non-profit organization already incorporated in the District of Columbia
and authorized

funding for

The

Endowment

activities.”

As

a

General Accounting Office report notes:

director of the

change

in the

Democracy Program told us that this significant
character of the Endowment was made because the Board
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Diplomacy Relat.ve

to

Nat.onal Security,” created
the International
Poht.al Comnnttee

(IPC), one of four interagency
standing committees reporting
to the Speeud Planning

Group (SPG) of the National
Security Council. The IPC
was given
for planning, coordinating

and implementing international

of U.S. policies and national
security

the responsibility

political activities

m support

interests including providing
“aid, training

and

organizational support for foreign
governments and private groups to
encourage the

growth of democratic

political institutions

and practices.” Instructed

to

business, universities, philanthropy,
political parties and the
press, the
the task to “build
“initiate plans,

up the U.S. Government capability

programs and

aggressive political action

(NSDD

77,

labor,

IPC was given

promote democracy” and

to

strategies designed to counter
totalitarian ideologies and

moves undertaken by

J84, pp. 131-2).

1

to

work with

As

the Soviet

Union or Soviet

surrogates'

then-Secretary of State George P.
Shultz testified

before Congress, the third goal of the
U.S. foreign policy agenda was the
U.S.

“commitment
Reagan

s

to

expanding the forces of democracy and
freedom.”*'^ Echoing President

words spoken before the

British Parliament in June
1982, Shultz pointed out

Congress the perceived need “to move decisively

to

democracy

to strengthen the infrastnicture

free press, free trade unions, free
political parties

Secretary stated, “which allow people to
determine their

own

—

of

institutions,” the

future” (Shultz, 1983, p.

2 ).

Supporting the institutions and proponents of democracy
abroad, Shultz
proclaimed, was worthwhile because “only in
democracies

is

there inherent respect for

members were

not willing to accept a presidentially appointed
board that
they found would be necessitated if Congress were to
create the

Endowment (GAO/NSI AD-84- 121, 1984 n
’

97

The

first

two goals were:

commitment

’

t'-

10)}

more peaceful, secure world” so
pursue “peaceful change and to realize their political and economic
aspirations, and 2) to restore order and stability to the
international economic system”
by coordinating U.S. domestic and foreign economic policies in order to
“achieve
that states

1

)

a

to “a

may

sustainable, non-inflationary growth” (Shultz, 1983,
p. 2).
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individual libcrt,es and

ngh.s”

‘-frcedon,

of express, on and

real pariicipa.ion
,n

droosing leaders,” and
“econonuc vitality” Moreover,
Shultz cla.nted, dentoeracics
do not invade or subvert their
neighbors”
(Shultz, 1983, p. 8).

That the U.S. should engage

in Ihe

export ofdemoeracy abroad
was necessary
’

or so

,t

was

clainrcd,

due

,o both the distortion

of what U.S. dcuocracy
stood

because “practical assistance” was
required by those

who

called for merely keeping the
“beacon”

“meeting the econo, uie, social and

political

than far-sighted, Shultz implied,
for

it

growth elsewhere” (Shultz, 1983,

ofdemoeracy “bright”

p. 9).

in the

for

a function

world

is

was

was

referred to

(Shultz, 1983, p. 10).

the project and

[cjhange must

The CIA, he

come from

testified,

how

,n

“providing

this assistance “in

Democracy— as

the entire effort

within, not be imposed from
outside”

would not he

funds were to be publically accounted

all

less

Finally, Secretary Shultz claimed,

not the goal sought with Project

for

home by

activity," Shultz staled that
U.S. support

democracy abroad “should be done openly.”

destab,l,zat,on

Those

sufficient incentive for ils

Heralding past U.S. successes

of covert

and

to beheve,” he claimed,
that

asststance” to post-war Western Europe
and Japan and noting

some ,nstanccs...becamc

at

it.’*

needs” of the American people
were

was “na,ve

democracy’s mere “exislcnce somewhere

who would emulate

for

a recipient of any funds from

for.

Building on previous and on-going programs—
“with a proven track record”—

which sought

to influence political

and the American

Institute for Free

developments abroad, such as the Asia Foundation

Labor Development (AIFLD), Project Democracy

sought to channel funding into five key areas: “leadership
institutions

training, strengthening the

ofdemoeracy, education, conveying ideas and information, and
developing

closer ties between

American organizations and

individuals and their foreign

98

Then-USIA director Charles Z. Wick testified that American ideals and values were
“under attack by a potent Soviet propaganda and disinfonnation campaign”
(Wick
1983,

p. 116).
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coun.en,a„s- (ShuU,
.983,

,

4).

Privileging „n.s beUvecn
Wes.cn, En.ope an., ,„e

U.S., Shultz's statement
reiterated the desire to
strengthen the percep.ton
"of shared

values and a

common

destiny” between the citizens
of Europe and the U.S
,,

“our young people...are
drawing further apart” (Shultz,
1983,

Thus, as

initially set

abroad by the U.S. assumed
countries, that there

was

felt,

p. 12).

out by Secretary Shultz,
the promotion of
democracy
that

indigenous democratic forces
were active in other

a shared understanding

U.S. government as to what

he

for.

is

between these forces abroad
and the

meant by “democracy” and
“democracy promotion” or

“democracy-building”, that the
U.S.-acting through the instruments
of Project

Democracy
then own,
the U.S.

like the

that

NED-wou.d

only be providing assistance
for these forces to

such assistance was not aimed

a. destabilizing existing

had successfully provided such
assistance

democracies of Western Europe and
Japan,
establishing links with
counterparts, that

democracy stood

it

for,

by the

would be good

American organizations and individuals
and

would

governments,

in the past as indicated

that this practice

act

on

that

stable

for

their foreign

correct the supposedly distorted
view of what U.S.

and would be a worthy goal

in itself for

democracies respect

individual nghts and freedoms and are
nonaggressive, and would serve to strengthen

bonds of a

common destiny between Western European and

Caught

American

m a quagmire in Central America in the early

1980s and

from the effects of the Iranian and Nicaraguan
revolutions, the second
in addition to the Soviet

move

into Afghanistan, the

youth.'*"

still

reeling

OPEC

growing strength of marxist

regimes in Africa, as well as the electoral wave
which brought social democrats

power

in

Europe

at

shock

oil

to

the beginning of the decade, most notably in
France, Italy, Spain,

Portugal and Greece, and also confronted in the early
’80s by an anti-nuclear

movement

99

Cohen
programs

states that

democracy-building “refers generally to information and training
growth of participatory government, publicly accountable

that support the

institutions,

and the rule of law” (Cohen, 2000,
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p. 846).

m Europe which, a, the tinre, produced
Reagan administration realized
.0 counter the revolutionary

that

when he

thts

ulttmate determinant in the
struggle

stated in his 1982

now going on

rockets, but a test of wills
and ideas, a

More

massive anus build-up. by

its

rumbhngs then emanating from
many

Reagan himself acknowledged

549).

,hc larges, nrass
demonstrations in history, the

trial

for the

of spiritual

areas of the globe.
that “the

resolve...” (Reagan.
1982. p.

importantly, as Wiarda notes,
one prime motivation behind
the Reagan

much more

cooperative and supportive

presented as ‘democracy’” (Wiarda,
1990a,

was

insufficient

London speech

i,

came

“Congress, the media, public opinion,
church and labor groups,

It

was

world will no, be bombs and

Administration’s enthusiasm for
Project Democracy was
that

allies, are

itself,

the exposure

of CIA criminal

when

p. 147).

to

to realize that

say nothing of our

the goals of our policy are

NED critic writes that

Indeed, one

activities as revealed

by

the

Church Senate

committee, the Pike House committee,
and the President’s Rockefeller
Commission
the 1970s

which prompted the

shift

organization, with a nice sounding

As Blum

writes.

The

idea

was

of these interventionary

name-The National Endowment

that the

the libertarian

CIA

for

new

Democracy.”

NED would do somewhat overtly what the CIA

had been doing covertly for decades, and
associated with

activities “to a

in

thus, hopefully, eliminate the
stigma

covert activities” (Blum, 2000, p.
179). But, as Barbara Corny of

CATO Institute remarks:

The debate over NED is not a debate about democracy;
no one is
disputing that democracy and liberty are
worthwhile goals. Rather,
controversy surrounding

the

NED questions the wisdom of giving a quasi-

private organization the fiat to pursue what is
effectively an independent
foreign policy under the guise of “promoting

democracy.”

Noting

that

NED proponents argue that a private structure is necessary “to overcome the

restraints that limit the activities

of a government agency,” she likewise points out

the inherent contradiction of a publicly funded organization
that is
charged with executing foreign policy (a power expressly given to
the
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federal

govemnient in Ihc Constitulion)
and admin, strattve eontrols

polittcal

Moreover, Conty adds, the Cold

NED.

yet

exempt

(Conry,

War argnment

as a connter to Soviet
ideology,

is

that

frotn nearly

November

-tll

8, I9')3)

was previonsly

ttsed to jnstify the

no longer relevant sinee the
demise ofthe

Soviet Union. But on what
basis ean the U.S. elaim a
right to intervene

in the

of other eonntries? And what form
ofdemoeraey does the U.S. wish
abroad and for what ends?

domestie

affairs

In

an attempt

to

promote

to justify its intervention
in other cotintries’
affairs, the U.S.

promotion ofdemoeraey abroad, so claims
the NED's Statement of
Prineipics and
Objectives,

is

rooted

m universally recognized principles of international

law. The Universal
Deeharatton of 1 Inman Rights and other
United Nations agreements (ineinding
de Conventions ofthe International Labor
Organization), as well as the HeIsLi
Final Aet, commit governments
around the world to honoring the
fundamental
human nghts that are guaranteed to citizens
ofthe United States and other free

societies.
In

what one scholar favorable

to the

NED

interpretation” (Wiarda, 1990, p.
150), the

notes as “a considerable leap of
logic and

NED statement concludes that

it

is

therefore in keeping with established
international law for the American
people,
through an institution such as the National
Endowment for Democracy, to help
others build democratic institutions and
strengthen democratic processes that
will promote individual rights and freedoms
(NED SPO, 1992, p. 1).

To

the extent that such an interpretation of these
conventions has any validity

still

must acknowledge

that

any intervention

in

at all,

one

another state’s affairs also contradicts

internationally recognized principles of sovereignty;
consequently, whatever

intervention does occur must be understood either as the
prerogative ofthe dominant

power due

to the

absence of any reliable enforcement mechanism by international

bodies to check such interventionary

activities, or to the tacit
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acceptance of a host

country owing to their relative
weakness

intervemton

in

v,s-ri-v,> the

another state's affairs in any fonn

transgression of state sovereignty

becomes

to

development. The

generally suspect, such a

NED's justification

power

however,

since late 1991, lost

its

in a

relationships

it

War

world. Such

was

Cold War budgets are harder

the sentiment uttered

Democratic Majority, Ben Wattenberg,

democracy can help persuade

the

who

argued

American people

political scientist Charles

would be willing

to

and national

to a

to

years, viz.

defense establishment

defend

in a

post-Cold

by the Chairman of the Coalition
that

to

Maynes

for a

“embarking on a crusade

keep defense budgets high

prevent Soviet imperial recidivism’” (Wattenberg,
quoted

Moreover, as

takes a

climate where the foreign policy
establishment has,

main organizing principle of the previous
45

billion dollar annual

it

deals with.

anticommunism, the NED’s raison d’etre was
welcome news

whose 300

when

for intervent, on. therefore,
is not likely

win the admiration and respect of the
governments
In the U.S.,

Also, while

particularly egregious

pohtical form which seeks to
inntience domestic
political

is

hegemon

in

Maynes, 1990,

for

‘to

p. 14).

surmised: “Most Americans probably

defy international law,” not only “to support the use of
military

force to spread the cause of democracy if the cost were low”
but, moreover, they

“probably will also accept covert efforts to promote democracy, that

forms of interference, including violence,

that are barred

by

is to

say, other

international law.”

Arguing

100

See, for example, the Helsinki Final Act, Sections

Non-Intervention
Charter, Art.

I

in Internal Affairs, in

(2), Art.

Henkin,

2 (1-7), in Henkin,

et al.,

et al.,

I, II, III,

1987/1993,

Assembly Definition of Aggression Resolution of 1974,
333.
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IV, and, especially, VI:

1987/1993, pp. 262-264;

in

p. 2;

and

Henkin,

UN

UN General

et al.,

1987/1993,

p.

that

most Americans “do not have
the time or background

over long-temt costs,” Maynes
concluded, therefore,

ofncals can persuade them
rely

on

1990,

his

government

p. 15).

policy; thus

the

Still,

that the

to exercise

governments

in Central

become tembly troubled

that “[,]f the

end

,s

democracy,

end justifies the means. The
average American wtll

good judgment

there are limits to

Maynes warned

to

in

carrying out tins policy”
(Maynes,

which the Amencan populace

that if the U.S. supports
only “facade

America except Costa Rica before

w.ll support such a

democracies”

(e.g. all

the 1990s), then

“significant groups within the United
States will object vehemently”
(Maynes, 1990,

p.

16).

The question of “facade democracies”

versus, say, “real democracies”
raises the

question of the particular form U.S.
exported democracy takes. Hence,
Ihe National

the

NED

Endowment

for

Democracy Act

itself,

where the avowed

we must

six

turn to

purposes of

are stated as follows:

encourage free and democratic institutions
throughout the world
through private sector initiatives, including
activities
1 )

to

which promote the

individual rights and freedoms (including
internationally recognized
rights) which are essential to the functioning
of

human

democratic institutions;

2) to facilitate exchanges

(especially the

between United States private sector groups
two major American political parties, labor, and business)
and

democratic groups abroad;
3) to promote United States nongovernmental participation
(especially
through the two major American political parties, labor,
business, and other

private sector groups) in democratic training programs
and democratic
institution-building abroad;
4) to strengthen democratic electoral processes abroad through timely

measures

in cooperation

with indigenous democratic forces;

5) to support the participation

of the two major American political
parties, labor, business, and other United States private sector
groups in fostering
cooperation with those abroad dedicated to the cultural values, institutions, and
organizations of democratic pluralism; and
6) to encourage the establishment and growth of democratic

development

in a

manner

consistent both with the broad concerns of United
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requirements of the democratic

gmup?m
Endowment
These

(National

NED purposes,

as ret.erated ,n the

their ow'n’

Endowment

for

in turn, are to

NED's 1992

DemocrTc^yTc^^

be guided by the following
seven principles

Statement of Pnnc.ples and
Objectives:

*o

deshn;™”""''
"ght requires a system

freerlo

that

de.emtine

guarantees

communications media, and the

rule of law;
3) that a democratic system
may take a variety of forms suited
to local
needs and traditions, and therefore
need not follow the U.S. or
any
^ other
particular model;

4) that the existence

cul.ura institutions

is

ofautonomous economic, political
social and
the foundation of the
demoerati; process md

he best

guarantor ofindividual rights and
freedoms;

*at private institutions in free
societies can contribute
development of democracy through
assistance
1

1

to the

to counterparts abroad;

assistance must be responsive
to local needs and seek
lo

enco

t-d f- and

SnVan"

independent

7) that the partnership

between those who enjoy the benefits
of
aspire to a democratic future
must be based upon
mu ual respect, shared values, and a common
commitment to work together
extend the frontiers of democracy for
present and future generations (NED
statement of Principles and Objectives,

democracy and those who

to

1992, pp. 3-4).

As

these six purposes and seven principles
indicate, the conception of

democracy proposed by the
discretion as to

NED is,

in

many

what constitutes a democratic

instances,

vague and leaves room

for

institution, group, electoral process,

101

etc.

What

is

emphasized, however, are procedural rights of freedom
of expression.

101

In response to an April 1993 National Security
Council request for information

on
of the U.S. government, the State Department provided
other agencies the following list of purposes or activities
to serve as a guide for
identifying what constitutes “democracy promotion”;

democracy promotion

activities
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belief and associa.ion and
,he n.le of law while
„,ak,ng „o mention of
subs, an., ve rights

such as the ngh, to work,
education, health care, soctal
security, housing,

etc.

Furthennore, private-sector
polit.cal, social and
cultural ins„,u„ons
are privileged as the
best guarantors of individual
rights and freedoms.

over substanhve nghts. the

from

that

NED’s conception of democracy
does

which dominates within the U.S.

The

so offering these
procedural nghts

priorities,

far, if a. all,

internally.

particular brand of democracy
being exported

examining NED’s funding

no, stray

which emphasize

further revealed

is

when

three major functional
areas:

pluralism; democratic governance;
and education, culture and
communications. The

goals of these programs include
“the strengthening of civil
society, democratic political
institutions,

NED as

and democratic culture, respectively.”
These three areas are deemed by
the

“essential to the achievement

(NED SD,

1992,

p. 4).

and maintenance of stable democratic
orders”

Two other areas

involving research on democratic
development

and regional and international cooperation
receive more modest funding from
the

Endowment. All

NED programs, however, are devoted to encouraging

political development without mentioning

1992, p.

4).

And

economic or

democratic political development

is

social

democratic

development

(NED SPO,

primarily oriented around

independent private-sector organizations— especially
trade and business associations.

So again, we see

that the

emphasis

is

not on changing the economic underpinnings
of

CIVIC education; civic organization; civic-military
relations; conflict
prevention/resolution; ethnic, racial, and religious diversity

programs;
and training; information exchange; legislative
traming/development; media training and development; political party
development; public administration development; rule of law; support

human

rights education
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undemocratic governments, but
rather on effecting legal
and
1

pol.t.cal alterations.

i.e.

07

superstructural changes.

Funding by the
bipartisan effort to

Democratic
institutes

NED

primanly directed

promote democracy by

parties, the labor

of the

is

at

fostering a cooperative and

enlisting the support of the
Republican and

movement and organized

business interests. Four core

NED—the Center for International Private Enterprise

associated with the U.S.

Chamber of Commerce;

the

(CIPE).

American Center

for International

Labor Solidarity (ACILS). an arm of
the AFL-CIO; the Democratic
Party's National
Democratic

Institute for International Affairs

(NDIIA); and the Republican Party’s

International Republican Institute
(IRI)-receive the majority

And of the

these four institutes, the

AFL-CIO’s

received the overwhelming largess of
half of all

NED

NED

of NED grant monies.'"

international mstitute. through

funds, receiving between

40-50%

1

995.

or nearly

funds annually. However, since 1996.
following the ouster of Lane

Kirkland the year before from the presidency
of the AFL-CIO. labor’s share of NED
grants has been nearly proportional to the
institutes also receive

NED’s

other three core institutes. These core

funding from the U.S. Agency for International
Development

for elections/election reformj

(GAO/NSIAD-94-83, 1994,

and trade union development

p. 10).

102

In Marxist theory, the superstructure refers to
social institutions (legal, political, and
cultural) that are erected upon the economic base
103

Pnor

to 1997, the

AFL-CIO’s Free Trade Union

Institute (FTUI) represented
But as of 1997, the FTUI has been redesignated
as the American Center for International Labor Solidarity
(‘the Solidarity Center’ for
short) representing the merger of the four international
institutes of the AFL-CIO, i.e.
the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the
Asian American Free

organized labor’s

NED core recipient.

180

(USAID). The

NED

itself receives the

bulk of its monies for
grantmaking from annual

appropnations from .he U.S.
Infomration Agency (USIA),
.he
In.en.a.,onal

USIA's

Developmen. (USAID), and

in,egra.ion in.o .he

DOS

Public Diplomacy. Also, the

S.

Agency

the Dcpar.men. of S.a.e
(DOS).

for

Bu. w,,h

as of Oc.ober 1999, funding
decisions for ,he

hkely reside wi.h .he S.a.e
Departmen.’s Undersecretary

w.ll

U

“Endowment

collects U.S.

NED

for Public Affairs

Goveminent funds by

and

filing

requests for direct funding and by
presenting payment vouchers
against letters of credit

when

it

disburses cash for program grants
and administrative costs”

Report 1999, 2000,

p. 81).

Recipients of NED funding must
apply for grants on an

annual basis— which are doled out
quarterly by the
In

programs

its lirst

in Latin

few years

(NED Annual

in the 1980s, the

America.

By

NED’s Board of Directors.

NED allocated nearly half of its

the late 1980s, however, programs
targetting

Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union
were in

full

funding to

first

swing. These areas— Central and

Eastern Europe, Latin America, and, by
1992, the former Soviet Union or the so-called

Newly Independent

—were declared by

States (NIS)”

the

Endowment

to

be “post-

breakthrough” countries. These were broken down
further into two categories
including, firstly, “emerging democracies,

i.e.

countries that have achieved democratic

breakthroughs but not yet consolidated democratic institutions,”
and, secondly,
“transitional countries

where repressive

political authority is collapsing

and democratic

groups committed to peaceful transitions and the establishment of
alternative structures
exist

and need support”

Labor

Institute

Trade Union

(NED SD,

1992,

p. 8).

NED

sponsored programs

in these

(AAFLI), the African American Labor Center (AALC), and

Institute

(FTUI).
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the Free

countnes .hus -seek

,o

defend recen, demoera.ic
ga.ns. eonsolida.e ,he
de,nocra„c

process, and avoid reversals.”

bu.ldmg

efforts,

As

economic refom,

such, programs in ihese
couniries focus on -pariyinitiatives, electoral

monitoring and training.

rights monitoring, and the
establishn,ent of a free and
independent press”

Annual Repori, 1992,

p. 13).

And while many of the programs

ongoing, the focus of NED
grantmaking
(particularly China),

in the

In,

(NED

man

1991

in these regions are
still

1990s shihed more towards East
Asia

Afnca, and the Islamic countries
of the Middle

East.

These

latter

regions of the globe are termed
“pre-breakthrough” societies and these
are further

subcategorized into “closed societies
that repress
Slate,

and authoritarian systems

all

institutions independent

that tolerate the elements

of civil society but where

democratic development can only be
viewed as a long-term prospect”

NED programs

p. 8).

now

in these areas “are

more

of information, enhancing democratic

rights,

and creating

political

1991 Annual Report, 1992,

likely to focus

on

civic consciousness,

p. 14).

These

latter

NED Annual Report

promoting human

of funds devoted
for the remaining

societies,

to

new century while

of obligated funds

toward

“authoritarian systems”

in

was

31%

1999

post-

80% of all

(NED SD,

further broken

obligated

1992, p

down

into

to “transitional countries.”

1991 geared toward pre-breakthrough

closed societies” while

(NED

59% by

in 1991

“emerging democracies’’ and

20%

6% went

80%

{NED

pre-breakthrough societies continued to

1991 to approximately

1999, 2000). This

14% was earmarked

1991 Annual Report, 1992,
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1992,

facilitating the free

breakthrough regions’ funding has diminished from
approximately
in fiscal year

(NED SD,

space in which democratic activists can
operate”

receive increasing priority in the late
’90s and into the

program funds

of the

p. 25).

for

8-

49%

As

A more dynamic view

orihe Ins.ory ofilre

by examining the funding
breakdown by regton
below,

we can

NED grant

fnnd.ng can be gleaned

IWO

for the years

to 1999.

see that Central and Eastern
Europe funding toppetl the

decade w.th nearly $53

In

Tabic

for the

ItsI

million, followed by a slightly
lesser a.nonnt of over
$48

•/.

I

/.

million for Latin America and
the Caribbean, nearly
$46 nrillion for Asia, over $40
million for the

mtihon

Newly Independent

for Africa, nearly

% million designated as

$20

'A

States of the fonner Soviet
Union, over

$34

y,

million for the Middle East and
North Africa, with $1

Multi-Regional funding.

In addilion, since
1996, the

“Miscellaneous” funding category which
funds had previously comingled
under Ihe

“Mulli-Rcgionar heading became a separate
category and has since received
nearly $5
L.

million for various non-rcgion-specific
purposes. Likewise in Table
3, a breakdown

by year of funding

for the

NED's

grant recipients) reveals that the

Solidarity

followed

Center

(ACILS) was by

in

four core institutes (which are
annually the largest

AFL-CIO’s Amcriean Center

for International

far the largest grant recipient
garnering

a distant second by the nearly $34 million
for the

for International Private Enterprise

Democratic Party’s National Democratic

(CIPE), over $30

over $60

Labor

'A million,

Chamber of Commerce’s

'A

million for Ihe

Institute for International Affairs

(NDIIA), and

nearly $31 million for the Republican Party’s
International Republican Institute (IRI).

The “post-breakthrough”

societies

of Central and Eastern Europe, the Newly

Independent States of the former Soviet Union, and the countries
of Latin American and
Ihe Caribbean received

58% of all NED

funding allocated to

its

six regions

from 1990-

99, comparing similarly to the percentage of funding these regions received in
the year

1

99

1

taken alone, although the amount of funding for the “pre-breakthrough” regions
of
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Asia and Ihe Middle East/North
Africa since 1991 nearly
doubled and tripled for Ihese

.wo regions by 1999. Funding

for Africa appears to

decade, though the constancy of
funding for
recategorization of the

this

have renrained stagnant during
the

region must take into account
the

Middle East which now inconrorates

as well the area of North

Africa as of 1998, which likewise
reduces the scope of the Africa
region category.
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Table

.

ational

Endowment

for

1

Democracy Grant Funding by Region,
1990-1999
(In U.S. Dollars)

year

AFRICA

ASIA

CENTRAI

LATIN
AM. &

&
EASTERN
EUROPE

1.

National

Endowment

for

THE
CARIBBEAN

middle

NIS

EAST&
NORTH

MULTI-

(FORMER

REGIONAL

AFRICA

SOVIET
UNION)

Democracy Grant Funding by Region
1990-1999

N(3TE

Miscellaneous

spending which had previously been
comingled
under the “Multi-Regionai;’ heading was
made into a separate categow in
with various non-region-specific grant

funding as depicted in Table 2

Table 2
National

Endowment

for

Democracy Miscellaneous Grant Funding, 1998-1999
(In U.S. Dollars)

rtAK

MISCELLANEOUS

1996
1,060,025

1997

1,301,858

1998

1,483,994

1999

1,633,615

TOTAL
2:

'

$5,479,492

National

Endowment

for

Democracy Miscellaneous Grant Funding,
1998-1999
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Table
Natio nal

Endowment

for

Institutes,

YEAR
International Private

Enterprise

1

1,996,159

nn-i
1991

IRI

American Center for
International Labor

INDIIA

International

Republican Institute

Solidarity (formerly
the Free Trade Union
Institute

non
yy\)

Four Core

Its

1990-1999 (In U.S. Dollars!

ACILS
Center for

1

3

Democracy Grant Funding To

National Democratic
Institute for

International Affairs

FTUl)

7,117,411

2,645,022

2,106,843

4,875,909

1,201,317

1,191,834

5,766,102

1,673,000

2,172,723

7,735,119

2,234,342

2,455,333

9,095,722

2,941,675

3,305,418

3,516,821

8,441,082

3,163,841

3,241,360

3,577,463

4,320,721

3,826,277

4,095,361

4,603,606

4,124,999

4,333,001

3,811,098

4,104,988

3,885,790

3,989,645

3,888,815

4,545,189

5,171,624

4,828,512

4,248,113

$33,846,502

$60,534,479

$30,836,632

$30,516,898

1

2,472,340

1992

3,034,427

1993

2,672,194

1994

3,323,315

1995

1996
1997
1998
1999

TOTAL

-i. XT
3:
National

In 1990, the

quarterly

Endowment

for Democracy Grant Funding To
Core Institutes, 1990-1999

Its

Four

NED began to issue its own Journal of Democracy published

by the Johns Hopkins University Press which

is

said to

have both a scholarly

orientation and be accessible to general readers interested in worldwide
democratic

developments, in particular analyses of international democratic movements and the
cultural, political

and social factors

that affect the institutionalization
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of democracy.

Some of the contributors

to the journal include
polit.cal scientists

Samuel

P.

Huntington, Philippe C.
Schmitter. Arend Lijpharl.
Enrique Baloyra, Guilleimo
O’Donnell, Seymour Martin
Lipset, fontter State
Department analyst and now
RAND
Corporation analyst Francis
Fukuyama, and 1 998 Nobel Prize
winner and economist
Amartya Sen, in addition to “leading
democratic activists” such as
Chinese dissident

Fang

Lizhi, Russian parliamentarian

Gibson

Kamau

Oleg Rumyantsev, Kenyan
human nghts lawyer

Kuria, playwright-cum-president
of the Czech Republic Vaclav
Havel,

Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas
Llosa, and “His Holiness”
the Dalai Lama. Sinee
1994.
the Journal of Democracy
has come under a new arm of
the NED called the
International

Forum

for

Democratic Studies which

bills itself as

“a leading center for

analysis of the theory and practice
of democratic development
worldwide.
as a clearinghouse for information
institutions

working

Plattner and Larry

to achieve

Diamond

on the varied

activities

and experiences of groups and

and maintain democracy around the
world.” Marc

not only direct the

Forum

of Democracy. Three additional programs have
been

Democracy Resource

but they also coedit

initiated

by the

Fomm

around the world to spend from three

Democracy Resource Center

itself

DemocracyNews, which

information

among

it

articles

for

to ten

months

has set up

Journal
including a

its

in residence at the

own moderated

activists

from

Forum.” The

listserv

on the Internet

claims “facilitates an exchange of news and

NED grantees and other democracy activists, scholars, and

practitioners” (“Forum: International

Endowment

F.

Center, a Research and Conferences
Program, and a Visiting

Fellows Program that “enables distinguished
scholars and democratic

called

also serves

It

Forum

for

Democracy,” March, 1999). In

Democratic Studies, National
addition, a

number of anthologies of

from the Journal of Democracy have been published separately
by the Johns

Hopkins University

Press.
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NED website was initiated on the World

Also, in 1996, an

many of the NED’s

delineating

-DemocracyNer website
front

1990

ts

polictes and programs.'"

A

Wide Web

litghl.ght

of the

an online ‘•Democraey Projects
Database” of NED grants

to the present, in addition
to grants

made by newly

affiliated

Canadian and
European democracy-promotion
organizations including the
Westminster Foundation
for

Democracy (Great

Britain), the International
Centre for

Democratic Development (Canada), the
Foundation Jean

Mozer Foundation (The

Human

Rights and

Jatires (France),

and the Alfred

Netherlands). However, there are
several drawbacks to this

online grant database, including the
fact that only grants for one
region and for only one
grantee can be searched at any one time,
thus preventing the online researcher
from

perustng

all

grants for

all

annual reports online.
institutes

who

are also

Locators (URLs):

regions by year, though in 1999 the

NED began placing its

Links have been established as well

to the

now

CIPE

online

at the

following

<http://www.cipe.org/>,

web

NED’s

four core

addresses or Uniform Resource

ACILS

(formerly the ETUI)

<http://www.ned.org/grantees/center.html> IRI <http://www.iri.org/>,
and

NDIIA

<http://www.ndi.org/>.
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URL

NED website is as follows: <http://www.ned.org/>.
This researcher is thankful to NED librarian Allen Overland
at the Democracy
for the

Resource Center for overcoming

this obstacle by sending me via the Internet
the entire
database for years 1990-97 and for Jane Riley Jacobsen at
NED who sent me
hard copies of the NED’s grant database for years 1998-99. Thanks
also are extended to
UMass OIT Data Analysis Services for their help in sorting the 1990-97 data,

grant

file

particularly Scott Evans,

Eva Goldwater and Trina Hosmer
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It

page

should be noted that
is

ACILS ’s

(which before 1997 was known as the ETUI) web
supported solely on the NED server whereas each of the other core institutes

host their

own

fully

developed web

ACILS

has been noted by Scipes

there

also

is

sites.

who

no notice of ACILS on the

<http://www.aflcio.org/> (Scipes, July
the possibility of the

AEL-CIO’s

The nonexistence of a

ACILS
AEL-CIO’s own web

writes that one

8,

separate

critic

web

site for

pointed out that

site

1999). This omission raises the question of

reluctance to admit

and U.S. government agencies.
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its

collusion with both corporate

In addition to these
efforts, the

Movement

for

Democracy.” holding

NED

its ftrst

in

1998 launched what

meeting

in

it

tenns -The World

February 1999

m New

Delht,

India with 400 participants
representing over 80 countries.

Descnbed as “a dynannc
network of democrats, both
individuals and organizations,
who aspire to work m a
coordinated

way

to address proactively the
toughest challenges to the

democracy and human
that this first

rights in the world today,”
the

advancement of

NED's 1999 Annual

Report states

assembly

established the World Movement
as a unique global forum for
mutual
support, exchange, and cooperation,
and highlighted the potential for
usitig new information
teehnologies, especially the Internet,
to meet the
challenges posed by authontarian
regimes and to support democratic

development

With plans

(pp. 5, 9).

for a follow-up conference in

Sao Paulo,

2000, a Steenng Committee has been established

development, with the

p. 9).

assembly

first

from November 12-15,

to guide the

World Movement’s

NED designated as the Movement’s current secretariat

Annual Report 1999, 2000,
Democracy’s

Brazil,

in

It is

also noteworthy that the

New Delhi

was funded by both

{NED

World Movement

for

private and public

resources including: The Starr Foundation,
The Ford Foundation, CIVITAS, Freedom

House, Godrej

& Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd., the Holdeen India Fund, the Industrial

Development Bank of India,
State’s

2000,

RPG Enterprises,

Bureau of Democracy,

Rights and Labor

{NED Annual Report

1999,

p. 9).

To

see

how NED

practice conforms (or not) to

examine some of the programs

Annual Report and
there

Human

Tata Steel, and the U.S. Department of

were 50 grant

its

NED funds more directly.

own

rhetoric,

Looking

at

rather sketchy description of grant allocations,

recipients for

largest single grant recipient

Economic Studies

its

was

all

of Africa

in fiscal year

we need

to

NED’s 1991

we

can see that

1991 (See Table

4).

The

a $330,000 grant to the Joint Center for Political and

to enable the Institute for a
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Democratic Alternative for South Africa

(IDASA)

,0 support a reg.onal
office in Na.ai

$230,000 grant

to the Free

American Labor Center (AALC)

Provmce. The second largest
recipient

Trade Union

Institute

(FTIU)

to

allow the African-

to hold three leadership
seminars in the U.S. for

African trade union leaders and
to develop worker
education course materials.
In Asia,

30 grants were made with the

Asian-American Free Labor

largest, a

Institute

unton .nstitutions in the Philippines.

FTUI

to

enable the

AAFLI

Hong Kong, Nepal and
and Eastern Europe,

FTUI

to the

in regional

to

to

$363,000

(AAFLI)

A

to allow the

was

of free trade

also given to the

support trade unions in Taiwan,
Pakistan, India, Malaysia,

several “sub-Asian regional
union organizations.” In Central

NED

funded 51 grantees

in

1991 with the four largest grants
goint

fund labor organizations in Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Poland and

to assist

independent trade union development.
As for the republics of the fomier

FTUI

lesser grant

FTUI

to support the strengthening

lesser grant of $318,337

Soviet Union, 22 grants were made,
with, by
to the

grant, going to the

to

far, the largest

provide support for independent trade
unions

of $250,000 was given

conduct conferences in

Moscow on

to the International

in the region.

A much

Republican Institute (IRI) to

institution-building and political training.

programs for Latin America and the Caribbean
had 56
far the largest

grant of $1,000,000 going

number of active programs of all

the largest grant of $294,650 to enable the

recipients in fiscal year 1991,

the regions. Again, the

AIFLD

to

NED

monitor

FTUI

human and

by

received

trade union

nghts in Latin America. This was followed by a
$2 5,000 grant to the Ethics and
1

Public Policy Center to sponsor a Libro Libre publication
program of books which

promote democracy. The
1

1

grants were

made

in

1

last

region to receive funding was the Middle East where just

99 1 with the

largest grant for

$272,955 given to the Center

International Private Enterprise (CIPE) in order to publish a

Reform

for

new Journal of Economic

for the region.

By

1999, the number of grants for

all

regions except for the Latin

America/Caribbean region had increased, going from 50

190

to

76

in Africa,

from 30

to

74

m Asia,

from

5

1

to

90

in Central

and Eastern Europe, from

East/North Africa region, and
from 22 to 93 in the

in

1991 to 52

were given

to

m

1999.

Two

allocated to

ACILS

in the

so that

Middle

States, with only

for the Africa region in

allocated so as to “increase
participation

Union Nationale des Syndicats des
Traveilleurs du Benin and

Autonomes du Benin

to 41 in the

number of grants going down from

of the three largest grants

ACILS, with $142,000

1

Newly Independent

the Latin America/Caribbean
region declining in the

56

1

1999

of the

the Centrale des Syndicats

1999 parliamentary electoral process”
and $162,385

it

could “work with the Union des
Syndicats des Travailleurs

du Niger to reverse the current deterioration
of worker and
second largest grant for the Africa region

1999 went

in

trade union rights.”

to the

NDI

for a total

The

of

$1 50,120 to “help prepare key political
party figures for the competitive
multiparty
elections

1

8).

In

m March 2000” in Zimbabwe (NED Annual Report

Asia

m

1

999, four of the five largest grants went to

1999, 2000, pp. 12, 15,

ACILS

with the largest, for

an amount of $551,232, going to “support
the protection of workers’ rights
and the
institutional

development of trade unions

largest grant for

$489,716 went

in

Thailand and Malaysia” while the second

to the IRI for its

progress and consolidation of electoral reform

programs on

legislative reform at the national

work

in

China

at the village level,

in 1999,

and by

far the largest

and

and provincial levels”

Report 1999, 2000, pp. 26, 29). The one grant that stands
out

Europe

to “support further

of all regional grants

to

(NED Annual

in Central

that year,

conduct

and Eastern

was

for

$735,177

allocated to the IRI in order to “establish a regional field
office in Bratislava, Slovakia,

from which IRI will organize and implement a variety of programs
involving
participants from

one or more of 12 countries”

(NED Annual

Report 1999, 2000,

p.

grant for $284,284 allocated to the IRI so that they can “conduct
an international
election observation mission during the October and

elections in Ukraine” tops the

Annual Report 1999, 2000,

list

p. 48).

of funding

in the

November 1999

presidential

Newly Independent

States

(NED

Likewise, the IRI received the largest grant in the

191

Latm America/Caribbean region

for

1999 with an amount of $310,507
allocated so they

can “work with the Cuban Democratic
Revolutionao' Directorate

democratic transition in Cuba”

ACILS

(NED Annual

Report 1999, 2000,

to

promote a peaceful,

p. 53).

And,

received the biggest grant for the
Middle Eastmorth Africa region

an allocation of $353,897

Lebanon and the

in

order to “work with the Working

International Institute for Peace and

trade union institutions,

empower working women,

in

lastly,

1999 with

Women’s League

Democracy

to build

in

democratic

raise consciousness about child

labor and migrant labor issues, and develop
intra-Arab union networks to promote

democracy thoughout the Middle East/Northem Africa
region” (NED Annual Report
1999, 2000,

p. 63).
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Table 4
National

Endowment

for

Region

-

AFRICA

Democracy Number of Grants By

And

Year, 1990-1999

CENTRAL
AND
EASTERN
EUROPE

ASIA

LATIN

AMERICAN
AND THE
CARIBBEAN

MIDDLE
EAST &

NIS
(FORMER

NORTH

SOVIET
UNION)

AFRICA
1990

21

1991

23

0

23

6

56

11

22

6

63

7

43

10

39

67

19

55

9

53

65

34

61

8

60

63

39

54

10

53

50

48

67

3

60

42

42

74

5

70

50

41

84

11

74

90

52

41

93

17

486

624

579

282

576

85

30

58

1993

49

58

1996

62

58

1997

58

62

1998

47

74

1999

58

76

TOTAL

569

4: National

54

42

63

1995

51

43

49

1994

End owment

lor

Democracy Number of Grants By Region

And
NOTE: The number

regional

71

50

1992

94

multi-

of grants

in the

Year, 1990-1999

newly autonomous “Miscellaneous” category

are

depicted in Table 5 below:

Table 5
National

Endowment

for

Democracy Miscellaneous Number

YEAR

of Grants 1998-1999

NUMBER OF
GRANTS

^

1997

-

1998

9
9

1999

11

TOTAL
5:

29
National

Endowment

for

Democracy Miscellaneous Grants, 19981999
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That the

NED annual reports are vague as to the specific

individual grants has been noticed
also

Office which in 1991 investigated
36

by

breakdown of its

the U.S. government’s
General Accounting

NED projects-accounting for a total of 20

million dollars-^-and concluded
that only one had been
evaluated adequately. In
addition, there

were several instances of petty

graft including

$10,000 spent on

unauthonzed office renovations, inappropriate
loans made with
on a rental car for an individual

unapproved expenditures

More

to the point,

to

it

to assist in

accounting for

works with mostly small

conditions. Nation columnist David
oversight,

it

is

apparent that

drugs and then further

GAO also found itself unable to get the General

had received from the ETUI. And though the

claiming that

funds, funds spent

cover the cost of rental fees on the
impounded vehicle.

however, the

Workers Union of Portugal
It

later arrested for dealing

NED

how

it

spent

$2.6 million grant

NED brushes off such problems by

activist organizations

Com

its

states that given this

working under trying
atmosphere of lax

NED recipients are “clearly learning one vital

lesson of

U.S.-style democracy: Taxpayer dollars.. .are funds
just waiting to be burned” (Com,

1991, p. 548). In

GAO’s

its

March 1991

last report in

improved

its

report, the

1986, the

GAO stated that since the

Endowment

has not significantly

capability to evaluate and report on the effectiveness
of its

program. The Endowment has not given adequate attention
to
systematically planning program objectives and assessing program
total

results.

In addition, the

Endowment

has not developed an adequate
evaluation capability to independently evaluate and report on the

effectiveness of its total programs

And

at

NED which perhaps, if the political will

be addressed, other funding programs

raise questions as to

promote democracy and indicate the narrowness of its

example,

in

p. 3).

while instances of petty graft and vague financial reporting point to certain

administrative problems

to

(GAO/NSIAD-91-162, 1991,

May

1989, the

NED held

its first
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NED’s

exists,

may

easily

priorities in its efforts

ideological orientation. For

“world conference of democratic activists”

whose

invitees

were

strictly disc, pies

of

free

market

capital, sn, including

Hernando de

Soto, the free market Peruvian
economist and author of The Other
Path- the anti-Soviet
activist

Vladimir Bukovsky; the Polish free-marke,
advocate Leszek Kolakowski; and

Mexican neoconservative Octavio

the

“renowned” Chinese dissident Fang

Paz.

Lizhi,

Award winners

at this

event included the

Nicaraguan President Violeta Chamorro
and

Vaclav Havel, current president of the
newly-renamed Czech Republic [which separated
from Slovakia

ceremony

in

at the

993]. Offering the invocation for the 1991

1

convention was Tihet’s Dalai Lama.

And

to

Democracy Awards
conclude the program.

Vice President Dan Quayle praised Havel and
Chamorro as representing “demoeratic
statesmanship

Since 1989, the

9).

in

at its

March, 1997

very finest” (Quayle, quoted

in

NED has hosted approximately

entitled “Consolidating

examine “the Taiwanese

Democracy

political landscape in the

NED

1991 Annual Report, 1992,

p.

17 other conferences including one
in

Taiwan” which promised

wake of its

historic

to

March 1996

presidential elections to identify obstacles to the strengthening
of Taiwan’s democracy,

and

to explore the

International

impact of international factors on Taiwan’s future prospects” (NED:

Forum Conference Reports

<http://www.ned.org/pubs/intercom.html>).
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of NED conferences include: The 1999 Elections and the Future of Nigeria
(October 1999), International Relations and Democracy (March 1999), Democratic
Consolidation in South Africa: Progress and Pitfalls (February 1998), India's
Titles

Democracy

at Fifty

(September, 1998), Institutionalizing Horizontal Accountability:

How

Democracies Can Fight Corruption and the Abuse of Power (June, 1997),
Democracy in South Asia (September, 1997), Five Years into the Transition: Where

is

Russia Headed? (May, 1997); Consolidating Democracy

in Taiwan (March, 1997);
Asia (December, 1996); Constructing Democracy and Markets: East
Latin America (July 1996); Stability and Reform in Egypt (May 1996); Mexico:

Democracy
Asia

&

in East

the Challenge of Political Opening (December 1995); Civil-Military Relations and the
Consolidation of Democracy (June 1995); Democracy’s Future (April 1995); Nigeria’s
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That the 1989 convention featured,
as did
the heroes of the conservative
right

out this orientation

more

clearly.

A

is

others which followed,

tire

not suntrising.

Still,

1984 FTUl grant

to

other funding programs
spell

Panamanian union

used to promote the presidential candidacy
of one Nicolas Barletta

Panamanian military endorsed. Such support

NED principles but
grants to

for

is

$500,000 went

against Mitterand.

to

The

but,

two

group which proceeded

grants, not only did

secret

to stage protests

NED

socialist

and communist controlled

funding raise questions about

1

were funded

ally

of the U.S.

secretly again violated both

08

law.

In another effort at destabilizing an elected government,
the

more than $615,095

Political Crisis:

FTUl gave

campaigns, especially against a democratic

fact that these activities

NED principles and U.S.

allocated

the U.S.-backed

other secret grant for $800,000 went to
a CIA-connected trade

in destabilization

moreover, the

was

for particular candidates
not only violates

union called Force Ouvriere which acted to counter

engaging

activists

French President Francois Mitterand.
One grant

to a rightwing activist

unions. In these latter

who

against U.S. neutrality laws. Also
in 1984, the

two French groups opposed

many of

to the Bulgarian

NED

in

1990

Union of Democratic Forces with

Which Way Forward? (February

1995); The Prospects for Political
China (December 1994); and The Unfinished Revolution (April 1991).
This March 23, 1996 presidential election represented Taiwan’s first election
since Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang party (KMT) fled mainland China in 1949,

Change

in

after losing the civil

war with

the communists, and set up a dictatorial government on

the island of Formosa. Democratic opposition to the

KMT-led government coalesced
around the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which was able to successfully push for
the lifting
for the first time since 1949
of Martial Law in 1987. The DPP’s success

—

in

pushing for a

elections,

—

political

opening

in

Taiwan, however, was not rewarded

which was won by the ruling

in the

KMT party candidate, Lee Teng-hui.
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1996

another $232,695 going to

its

newspaper

Party in the June 1990 elections.

When

in

an attempt to defeat the Bulgarian
Socialist

even

this financial aid failed to
prevent a

BSP

(which formerly had been the Bulgarian
Communist Party) victory, the NED, Blum
writes:

stepped

m with generous funding and advice to the specific opposition

groups which carried out a campaign of
chaos lasting almost five

months: very militant and disruptive

street demonstrations, paralyzing
labor strikes, sit-ins, hunger strikes, arson...
parliament was surrounded,
the government was under seige. .until
finally the president was forced
.

to resign,

followed by some of his ministers;

gave up his office (Blum, 2000,
In the

Blum

writes,

what

other

p. 157).

NED calls the

‘democratic forces’

and groups

NED has working for

democratic goals; moreover, what goals
it

if

tarnishes

not illegality, but also

its

stated

—which have more

to

in

commitment

do with

accumulation of wealth and expansion of power, than

democracy. For example,

p. 157).

NED does have only further indicates that in

merely pursues U.S. foreign policy aims

state interests, e.g.

it

allies prevailed, or as

won” (Blum, 2000,

NED practices not only suggest impropriety,

certain individuals

truth

prime minister

subsequent 1991 Bulgarian elections, NED-backed
political

Still

to

lastly, the

one 1990 grant given

to the University

in

selfish

promoting

of South Carolina,

the university took a ten percent administrative charge for handling the funds
and

passed the rest on into several vaguely described Chilean projects with money being
deposited directly into the personal account of the director of one of the Chilean projects

with no further documentation on

how

it

was

spent.

As

investigative reporter Holly

Sklar and political analyst Chip Berlet note, “the university was used essentially as a

108

See Chapter 3 above on the enlistment of the U.S. labor movement
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in

America’s

money

laundry” (Sklar and Berlet,
1991-92,

former pro-Nazi Arrow Cross

was helping

to channel

NED

official

Also

p. 13).

1990, U

in

was found

out that

Laszlo Pasztor, a convicted
Nazi collaborator,

funds to his friends

in

Hungary by

translating and

evaluating grant requests from
Hungarian and Czechoslovak groups
to the National

Republican and National Democratic
Institutions

for International Affairs.
Just

two

years before, Pasztor had been forced
to resign from President
Bush’s 1988 presidential

campaign when
Nationalities,

it

was found out

that the

campaign’s Coalition for

headed by Pasztor, had numerous

Amencan

ties to anti-Semitic

and openly

fascist

organizations (Berlet and Sklar,
1990, pp. 450-51). In September 1991, a
scandal

m the Philippines after the U.S. attempted to buy the support

erupted

Senator Ernesto Herrera for the treaty to
keep U.S. bases
the general secretary of the Trade

received

of Philippine

in the country.

criticizing the treaty as

funding

TUCP

was

in

P.

able to temporarily strike

of NED

support” (Sklar and Berlet, 1991-92,

activities, or rather the lack thereof in

when Congressman William

to distribute

Gray

NED

$10 million

III

fight against

bill

interest,

AAFLI

p. 59).

promised

NED

one noticeable 1991 case, came under

(D.-Pa.), the

House Majority Whip

at that

fire

time,

funding in retaliation for the apparent unwillingness

in aid to political groups helping victims

South Africa. The money had been approved

appropriations

also

Institute

being against Filipino workers’

Herrera reportedly switched his vote in favor
of the losing treaty after
$3.7 million in additional

is

Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) which

NED grants via the ETUI and the Asian- American Free Labor

(AAFLI). After

Herrera

and yet 14 months

later,

as part

of a

the funding

still

communism.
198

1

of apartheid

990 supplemental

had not occurred. But

hcforc Grsy could

quickly dropped

move

NED

funding from

NED

.991, pp. 1594-5,.

HR 2608

opened the

The degree

NED

to

order to avoid a

racist implications

which the

its

NED will

full

debate (Biskupic ’

later in the

of NED

year in the

action, or rather

go

to subvert a country’s
sovereignty

can

funding of ant.-Sand.nista
groups ,n Nicaragua. Prior

example, part of $3.5 million

organization called

funding for 1991, the
House

up to further senitiny.

perhaps best be gleaned from
to 1986, for

in
i

in

funding was reintroduced
and passed

1992 appropnations process,
but the
inaction,

NPO’cs toe
'n*
NED
$26 million

to eliminate
climiriiitc

PRODEMCA

NED grants to Nicaragua went

in

to an

which funded the Sandinista
opposition newspaper in

Prensa while simultaneously taking
out advertisements supporting
Reagan’s contra war.

To

obviate criticism which resulted
from this practice, funding
for La Prensa was taken

up by the Washington-based Delphi
International Group which
grant operator in Nicaragua.

NED pumped

in

is

blatant interference

(UNO)

in the

than $2.8 million for opposition

all

but

go

Endowment

movements

Panama had

in Chile,

And

a

key

NED

989 when

1

to Nicaragua’s Sandinista-dominated

charter as well as U.S. law

s presidential

by working

NED had gone

never, prior to 1989, spent

Poland,

Panama and
1

more

the

.6

million

though by Nicaraguan law half the aid had

Supreme

partisan funding raised questions as to whether

UNO

in

larger populations than Nicaragua’s

voters (Overt Meddling, 1989,
p. 408).
to

was witnessed

February 1990 elections. That the

indicated by the fact that the

Philippines, and

became

nearly $9 million to help fund
Nicaragua’s anti-Sandinista United

Nicaraguan Opposition
overboard

More

later

Electoral Council, the

NED

NED had violated its own principles and

to elect individual candidates, in the present
case

candidate Violeta Chamorro, and by paying the salaries of
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ectoral Council, however,
did

have

to put

its

foot

down when

called the Center for
Training and Electoral Promot.on

an NED-funded group

(CAPEL) proposed

to airdrop

nearly two million “civic
education leaflets” at the final
political rallies of both the

UNO and the Sandinista Frente on Febniary
also decided not to allow a

(GAO/NSIAD
(IMA), a

New

campaign,
battle

18 and 21, 1990, respectively.
The Council

CAPEL produced

90-245, 1990,

As

p. 22).

videotape to

television

a report by the Institute for
Media Analysis

‘“The U.S. defines the Nic[araguan]

between the [Sandinista] Frente and
the

other contenders. However, the
definition into a reality.

Why

on Nicaraguan

York-based nonprofit which monitored
the 1990 Nicaraguan television

stated:

beginning’”

air

It is

(IMA quoted

in

money

electoral

campaign

UNO will turn this

totally distorting the electoral
process

the Sandinistas allowed

NED

temis of a

UNO despite the fact that there are eight

that the U.S. is giving to

Branan, 1990,

in

and

this is

only the

p. 14).

funding to begin with

is

a telling case of the

coordinated pressure tactics used by the
U.S. to-in Ronald Reagan’s words-get
the
Sandinistas “to cry uncle.” Economically strangled
by U.S. control or dominate
influence over international markets and
international lending agencies and under

pressure by Washington to

make concessions

to the opposition in order to

end U.S.

backing for the counterrevolutionary guerrilla bands
known as “the Contras”, the

Nicaraguan government figured
in order to thwart the

electoral

it

had

little

impact of NED funding, the Sandinistas passed

law— mentioned above— which

political parties

choice but to allow the funding. However,

1989 a new

required that half of all funds donated to

from non-Nicaraguan groups must be turned over

electoral council as a tax to help

in

pay administrative costs of the
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to the

government’s

election (Nichols, 1990,

PP. 266-67).

Law

y Public

1

990,

p.

With regard

1

8).

.o the

NED,

abou, half of its $2.1 mill,
on granted ,o the

lOI-l 19 went to the Electoral
Council for taxes

The Nicaraguan

UNO

(GAO/NSlAD-90-245,

law, however, did not
envision nor could defend agamst

mtllions of other dollars in U.S.
aid which also flowed to
the Sandnnsta opponents

including $47.9 million authorized
under U.S. Public

authonzed under U.S. Public

Law

(GAO/NSIAD-90-245, 1990,

p. 8).

As

the victory of Violeta

Law 100-276 and

101-14 for the “Nicaraguan Resistance”

Chamorro

in the

1990 elections proved, overt, perhaps

even more than covert, U.S. funding can
have a powerful influence
internal politics

$49.75 million

of other countries. Indeed, current

efforts to

in

manipulating the

undermine the Cuban

government are running along full-speed ahead.
With help from the anti-Cuba
Torricelli bill signed into

Burton Act signed

into

law by President Bush on October
23, 1992 and the Helms-

law by President Clinton on March

to tighten the then 34-year-old U.S.

international trade

owned by

blockade of Cuba by attempting

by penalizing companies doing business

in

to cut off

Cuba on

properties

U.S. companies and citizens prior to the 1959 revolution,
denying U.S. visas

to executives

citizens

12, 1996, external pressure

of companies doing business

— including Cubans who have

in

Cuba, allowing lawsuits by U.S.

since the revolution

become U.S. citizens— for

reclamation of land nationalized by the Castro government, will
be complementing

NED

funded anti-Castro groups which

in turn could

202

produce what years of CIA covert

activities

have been unable

though on

.lune 27,

to do, v,z. the overturning

2000 (following

of the Cuban revolution.'” And

the Elian Gonzalez saga) the
U.S.

House of

Representatives voted to ease sanctions
on delivering food and medicine
to
first

time in 40 years,

against

2000

Cuba

it

Cuba

for the

remains to be seen whether other
aspects of the trade embargo

will be relaxed or not

by

the

new

administration following the

November

elections.

One of the key

NED grantees in the anti-Castro operation is known as the

American National Foundation (CANE) founded and

originally chaired

by

Cuban

a wealthy

109

Formally known as the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the Torricelli
bill (named
after Robert Torricelli (D.-NJ)) forbids overseas subsidiaries
of U.S. corporations from
doing business with Cuba, threatens reprisals against any country trading
with the
island, and prevents foreign ships that visit Cuban ports from
docking in U.S.
harbors.

The 1996 Helms-Burton Act

(the

Cuban Liberty and Democratic

Solidarity

(LIBERT AD)

Act) allows lawsuits in U.S. courts against foreigners who use property
seized by Castro’s government from U.S. companies or citizens, including
people who

were Cuban citizens at the time of confiscation but whom are now U.S. citizens. The
Act also bans executives from companies investing in such properties from the U.S. by
denying them

visas,

no
Elian Gonzalez

by

his

mother

immigrants

in

was

a six-year-old

November of

Cuban boy who was brought

1999, the

latter

who drowned

in the crossover to the Florida coast

a custody battle to repatriate his son to

Miami-based anti-Castro

activists

who

Cuba on
filed

along with ten other Cuban

from Cuba. His Cuban father
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later

July 6, 2000, albeit in defiance of

numerous lawsuits

return.

illegally to the U.S.

to

prevent the boy’s

won

M,an,i businessman and
virulen, anti-Castro activist
Jorge

CANF came under scrut.ny as Mas conttnued

Mas Canosa.

to receive large

'

'

Mas and

'

NED grants

through

1

9d2

and, in turn, funded eantpa.gns
of scores of candidates for
federal oflice, mcluding
that

of former chair of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee,
who was

NED and

its first

pp. 389-90).

News

whether
rule

by

Indeed, Representative Robert
Torricelli, sponsor of the
Cuban

their

in

23,

(CANF)

Miami
1

in

funding from

World Report correspondent Linda
Robinson wrote:
goal

is

promoting democracy

a wealthy elite. In fact.

cohorts

March

&

of

acting chairman, Representative
Dante Fascell (D.-FI.)
(Nichols, 1988,

Democracy Act of 1992, received thousands
of dollars
U.S.

also a founder

to serve

said to

Cuhano por

to overturn the Castro

Cuba

“It is less

or restoring 1950s style

in a post-Castro

k, Paz).

for Ins

Cuba” (McAfee,

These NED-funded

government “leads

r

dear

have already chosen positions

under him as president

994, Movimienlo

Cuba intended

Mas was

in

CANF. And

activities in

to the probability,” stales

In 1997, the Center for Public Integrity
identified

CANF as not only ‘“the most
potent voice on U.S. policy toward Cuba’”
but as well ‘“dollar for dollar, arguably
the
most effective ’ The Center’s report notes that
CANF funneled approximately $3.2
million into the U.S. political system from its
founding in 1981 until 1997 As
Washington Post reporter Karen DeYoung writes,
CANF “claims credit for the current
pillars of sanctions policy— Radio and TV
Marti, a $28 million-a-year taxpayerfinanced system broadcasting into Cuba, along
with the embargo-tightening Cuban
.

Democracy Act
2000,

p.

in

A02).

1992 and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act” (DeYoung
Februarv
^ 21

Mas Canosa
U.S. policy towards

died unexpectedly on

November 23,

Cuba

decade and a

for the previous

altered the previously beligerent

manner

in

1997.

As

the front

half, his death

man

’

for

has arguably

which U.S. policy towards Cuba

is

carried

out.
1

12

In 1987, Fascell

1991,

is

was

the recipient of the

a small-scale replica

NED’s

first

Democracy Award which, since

of the so-called “Goddess of Democracy” statue
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fonner

CIA

agent Ralph

McGehee,

“that [the]

CIA

NED’S hundreds of so-called
non-governmental
human

rights groups, are little

more than

Furthermore, he argues: “Since

uses [the]

NED

organizations

for cover and tha,

(NGOs)-many ofthem

fronts for the operations
of the

CIA.”

NED sponsors human rights groups and

other

NGOs

in

about 80 countries, this creates a
massive worldwide mechanism
for subversion”

(McGehee, September

6,

1

996).

Since 1990, and especially since the
collapse ofthe Soviet Union

NED has funneled millions of dollars for political
union development into Russia primarily
through

in 1991, the

organizing and independent trade
its

four core institutes. These efforts

have been supplemented by millions of
dollars more from other U.S.
foreign policy
agencies including the USIA,

USAID, DOD, and

the State Department.

As

the

GAO

noted, the “democracy assistance
program in Russia seeks to capitalize on
the historic

opportunity to build democracy in place of
a centralized Communist system”

(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1 996,

p. 2).

For the years

1

990

till

June of 1 999,

NED funding

has exceeded $38 million for Russia and the
former states ofthe Soviet Union.

Although the

GAO reported that democracy related projects under their review were

constructed by students for use during the Tiananmen
Square protests in Beijing China
in May and June 1989.
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seen as “generally valuable”
by Russian refomrers and others,
they stated there were

m.xed

results as far as the projects
contributing to significant

pol.lical, legal, or soc.al

system and concluded

that “the

changes

in

most important

Russia’s

factors

determining project impact were
Russian economic and political
conditions"

(GAO/NSI AD-96-40.

1996. p.

2).

While

citing a

“new openness” of the newly

independent media as indicated by their
“frequently aired views highly

Communist government,”
forcing

many media

organizations “into bankruptcy or joining
larger

the pressure faced

of the

the report also noted insufficient
advertising revenues were

curtailing their independence and
capacity to produce their

was

critical

by many

print

own

affiliates,

thereby

programs.” Also noted

and broadcast outlets “from local

political

authonties or from organized crime, in large
part due to their dire financial
situations”

(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996,
Regarding the
the

NED

p. 3).

funded

activities to

promote

free trade

union development,

GAO recognized the FTUI for providing “important equipment and training

first

for the

independent, non-Communist unions that arose in
the late 1980s, that backed Boris

Yeltsin and other reformers, and that played a key
role in the breakup of the Soviet

Union.

However, the report notes, the “influence of the successors

to the official

“

113
^

should be noted that in

1996 report, the GAO chose not to include any projects
undertaken by the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)
in its review on
U.S. democratic development assistance to Russia stating that “the
primary focus of the
Center s projects was to promote privatization and promarket reforms, two
areas outside
the scope of our review” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996,
p. 10). Commenting on the
It

its

GAO’s

omission of CIPE projects, NED President Carl Gershman argued that the GAO
“erroneously categorized CIPE’s efforts as business development” rather than, he
argued, as “strengthening the capacity of private groups to build a constituency for free
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Communist

trade unions, the inexperience
and isolation of democratic
unions, the

apathy of Russian cit,^ens, and
the weakness of the economy”
continues to hamper the

new democratic untons (GAO/NSI AD-96-40,
between three

to five million

workers

in the

movement (encompassing such unions

1996, p. 5).

As of late

1994, there were

“independent” or “democratic” labor

as Sotsprof with 300,000

members; the

Confederation of Maritime Workers with
86,000 workers; and a regional affdiate
of the

Independent Miners’ Union of Russia with
about 95,000 members), while the

overwhelming majority of workers, more than
50

Communist dominated

million,

were

still

affiliated

with the

unions. Leaders associated with the
“independent” labor

organizations cited their biggest obstacle to
establishing independent unions as laying
in
the continued control of the social
insurance fund

which they could disperse benefits such

(GAO/NSIAD-96-40,
participating

transitional period

official trade unions,

as workers’ vacations and sick

through

pay

1996, pp. 31-33). Citing the need to give workers a
means of

m the new political

and U.S. and Russian

by the

officials

and economic environment,

warned

NED program documents

that “if workers are not given a voice during
this

and believe that free markets and democracy only work

to their

disadvantage, then they could pose a threat to social peace and
political and economic

development” (GAO/NSI AD-96-40, 1996,

With reference

to political party

p. 30).

development

in Russia, the

GAO noted that

U.S. funded activities “had not significantly strengthened reformist national
political
parties, either organizationally or in terms

of increased membership or perfomiance

market democratic reforms through advocacy and educational programs”
(GAO/NSI AD-96-40, 1996, p. 63).
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in

cicclions.” Dcsp.lc Nltl)

1992

lo

lumlmg of $956,000

the

NDIIA aiul
and

the IRI
IR| between 1990

snpporl the anl.-Com,n„nisl
Danocatic Rassia Movcmcnl,
cnient, as well as

lundtng lo conduct civic cdiicalion
and grassroots organizing
programs

I

the national and local levels
in addition lo over
$2()0,000 to monitor the
elections and lo send Russian
parly leaders to the U.S. for
“training,” on

million spent

by

USAID

on similar

efforts during tins

same neon,

public have not been receptive to their
political message”

Since the

37).

1

993

I

(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996,

p.

elections, the situation for reformist
parlies has “only marginally

improved," such by the December

1

995 parliamentary

elections, “the

reform election blocs of 993, Yabloko and
Russia’s Choice, had

two large pro-

1

parties and

refonmst

will

movements.” Russian

political parties

political

reform activists lamented

“may only emerge

after

more than

a

only win elections when the Russian people arc
receptive

political

message.” As

for

now, the report notes

by “the unpopularity of their
‘party’ (a harsh

free

memory from

split into

1 1

different

that viable

decade” and

that

to a refonnist,

that reformist parties are

“they

democratic

bogged down

market message” and the “historical negative view of

the days of Communist party control)”

(GAO/NSlAD-96-

40, 1996, pp. 40-41). Moreover, local elections held countrywide in
1994, notes the

GAO,

raised concerns about future national elections, as these elections were

by many

irregularities

marked

and low voter participation” (GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 1996,
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p. 27).

Civ.c educalion programs
funded by the
to better

promote democracy

,n Russia.

NDIIA and

the IRI

were

way

cited as a

In part.cular, polit.cal
party pan.cipants ‘'spoke

favorably of U.S. support for
sending Russians to the United
States for training.” Such
efforts.

,t

was

stated,

may convince

Because of a lack of success with
encouraging the

NDIIA and

programs and more on

their

Russians to support the reformist
parties’ message.

political party

development,

USAID

has been

the IRI “to place less emphasis
on their party training

work with

civic organizations"

(GAO/NSIAD-96-40, 996,
1

p. 43).

Given the foregoing
promotion

is

tainted

NED

funding

activities,

Its

which

aims

fair to

say that U.S. democracy

and contradicted when advanced through
secrecy, money

laundenng, vote buying, kickbacks, paid
junkets
acts

it is

to the U.S. for “training”,

and blatant

violate national sovereignty. That
the U.S. has been successful in achieving

m several

areas of the world

is

undeniable— the

election of Violeta

Chamorro

being a classic case in point. But short-term
gains can have long-term negative

consequences as witnessed by

CIA coup

d’etats

and other covert

Guatemala, Nicaragua and elsewhere before and during
the Cold

activities in Iran,

War which continue to

lend fuel to fire virulent anti-American sentiment in
these countries.

presumably overt nature of much
resentment, but

NED

funding

may

help to dispell

It is

true that the

some of this

NED proponents should not be surprised if the new beneficiaries of this

made-in-America brand of democracy begin

to reject this export seeing
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it

as just another

attempt ,o mask U.S. des.res
for world hegemonic
dominance.'
is

most

likely to occur

when

" And

such a rejec.on

the supposedly liberalory
institutions of this capitalist,

market-based brand of democracy

fail to

deliver material goods adequate
to the

promises given. For. indeed, are not
compliant and/or submissive publics
part satiated, while those

whose needs have long gone unmet

for the better

stirred to revolt?

Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to
pursue this course of “promoting
democracy”

abroad

in the

Clinton administration. In

president-elect Clinton

Secretary of State

who

was quoted

fact,

in 77, e

before he was sworn into office, the
then

New

York Times as stating that he wanted a

possesses “a commitment to global growth
and economic

regeneration here and the fuffilling of our
responsibility as the world’s sole superpower
to try to

promote democracy and freedom...” (Clinton,
quoted

Friedman, 1992,

in

p.

US/NATO war on Yugoslavia, instigated on the pretext of
“preventing a humanitarian catastrophe,” with the stated
intent to bring democracy to
that country or, at the very least, to its
Kosovo-Metohija region, and following the
bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese People
's Daily, in an article
In the midst

entitled,

ofthe 1999

“On New Development of US Hegemonism,”

stated, as regards the

US

intervention in Yugoslavia:

It is an important measure taken by
the United States to step up
implementation of its global strategy of seeking hegemony at the turn
of
the century, and a major indication of the new development of
US

hegemonism....
Flaunting the banners of “freedom”, “democracy” and “human
rights”, the

United States wantonly interferes

in the internal affairs of the
developing countries. The United States has tabled, year after year,
motions concerning other nations’ human rights at the UN human rights

meetings, attempting to act as the
“trials”

“human

of developing countries (“On

Daily Online,

May

New

27, 1999).
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right

judge” and conduct

Development.

.

.”,

People ’s

armed

A

1

9).

For the most

part, Clinton, in his

two terms

,n office,

has not had to confront

.he multiphcity of antt-U.S.
rebellions and revolut.ons
around the world winch

marked

115

W

Secretary of State on

nuary 20, 1993, '"'Tb"'"
Janu'Ill^o'l
and his successor,
Slate,

13
3,

1
1

who was sworn

T

in

Madeleine Albright, the

first

on January 23, 1997, Clinton may
be

°
W3
"i"'
993, Secretary-designate
Christopher stated:

built

female Secretary of

said to have gottenThe^

remarks on January

^

1

Democracy cannot be imposed from the top
down but must be
from the bottom up. Our policy should
encourage

patient, sustained
efforts to help others build the
institutions that make democracy
possible:
political parties, free media, laws
that protect property and
individual
rights, an impartial judiciary, labor

unions, and voluntary associations
between the individual and the state. American
private and
CIVIC groups are particularly well
suited to help.
that stand

In this regard,

will

move

Americans

swiftly to establish the

Democracy Corps,

we

to put experienced

m

contact with foreign grassroots democratic
leaders, and to
strengthen the bipartisan National Endowment
for Democracy.

We must also improve our institutional capacity to provide
timely
and effective aid to people struggling to establish
democracy and free
markets....

These three

our foreign policy

pillars for

military strength, and support for

A vibrant economy will

— economic growth,

democracy— are mutually

re-enforcing.

strengthen America’s hand abroad, while
permitting us to maintain a strong military without
sacrificing domestic
needs. And by helping others to forge democracy
out of the ruins of
dictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new
ones, and create

new markets

for

US

trade and investment (Christopher January 13

1993).

And

as Secretary-designate Albright stated in her prepared
confirmation remarks before

the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations

Committee on January

8,

1997:

Mr. Chairman, we have reached a point more than halfway between the
Union and the start of a new century. Our
nation is respected and at peace. Our alliances are vigorous. Our
disintegration of the Soviet

economy

is

strong.

And from

the distant comers of Asia, to the emerging

democracies of Central Europe and Africa,
democracies

that exists within

impemianent exception

to that

to the

community of

—

own hemisphere and to the one
community, Castro’s Cuba American

our

—

most U.S. administrations
throughout the years of the
Cold War. Cettatnly the demise
of the Soviet Union has
eontributed

to the lessening

of international tensions.
But one

could argue that U.S. interventtonary
behavior Itke those carried out
by the

NED may

likewise be impacting on the
present absence of major
international connicts.

NED

advocate Cohen argues the case that
“[t]o the extent that U.S.
foreign policy and

diplomacy

fosters the spread of democracy,
the

world will become more hospitable

to

freedom.” Moreover, long-term support
for democracy promotion,
he predicts, will
yield “a less contentious

few refugees, and

freer

community of nations,

economies

markets to all” (Cohen, 2000,

regional stability, freer soeieties
with

that spread prosperity to their
citizens while opening

p. 846).

That

this

view

is

shared by the present

administration can be witnessed by the adoration
of Secretary of State Albright who, on

May
NED,

16,

2000, praised the

NED stating that

it

“is

one of my favorite

institutions.”

The

she remarked:

has pioneered the use of our

own

civil society to

democracy from other countries and

cultures.

work with supporters of

It’s

had extraordinary

success in helping democracy-builders learn from
each other by sharing
experiences across national lines. And by so doing
has helped to give
global impetus to the movement to democracy
(Albright, May 16, 2000).
Secretary Albright’s claims of success

may

be more than just cheerleading as the U.S.

has perhaps found an answer to what years of Cold

institutions

War arms and

advisors often failed

and ideals are a model for those who have, or who aspire

to,

freedom.

no accident, and its continuation is by no means
inevitable. Democratic progress must be sustained as it was built
by
American leadership....
All this

is

—

And we will continue to promote and advocate democracy
because we know that democracy is a parent to peace, and that the

212

to achieve,

namely, pae.flca.ion of hostile
foretgn popula.tons.

And though

NED's

the

acttons constitute only a
small part of overall U.S.
government acttvity abroad and

much

less

of the overall

activity associated wtth
globalization

the world’s various regions
into a single global market,
the

coopting political elements

in the

and the tying together of

NED

ts

nonetheless actively

developing nattons which, to the
consternation of both

anti-U.S. and/or anti-capitalist
activists, otherwise might
be susceptible to following

indigenous oppositional rule."^

Whether

new

this

commitment

to

U.S. administration elected in

promoting democracy abroad continues
with the

November 2000 remains

present, the bipartisan consensus
supporting the

solidifying this

President, Carl

stated

m

for the foreseeable future.

1999; “Today, the Cold

memory, and democracy-promotion has become an
activity,

and a

pillar

of American foreign policy”

Shared assumptions about the nature of the
the

presumed

virtues

of civil society

the active support of both the

War

(NED Annual

AFL-CIO and

is

the

is

As

NED

almost a distant

Report, 2000, p.

liberal capitalist state

power

at

established field of international

will assure that the U.S. is

foreign policy path whether the party in

be seen, though

NED appears to remain constant, thus

component of U.S. foreign policy
Gershman,

to

and

its

4).

foundation in

committed

to this

Republican or Democratic and with

Chamber of Commerce. The

successful

export of a political philosophy, however, especially one
closely intertwined with an

American constitution remains the most revolutionary and
source of change in the world (Albright, January 8, 1997).

NED’S

inspiring

annual budget of approximately $32 million “is 0.2 percent of America’s $16
budget and just 0.01 percent of its $300 billion defense

billion foreign operations

budget” (Cohen, 2000,

p. 848).
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ccono.nic progra.n, rcc,„ircs
,hc ah.l.iy
cc<,n„mic .locisions, policies,
and Ircnds
In .1,0 nox.

and

f.nal

in

counirics largctcd

Ihal Iho

hogonron n,ig|„ acl lo med.alo and

world

capi.alisi syslen,

negate

its

de.nocracy

p, on,

goals.
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will

nnder Ihe lu.elage oflhc

racil.lale Iransilions ,o
Iho

.lomocracy or genoralc snllicicnl
resenlmenl and aniipalhy
lo

To,-

.lircc,

chap.c, U.S. Iransna.ional
ccono.nic cx.csion and
leadership

bo analyzed as lo Ihe l.kelihood
t'.S.

i„nucncc, c„o,cli„a,c, and
son,e,,n,cs

U.S. .nodol of

lo Ihis U.S.-lod export
so as

V.

Dunng

CAPITALISM, HEGEMONY, AND

DEMOCRACY

the last years, the

power of money has presented a
new mask
cnmtnal faee. Above borders, no
matter race or 00^7 the Power
of ntoney humiliates d'gn, ties,
insults honesties and
assassinates hopes
Re-named as Neol.berahsm”, the
historic crime in the
coneentration of
pnvi^ges, wealth and impunities,
democratizes misery and hopelessness.
ubcomandante Insurgente Marcos,
(
January 30 1996 Za
Jornada, “The EZLN calls for an
over

,ts

gathenng.

Can

intercontinental ami-1, b^ralism

Mexico; Chiapas Mountains.)

the U.S. successfully export

its

own brand of democracy abroad? Can

this

“revolution” towards democratic
capitalist structures be effected
in a passive manner or
will

one

It

create the type of convulsions
historically

state into the affairs

awakened by external intervention of

of another? Indeed, does not

this

U.S. brand of democracy

contain contradictions of political obligation
which could forestall such transitions?

Intended to foster U.S. hegemony and, hence,
the functioning of the world capitalist

system under

its

leadership, will not such transitions to
liberal

democracy

in fact

impede

or obstruct the necessity to accumulate
capital as national resentment against
the U.S.

hegemon and

its

dominate? In

this

foreign export grows? And, in this event, which
interests will likely

development since

concluding chapter,

WWII

I

and the affect

examine
this

between the so-called “developing nations”

As
at

certain aspects

development

is

of global

capitalist

having on the relations

vis-a-vis the so-called

“developed nations.”

well, the accelerated globalization of the world market in the
1990s

demands a look

the established international economic bodies including the newly
formed World

Trade Organization (WTO). Utilizing a Marxian
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class analysis,

I

then construct a basic

theoretical

model of capitalist production

and attempt to analyze the
concomitant
general. In this regard, an
assessment
to

promote democracy abroad

outlined

by Gramsci

(in the

falls

as

It

on the U.S. export of
democracy

effect

is

operates within the current
global market

made of the degree

to

in

which the U.S. attempt

within the prescription for
hegemonic rule as

sense of domination combined
with political leadership).

Indeed, the possibility anses of
a division between the
interests of international
capital

from

that

of U.S. national

organized capital to create
e.g. the Multilateral

instruments, e.g. the

interests proper and, hence,
the necessity

its

own instmments

by internationally

for the implementation

Agreement on Investments (MAI), and/or
expand

World Trade Organization (WTO),

of its

policies,

existing

the International

Bank

for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD;
otherwise known as the World Bank),
the
International

Monetary Fund (IMF), and

the United Nations

From 1995 to December, 1998, the Organization
Development (OECD), a Paris-based invitation-only

for

(UN)."^ As such, can

this

Economic Cooperation and

secretariat that includes 29
of the world’s wealthiest nations, had been
negotiating
a pact “aimed at setting investment ground
mles in the world’s richest nations, to
remove limits on foreign ownership of certain industries,
and allow the free movement
of capital across international borders” {Multilateral
Agreement on Investment..., March
5, 1998, pp. 1-2). According to the testimony of
Lori Wallach, director of Public’
Citizen s Global Trade Watch, the U.S.-based public
interest watchdog group, the goal
of the MAI “is to expand the same extreme mulinational
corporate agenda of
undermining countries sovereignty and disempowering even
legitimate government
action which is found in the GATT- WTO” {Multilateral
Agreement on Investment

member

countnes, including

all

.

March

5,

1998,

the proposed

p. 58).

MAI

..,

Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch Backgrounder notes that

would

“legally limit

how and when

nations, states or communities
investment policy,” “would require ‘national treatment’ for all member
countries
meaning foreign investors must be treated equal to domestic investors in all instances,”

can

set

would ban ‘performance requirements,’ such

as employment, reinvestment or other

conditions used to regulate multinationals investing in some communities,” and it
would grant legal standing to investors and corporations so that they can directly sue

governments

in international tribunals for failure to deliver
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all

of the MAI’s benefits.”

U.S. policy be pursued
successfully solely within the
framework of a nahonal state
acting as the

hegemonic leader or w, 11

be constructed and/or expanded

a supranat.onal or
urtemational

in order to legitimate

democratic values being exported?
In short,

is

and enforce the

the western liberal

framework need
capitalistic

(i.e.

capitalist)

democratic state under U.S. hegemony
the best form for the
realization of continued
capitalist

its

own

accumulation or does

this

form of state and hegemonic
relat.onships produce

irreconcilable contradictions which
undermine this very

n short, the proposed

hegemony?

MAI

“would accelerate economic globalization
while at the same
of democracies to control investment
policy.” I,
'r,,?, patly hinder the ability of
governments to combat the worst consequences
of
economic globalization: increased disparity
of wealth and income, growth of
national
n global monopolies and loss of
democratic control of a wide range of
policies from
“''"“7“'’
‘“b” rights to welfare policy” (“The Manning
A
Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI) Now Being Negotiated

iiL"®

I

at

*

the

OECD”)

Congressional committee hearing underscored
the opposition’s arguments'
“
7^,
one of the cntical concerns about the MAI”
is the “infringement on
national
sovereignty {Multilateral Agreement on
Investment..., Mdxch 5, \99%
p 2 ) In an
atement released on December 3, 1998, the
^

OECD stated: “Negotiations on
longer taking place” {Official OECD
Statement, December 3, 1998).
However, as De Brie points out, learning from the
temporary failure of MAI, “big
business and technocrats are trying to force
through a decision before the end of 1999”
either through the Transatlantic Economic
Partnership
the

MAIfare no

of the World Trade Organisation scheduled
“that will

(TEP) or the Millennium Round

to take place in Seattle in

December 1999

remove

the final obstacles to the free play of ‘market
forces’ and require
countries to submit to the unfettered expansion of
the multinationals.”

So

neither of these meetings

was

far,

however,

MAI. However, the TEP, with its lobby
of big businesses on both sides of the Atlantic known as
the Transatlantic Business
Dialogue (TABD), continues to seek to dissolve the European
Union in a free trade area
with the United States. As regards the WTO meeting in Seattle,
De Brie writes: “The
idea is to convert the meeting of the ministerial conference
of the 131 WTO member
countries in Seattle in

removal of the
mell

(De

Brie,

able to revive the

December 1999

enormous globalisation fair, where the
freedom of action would be negotiated pell1999). But with the enormous protests galvanized by this 1999
into an

final obstacles to capital’s

May

Seattle meeting, the

WTO has temporarily been stalemated in attempting to move

forward in this regard.
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A

Short Histo ry of the Post-WWII

Arthur Jensen (played by aetor

Ned

LIEO

CEO of CCA (a fictional
TV network anchonttan

Beatty),

corporatton) ,n the 1976 film
“Network” to

actor Peter
Fi™eh)
nch) after
aterBealf''
Beale went
T'‘
on air criticizing a proposed
buyout of CCA bv
die Western World Funding
Company, a eontomt.on baukroftld
'’5'

by Arab

You have meddled with the primal
forces of nature Mr
won have it! Is that clear?!
You are an old man who thinks in terms
of nations and

Beale, and

I

t

peoples

There are no nations. There are no
peoples. There are no Russians
There are no Arabs. There are no
Third Worlds. There is no West
There is only one holistic system
of systems, one vast and immense
interwoven, interacting, multivariate,
multinational dominion of
ol

ars— petro-dollars,

electro-dollars,

multi-dollars, reichmarks, rheims
and shekels. It is the international
system of currency
Which determines the totality of life on
this planet. That is the natural
order of things today. That is the
atomic and subatomic and galactic
stnicture of things today! And you
have meddled with the primal forces
of nature! And you will atone!
rubles, pounds,

Am
You

I

getting through to

get on your

’

you Mr. Beale?

21 -inch screen and

little
howl about America
and democracy. There is no America. There
is no democracy. There
only IBM and ITT and AT&T and Dupont,
Dow, Union Carbide, and
Exxon. Those are the nations of the world today.

is

What do you think the Russians talk about in their councils
of
Marx? They get out their linear programming charts,

state? Karl

statistical decision theories, minimax
solutions, and compute the
price/cost probabilities of their transactions and
investments just like we
do.
no longer live in a world of nations and ideologies Mr.
Beale.

We

The world

is

a college of corporations inexorably determined

by
immutable bylaws of business. The world is a business Mr. Beale.
It
has been since man crawled out of the slime. And our children
will live,
the

Mr. Beale,

to see that perfect

oppression, or brutality

whom
will

men

all

work

will

—one

work

to serve a

world

And I have

Howard

Beale:

which there

is

no war or famine,

vast and ecumenical holding

company

for

common company for whom all men
common profit in which all men will hold a share of
to serve a

stock, all necessities provided,

amused.

in

all

anxieties tranquilized,

chosen you Mr. Beale

all

boredom

to preach this evangel.

Why me?

Arthur Jensen: Because you’re on

dummy. Sixty million
Monday through Friday.

television

people watch you every night of the week,
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Howar^Be^

I

have seen the face of God!
might be right Mr. Beale.

AilhjirJen^ You just

“The corporate cosmology of
Arthur Jensen.”
Following World

War

II,

a Liberal International

established under U.S. tutelage at the
historic Bretton

Economic Order (LIEO) was

Woods Conference

in

New

Hampshire. Building on the Articles of
Agreement of the 1944 Bretton Woods
conference, the

LIEO which was

to help facilitate the

constructed included several institutional
instruments

expansion and security of market forces.
The conferees

to the

1944

conference wishing to avoid the ubiquitous
imposition of trade barriers and the

widespread practice of competitive devaluation,
which
exacerbated the Great Depression, thus

governments a means would have
country

s

to

currency relative to others

knew

1920s and 1930s

that to alleviate the fear

be devised

(i.e.

in the late

to

determine the

fair

and

distrust

of

value of each

the necessity for convertible currencies)
so that

trade could proceed in an orderly and uninterrupted
fashion."^ With specialized

agencies like the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (IBRD;

Trade Organization (ITO), the Bretton

economic
of power

118

structure

in a small

which was

to rest

number of states,

a.k.a. the

World Bank), and

Woods agreements

on three

the International

laid the basis for a

postwar

political conditions: “the concentration

the existence of a cluster of important interests

.

Driscoll notes that during the 1930s:

“The relation between money and the value of
goods became confused, as did the relation between the value of one national currency
and another. Under these conditions the world economy languished. Between 1929 and
932 prices of goods fell by 48 percent worldwide, and the value of international
fell by 63 percent” (Driscoll, July 1997, p. 3).
1
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trade

shared by (hose states, and
the presence of a dominant
power [the U.S.] w.lling and able
.0

assume

a leadership role” (Spero,
1981. p. 23).

adopted whtch forced
their

exchange

all

the world.

set limits

with their currencies earmarked

be sold or redeemed

relatively high vis-a-vis

agreed upon status

reinforced

narrow

in the different

to the

U.S.

exchange markets around

U.S. dominance in the post-WWIl
international economy kept the parity

of the dollar’s value
Its

participatory countnes to
balance their finances while
keeping

rates within

dollar so that they could

A system of ftxed exchange rates was

by

its

at

Bretton

Woods

as the standard bearer

seeming invulnerability up

acted as the standard by which

all

most other of the world’s currencies,
hence

to the 1970s.

unhindered as the

And because the U.S.

dollar

other currencies’ exchange rates were
set while

retaining a relatively high panty in
relation to
to act relatively

was psychologically

capitalist

most other currencies,

the U.S.

was able

world’s banker as the dollar became the

currency of preference for international
transactions and investment.

An

agreement on a new international trade order proved
more elusive than on a

monetary order, however. Whereas the U.S. had
dominated decision making

at

Bretton
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From 1945 to 1971, the U.S. dollar was said to be “as good as
gold,” for countries
were indeed allowed to trade in their U.S. dollars for gold.
Exchanged at the rate of one
ounce of gold for every $35, the U.S. government backed up
this
arrangement,

exchanging gold for dollars at the above rate on demand. Moreover,
as Kegley and
Wittkopf note. Dollars earned interest, which gold did not; they
did not entail storage
and insurance costs; and they were needed to buy imports for survival
and postwar
reconstruction” (Kegley

& Wittkopf,

1981/1989, pp. 187-9). However, in 1971, the
gold standard was abandoned, as countries, resentful over U.S. policies
in Vietnam and
fearing

American

instability due to chronic deficits in the U.S. balance of payments
(necessary to keep the war going), increasingly demanded gold instead of dollars.
The
resulting depletion of U.S. gold reserves forced the transition to a free floating
currency

market not based on gold convertibility. Since then, each countries’ money has been
worth whatever it can fetch on the world’s markets.
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Woods. U was unable
Charter.

to dictate the stn.cture

Immediately from the

start,

of trade

rules fonnalized

the

exentptions from generalized
rtdes by

Havana

member

countries participating in the
trade negotiations weakened
the dominant role of
the U.S

and made the ITO a watered
down

abandon the ITO

until

institution.

was

known

to serve until the

the U.S. did not fonnally

1950 (by not submitting the Havana
Charter

raced certain defeat), an interim
treaty
force ,n 1948)

And though

as the General

drawn up by

Agreement on

to

Congress where

the U.S. in 1947 (which

and Trade

Tariffs

Havana Charter was ratified_by

of the international consensus on trade”
(Spero. 1981.

default

became “the expression

p. 78).

economy

required for the existence of an
international economic

hegemonic

1

is

the

LlEO

that the

most basic factor

regime— the

stability thesis” (Kindlebcrgcr,
1973; Gilpin, 1981;

984), Ruggie argues that the existence of a

into

(GATT)-whieh

While acknowledging as "useful and
necessaiy” the contention
configuration of state power in the world
political

came

so-called

Keohane, 1980

&

“has more to do with the

international projection of a particular
configuration of domestic state-society relations

than

it

place

does with the projection simply of state power”

is

given to market rationality, and “political authority

maximum

An

for, in

(sic)

is

a liberal order pride of

designed to give

scope to market forces rather than constrain them.”'^^
Hence, Ruggie notes:

LIEO

will exist, then,

when

this

form of state-society relations enjoys a

120

The two central propositions of the hegemonic stability thesis as outlined by
Keohane are; 1) that order in world politics is typically created by a single dominant
power. Since regimes constitute elements of an international order, this implies
that the
formation of international regimes nonnally depends on hegemony. The other
major
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it

hegemonic

status

among

the major

major economic powers achieve

this

relations, the collective
purposes

justified as policies.

And

this,

economic powers” (Ruggie,
1984,
congruence

in the

of these regimes must

p. 35).

Once

the

balance of their state-society

still

be operationalized and

Ruggie argues, “largely depends upon
the prevailing

bodies of economic theory and ideology
to which the regime-making
states hold.”

When

the gold standard prevailed prior
to

WWI,

for example, state abstinence

was

advocated and understood within the
framework of classical economics and
justified by
the Imssez-faire ideology.

states

The interwar period saw no reigning theory
or ideology

Ruggie. In the post-WWII period, however,

among

the capitalist countries social democratic
doctrines and methods

have coexisted with more

traditional economic forms, but there
has been
a substantial area of theoretical and ideological
overlap in the Keynesian

middle (Ruggie, 1984,

The neoclassical-Keynesian

p. 36).

synthesis, he argues, provided “the

means both

to

legitimate the prevailing social objectives of the
major economic powers as well as to

tenet

of the theory of hegemonic

stability is that the

continued hegemony” (Keohane, 1984,

p. 31).
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maintenance of order requires

opera, ionalize Ihosc

programmed

objccves imo specinc

to coordinate”

(Ruggie, 1984,

Though U.S. prcdo„„nancc
establish,,, ent

p.

make

it

economic regimes were

37 ).'^'

post-war penod cotdd
guarantee the

of a LIEO, a n,uc„ n,ore
eotnpheated

the system in order to

principle

in the

policies ,ha, ,he

task

was

,„ secure ,egi,in,acy
for

work. This was to be aehieved,

o[co„pan„lve a, Ivan, age which was

to renect the

first,

fonnal equality of those

states party to the agreentents.
This “mutual-gain” approach,
as
to

It

,t.

stipulated that “any

two nations

through the

Bhagwati (1984)

will benefit ifcach
specializes in those

can produce relatively cheaply and
exchange for goods

that

it

refers

goods

can produce only

that

at a

121

avnihhl
available

own

^
of capitalism to lead to an excess supply
of commodities
consumer demand (and this situation’s

relative to

resulting consequences of driving

prices and prollts, leading to capital
flight, closure of industries,
etc.) indicated to

Boventments in the 1930s the political inadvisability
of waiting for “self-regulating’
marke s to correct their imbalances, amidst
massive unemployment, demands for
pro cettng national trade and, hence, the
proliferation of world

tariff barriers, and other
fhe British economist John Maynard
Keynes proposed addressing the
counterpart to the problem of overproduction,
viz. inadequate demand,
through
governmental interventionist policies designed

distortions,

to spur consumer purchasing
power
was done in the U.S., for example, through FDR’s
New Deal programs such as
Works Progress Administration, the Civilian Conservation
Corps, the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration, and the Civil Works
I

h's

Administration,

the

etc.

(Leuchtenburg, 1963). As Greidcr notes;

Keynes argued
artificial

markets cannot extricate themselves from pemianent
unemployment and underutilized capacity without the

that

stagnation, high

demand stimulus of government spending. The new spending
demand for goods and labor; governments promote rising

creates market

wages and schemes
will

that redistribute incomes downward
spend the money (Greider, 1997, p. 51).

to those

who

The consensus around

the success of the Keynesian solution to the capitalist crisis
of
ovcrsupply lasted well into the decade of the 1970s until free market
purists gained a
political

upperhand and began demanding the shrinkage of government while heralding

the benefits of unregulated markets.
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higher cost” (Kegley and
Wiukopr, 1981 / 1985

p.

.

172 ). Special, za, ion was
thus

to

ensure effective low-cost
production while the bcnehis
of unfettered hade were
to

aceme

to all participating
nat.ons,

more

so than

would otherwise be possible

system

in a

of protective trade bamers. And.
secondly, the principle of
non-.liscnnn,u„ion was
incorporated in the designat.on of
Most Favored Nation

each

member country had

favorable trade conditions

to treat all

it

of its fellow

had made

status

which meant

that

GATT .nembers equally, extending

one country

to

(MFN)

to all fellow cotintries,
as well as

prohibiting quantitative restrictions
on imports (although these restrictions
were deemed
to

be suitable measures

for safeguarding balance

In addition, this high level

what were deemed

was

to lead to an

to

of mutual economic

of payments) (Ruggie, 1984,

interaction

among

p.

37).'“

states involved in

be relatively symmetrical relationships
on an even playing

field

interdependence between states thus legitimating
the system.

In practice,

however, the principle of mutual-gain gave
way

to self-gain as

competition rather than cooperation became
the norm.'^^ Concomitantly, nations

As of 1998, the U.S. Treasury Department notes that the
term “Most Favored-Nation
(MFN)” has been changed to “Normal Trade Relations (NTR)”
status. The name was
changed, the department

states, “because the term Most Favored-Nation
status was
deceiving since most nations have this trade status
except for a handful of rogue

nations

that

have been refused

normal trade relationship.” Like MFN, “[ujnder NTR both
parties agree not to extend to any third party nation
any trade preferences that are more
this

favorable than those available under the agreement concluded
between them unless they
simultaneously make the same provisions available to each other”
(International Trade

Data System [ITDS], June

4, 1999).
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Using World Bank

figures,

Madeley

(

industrialized countries to keep out Third

between $50
a tariff,

billion

which

which has the

is

and $100

1

992) writes that trade barriers used by

World goods

“cost poor countries anything

billion a year” (p. 56). Industrialized countries either use

basically a tax levied on a product at the port of entry into a country

effect

of increasing the cost of the product and hence reduces
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its

sale or,

repeatedly interfered with free trade
praetices, continuously trying
to get an edge

market shares and exchange rates while
playing favorites
granted

MFN status.

in

deciding

who was

to

in

he

Indeed, as per section 5 of the Trade
Agreements Extension Act of

1951 (P.L. 82-50). President

Truman suspended

countries of the then Sino-Soviet bloc.'“

MFN status to the Soviet

The presumed

equality of states

Union and

was

all

thus hit

with the reality of their inequality as states
with greater resource reserves and
productive
capacities, as well as with

more advanced technologies and

a skilled

work

force, could

use this leverage to ensure unequal trade patterns.
This had the political consequence of
perpetually subordinating those nations less
well-endowed. Interdependence thus gave

way

to dependence. Indeed, as

Bank and

the

IMF

—one

Danaher argues: “The unwritten goal of the World

that has

been enforced with a vengeance— has been

to integrate

countries into the capitalist world economy.” Rhetoric
about development and the
alleviation

of poverty, asserts Danaher, merely cover the

fact that the central function

of

most expecially since the 1980s, protectionist measures of industrialized
countries have
included the usage of non-tariff barriers such as the quota, which restricts
the quantity
of a particular product which is allowed to be imported into the market
of a
country.

By

1990, states Madeley, “nearly a quarter of protectionist measures were in the form
of
non-tariff measures” (Madeley, 1992, p. 132). Though “the
clause might be more
accurately called the ‘equal treatment’ clause,” “[wjhatever its name, the clause
has

MFN

frequently been ignored by Western countries in their dealings with developing
countries” (Madeley, 1992, p. 132).
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Title IV,

restoring

of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974,

sets out the conditions

and procedure

MFN status to any of the “nonmarket economy” (NME) countries.

key conditions of Title IV

are:

for

The two

“(1) conclusion of a bilateral trade agreement containing

a reciprocal grant of the MFN status and additional provisions required by law, and
approved by the enactment of a joint resolution; and (2) compliance with the freedom-

of-emigration requirements (‘Jackson- Vanik amendment’). These requirements can be
fulfilled either

by a

Presidential determination that the country in question places no

obstacles to free emigration of its citizens, or, under specified conditions, by a
presidential waiver of full compliance” (Pregelj, June 10, 1998).
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these n,ul.ilatcral Icncimg
agencies

more

states

tightly

(i.e.

Woods

written in Washington, where
both the

Third World, this harkens back

in the

World Bank and

imo a world economy dominated by

coTiorations” -[Tlhe Bretton

And

Ihe

II,

e

IMF]

lo colonial

the

Fund

saw

draw weaker

economic polices

are based. For

times” (Danaher, 1994,

since post-war decolonialization

lo

large, transnational

inst.tniions,” he adds,
‘•cnrorec

Bank and

is

many

in the

p. 2).

the rise of independent
states mostly

southern hemisphere (hence the
terminology: “the South"), the
objective

condition of these emergent countries’
economies vis-a-v,s the capital intensive
and
technologically advanced “North” led
to the formation of political
alliances

and the creation,

first,

of the Non-Aligned Movement

(NAM)

in

1955

at

in the

South

Bangdung,

Indonesia where 29 Asian and African
nations met to devise plans to
combat

neocolonialism which grew into an institutionalized
organization by 1961.'“ Choosing,
or rather destring, to remain outside
of the superpower confrontation of ihe Cold
War,
Ihe nonaligned countries attempted to
maintain bilateral and cooperalive relations
with

both the Western capitalist and Eastern communist
blocs, cslablishing mixed economics

which incorporated frequent

state interventions

while not totally nationalizing

all

capital.

The disenchantment of developing

nations

was again vocalized

1964 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

where a joint declaration by 75 (two other countries

make

it

known

as the

(UNCTAD)

Movement

consists of

226

the .June 15,

in

Geneva,

later joined in the declaration to

“G-77” declaration) developing countries

Currently, the Non-Aligned

at

1

called for “a

new

12 mostly developing nations.

mtemafonal

division oflabour oriented
towards the accelerated
mdustnal.zation of

developing countries. .supplemented
and strengthened by
constructive mtemational
.

action” ^Joint Declaration
of the Serenty-Seven Developing
Countries

Conclusion of the United Nations
Conference on Trade

Geneva, Switzerland). While

in

UNCTAD became a fon,m

Made at

Development, June
for the expression

the

15, 1964,

of the

South’s woes and subsequent demands,
the G-77 countries established
a permanent
organization to push for multilateral
cooperation within the

UN

framework

to alter the

marginalization of the world’s developing
nations.

The 1960s and

early 1970s witnessed attempts
by these developing countries to

“extend the international normative consensus
in favor of independence to
international
support for development” with official
development assistance targets, preferential
trade

arrangements,

this

etc.

m order to “close the gap” (Ruggie,

North-South conflict (or “dialogue” as Ruggie

1984, p. 33).

et al. refer to

it;

The key

issues in

cf Jones, 1983) have

subsequently revolved around the economic and
political claims of the world’s “havenots” versus those of the world’s “haves,” with
political independence and sovereignty
as well as

economic assistance and development monies

constituting the primary thrust

127

of these negotiations.

It

(OPEC)

was

the triumph of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries

in the 1970s,

however, which suggested

to the developing countries

of the

126

Currently, there are 132

member countries of the G-77

127

“[T]he North-South system

is one of disparity and inequality,” writes Spero. “In
1977, the developed market economies had an average gross national product of $7,317
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South “that other commociilics
couUI be cartelized
the North" (Bhagwati,
1984.
strengthcnetl

by OPEC's

commodities
ittsisling that

23)

p.

With the

to extract resources
unilaterally

eredtbility ofconttnodity

lead, the Sottth sought
not only to

but, moreover, to overturn
the

LIEO

1

1

power

cartelization to other

established at Bretton

Woods

“the entire range of international
economic issues-lrade, money,
aid,

energy, raw materials, ete.-be
negotiated together.”

New

less than a

expand

from

International

What was

called for

was nothing

Economic Order (NIEO) which was
“proclaimed

973 Algiers Non-Aligned Conference and
embraced

974 Sixth Special Session” (Bhagwati,
1984,

p. 25).

at the

At

UN General

this stage,

at the

Assembly’s

developing

countries pursued a strategy of “Global
Negotiat.ons” seeking resource transfers
to the

South arguing

wouhl

leatl to

that

such transfers would stimulate Southern
growth which,

increased

demand

in turn,

for Northern exports, thus “pulling
the North out

of

recession without rekindling inllalion”
(Rtiggic, 1984, p. 34). Before the
South’s

newfound commodity weapons could be deployed,
however, world
and the cartelization of oil proved unable

to

oil prices stabilized

be successfully duplicated with other

commodities. As Northern vulnerability declined,
demands by the South

for

Global

Negotiations went unheeded. Bhagwati contends that the
lack of Northern response was

per capita whereas the underdeveloped countries had an average
gross national product
of $573 per capita” (Spero, 1981, p. 14).
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“The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed at
in Baghdad on September 10-14, 1960. There were five
original
members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Between 1960 and

a

conference held

1975,

the organization expanded to 13

members with

the addition of Qatar, Indonesia, Libya,
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, and Gabon. Currently, OPEC
consists of
member nations (Ecuador dropped out in December 1992 and Gabon
1

1

withdrew effective January 1995)” (“OPEC

FACT SHEET,” January

228

1998).

.Iso

due

to

a weakened maeroeconom.c
situation

which hampered

“tlre.r

in the

advanced

cap.talist countries

pohtical and financial capability
to respond construet.veiy,

especially in regard to redisiributton
measures such as foreign aid
fiows” (Bhagwati,

1984,

p. 26).

And though

a temporary resurgence
in

followed the 80 percent rise

in oil prices

demands

for Global Negotiations

stemming from the 1979 revolution

tn Iran, a

circumvention of OPEC by the North
by obtaining other sources of
oil and by increased
production by Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait followed by a subsequent
reduction in

oil prices

diffused the crisis thus stalling the
Global Negotiations further.
While energy

conservation played a role in easing the
vulnerability of the North, Bhagwati
noted that
“ultimately the world recession, following
on the tight-money policies of the
Federal

Reserve combined with the expansionary
budget
rise in

US

interest rates, delivered Ihe

deficits

and the resulting phenomenal

coup de grace” (Bhagwati, 1984,

p. 27).

with Southern inability to demonstrate
any comparable commodity power

Thus

to get the

attention of the North as oil had, and
with the North feeling less vulnerable and,
hence,
less willing to listen to

Southern demands for resource

of OPEC was rendered harmless
Negotiations

lack of slate

waned

transfers,

once the cartelization

(for the time being, at least), interest in
Global

as the South found itself without any bargaining
power. Thus, the

power on

the part of Ihe South led to the stalled Global
Negotiations, for in

trying to establish a “regime” under the rubric of the

Bretton Woods, the South

s relative

power

NIEO

vis-a-vis the

to counter the

North was greatly

LIEO of

inferior.
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Krasner defines regimes “as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actor’s expectations converge in a given area

of international relations” (Krasner, 1982,

p. 186;
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see also Krasner, 1983). Ruggie

The
to Bretton

d,suni,y of ,he South also
hindered

Woods.

(NlCs)-what

,ts

Specifically, this related to the

abilt.y to establ.sh a
counter-reginte

newly

industrialized countries

are often referred to as the
senn-penphery countries-sueh
as Brazil,

Taiwan, and Singapore who, once
entering the world's

financial markets,

were no

longer interested in solutions like
“generalized debt relief to
North-South disparity
issues (Bhagwati, 1984, p.
7).

South was unable

to agree

Thus with developmental gradations

on the

collective purpose their

While the South was vulnerable due
Its

state-society relations, such

was

to its lack

NIEO

regime was to pursue.

of congruence

in the

altered over

time-had nonetheless

held the major capitalist oriented nations
together for over 50 years

at this

though Ruggie concludes that “[t]he North-South
dialogue has had

transforming international economic regimes,”
he counters

dialogue “has not been entirely irrelevant to

defines

international

balance of

not the case with the emerging
international society

of the North, whose collective purposes—
though

And

in its ranks, the

economic regimes”

this

writing.'^"

little to

do with

that, nevertheless, the

process” as indicated in

tliree

areas

as “governing arrangements constructed

by

states to coordinate their expectations and organize
aspects of their behavior in such
issue areas as trade and monetary relations” (Ruggie,
1984, p. 34).

“A
states,

society of states (or international society) exists,” states Bull,

conscious of certain

common

“when

a group of

common values, form a society in
sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set
of rules in their
relations with one another, and share in the working of common
institutions” (Bull
interests

and

the

1977, p. 13).

Though the Bretton Woods monetary and financial system collapsed in 1971,
management of the LIEO remained in the hands of the U.S. which continued to sustain
the free market principles of the Bretton

Woods

system. Nations could no longer

exchange dollars

for gold and fixed exchange rates were replaced by free-floating
currency values determined by market forces, thus introducing uncertainty and

unpredictability into international monetary relations while alerting other countries to
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which these negcahons
have

in, paced:

firs., in

pn„,„g

international agenda; second,
in creating a nonnative

in, pact

,saes „„ .he
as “the ritual of

nego.iat.ons provides a useful
ins,n,men. in the global
legitin,a„on struggle
because
is

earned on

in universal.st.e tenns

and

in the

language of con,n,on
interests”; and

the Nor.h-Sou.1, d.alogue
has impacted the institut.onal
level by

development policy constituencies

,n the bureaucracies

of all the

i.

th.rd,

embedd.ng
industrial, zed

countries, “in large measure,”
he adm.ts, “because of the
need lo prepare for and

respond to the never-ending rounds
of the dialogue” (Ruggie,
1984, pp. 40-41).

Without a formal mechanism governing
in.emahonal economic relations
following the collapse of Ihe Bret.on

bloeks emerged in the

late

Woods system

itself is a

in the early 1950s.

The European

byproduct of the Cold War, as a working
relationship

between pos.-WWII France and Gemtany
was seen

communist countries of Europe
PO'ce

of regional trading

1970s and ’80s building on the
success of the European

Economic Community (EEC) wh.ch began

Community (EC)

in 1971. the idea

into a unified

in Duff, e. al., 1994, p. 10).

as necessao- to anchor the non-

and workable system (Fontaine,
1997;

This integration was endorsed and
overseen by the

United States which, as Pryce notes, “began
by strongly encouraging the formation of
the

EC, and shielded

it

in

its

early years from British hostility...”
(Pryce in Duff, et

1994, pp. 8-9). The European Coal and Steel

the fact of U.S. inability to solely

1981/1989,

manage

Community (ECSC) was

the existing

p. 194).
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LlEO (Kegley

the

first

al.,

joint

& Wittkopf

treaty

which paved the way

to further cooperation

This was followed with the

Treaty of Rome on March
25, 1957 establishing the
European Economic Community

(EEC) which abolished customs
quantitative limits

had spectacular

on

trade.

effects:

duties

on trade between signatory

“Between 1958 and 1970,

trade within the

community

states as well as

the abolition

of customs duties

increased sixfold while

EEC

trade

with the rest of the world went up
by a factor of three. Average
gross national product

m the EEC over the same period went up by 70%”
success, the

EC began to

elections to the

still

With

enlarge, beginning in the
1970s, and in 1979 the

European Parliament

European Council

(Fontaine, 1997).

in Strasbourg

its initial

first direct

were held, though the non-elected

controls most of the important
decisions.''^

The

initial signatories to the ECSC
included France,
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg.
“In creating the EC its original six
members

Gennany

By

the mid-1980s

Italy the

set out on a more ambitious course
aim of which was described in the 1950 Schuman
[i.e. French Foreign
Minister Robert Schuman] Plan as a federation”
(Pryce in Duff, et

the essential

al.,

Denmark,

Ireland,

and the

UK became EC members on January

Spain, and Portugal were admitted in the

admitted on January

1,

1,

1994,

p. 10).

1973

Greece

980s. Sweden, Finland, and Austria were’
1995, bringing current EC membership to a total of 15
countries,
1

The European Parliament (EP) grew out of the representative
assembly
established with the ECSC, though prior to 1979, Members
of the European Parliament
(MEPs) were selected by their respective national parliaments (Laffon
in Cafruny &
Rosenthal, 1993, p. 45; Fontaine, 1997). The European
Council, on the other hand, has
been meeting since 1974. Here, “Heads of State or Government
meet at least twice a
year in the form of the European Council or ‘European Summit’.
Its membership
also

includes the President of the Commission,
invited to

make

fhe President of the European Parliament

is

a presentation at the opening session” (“The Council of the European

Union,” 1997).

The Council of the European Union

“is usually

known

as the Council

Ministers, and has no equivalent anywhere in the world. Here, the
legislate for the

Union,

Member

of

States

set its political objectives, coordinate their national policies

and

resolve differences between themselves and with other institutions. ... Each meeting of
the Council brings together Member States’ representatives, usually ministers, who are
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EC

countries were ready to abolish

member

states’

(SEA) which

January

1993 as the date -by which a

1,

established” (Fontaine. 1997).
ultimately passed because

nations.

strategies

Rosenthal, 1993, p.

economic union
which came

4).

it

As Cafruny and

corresponded

its

to the

of economic and

to

be

SEA “was

perceived national interests of
Europe’s
that international capital
mobility

one country’ obsolete; they saw the

in

market was

SEA

as an extension of

financial liberalization” (Cafruny

The SEA was followed by

the

more

had

&

decisive political as well as

resulting from the signing of the
Maastricht Treaty on February
7, 1992

into force

on November

340 million people providing

free

1,

1993 and created “a vast internal market
of over

movement

within

goods, capital and services and the citizens of
the
1994, pp.6-7). Although an

1992 was overcome a year

May of 1993,

full internal

Rosenthal note, the

Governments recognized

rendered ‘Keynesianism

new domestic

additional obstacles to free
trade wilhin

borders and thus signed on Febniary
17, 1986 the Single European
Act

set

most powerful

many

initial

later

the fact that only

it,

with only limited exceptions, for

member

states” (Pryce in Duff, et

Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty

June of

with a majority “yes” vote in a second referendum

Denmark and France (amongst EC members)

public referendums on the treaty, with the Danish referendum
requiring to be

while the French majority was

in

less than three percent

al.,

in

held

mn twice

of the vote (51.05% to 48.95%),

indicates a possible division of interests between European financial
and political elites

responsible to their national parliaments and public opinions. Nowadays, there are
regular meetings of more than 25 different types of Council meeting: General Affairs

(Foreign Affairs ministers).

Economy and

Finance, and Agriculture meet monthly,

others such as Transport, Environment and Industry meet two to four times a year”

(“The Council of the European Union,” 1997).
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and the populations of these
countries (Duff in Duff,

et ah,

1994, pp. 54 - 65 )

Nonetheless, Maastncht ushered
in the transfomiation of
the European Conuuru.ity
into
.he

European Union (E.U.) and,

states to

EC

in the process, transferred
‘‘a great deal

institutions” (Cafruny

& Rosenthal,

1993, p. 4). Perhaps the most

tmportant consequence of the
Maastricht Treaty, however,

economic and monetary union (EMU)
buttressed by
European currency-the Euro-which
came
the introduction of the single
currency

is,

of power front

is

the decision to enact an

the establishment of a
single

into existence

on January

1,

1999. While

for Fontaine, the “final,
logical stage in the

completion of the internal market” (Fontaine,
1997), Cafruny and Rosenthal note

“monetary union would certainly represent
an unprecedented and fundamental
on the nation-state.” Pointing out

that the

power to

issue currency

aspect of national sovereignty and the
most important

is

that

assault

“a fundamental

means by which governments

regulate national economies,” they denote
the decision to adopt “one currency
and one
central

bank by the year 2000”

Maastricht” (Cafruny

as clearly constituting “the

& Rosenthal,

1993,

p.

major achievement of

6)."' Maastricht

was followed on January

133

treaty

was passed by

134

the national parliaments of the remaining

EC

states.

One should

note that the adoption of a single currency for the countries
of Europe
has its counterpart in the calls for the “dollarization” (i.e.
adopting the U.S. dollar as
legal tender in place of the national currency) of several
economies in Latin America.
In fact, in February of 1999, Argentine President Carlos

abandonment of the Argentine peso and
official

Menem

called for the

the adoption of the U.S. dollar as the country’s

medium of exchange. And though one

analyst states that this indicates

how

far

nationalism has receded in Argentina compared to only ten years prior, he adds
that, in
actuality, Menem’s proposal is not as radical as it sounds because, he states,
“Argentina
is

effectively dollarized anyway, since 50 percent of the deposits in the country’s

financial

system are already

in dollars or dollar-denominated instruments” (Falcoff,
April 1999). Opposition to dollarization, however, was witnessed in Ecuador in January
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,

1994 with the establishment
of the European Economic
Area (EEA) joining together

m one single market the

15

members of the E.U. with

five

members of the European

Free Trade Association (EFTA):
135
Austria. F.nland, Nonvay,
Sweden, and Iceland.

The EEA,

at that time,

became

“the world’s largest free
trade zone, comprising
372

againstfe™!^

2000 when mass protests
followed by a coup d’etat by several
of the
announced ptos for dolarization of
the
resign his office and replacing

countries’ top

generals— after Mahnad

Ecuadorian economy-forcing

him with

Matad to

his vice president as the
country’s
is pushing a similar
plan for Indonesia

new leader
Economist Ross Mcleod, who
sTvs
movement towards dollarizat.on ”is a legacy
of the" teady sberornrarc."
.hat
have beset the world over the last two
decades.” States Mcleod:
In these crises, countnes
experienced sudden capital outflow
driven by a
widespread expectation that their currencies
were likely to be markedly

devalued.

A sinking implication of this is that if countries

did not have
currencies, they could never be
subjected to destabilizing
swings
capital flows resulting from
exchange rate speculation It
follows that vulnerability to occasional,
but severe, financial
their

own

m

be mitigated

crises could

if countries

were

January 28, 2000, V. 26, No.

own currencies (Mcleod
CNN.com Asia Now)

to abolish their

3,

EFTA was

established on November 20, 1959, as
Ministers from Austria, Denmark
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom (seven West
European countries that were not members of the
European Economic Community)
approved m Stockholm the text of a Convention
establishing the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA), which entered into force on
May 3, 1960. As an alternative
method toward European integration, EFTA’s goal “was:
(a) to remove import duties,

quotas and other obstacles to trade in Western
Europe and (b) to uphold
discriminatory practices in world trade.”

“The membership of the

EFTA has undergone

liberal,

non-

significant changes since the

inception of the organization. Iceland

became a member in 1970; Finland, which had
been an associate member from 1961, became a full member
in 1986; and Liechtenstein
became a full member in 1991. Of the original members, six have left
to join the
European Union (EU): the United Kingdom and Denmark in
Portugal
1972;

in 1986;

and Austria, Finland, and Sweden, on January 1, 1995. Norway,
however, decided
against membership in the EU in a referendum in November 1
994, after completing
negotiations for accession to the

present

members of EFTA

EU along with the other three EFTA countries.

are: Iceland, Liechtenstein,

(European Free Trade Association, April

10, 1997).
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The
Norway, and Switzerland”

million people,” thus

making

the E.U. “one of the
three most important
players on the

world economic scene alongside
the

The

.a,es. addition to these

USA and Japan” (Pryce m Duff,

et al,

1994,

docuntents constituting the
unification of Europe

is

p. 7).

the

signing on October 2, ,997
of the Treaty of Anrsterdan,
wh.ch more fully expands
on

and

social

political consolidation

Treaty; in effect.

treaty ts

,t

.mended

of the Union while revising
aspects of the Maastricht

represents the

new

treaty

on European Union.'“
The Amsterdam

to consolidate -the
three great ‘pillars’

wh.ch have been the

foundation for the Union’s work
since the Maastricht Treaty
of

European Communities
pillar);

and cooperation

major objectives.

(first p.llar);

in the fields

July 31.

.

around the “Agenda 2000”

1999

way

at

1

the

common

of justice and home

March

affairs (third pillar)”

agreement reached by

European Union
in

24-5, 1999;

Only

also applied for

(“The four

EU

in the

on March 26,

The agreement opens

wave of countries from
six

the

Central

applicants-Cyprus, the

Slovenia. Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,

26, 1999).

Norway, and Liechtenstein

EFTA members

first

leaders

membership (“Presidency Conclusions,”

“Agenda 2000...,” March

Iceland,

remain as the sole

to a first

2002, including the

Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and

Romania and Slovakia have

1993: the

foreign and secunty policy
(second

the end of a special European
Council held in Berlin.

and Eastern Europe beginning

November

997). European plans for the
.mmediate future center

political

for the enlargement of the

I

(the latter

which joined

EFTA

in

1991)

EEA

136

One

notable aspect of the

new

treaty

is

that identity checks along internal borders

be abolished within five years of the signing of the
Ireland and the United Kingdom.
will
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treaty,

except

at the

borders of

One

further group,
ng to

emerge ou, of the econom.e
tunuoil of the
1970s

to

attempt to diree. and
control the intemat.ona,
capitalist economy hy
coordinating

economtc

policies

was

the so-called

Group of Seven (G7) launched

in

consishng of the seven major
industnalized democrac.es
„he United

Kingdom. France. Germany. Japan.

become

a jun.or partner in this

Italy

.s

also being included in

unencumbered by bureaucracy.” The
G8

is

to

G8

cond.t.on.

as a separate

discussions and summ.t meetings.

meetings which form the basis of
this organization, which
relal.vely

States, the United

groupmg. hence the
nomenclature change

G7/G8. Increasingly, the EU.

G8

1975 and

and Canada). Since the
mid-1990s. Russia has

Group of Eight; though, because
of Russia’s precanous
economtc
refer to the grouping as the

state

It is

or

some

compos, te

the annual

st.ll

entity,

summit

“relatively informal and

also has a secondary
stracture of

regular policy coordination
meetings between these states’
fore.gn and finance ministers

and a third structure of regular
meetings of lower-level

one

analyst, “has achieved respectable
results

global issues” (Hajnal, June

The

Entenng

part

1,

which,

on many economic,

in the

political

mind of

and other

1998).

New World Order of Global

Capitalism

the decade of the 1990s, and especially
following the collapse of the

Soviet Union and

economies

1

officials

its

eastern European allies, with the return
of capitalist market

to the countries in these regions, the
North-South terminology has in large

been supplanted

in the literature

by more common

between developed market economies and developing
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references to the dichotomy

countries.

With the

loss

of the

Soviet Union,

adnft and

many of their fonner

left to

negotiate their

And particularly,

own

m

World were

set

deals with the U.S., Japan, or the
European Union.

these countries quickly learned that
in this

proclaimed by President Bush

way

client states in the so-called Third

New World

Order

1990, state-to-state economic relationships
often give

either to state-to-corporation deals or,
as

is

the preference with the transnational

corporations, private corporation-to-corporation
arrangements and agreements, which
further threatens and undermines

many of these

developing nations’ ability to

democratically and, hence, publicly control their

own

development,

conscious long-term public development plans and
projects. In

might be objected

that nationalism

developing countnes exhibit

little

and the

states

democracy

system

in practice,

less enact

this regard,

though

outdated and that

is

it

is

it

many

nonetheless clear that the

developed market economies, particularly the U.S., are exceptions

of the depreciation of state control. Thus, contrary

much

to the Francis

to this general pattern

Fukuyama’s 1989

declaration of “the end of history” and the ultimate victory of liberal
democracy as the

most

effective and just organization of human society (Fukuyama,

December 1991,

&

1992), what

of the end” of their sovereign

many

developing countries

now

Summer

feared

was

1989,

“the history

137

integrity.

Philosopher Jacques Derrida, in his Specters of Marx (1993/1994), states that “the
eschatological themes of the ‘end of history,’ of the ‘end of Marxism,’ of the ‘end of
philosophy,’ of the ‘ends of man,’ of the
is,

forty years ago, our daily bread.

.

..

‘last

man’ and so

forth were, in the ’50s, that

Thus,” he notes, “for

media parade of current discourse on the end of history and

us,

I

venture to say, the

the last

man

looks most

often like a tiresome anachronism” (Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 14-15). Referring to

Fukuyama’s

thesis that “‘liberal

democracy remains

the only coherent political

aspiration that spans different regions and cultures around the globe’” as an “anhistoric
(sic) telos

of history,” Derrida adds

that not

only
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is

Fukuyama’s model of a

liberal state

As

regards

around the

oil

resources necessary to fuel
this

Amencan hegemon,

New World

the U.S. achteved w,th

its

(however temporary or long-lasting)
a decisive advantage
antes tnto greater dependence
upon

its

continuous flow of relatively cheap

oil to

Order constituted

victoty in the 1991

GulfWar

,n forcing the Persian

Gulf

military and security capabihties
thus ensuring a

developed market economies

for the near-term

Acting on the precarious situation
of Iraq—just two years out of the

future.

economically and socially devastating
Iran-Iraq War which
debt and wtth

at least

left Iraq

over $100 billion

in

150.000-200,000 casualties, the U.S,
successfully goaded Iraq's

of Hegel, the Hegel of the struggle for
recognition”
Hegel who pnvileges the ‘Chnstian vision’”
“that

but, moreover, “it is that

of a

(Derrida, 1993/1994, pp. 57-60).
admission that some countries might not
be able to

Expanding upon Fukuyama’s

achieve the ideal of liberal democracy,
Derrida argues that this failure to
measure up
primitive forms of government, theocracy,
and military
dirTfn
c atorship but as well charactenzes
“a priori and by definition, all democracies
including the oldest and most stable of
”
so-called Western democracies. At
stake here
he wntes, ‘‘is the very concept of democracy
as concept of a promise that can
only arise
such a diastema (failure, madequation, disjunction,
disadjustment, being ‘out of
joint’). That IS why we always propose,”
he adds, “to speak of a democracy to
eome
Comparing the democratic promise to the communist
promise, Derrida states
that Its effectivity “will always keep within
it, and it must do so,
this absolutely
undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological
relation to the to-come of
an event and of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot
be anticipated” (Derrida,
1993/1994, pp. 64-5). Noting that Fukuyama explicitly states
his rejection of empirical
evidence which contradicts the ideal state of existence
to which liberal democracy has
presumably brought in its wake, and quoting him to the effect
that we can only judge
“the goodness or badness of any regime or social
system” by certain

m

.

.

.

“trans-historical

standards,

Derrida states

that,

empirical event” whenever

on the one hand, Fukuyama

“accredits the logic of the

a question of certifying the defeat of “so-called Marxist
States and of everything that bars access to the Promised
Land of economic and political
it

is

liberalisms,

while on the other hand, “in the name of the trans-historic and natural
he discredits the “so-called empirical evenf in order, argues Derrida,
“to avoid
chalking up to the account of this ideal and its concept precisely whatever
contradicts
ideal,”

them

in

’

such a cruel fashion:

capitalist States

and

the evil,

all

that is not

m liberalism...

agreement with Derrida

mere apologia

m a word, all

in line

that

going well

in the

(Demda, 1993/1994, pp. 67-9). This author is in
Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argument is ahistorical and a

with U.S. post Cold

War triumphalism.
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Saddam Hussein
Ogden, April

1,

to invade oil-rich

1991,

p. 36;

Kuwait

in

1990 (Horwitz, December
1988,

Agee, October, 1990; see also
Baker, 1995,

p.

75;

p.

274), thus

providing the pretext for the subsequent
1991 Gulf War which, though
comprised of
international forces,

was heavily dominated by U.S.

especially, the top general staff
which directed the

personnel, including, and

two-month war. And though

Gulf War did not secure the overthrow
of Hussein’s government,
strategically position U.S. forces
around the

ensuring a long-term presence of the

base-which

5‘^

key global

Fleet

ability to pre-position stocks

oil reserves in the

at

East,

floating

bases in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
Bahrain, the

of armaments and material

in the region, all

oil reserves in

And, indeed, the continued existence of unfriendly
governments
in Iraq

and Iran serves

presence in the region,

at least

to

Hoagland, January

sell

15, 1998, p.

(i.e.

of which

favor of the U.S.'^^

vis-d-vis the U.S.

both perpetuate and legitimate a U.S. military

amongst U.S.

allies.

This U.S. presence

by a regime of United Nations sanctions (Goshko, May

produce and

Middle

m the Persian Gulf-a virtual

decidedly has shifted control over the Middle
Eastern

its allies)

nonetheless did

operates out of Bahrain, as well as securing
agreements for a constant

presence of over 20,000 U.S. troops

and

it

the

A14) which

on international markets,

21, 1996, pp.

dictate whether and

is

A1

supplemented

& A14;

how much

in addition to allowing for

oil Iraq

can

numerous other

violations of Iraqi state sovereignty, including controls over
production and storage of

138

companson with Middle Eastern OPEC countries, U.S. oil reserves of 22.4 billion
barrels do not come close to Kuwait’s reserves of 96.5 billion barrels, Iraq’s 112
billion
barrels, Saudi Arabia’s more than 259 billion barrels, and Iran’s 88 billion barrels
of
In

proven

oil

reserves (Energy Information Administration Country Analysis Briefs;

<http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html>.
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military stocks, circumvention
of Iraqi air space, other trade
sanct.ons, etc.

The

subsequent Pax Americana
(anchored by the U.S. client states
of Israel, the Gulf

Cooperation Council

(GCC)

for the pohtical reality

states,

Turkey, and Egypt), however,

of U.S. dominance

in the

,s

not a secure one,

region has and will likely
continue to

threaten to undermine the very
regimes the U.S. depends upon to
operate in this region
139

of the world.

Indeed, U.S. ability to secure

its

presence in the Persian Gulf region

is

a consequence of the other major
event of the early 1990s: the collapse
of the Soviet

Union and

its

eastern

The United

Union—beset with

European

allies.

States’s biggest nemesis throughout
the Cold War, the Soviet
internal feuding spurred

on by the

electoral victory claimed

by Eons

Yeltsin to the Presidency of the Russian
Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
in June of

1990 by the Russian parliament, followed
President of the Russian republic,

Gorbachev
1991

as head of the

collapsed and

.

Chnstmas Day 1991.

1991 by Yeltsin’s popular election as

compounded with

Communist

was replaced by

the resignation of Mikhail

Party of the Soviet Union

(CPSU)

in

December

the Confederation of Independent States
(CIS) on

140

Gorbachev himself had supported

pnvatization of the Soviet
the Soviet

in

economy when he

initially

Union from a centrally-planned economy

the drive towards

backed the 500-day plan

to a

move

market economy within a year

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states include; Bahrain, Kuwait,
Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
140

to

the

A symbolic prelude to this collapse was the destruction, beginning in November
1989, of the wall which had divided East and West Berlin since 1961 in anticipation of
the economic, monetary, and social union between East and West Germany, which was
enacted in 1990.
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and a

half, as drafted

by the economists Stanislav Shatalin and Grigory
Yavlinsky. As

former Washington Post correspondent David Remnick
stated

Tomb, Shatalin and Yavlsinsky had done nothing
plotted, in civil tones

Upon

the legislature he

all

was

the next eleven months,

to scrap the

reform could not

to

The

all

summer of 1990

than

to

free

As Remnick

p.

359).

writes: “That

war

And

that

was

would rage

for

because Gorbachev

this sent signals to other free marketeers that

within the system (Zaks, 1997). Consequently, internal

market advocates then

lent all

of their available resources

accomplish the job. As one analyst concluded

“Whereas Gorbachev seemed unable
built

’s

holiday on the Black Sea, Gorbachev “told

fight for their political life, a

500-day plan,

and

back Boris Yeltsin

summer

had begun” (Remnick, 1993,

come from

pro-capitalist forces

his

inclined’ to support the plan.”

the hard-liners had to hear.

was forced

during the

book Lenin

and bureaucratic language, the dismantling of the System.”

Moscow from

returning to

less

in his

to part with the

at the time:

dream of a Soviet empire, Yeltsin

both his economic and political programs on the assumption of full sovereignty for

republics” (Shlapentokh, 1993, p. 165). External efforts also contributed to the

downfall of the Soviet Union as both overt and covert assistance came in the form of
funds

—over $40

— from

million between 1984 and 1990

Democracy. Indeed, describing the U.S.
“full court press”,

one writer notes

intelligence

the National

community’s

Endowment

for

role as constituting a

that the U.S. cooperated with at least

50 other

organizations, including British, German, French, and Israeli intelligence agencies to

take advantage of the internal turmoil in the Soviet Union estimating that alone the

“CIA was probably spending $160

million per year on intervention operations in the
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SociaHs, Bloc”

141

Noting

,ha, .his U.S.-led

.n.ewenhon ”was probably one
of .he

larges, coordinated
cover, operations ever set
in

An

“anti-communist putsch” or
^

“rmm”

motion ” Gervasi concludes

,c
IS

not a “democratic revolution ”

*

Ta^d mb

that:

il

both ways- If

democrattc revolut.on” but a victoty
in a new kind of
warfare The
debate about the “collapse of
communism” needs to be seen for
what
the propaganda

_

which accompanies

warfare which, given

its (at least)

this

new kind of warfare— a

short-term success,

is

bound

it

kind

be

to

eproduced and exported around
the world (Gervasi,
Winter, 1991-92
p

With the

shift in political

the U.S.) and the path

now open

power

to the

developed market economies
(particularly

to virtually unrestrained
global exploitation

and

marketing of commodities and services,
international economic integration
became the
order of the day.'^^ In this respect,
the U.S.

moved

in quickly, first, setting

regional trade pact encompassing
Canada, Mexico, and itself-otherwise

North American Free Trade Agreement

(NAFTA)

in

up a

known

1993-which became

as the

effective

on

141

The term

full-court press,” as described

by Scheer, “is a basketball expression
that
describes an attempt to wrest the ball away
from one’s opponent in his own territory”
Scheer, 1982, p. 8). It was first used
within the anti-Soviet context in a
United Pr7ss
ahng

^

Administration official as

Reagan had approved an eight-page national
security document
undertakes a campaign aimed at internal reform
in the Soviet Union
that

the Soviet empire.’

Soviet Union

He

that

and shrinkage of

affinned that

(Story by

it

conid be called

‘a full-court press’ against the

UPI White House correspondent Helen Thomas
May

1982, quoted in Scheer, 1982,

’

21

»

p. 7)
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International

economic integration has been defined by economists
specializing in
international trade as denoting “‘a state of
affairs or a process which involves the
amalgamation of separate economies into larger free trading
regions’.” El-Agraa
comments that less specialized economists “have for quite a
while been using the term
to mean simply increasing economic
interdependence between nations” (El-Aeraa
^
1997, p.l).
’

243

Janua^
.anffs

, ,

.994,

The bas.c provisions of
NAFTA .nCuded an agree. en,

on a„ products by 2009.
Tanffs on

certain

,0 eliminate

goods were dropped inr.ed.aieiy,

while others are schedule to
be phased out within
15 years.
Secondly, in that same year
ofl993, President Clinton
called for a summit on

Blake Island

in Seattle,

community (APEC)

R.m countnes,

Washington of the Asia

to establish the

framework

including the existing then six

Pacif.c

Econom.c Cooperation

for a free trade area
spanning

member

8 Pacific

Associat.on of South East Asian

Nations (ASEAN), as well as
China. APEC’s combined
1994
trillion dollars

1

GNP of more than

13

represented “about half the world’s
total annual output” and
“about 46

percent of the world’s total trade
in merchandise”
(“Overview of APEC,”

May

12,

143

1997).

,n

November of 1994,

the

APEC

leaders,

meeting in Bogor, Indonesia,
issued

a call “to usher in an era of free
trade and investment in the
region by not later than the

year 2020”

(APEC

Finance Ministers’ Meeting, April
24, 1995,

Japan on November 19, 1995,

p. 368).

In Osaka,

APEC ministers adopted an Action Agenda dealing

with

trade and investment liberalization
and facilitation along with furthering
economic and

technical cooperation. This

was followed

the next year by the Manila
Action Plan for

APEC (MAPA) adopted on November 25,

1996 which called for progress reports on

opening member economies to trade and
investment and noted the establishment of
several joint activities including the

APEC Educational Network (EduNet),

the Asia-

143

ASEAN is currently comprised of ten nations:

Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,

Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Vietnam. Founded in
1967 to buttress U.S. efforts in the Vietnam War, ASEAN
later expanded to include
Brunei in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Laos and
Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in
1999 (El-Agraa, 1997, pp. 27-9; Chalermpalanupap, June
1, 1999).
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Pacific

Energy Research Center
(APERC), the

Network (LMI), and

Ministenal Meeting

in

January

the

8,

APEC

done

who

in

the

new members

to

at the

APEC,

November

18,

,998 meeting

leaders me, amidst a staggering
financial crisis

in

commttment

to

political

that archipelago nation

which threatened

of 17.000 islands since

financial cataclysm gripping
Asia, the

the

his

it

to

had already

May

21. 1998

overthrow of President

in the process.

Despite

APEC leaders renewed their

pursue “a cooperative growth
strategy” with the “goals of
achieving

18,1 998).

And

New Zealand, which met

at the 7“'

APEC” (“APEC Economic

APEC economic

leaders’

region’s countries

free

Leaders Declaration.”

meeting

in

Auckland,

from September 12-13, 1999, “economic
reform”

privatization) and “liberalization”

many of the

a.

following which a 10-

foundations of many Asian
countries, as indeed

and open trade and investment
within

November

1997

m Kuala Lumpur, Ma.ay.a,

a 1965 co„p d’etat, killing
hundreds of thousands

impending

annua, review

1997 meeting, Peru,

Indonesia with the removal
from office of President Suharto
on

had ruled

Sukarno

firs,

new membership was announced
(APEC News Announcements.

,998). And, a. the

undermine the

The

liberalization took place
tn

Vancouver. Canada. Also

Russia, and Vietnam were
admitted as

year moratorium on

Labor Market Infomration

the Trade and Investment
Data Database.

of member coun.nes'
progress towards market

APEC

APEC

(i.e.

were the primary items being discussed
even though

were

still

recovering from the financial

before. Moreover, the leaders reaffirmed
their

commitment

to

crisis the

year

“promoting open.

transparent and well-governed markets
(particularly domestic financial markets)
and to

achieving the goals of free and open trade
and investment
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in

APEC by 2010/2020, as

Ihey had agreed at the
2nd

(“APEC 1999 Summit

-

APEC

Aiikland,

Third, the eighth round of

Uruguay

in

New

15,

in

Bogor, Indonesia”

Zealand,” 2000).

GATT negotiations,

launched

September 1986 (and which had
dragged on

quickly accelerated

December

Economic Leaders’ Meeting

al

Punta del Este.

for over seven years

by 1993)

proposals for a permanent regulation
of trade by estabhshing on

its

1993 an institutionalized World
Trade Organization (WTO),
centered

Geneva, which would from

now on

Signed by 123 countries which

in

regulate the developing globalized
economy.

at the

time accounted for

90%

of world trade, the

Uruguay Round of GATT mandates
“a more than one-third across-the-board
reduction

m tanffs” as well as the elimination or reduction of many

non-tariff barriers to free

trade, including “quotas,
discretionary licensing, import bans, or
voluntary export
restraints.”

Even

in the

highly contested area of agricultural
trade,

provisions require countries “to provide
a
for certain products, usually sel
at

Round, July 1995,
1994

in

IS

Final Act of the

came

into force

on January

body of rules ever conslructed

also unique in that

Settlement

it

states as well as adjudicate

its

Uruguay

WTO was signed on April
in

15,

December

1995. Encompassing the most

govern international trade relations, the

WTO

establishes a semi-judicial structure referred to as
the Dispute

Body (DSB) which

agreements and

to

1,

access

of import access opportunities

Marrakesh, Morocco, and was approved by the
U.S. Congress

1994, and officially

detailed

level

3% of domestic consumption” (Fact Sheet;

The 550 page

p. 20).

minimum

new market

has binding authority to

settle trade disputes

over rights and obligations arising out of the

dispute settlement process.

Some

WTO

analysts see this as the beginning

of the end of the hallowed principle of state sovereignty

246

among

in international relations (Jones,

"*.i™ o,U,S. ,..
atives

and progressives

in the

U.S. up in arms as
indicated by
condemnations

from .ndependen, sociaHs.
Rep, Bemie Sanders
(,-VT)

(of.

••Len-Ri,h, Coalidon...',
,o

consen,a,ive eo^nren.a.or
and Pres.denda, aspirant
Pa.nck Buchanan
(Buchanan, ‘The
Rise of Sovereignty
Fears”;

May

Raunr.Janua^

14, 1996, Representative
Cliff

'hen.

'

and

,

9

.

,

996 ), Speaking before
Congress on

Steams (R-FL)

still

enH

maintain, that our sovereignty

77“"^"^

and safety laws

into the

J

WTO m7

i. as a means
toward the dlise”
of our standards and laws,
and as a means

In nth
j
o'her words,

luTIoX'"; r^'a^LT
toward

sure,” argues

tL subverZn n?l
May 14, 1996,

Steams,

H4904k‘’''“"°'''

“To be

not

worirs^oratanredTuT’

•>’«

health,

is

--

^'7'^

equa^r^trYars"^^^
To™'
d
orward-looking
environmental,
we have the most to lose. Entry

stated:

one pro- WTO

analyst,

m,erna,io„al law to comply with
the

p.

“WTO members have an obligation under

WTO mies, but the WTO itself has no means

force countries to honor
those obligations” (Schott,
September, 1996, p. 4). Like
non-institutionalized

predecessor-GATT (which remained

1995 and whose agreements have

all

become

in force until the

inconaorated into the

to

its

end of

WTO), which

operated on the principle of
comparative advantage and Most
Favored Nation status—
the only

remedy

authorization

powerful

is

for

noncompliance and unequal treatment

permitted by the

states, particularly the

WTO) by the injured

is retaliation

state.

(once

Thus, again, the more

U.S. and the European Union (E.U.),
will continue to
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maintain their
asymmetrical domination
over the world’s
markets and, hence.
over
144

weaker

states.

Fourih, at the

Summit of the Americas

December ,994

in

in

Miami. Flonda.

altended by 34 heads
of state from the western
hemisphere, with only

Cuba

no,

represented, President
Clinton laid the framework
for the Free Trade
Area of the

Amencas (FTAA) which would

establ.sh a free trade
area encompass,

ng the

entire

western hem.sphere. except
for Cuba, from
Canada to Chtle by the
year 2005 (Fact
Sheet:

Summit of the Americas. May

of the world’s population,
the

.995, pp. 3,-2). With 850
million people or

FTAA woulda represent
renresent

goods and services” (Pomeroy,
fanuaty 28, 1995,
of the proposed

March
.0

FTAA

met

in

•

a
a “h,.
buying

The

p. V),

Colombia and vowed

May
was

16,

1997

a,

(‘Toin, Declaration.”

March

on March

preparations for the Second

he

4,

E.U

1999

IS

commitment

to facihtate the

economic

21, ,996); a third time on

19,

1998

in

San Jose, Costa Rica where they

Summit of the Americas

held in Santiago. Chile

on April 18-19, 1998 by approving
the San Jose Declaration;
and a

November

3 trillion in

Belo Horizonte. Brazil where
a Working Group on
Dispute Settlement

established; a fourth time

made fmal

1

min.sters of the 34 states

to strengthen their

conclude the pact by 2005 by
establishing working groups

of the hemisphere

power of $

Denver, Colorado on June
30, 1995; a second time
on

18-21, .996 in Cartagena,

integration

Ur.

in

fifth

time on

Toronto, Canada where the
ministers reaffirmed their
commitment

a customs union whereas

NAFTA and

the

FTAA are

Customs unions have common external
trade barriers whereas
Member nations of free trade areas do “remove
all trade

free trade areas

free trade areas

do no.

impediments amongst

themselves but

retain their freedom with regard
to the determination of their
policies vis-a-vis the outside world”
(El-Agraa, 1997, p. 1).
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own

.0 l,bera,.3a,io„

and vowed ,o “strongly
support the widen,
ng and deepen, ng process of

econonrrc integratron in
our Hemisphere, including
sub-regronally, brlaterally
and

.hrough the adoption of
unilateral liberaltzation
measures in some ofoureeononnes”

(“FTAA

Declaration of Ministers Fifth
Trade Ministerial Meeting,
Toronto, Canada,”

Novemberd,

1999).

At a preparatory meeting

for the

Second Summit of the

Americas, Sven Sandstrdm,
Managing Director of the World
Bank, acknowledged
“at least one-fourth

11

of the

total

population in the

0 mill, on people-continue
to live

in

Region-^r somewhere on

poverty” while “another
quarter

that

the order of

live just

above

the poverty line” and, yet,
he stated:

Throughout the Regton, there has
been tremendous economic
through the hberahzation of trade,
the privatization of stateowned enterpnses, the freeing of
markets, and the reform and
redirection
of state acttvttres. Accompanying
this process of fundamental
economic
reform has been an equally historic
process of democratization and
an
opentng up of pohttcal systems to
enhanced popular participation, new
foms of representatron, and the flounshing
of grassroots organizattons
and civil society (Sandstrdm,
October 1, 1997).
progress

With one-half the population of the
region just above or below the
poverty

most

uncritical

proponents of the

bang estabhshed and to what

line,

even the

FTAA should question what type of democracy is

extent

is it

accompanied by popular

participation.

Moreover, as foreign debt of a combined
group of 23 Latin American and Caribbean
countries reached $644 billion in

1997—a growth

of 50% between 1991 and

1997— it

The San Jose Declaration, which served as the
basis for the beginning of the
hernisphenc trade negotiations by heads of state
and government at the Second Summit

of the Amencas

m

Santiago, Chile on April, 18-19, 1998, represents
“the largest
regional integration effort ever undertaken
involving both developed and developing
countries in a common objective to realize free
trade and investment in goods and
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becomes increasingly
questionable whether
problem

,o

removing .he region’s deb,
obligations

January 27, 1998,

An

free trade liberalization
is the

(’’Poor Countries

Deb,

panacea or
R.ses.

B5).

p.

effort similar ,o the
free trade pact for ,he

Americas has been devised
with

regard ,o the countries
of Africa. After five years
in the maktng. the
Afncan Growth

and Opportuntty Act,
sardonically nicknamed the

“NAFTA

for Africa” bill,

was

finally

passed by the U.S. Senate with
a vote of 77-19 and
signed into law by President
Clinton

on

May

1

8 , 2000.

I,

was the

firs,

major trade

legislation

approved by the U.S. Senate

since the 1994 legislation
which led to the creation of the

Seeking

to establish a

new

World Trade Organization.

trade and investment policy
for sub-Saharan Africa,
the Ac,

would provide sub-Saharan African
coun,ries-as well

as Caribbean nations-with

increased foreign aid and U.S.
trade concessions, while helping
to establish a free-trade
area amongst countries in the
region.'^'’

700 million people

in

Though Africa possesses a population
of over

over 43 countries, one South African
business paper

‘Even by the standards of developing
countries, Africa
just

1 1

is

states:

a backwater, accounting for

.3% of developing country exports and
8.6% of developing country GDP,

according to the

Frontier,”

IMF World Economic

August 30, 1998). Despite the

of gold and diamonds which

services,

Outlook of May 1997” (“The Last African

it

fact that

sub-Saharan Africa has vast deposits

exports along with “large quantities of
copper, bauxite.

on a basis of strengthened trading

rules and disciplines” (cf
<http://www.alca-ftaa.org/EnglishVersion/view e htm>)
’’
—

FTAA web

site
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Associated Press writer Sonya Ross notes: “The
inclusion of Canbbean nations
helps level the trade playing field that tilted
in Mexico’s favor after the North American
Free Trade Agreement went into effect” (Ross,

May
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1

8,

2000).

iron ore, uran.unr,
phospha.e rock and nranganese;
snraUer ,nanu..es

of asbestos,

betylbunr, cad™iu.n,
cbronrde, coba„, gen^aniunr,
,ead. li.b.unr, nickel,
pla.inunr,

.amame,

,i„.

tungsten, ntckel. vanadittnt,
[and] ztnc,” prices
in world markets
for

Afncan products •.ave been
faibng sbarpl,
for oil and

most minerals

in the early

Negative economic performance

ts

1

since ,950. with on,,
an exceptional blip

& Tiffen,

970s” (Brown

1

992, pp, 3 . 66).

both cause of and caused
by detrimental political

perfonnance. but while certain
Afncan governments are partially
responsible for

cunent

state

of economic and

poittical

deCtne,

Brown and

this

Tiffen argue that “Africa-s

pohtica, disaster has to be
understood in context.”
Specifically, they note that
analysts

must understand the follow,
„g three elements
and

poittical stagnation:

I

)

in order to understand

“the bnttalisation to which

outside since the beginning
of the age of colonialism”;
state structure

rulers

which colonialism

firs,

first

7).

and suborning or eliminating those
who get

(COSATU).

Opportunity Act nonetheless had

its

the

later

by the

in the

way (Brown

AFL-CIO. and

others. Africa’s

free trade

and took

ne«

large

& Tiffen,

local

1992, p.

the Congress of South

others, the African

Growth and

corporate supporters in the likes of
Chevron,

Texaco, Mobtl, Caterptllar, as well as
the administration of President

amongst

to its

by corruption,” by rewarding

Opposed by South African President
Nelson Mandela,

African Trade Unions

subjected from

2) “the artificial nature of the

by colonists and

transnational conrorations has
been accompanied
allies

Afnca has been

imposed on Africa and then
bequeathed

and 3) “exploration of Africa

;

Afncan economic

underdevelopment may explain

regime for the continent had not been

five years to pass, but the logic

at the

of capitalism
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in part

why

Bill Clinton,

consolidating a

top of U.S. government priorities

for a constantly

expandtng

market for

its

products necess.tates, as

system “must nestle everywhere,

(Marx

& Engels,

1848/1948/1998,

Further, though by no

fundamental transformation

from national governments
last resort,” the

Woods

settle

in its

everywhere, establish
connexions everywhere”

last,

the

World Bank has begun
implementing a

operational procedures designed
to sh.ft funding

away

to direct project assistance.
Posturing itself as “a lender

World Bank, since

Conference, has

that this

12)."'^

p.

means

Mat. and Engels long ago
argued,

lent

its

money

international capital markets.'^*

inaugural meeting in 1946
following the Bretton

to countries to

Once

of

a countiys

improve

their creditworthiness

economy was

stabilized,

on

was

it

expected to “graduate" and stop
borrowing from the World Bank.
But the key aspect of
this

lending

is that

money was

which also received

lent to the national

government of the borrower country.

significant conditionalities over

how

such

money could be

spent.
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Walter Rodney,

in his

book

How Europe

regards to Africa’s development
situation:

The question

Underdeveloped AFRICA (1982^

,

states in

who, and what, is responsible for African
underdevelopment can be answered at two levels.
First, the answer is
that the operation of the imperialist
system bears major
as to

responsibility for

African economic retardation by draining
African wealth and by making
It impossible to develop
more rapidly the resources of the continent.
Second, one has to deal with those who
manipulate the system and those

who

are either agents or unwitting accomplices
of the said system.

of Western Europe were the ones who actively
extended
exploitation from inside Europe to cover the
whole of Africa.

The

capitalists

In recent times, they were joined, and to

some

their

extent replaced,

by

from the United States; and for many years now even
the
workers of those metropolitan countries have benefited
from the
capitalists

exploitation and underdevelopment of Africa (Rodney,
1982, p. 27).
In its

mission”

new
is

Strategic Compact plan, the World Bank now states
one of “reducing poverty” (Strategic Compact, 1997).
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that its “basic

Nevertheless,

its

new

operational plan imphettly.
though not directly, calls for
the

bypassing of national
governments. Designated as the
Strategic Compact,

developed

in

development agenda”

to

pnvale capital flows are

Compact”

conform

to “the rapidly

and

1

changing global economy-where

calls for “decentralizing
activities to the field in
order to better

World Bank heralds

strategies, design

its

more appropnate

conditionality, and

As

well,

strong cooperation with
Non-Governmental Organizations

“are involved in half the
Bank-assisted projects approved in
fiscal 1997”

calls for “strengthening operations

997). In effect, this

nations’ sovereignty,

new World Bank

many of whom

and dialogue with

NGOs” (Strategic

Compact,

plan constitutes another attack on
developing

are too powerless to resist the
obvious

149

By

tradition, the President

Managing Director of the
July 1997, p.

the

calls for “refocusing
the

build local ownership of
development programs” (Strategic
Compact, 1997).

(NGOs) who

plan

five times greater than
official assistance.”'®
In particular, the

customize country assistance

the

new

1997 by World Bank President
James D. Wolfeiisohii and
approved hy

Executive Board of the Bank in
March of that year,

“Strategic

this

of the World Bank

International

is

a U.S. national whereas the

Monetary Fund (IMF)

5).
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is

a European (Driscoll

undent..,, n, of ,„e
bas.c pnnciple of
sovereignty

operated,

at least ,n

Another key
is

betng bu.lt

is

by wb.ch

tbe tntentationa,
systen, bas

principle, since the 1648
Treaty of Westphalia.'’"
institutional structure

upon which

tins

globahzed

New World

Order

an enlarged and nrore
activist and interventionary
Intenrat.onal

Monetary Fund (IMF,. As
an additional byproduct
of the .944 Bretton
Woods
Agreenrents, the

IMF was

established -largely in
reaction to w, despread
inconvert.b.lity

and related exchange
problents” which prec.p.tated
the worldw.de depression
of the
1930s (Driscoll, July 1997,

p. I).

mentbership of 39 countries, the

one

to

IMF

Beginning operations

IMF today

has

1

8

1

in

1946 w.th an

initial

member countnes which,

according

proponent,

have voluntarhy joined because
they see the advantage of
consulting
w.th one another .n this forum
to ma.ntain a stable system
of buying and
se Ihng ,he.r eutnencies so
that payments in foreign
money can take place
ween countnes smoothly and without
delay (Dnscoll, July
m.
1997,

& 3).

|

150

S“egal-based Council for the
o
S^'^nce Research
states that many African
economies have been
so hard
7hTt
h.t by the .mperat.ves of
economic liberalization that some of them
are likelv to
” With
Africa's debt now
staZlg at $235'hJI
standing
'"IT"
billion (which
even the Archbishop of Canterbury,
George Carey
urged the multilateral finance institutions
to cancel) and promised foreign
aid to those

Devtbleroft''

L

bvl

S

ZemTe adds:
Mbembe
a?d°

World Bank liberalization measures nonexistent,
The entanglement of Africa is likely to lead
to the fragmentation

of
p bhc authority and the emergence of pnvate indirect
government. Then, the bottom
hne IS that many African countnes would
revert to the

where trade by barter would replace monetised
Njoku, January 27, 1998).

post-Atlantic slave trade era

(sic)

economy” (Mbembe, quoted

in

151

The formerly centrally planned economies of
Eastern Europe and
Union have, since 1991, become IMF members.
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the former Soviet

IMF numbers
which

the

ac. as

IMF

are assigned annua,
-quota subset, p.ions(rev.ewed every five
years)

„enrbership

fees,

„

front

is

,ba, ,he

,end,ng poo, had grown
to more than $200
bihion by

member countnes may bomow
from
(specia,

„us poo, of nroney

drawing

,MF

the

rights) is proportions,
to the

members’ vot.ng power

is

in

,

997.

,MF

,e„ds ,o

Tbe amount

penodie afiocations known

amount they

contr.bute.

exampie, the U.S., with the
world’s

As we„,

iargest

,MF

poiicies. Thus, for

economy, -contributes most

to the

providing about ,8 percent
of tota, quotas (around $38
bihion),” gamering
,

8 percent

of the

tota, ”

On

And

contrary to Dnscoh’s

IMF, the membership

itseif dictates to the

from the vote ahocation
procedures

do the

dictating and

Ca.m

that an

which are forced

(Drisco,,. Ju,y ,997, p. 5).

The

to

recent

that -[(]ar

IMF

IMF

deflating of economies in
conjunction with

it

asymmetry

275 votes

it

exists as to

the

governments

set,

(Drisco,,. Ju,y

wi„ fo„ow,”

it

to

is

by the
c,ear

which IMF members

“wi„ of the majority”

imposition ofstnet austenty
measures

demands

for reduced spending

welfare measures) combined with
directives to open up the economies
that

-about

it

from being dictated

the poiicies

comply with

,MF.

the other hand, the
Marsha,, ,s,ands

has the smahest quota, totahng
about $3.6 mihion, giving
997, p. 4).

SDRs

d.rectiy ,inked to their
annua, financia, contributions,
giving

the biggest contributors
the strongest voice in
determining

265,000 votes, or about

as

(i.e.

on

social

demands

off pubhc enterprises and privitege
production for export rather

than for domestic consumption)
of South Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and
the
Philippines to foreign direct
investment—measures emphasized by subsequent
U.S.

coercion— spell out

(i.e.

the hierarchical nature of the IMF.
Moreover, even though
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convert, bil.,y rates have,
since the early 1970s,
been determined by the
market

mechantsm, the

IMF

has increased

mon.toring of members'
economies penetrating

its

beyond the exchange value”
and examining
cause the exchange value to
be what

it

is

“all aspects

of the member’s economy

that

” States
Driscoll:

or supervision, over
members'

Ixcw

exchange pohci^es.
nolLfe'^ Supervision is based
on the conviction
and consistent domestic economic
rates

and a growing and prosperous
world economy (Driscoll, July
1997

Concomitant
final

that strong
policies will lead to stable
exchange

to this surveillance role
for the

word on

IMF, however,

the health and stability of
a country’s

also the

is

power to be

the

economy and economic

performance, thus centralizing such
tasks in an institution which
cames out the will of
its

most prosperous members,

IMF

has

pumped

billions

prop up the existing

December

26.

1

of credit

of dollars

LIEO and

997, p. A2). The

to fend off threats

billion

particularly the

to

into the international

IMF

lent

of default on loans.

And

loans which later

fell

agreement
through

government defaulted on

152

in July

1995 alone, the

in

profit

IMF

fomt of loans

from

it

weeks

later,

(Wessel

billion in the early 80s

IMF

billion to Russia.

billion in

in the

extended over $17.8

The poor perfonnance

loans in 1996. This

1998 for an additional $22.6 billion

as, just four

billions

who

member countries $28

Mexico and more than $6.2

initial

economy

the international lenders

of the Russian economy required another
$10
followed by an

U.S.'” During the 1980s and
1990s. the

on August

in

17, 1998, the

was

IMF
Russian

of dollars of debt and effectively devalued the rouble

.

Running

a distant second to the U.S.

IMF quota of 18.25% are: Germany (5.67%),
Japan (5.67%), France (5.10%), and the United Kingdom
(5.10%) (Driscoll July 1997
p. 4).
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from around

six to the dollar to

the Russian stock ntarke,

citizenry

1

dunng

999 threatened

in a

were w.ped

the 79-day

to

25

out.

US/NATO war on

in

IMF

lesser

lent

$21 billion

loans approved in

amounts

to other

The number and

Yugoslavia between March and
June,

billion in loans in April

economies came under severe hardship

IMF

Intense anti-Amencantsm
amongst Russian

end relations with the West,
which perhaps explains why the

came up wtth another $4.8

1998, the

matter of weeks while
90 percent of shares on

size

to

in

meeting

of 1999. And
their debt

IMF

in Asia, as these

payments

in

1

997 and

South Korea, $10 billion (with
an add.tional $1

March of 1999)

to Indonesia,

$4

Asian countries (“IMF Bail Outs..

of these loans indicates

that far

billion to Thailand,

.,”

b.llion

and

Januaty 12,1998, pp. 3-5).

from being just a supervisoty

“institution for coordinating efforts
to achieve greater cooperation
in the fonnulation of

economic policies”

become

(Driscoll, July 1997, p.
9), the

tn fact the capitalist

world’s central bank. And, as

the Asian financial crisis of
1997-98, the
crisis

IMF-despite

IMF tended

to

its

disavowals-has

Wade notes in

the

wake of

agree with the U.S. that this

had “home-grown” causes, the so-called
“crony capitalism” of “particularly

cotTupt national banking systems that
promoted the misallocation of resources

from

[i.e.

their

most

efficient uses.” Consequently, the

liberalization] a condition

of its huge bailout loans

Thailand” (Wade, Winter 1998-99,
Since 1962, the

IMF has

to

by the

for Indonesia, South Korea,

extended a line of credit

Borrow (GAB) with

recently supplemented

further capital opening

and

p. 43).

and banks throughout the world. This

Arrangements

IMF “made

away

line

to a

number of governments

of credit, known as the General

a capitalization of about

New Arrangements
257

to

US $24

billion,

has been

Borrow (NAB) adopted by

the

IMF

Execulive Board

January 1997 with a capitalization
of US $48 btllion (“IMF

Adopts... “Januao27, 1997,p.
latter

which remains as

1 ).

While

a lender pool, “the

the

NAB does not replace the GAB, the

NAB

will

be the

facility

of first and

recourse in the event of a need
to provide supplementary
resources to the
Adopts...,” January 27,
1997, pp. 1-2,. ,n effect,
the international system,
requiring the
‘‘.n

the form of loans

10 forestall or

up

to specified

IMF

NAB

is

principal

IMF” (“IMF

a response to the volatility
in

to obtain resources

from wealthy countnes

amounts when supplementary
resources are needed

cope with an impairment of the
mtemational monetary system or

to deal

with an exceptional situation
that poses a threat to the
stability of that system”
(“IMF

Adopts.

.

January 27,

In the case

monopoly on

1

997,

p. 4).

of the 1997-98 Asian

crisis,

the

IMF,

states

the rescue effort and has been
steered, in turn,

Wade, “had

by

a near

the U.S. Treasury.”

IMF-directed policy changes enforced on
loan-recipient countries are of two
kinds:
policies “to restrict domestic

demand using higher interest

rates,

1)

lower government

spending, and stiffer taxes, the objective
being to stabilize the currency and

make

it

easier for countries to repay foreign
debts,” and 2) policies designed “to
undertake
liberalizing reforms in finance, corporate
governance,

case, adds

Wade, “the IMF has pressed

easier for financial capital to

move

liberalize their capital account) ...”

liberalization is “at the top

because the U.S. “needs

do

if world financial

in

and labor markets.” In the

the governments involved to keep

and out of their countries

(Wade, Winter 1998-99,

(in other

p. 44).

latter

making

it

words, to

Capital

of the U.S. foreign economic-policy agenda,” remarks Wade,

to tap the rest

of the world’s savings, which

is

markets are highly integrated.” The U.S. pursues
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much

easier to

this policy.

argues Wade, .n order
for

nves„; ihe

i,

‘.[,]o

al.errra.ive

maintain

ofT.nanc.ng

high levels of consunrp.ion
and

its

.nves.nren.s v.a h.gher
donreshc savings,- he

adds, -would require
a shan, cu, ,n consunrp.ion
(io allow .he extra
savings), causing

massive recession” (Wade,
Winter 1998-99,
In

p.

45)

summation, by the actions
descnbed above,

is

it

clear that the U.S.
under

President Clinton, “is carrying
out the most important
and ambitious international

economic agenda of any President

Economic and
over, and with

it

It is

almost a cliche

And

yet,

to say that

she cautions:

and militao’ supe^iower, but
when
a lot

now

it

of competition” (Spero, March

comes

7,

at

is

our

our future will be

“We may be

to

Secretary for

“The Cold War

has gone our traditional
frame of reference for looking

described in economic tenns.”

we have

As Under

Agricultural Affairs, Joan E.
Spero, stated in 1994:

international involvement.

political

in nearly half a century.”

the world’s only

economic and business matters,

1994, pp. 123-5). While Spero

may be

correct in both the ubiquity
and/or intensity of world
competition for control of markets.
It

IS

the unevenness of this
competition which captivates the rest
of the world, which

intensely focuses on the U.S.’s
political and military superpower
status.

Demonstrating

its

resolve in the post-Cold

War era,

over Gulf oil resources for the
foreseeable future with

where

it

was

the driving force

of a UN-sanctioned

Currently, the U.S. aggregate savings rate

is

its

victory over Iraq in 1991,

coalition

the lowest

Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

the U.S. secured control

of states. Through

among Organization

political

for

countries, with “gross domestic

savings equal to 15 per cent of GDP,
equal with the UK at the bottom of the scale—
and
Its household savings rate of
per cent of disposable income is the lowest of
any major
I
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and economic leverage,

Umon

m

s

i,

has pacified and coopted
Russ.a and most ofihe
Soviet

fomier East European

exhibiting

its

More

all.es.

resolve, given the lack

recently, and perhaps

most demonstratively

of UN .ntemational sane,
.on and violat.on of,
he

sacred principle of state
sovereignty, the U.S. has
been the driving force
behind the

ongotng d.sn.embem.en, of
socialist Yugoslav, a-a
the 79-day

NATO bombing campaign

did no, even attempt to obtain

provisions in the 1949

role

which became obvious with

against Yugoslavia (a
military campaign which

UN sanc.on beforehand and

NATO treaty itself) ,n the spr.ug of 1999,

the de-facto severing of the
province of Kosovo-Metohija

military

campaigns and the

political

Europe do indicate U.S. intentions

rule,

it

is

received during the

is

While these

one side of

the need to shore up

more

indication of this U.S. concern for

perceived— and which

10."'’

by June

to clearly assert its domination,

leadership which will likely concern
U.S. leaders

new

effectively ending with
w,

and economic leverage over
Russia and Eastern

Gramsci’s prescription for hegemonic

Indeed, one

which violated defensive

fully in this

how

its

its

political

one-superpower

political leadership is

likely a response to the less than
enthusiastic support

US/NATO war on Yugoslavia— is witnessed

establishment by the Clinton administration in
July, 1999 of a

Information group, whose purpose

is to

era,

it

in the recent

new

International Public

‘“influence foreign audiences’ in support of

U.S. foreign policy and to counteract propaganda
by enemies of the United States.”

industrial

economy

September/October
1

since the Second
1

998, pp.

1

World War” (Wade

& Veneroso,

7- 1 8).

54

Yugoslavia was the only country

in Eastern

Europe which steadfastly held on

economy, despite years of intimidation, economic
military intrigue from the U.S. and other U.S. allies.
socialist
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to its

sanctions, and political and

ln.end.ng ,o coord, na.e

a.,

overseas .nfor.ra,io„

a.ong

govenrnrem. the aim of the IPI
grouping, according

-.0 enhance U.S.
secun.y,

bolster

democracy abroad’.- With
objectives, themes

nttligate crises

and messages

lo ,he IPI

Amenca's economic

a stated objective to

that will

,he vanous branches
of.he U.S.

Core Group Charter,

,s

prosperity and to promote

-synchron.ze the infonnat.ona,

be projected overseas...to
prevent and

and to innuenee foreign
audiences

,n

ofU.S. foreign policy objectives',”
Barber remarks

ways favorable

that

to the

achievement

numerous clauses

in the IPI

Charter "have an Orwellian ring
that gives the impression
of a vast, coordinated

propaganda operat.on” (Barber, July
28,

what success the U.S.
goal

is

999).

While

will achieve in this endeavor,

,t

is

to project U.S. international
leadership and, with

capitalist world,

through the vehicle of the U.S.
national

leadership from the U.S.

The

1

New

was

it

is

too soon to fully assess

nonetheless evident that

it,

its

the leadership of the

stale.

Exactly this sort of

called for in early 1999 by
the foreign affairs columnist
for

York Times, Thomas Friedman,

who proclaims

that globalization

is

the

new

international system that has replaced
the cold-war system and
that the driving idea

behind globalization

is

free-market capitalism. For globalism
to work, argues

Friedman, “America can't be afraid

Managing

to act like the almighty

March

28,

1

999 New York Times Magazine

with red, white and blue stars and stripes
of the U.S.

Friedman argues: “The hidden hand of the market

And

that

it

is.”

globalization “is a role from which
America dare not shrink.” Highlighting

his article for the

fist

superpower

McDonald
the hidden

s

flag.

is

a full-cover

fist

painted

Calling for a global enforcer,

will never

work without

a hidden

cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder
of the F-15.

fist

that

keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley's lechnologies
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is

called

Ihe

Un„ed

States

An„y, Air

Force,

Navy and Marine Cot>s”

(Fr.edn.an, Marcl,
28.

1999, pp. 84, 96).

As

is

evident with the recent

US/NATO-led war on Yugoslavia,

the U.S.

is

willing to bypass established
.ntemational ntstitubons-institutions
established ,n the

wake of WWII— at

least temporarily, to

achieve

i
Its

aims.

It is

unlikely, however, that

U.S. hegemonic rule can
long afford to Ignore
existing international
institutions and

agencies and. more likely,
for the

,t

will, as in the case

Fomter Yugoslavia-established

international humanitarian
law

since

I991-ut,hze

,ts

in

committed

of the Intemat.onal Criminal
Tnbunal

May, 1993

to

prosecute violators of

m the territory of the fonner

Yugoslavia

leverage to direct these agencies
to pursue activities

in

accordance with overall U.S. foreign
policy ohjec,tves.'“ The
withholding of U.S. dues
to the

United Nations

until

it

undertakes U.S.-directed reforms

is

also another fonn

of

155

Charges assailing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Ihe Former
Yugoslavia and
tnbuna prosecutor Judge Louise
Arbour for their lack of impartiality
have beefmTde
y Professor Michael Mandel. a professor of law at
York University in Toronto and one
of the complainants in a (so far
unsuccessful) case
brought against

andel notes that judge Arbour
appeared
St
i’
State

at

NATO leaders

two press conferences during Ihe
79-day

^
Cook and once with U.S. Secretary of
’
h
rllf
Madeleine
AIbnght,
both of whom have formal complaints
against them before

7

*0 press Conferences were highlighting alleged
“Serbian war
Further evidence substantiating his
charge of bias in the intemat.onal tribunal
can be gleaned from the fact that
Secretao- Albright publicly announced at that
press
conference with Judge Arbour that the United
States was the major provider of funds
for
the t^nbunal and had pledged even
more money to it. “Within two weeks,” of this
press
conference, wntes Mandel, “indictments were
issued against Yugoslav President
S obodan Milosevic and four other Serb leaders,
in what
cnmes.

seemed indecent haste, dictated
not by the needs of justice, which certainly
could have waited, but by flagging popular
support for NATO’s war effort
the face of mounting ‘collateral damage’”
(Mandel
July 20, 1999, p. All).

m
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pressure utilized to effect

its

on an

will

role in the establishment
of the

international agency."'’
Providing a leadership

WTO while cont.nuing to shore up the IMF

World Bank, promoting worldw.de
economie

integration

by supporting

and the

the

establishment of free trade areas
in the Americas. Asia,
and Africa, wh.le assisting
in

European Union consolidation,

.s

it

arguable that a two-track policy

one which promotes the authority
of (pro-U.S.)
maintains U.S. domination
lifting

is

being pursued,

international institutions, and

in the .ntemational order,

one which

both tracks to be pursued by
the

and/or removing of national
restrictions on trade.

But

.s

the world ready for barrier-free
world

trade— i.e.

laissez-faire

on the

grand scale-albeit under the rubric
of an international trade regime?
Former Deputy
Director of the

negative.

GATT

from 1987 through 1993, Charles R.

“Whatever the appeal of global

for the idea is just not there”
(Carlisle,

out that no major initiative of the

Carlisle,

answers

in the

free trade,” he asserts, “the
political support

November/December, 1996,

p. 115).

Pointing

WTO stands a chance of success without both U.S.

and E.U. cooperation, Carlisle recollects how
the Uruguay Round of GATT

talks nearly

broke off over U.S.-European differences
over agricultural subsidies and protection.
Also, he notes that protectionist sentiment

is still

not only in the area of agriculture (this sentiment

and many other countries) but also

in the areas

very high in both the U.S. and Europe
is

shared also by Japan, South Korea,

of services,

textiles,

and especially

labor.
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As Senator Charles
situation

we

S.

Robb

find ourselves in

stated

is that

on June

1

7,

1

997, “the political reality of the

a majority of this

body

[i.e.

the U.S. Senate]

prepared only to pay our debts conditioned on comprehensive refonns
being
implemented at the U.N.” (Robb, June 17, 1997). By 1999, U.S. arrears to the

exceeded $1.3

billion.
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is

UN had

whether (he

IluIcccI,

(

I

arhsle, the

14).

And

WTO will

adopt .nte.nalio.,ally reeogMi/ed
labor rights

“most highly eontested question”

(Carlisle,

states

is,

Novemher/I )eeember,

l<)«)6, p,

while, argues Carlisle, the extent to
which inereased international

competition has contributed to job losses
can be debated; nonetheless, he
writes,
“hllicre can be

little

doubt, however, that

objections to job losses are being raised

it

is

a signilieant lactor,

in l-iurope

and Ameriea.”

and

I

continues;

le

he burden ol adjustment teiuls to fall
most heavily on those
handle it
those who have lew skills and little

politieal

I

least able to

edueation, or lack job

mobility because ol their age, health, or
economic cireumstances. In
tile burden (alls on those unable
to move into high-|iaying exportlelated jobs (C arlisle, November/December,
199b,

shoit,

pp.

Noting also

commit

It

to

that

Hiina

opening

would be

its

is

C

rutile” (C arlisle,

is

to I'oreign

WTO,

and

C

C

arlisle

'arlisle

Ib-I 7 ).

cautions that reciuiring

it

“to

competition would be as unwise as

November/December, 199b,

hina to Russia as well.

worldwide

member of the WTO, he

markets completely

yet been admitted to the

legards

not yet a

|

p. 117).

Russia akso has not as

extends this same cautionary advice as

concludes by noting

that “| l'|ree trade

a distant goal, I'raught with dirilculties,” but, he says,
“regional trading

arrangements have been somewhat easier

to attain” (C'arlisle,

November/December,

I99C), p. 118).

Arguably, given the above develo|iments since 1990, the market
(llnancial or otherwise)

the

I

the

l'..U.

).S.

is

more

globally oriented than ever before, though

lemains the driving force

ol this global capitalist system.

and the establishment ol several

Iree trade areas

I

that ol its

Warsaw

it

is

caught organi/ed labor off-

I

Inion’s collap.se

Pact allies, as well as labor’s lack o( strong international

2M

clear that

he con.solidation o(

guard, partially owing to the disorientation a.ssociatcd with the Soviet

and

Cor capital

orga„.za.io„a, ,,es and/or
differences between ,he
interests and capahi, it.es
.0 technological
variances)

called developed world.'”

mechanisms

of labor

in

developing countries from
that of labor

With the es.abltshmen. of the

WTO in

owing

in the sc

1995. the

for regulating global
free trade are in place,
though their legitimacy
and

enforcement power remain to be
fully

tested.

Moreover, policies which tend
to

undermine national sovereignty
and self-determination
Ihe

,t.e.

IMF, and

World Bank, which appear

the

“Privatization”.

The decentering of national

to

are being pursued

have as their

state

power

appears to be the aim of many
of these policies which,

common

(i.e.

by

the

WTO,

rallying cry:

other than the U.S.)

in turn, is

wreaking havoc over

the social safety net of many
countries’ econom.es, which
likewise impacts consumer

demand, as millions of workers around
the globe

find scant secunty in their
new-found

economic condition.
Preliminary caution and alarm resulting
from this
globalization

cnsis

was

when he

uttered

by financier George Soros

stated that if the crisis

were

“left

crisis

in the

produced by

wake of the 1997-98 Asian

unchecked,”

it

would “lead

to the

disintegration of the global capitalist
system.. .[and] permanently transform
the world’s

The 1997

defeat

of Fast Track

indicates organized labor’s

legislation to expand NAFTA in the
U S Congress
growing strength as they were credited with
largely

engineering this defeat and as well signals the
possible limits to the free trade euphoria
reigning since the beginning of the decade.
So-called “fast track” legislation would
allow the President to negotiate trade agreements
and write “implementing legislation”
needed to change U.S. laws to adapt to the
agreement. Under such power granted

to the

President, Congress must vote “yes” or “no”
on the implementing legislation with no
amendments within 60 legislative days.

Three main bodies currently

among

labor: the International

which promote international organization
Labor Organisation (ILO), the International
exist
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ties

rd capitalism and
free markets.”
Morover, Soros added,
”[w]hat

the system itself is
the

mam cause.”

makes

this

Dismissing criticism of the
cnsis as being wholly

atlnbuted to “crony
capitalism ” “Confucian
capitalism,” or “ the Asian
model,” Soros

remarks
mherent

that “(tjhe inescapable
conclusion is that the crrs.s
is a
in the global

symptom ofpatholog.es

system.” Singling out
blame for unrestrained
international

financial markets, he
writes:

:r"fsr»”ni7
Contrao. to free market ideology
which states that “financial
markets are supposed to
aet in the long n.n like
a

concludes that

in the

pendulum, always swinging back
toward equilibrrum,” Soros

absence of public-policy measures
enacted on the

international finance, then
“[ijnstead
act like a

wrecking

that stands in their

It IS

ball,

way”

of acting

like a

swinging from country

how

of

pendulum, financial markets can

to countty

and destroying evetything

(Soros, Winter 1998 - 99
, p. 58 ).

in this context

of economic globalization

U.S. emphasis on civil society’
and

its

that

many

comcomitant private

question whether the

institutions

can

fill

the

socioeconomic void, service the needs of
affected populations, and stave
off political
disorder while legitimating a

may

follow, if the U.S.

is

new

international political compact.
Theoretically, what

successful in this complex and long-term
endeavor,

is

Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),
and the (marxist oriented) World
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a single

*l».l

..

„„ ..

•ru.s.

so.™

„,,

,h.

*b.|

j».M.„i,

,.i,

r„, ,1.

,.j.^.„,

„

collapse along with
global political disniption
could likely result.

The Imperative of the Market

To analyze
a basic

model of a

analysis

& Its Democratic Cover

these intemational
economic developments in
a Marxian framework,
capitalist entetprise will

which atlempts

to specify the

positions comprising this

new

be presented followed by
a Marxian class

complex fundamental and
subsumed

class

intemational or globalized
social formation. This
will be

followed by an analysis of
whether the export of U.S.
democracy through the

NED will

contribute to or detract from
the expansion of capital
and, hence, the extension
of U.S.

hegemony.
Utilizing the categories

offundamental” and “subsumed”

herein chosen a maniist
analysis based

upon

that depicted

example, between the “functioning

capitalist”

unpatd labor directly from the
laborers as opposed
capitalist,

merchants, or moneylenders. In

who

to the

this sense, the

different types

(WFTU).
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have

is

engaged

of capitalists,

in the extraction

merely property-owning
“productive” or “industrial”

capitahst exists within the production
process, refeired to as the fundamental
class

Federation of Trade Unions

I

by Resniek and Wolff 1987
(
)

which understands Mant as clearly
distinguishing between
as, for

class positions,

of

process, and

is

-d, needy involved
,n .he

sopios value'. (Resn.eh

Who

.

Wolff,

appnopnahon of supins labor
p. 143).

So-called

fonn of

eapiuHs.

are no. dinec.ly
engaged ,n appnopna.ing
surplus labor and

producon

in .he

who

are ou.side of
.he

process, such as merchan.s
or moneylenders,
provide .he condi.ions
of

exis.enee for .he funda,nen.al
capi.alis, class process

off excess inven.ory
or ex.endmg

money

as, for

example. e,.her

or cred,. so .ha, a
prod,

is

in selling

realized for .he

.ndus,nal cap,.ahs,s. In
.h.s regard, such
unproductive capi.a„s.s
occupy a subsumed
class position v,x-u-v,s
.hose productive capitalists
engaged in the fundamental

extracdon of surplus value.

And because Marx

understands caphal as
-self-expand.ng

value", each type of
capi.ahs, realizes an
expansion in one's

initial capital.

In a

successful creui, of capital
expansion, the industrial
capi.ahs, realizes a profit,
that

value over and above his or
her
for

commodity

ini.tal

outlay for land, labor,
machinety and materials

production. Likewise, the
merchant or moneylender will
receive a share

of the surplus value either as
“merchants’ discounts or
the values they dispose

Subsumed

class

is,

of to be expanded” (Resnick

payments by

interest

& Wolff,

industrial capitalists are

payments” which “permit
1987, pp. 142-3)

made, therefore,

in order to

ensure the continued existence
of the fundamental class process.

As

well, Resnick and

Wolffs marxian

analysis takes as

its

epistemological entry

point the concept of "overdetermination”
drawn from Freud (1895/1957,
1900/1950),

Lukacs (1923/1976), and Althusser
(1970). To say a theory
Resnick and Wolff,
IS

to assert that “its existence,
including all

determined by each and every other process
constituting

complex

effect

is

overdetermined

its

is,

for

properties or qualities,

that society.

Theory

is

the

produced by the interaction of all those other
processes. As such an
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effec, .he process of

.heo„ en.hod.es .he

(Res„.ch and Wo.ff, .PS,
<ha.

p.

2)

d.fferen. ...n.,ences

addh.on,

.his ...an.is. ...ode,
,s a,..iesse...ia„s.
in

rejecs .he ..o.ion ,ha.
‘•con,plex..ies are red.,cible

i.

of ..s n.any de,en..„.an.s’

.0 si,nphci..es

and-effec. .ype. Ins.ead,”
no.e Resnick and Wolff,
“.he presump.ion
elenren. in .he con.ex.
of any even, plays

To

i.s

d.s.incive role

in

is

of .he cause.ha. every

de.emr.n.ng

even."

.ha.

wit:

158

d.alec.c, .he

It

more complex

can be shown

i.

becomes. “However.” he

®
s.a.es

that this

complexity is not the complexity
of an effective
overdetermmatwn, but the complexity
of a cumulative mternalization
hich

,s

only apparently an overdetermination.
In

of ..s development consciousness

lives

e essence corresponding to
the stage
echoes of the essence .t has previously
(

fact at

each moment

and experiences

its own essence
has attained) through all the
been, and through the allusive

its

presence of the corresponding historical
forms. Hegel, therefore, argues
every consciousness has a
suppressed-conserved {aufgehoben) past
even in its present, and a world (the
world whose consciousness it could
Phenomenology, its presence virtual and
!’
latent), and that therefore it
also has as its past the worlds
of its
at

1

superseded essences. But these past images
of consciousness and these
worlds (corresponding to the images)

never affect present
consciousness as effective determinations
different from itself these
images and worlds concern it only as echoes
(memories, phantoms of its
histoncity) of what it has become, that
is,
anticipations of or allusions
to Itself Because the past is never
more than the internal essence (initself)

of the future

it

encloses, this presence of the past

consciousness of consciousness
determination.

A

itself,

and no

is

the presence to

true external

circle

of circles, consciousness has only one centre,
which solely determines it; it would need circles
with another centre
than itself—decentred circles—ior it to be affected
at its centre by their
effectivity, in short for its essence to be
over-determined by them. But
this is not the case (Althuser,

1965/1986, pp. 101-2).
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very cause

is itself

also an effect and vice versa.

An

antiessentialist or

of =>ny event
b«a
,‘T'"
because
rt
does not presume that it exists.
An antiessent.alist theo^
nderstands every theory (nicluding
itself) to be inherently
partial a
pamcularly focused intervention in
social discourse (Resnick
and Wolff

In addition to the previously

component
as

the

descnbed aspects of this marxian

in its theorization

of society

is

analysis, another basic

the entry-point concept of
class, understood.

economic process of performing and
appropriating surplus labor” (Resnick
and

Wolff, 1987, p. 26). Marxian theory,
from this vantage point

begins

Its

analysis of any society

by

initially

specifying the forms of the
proceeds to elaborate how
the nonclass processes existing

class process existing within that
society.

such forms are overdetermined by

all

It

within the social totality and how they
participate in overdetermining
those processes (Resnick and Wolff,
1987,

all

p. 26).

These aspects of the marxian analysis depicted
above
analytical approach

from others which

either

do not

set

off and distinguish this

differentiate

amongst the

different

types of capitalists, do not distinguish
themselves from the Hegelian dialectic, are
cssentiahst

m that they point to some simplicity which lies at the core of any apparent

complexity, or which utilize the entry-point of class
to function as an essence. This

understanding of marxian analysis will be utilized in the
example which follows.
In his

book One World, Ready Or Not: The Manic Logic
of Global Capitalism

(1997), William Greider,

commenting on

system “by human experience,” remarks

the apparent discreditation of the

to the contrary: “but the ghost

over the global landscape, perhaps with a knowing smile.” This

The gross conditions

that inspired Karl

Marx’s

of Marx hovers

he adds, because:

original critique of capitalism in the

nineteenth century are present and flourishing again.”
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is so,

Communist

And

then as now, he writes.

“[t]he fundamenlal
struggle... is

between

about control of the
workplace and

how

capital

and

labor.

That struggle

is

always

the returns of the enteqirise
shall be divided”

(Greider, 1997, p. 39).

Though Greider recognizes

that inequality
characterizes the present
condit.on

peoples subjected to globalizing
capital,

is

it

the global nrarketplace
that he rejects the

precisely because

Ma.„an

of the developntcnt of

solut.on of the socialization
of capital

and property with the production
and distnbution of the surplus
the direct producers.

For Greider, the global marketplace

wealth and incomes from the
older, richer socict.es
transition

is

of

to the

is

to

be decided upon by

shifting “opportunities for

poorer ones.” And, while this

accompanied by ugly and “exploitative
aspects,” nonetheless, he

predicts:

the process of productive
dispersal has the potential to
produce a
dramatic dep^ure from the past,
an opening for greater equality
on a
global scale (Greider, 1997,
p. 42).

Projecting the metaphor of a seesaw,
Greider sees a unique development
emerging in

human

history, that the general prosperity

of one side of the seesaw can only be

defended by attending to human conditions

masses of people

in the global marketplace,

at the

other end. In sum, he argues: “For

economic

self-interest is

converging with

altruism” (Greider, 1997, p. 43).

While the
his basic

validity of Greider’s

model of a

harmonious prognostications remain

capitalist enterprise

to

be seen,

can serve as a useful heuristic device to

examine the fundamental mechanism of capitalist
economic development. Paraphrasing

who

Thorstein Veblen,

problem of supply,

i.e.

taught that the problem of capitalist enterprise

“managing the production of goods

and the return on invested capital,” Greider

in order to

states that “the present
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is

always the

maximize

profit

economic upheaval

revolves around old-fash,
oned questions .ha, have always
been the basics of

capitahsm ” Spec.fically, he
notes: -The challenge
of .nanaging supply
market demand and

to maintain profit levels
is the hear,

match the

to

of what preoccupies every

business manager from the
comer shop to the larges, industrial
corporation” (Greider.
1997. pp. 44-5).

To

explain

this,

he lays out h.s basic model
of capitalist production by

focusing on a localized,
self-contained market in which
an enterprise attempts to

produce jus, enough

As demand

to

meet

rises

visible

consumer demand. He

writes:

and a firm’s productive capacity

is eventually
exhausted, then the company invests
in building more plant
capacity to
increase its output. In the
meantime, its rate of profit should
increase
because, as nsmg demand exceeds
the supply of goods, a firm
is able to
raise its pnees, restrained only
by competing firms that might
capture the

new

On

sales

by keeping

their prices a bit lower.

the contrary, Greider notes,

threatened by

its

when demand

is

weak and

the

company’s

returns are

production consistently outrunning the
market of available buyers,

forces the firm to

limit Its supply of goods or else
be struck with unsold inventories,
surpluses that must be disposed of at
discount or perhaps a dead loss.

Excess production threatens to drive down
prices and thus narrow the
profit margins on the company’s
output. When a

firm’s profits decline,

owners of capital typically respond by moving
their investment capital
elsewhere, dumping the company’s stock and
searching for others that
will deliver a better return.

Eventually, in order to “halt the damage,”
Greider writes.

company has to shrink supply and even its productive capacity
closing the factory, either temporarily or permanently.
In simplified
terms, these are the main variables that managers
try to keep in balance
as they respond to changing conditions in the
market (Greider, 1997,
the

p.
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this

Heralding as a “great virtue
of capitalism”

expanding potential

to

make more

ability to yield

more from

less, this

produce more goods, he notes,
“also poses the enduring

contradition for capitalist enterprise:

can

,ts

how

things,” he says, “but can

to dispose

you

sell

of the surplus production ”
“You

them?” He explains:

n undisciplined expansion of
productive capacity will be
self-defeating
even dangerous for a firm, if all it
accomplishes are continuing supply
surpl uses that degrade prices
and undermine the rate of return
The
probletn of surplus capacity drives
not only the competition among
firms
for market shares but also the
imperative to discover new markets
(Greider, 1997, p. 45).

The global revolution towards
logic

a

one world market, Greider argues, “has
deranged

of standard business calculations."
Globalization, he argues,

making while technological innovation works
exponential scale.” The

new machines, he

allowed firms to disperse globally, going
local.” In addition to

to reduce costs

writes,

the

accelerates decision-

and increase output on “an

“have given capital wings and

after shares in

markets that were once securely

expanding potential supply, he notes, “the
breakout of new

production methods and products creates pervasive
downward pressures on prices.”

Consequently, he

states:

The old standard

logic

is

thus destabilized: the imperative to

modernize must be heeded

lest a company lose out in the price
competition, but the modernizing process also makes
the supply problem
worse. When companies adopt the technologies that reduce
costs and

protect their market shares, the inescapable result is
to enlarge productive
capacity. They do this to keep up, though it means supply
surpluses will
steadily accumulate somewhere in the marketplace—
goods that can’t be
sold, plants that can t be operated at full capacity.
Someone
will

have

to eat the losses.

Business people hope

it is

somewhere
not their company

(Greider, 1997, p. 46).

This scramble to avoid being
threat to the functioning

left

holding the surpluses

is,

argues Greider,

now

a major

of the current international economic system. Companies may
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anen^p. ,o pro.ee, .henrselves
by clos.ng fac.ones or unload.ng
excess goods below

prevading prices, bu, .hey are
caugh.

.he logic of .he sys.en,

wh.ch •‘compels .hem

keep do.ng more of .he same:
more cos, reducion and price-cu„ing
and,

in

expansion of po.en.ial supply ”
“The circle conl.nues,” he concludes,
“wi.h

.o

.um, more

i.s

deslrucive elemen, concealed by
.he fabulous expansion of
.he sys.em” (Greider,
1997,
P. 46).

No,ing

,ha, .he

supply problem “is no, .he only

slandard praCices,” he argues
none.heless: “bu,
else that

happens” (Greider, 1997,

is

is

are to

more

one mos, cen.ral

,o every.hing

its

capitalist

tendency for supply

to

outpace

also required of the basic class
structure of civil society

which upends the enterprise and makes

we

.he

on the problems of the

enterprise and of its basic contradiction
found in

demand, an analysis

is

global revolu.ion upends

p. 46).

While Greider’s pnmary focus above

available

i,

way

capitalist production

of commodities possible

if

fully understand the potential
social and, hence, political disruptions

which may undermine the NED’s implantation
of liberal democracies abroad. Quoting
Marx, Resnick and Wolff understand the “class
process”
surplus-labor

is

pumped

as that ‘“in

out of direct producers’” (Resnick

demonstrating the exploitation inherent in

between necessary and surplus

which unpaid

& Wolff,

capitalist production,

Marx

1987, p. 115). In

distinguished

labor, with the former referring to the “quantity
of labor

time necessary to produce the consumables customarily
required by the direct producer
to

keep working. Surplus labor,” on the contrary,

the direct producer performs

115).

is

“the further, the extra time of labor

beyond the necessary labor” (Resnick

Writes Marx:
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& Wolff,

1987, p.

In the present state of
production,

produces

in a

with each

human labour-power not only

day a greater value than

new

it

itself

possesses and costs- but

scientif.c discovery, with

each new technical invention
there also rises the surplus of
its daily production
over its daily cost
'^
Ihere diminishes that part
,'
of the working day in
1
which
the labourer produces the
equivalent of his day’s wages,
and on
the other hand, lengthens that
part of the working day in
which he must
present labour grato to the capitalist

(Marx, 1849

1935/1985,

The

&

&

1865/1933

p. 12).

quantities of necessary and surplus
labor vary depending

on technological

innovation, political strength or weakness
of the workers or owners

stmggle), the market for the specific

commodity

(-ies) the

(i.e.

the class

firm produces, the market of

available labor, etc. In sum, the process
of extracting surplus labor in capitalist

production

rather, as

1

15).

is

a determination of many other aspects
in the firm and society at large
or

Resnick and Wolff refer to

What

is

1 )

this

overdetermined (Resnick

the extraction of surplus labor

from the direct producer who
and

is

has

its

is

is

is

1987, p.

the

“the creation of ‘unpaid value’”

paid only a wage equivalent to her or his
necessary

counterpart in 2) the “industrial profit ‘as
appropriation of other

people’s labor’ (meaning their surplus labor)” (Resnick
firm and, hence, for those

legality

& Wolff,

useful in this approach, for the purposes of
this analysis,

understanding that

labor,

it, it

who own

of private property

such enterprises

& Wolff,

1987,

—ownership being

in a capitalist social formation.

The

p.

1

16) for the

sanctified in the

class process described

above, pending no major disruptions, reproduces the two primary
classes which

comprise any particular

capitalist social formation:

Resnick and Wolff refer

to the

i.e.

capitalist

above process where the

and worker.

direct producers perform

necessary and surplus labor while capitalists extract or appropriate surplus labor

as,

outlined previously, the fundamental class process. The theoretical category of the
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amdamental

class process, they
emphasize, does not refer to any
essential function as

.he ftnal detenninant of
social change,

bttt

rather

it

is

a conceptual category
utiltzed to

dtstinguish the production and
extractton of suttIus labor
and the class of persons

corresponding to this process, the
producttve laborers and the
tndustrial
other persons

positions, that

is,

occupy, what Resnick and Wolff
refer to

persons

who

as,

subsumed

class distributors and recipients

from

class

distribute the already appropnated
surplus labor or

The purpose of the subsumed

products.

ts to

who

capitalists,

its

of surplus value

“provide specific conditions of existence
of the capitalist fundamental
class

process” (Resnick
value

may need

to

&

Wolff, 1987.

be paid

to a

p. 119).

Thus, for example, a portion of
the surplus

landowner so

that surplus value

may be produced and

appropriated. In this respect, the private
landowner occupies a subsumed class
position
in that the

capitalist

landowner provides a specific condition of
existence necessary

for the

fundamental class process to occur. Resnick
and Wolff provide other

examples of subsumed

classes, for example, the necessity of
private

moneylenders

to

provide “access to quantities of money capital”
so as to satisfy a specific condition
of
the capitalist fundamental class process.
“Government, too,” they argue.

provides conditions of existence under certain
social conditions, for
example, a judicial apparatus for adjudicating and

enforcing contractual

relations.

The existence of the

capitalist

fundamental class process may
then require that a distribution of surplus value to
the government be

accomplished

(in the

form of taxes on

capitalists)

(Resnick

& Wolff

1987, pp. 119-20).

It is

possible, they add, for the government to defray

levying a tax on surplus value, that

is,

its

costs in other

ways without

by providing a judicial condition of existence

without requiring a subsumed class distribution, though
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it

is

not readily apparent

how

m.gh, occur.

Cher

,ha„ by

Ux.ng

,he direct producers
for such cos.s, perhaps
.he

authors are referring
to state plunder and
booty from war or other
impenal “taxes”
extracted in a

hegemon.c

costs without a

.nterstate relat.onsh.p

subsumed Cass distnbut.on

which allows

a

government

for j udicial or other
conditions

necessary for the operation
of the fundamental class
process? Suffice

it

to

to

defray

its

of existence
say that

whether through government
taxing authonty or private
expenditures of sunrius value,
the conditions of existence
for the fundamental
class process to operate
wtll vary in

form and content

relative to the population

and geographical parameters
either extant or

foreseen in the near future in
any part.cular capitalist social
formation. “In general

terms,” they state,

capitalist fundamental class
process and all
the other processes occurring
within any particular social
formation will
verdetermine which conditions of
existence of that fundamental
class
subsumed class process to exist.
Subsumed classes are
diTn'ir
hen the persons occupying the
positions of distributors or
receivers of
the portions of surplus value
allocated to secure the provision
of those
conditions of existence. The
overdetermination

subsumed

of both fundamental and

class processes implies that
both are contradictory and

constantly changing (Resnick

Viewed within

Endowment

for

this

&

Wolff, 1987,

p.

120)

Marxian framework, the operatives of
the National

Democracy

in

pursuing

its

mission of exporting

abroad can be seen as occupying a
subsumed class process. In
arrangements the

liberal

democracy

this regard, the political

NED seeks to establish and support worldwide are geared

towards

establishing specific conditions of existence
(e.g. electoral democracies based
on two or

more market-oriented
movements, support

parties,

with apolitical and anticommunist trade union

for collective bargaining arrangements,
privatization of public

enterpnses, civilian control of national militias and
defense forces,
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etc.) for

capitalism’s

fundamental class ptocess
to operate on a global
scale under U.S. begentony.
And
these efforts of the

NED are enabled tlrrough subsumed

class

through the taxtng authorrty
of the U.S. goventmen,
utilized

Gtven the necessity
available

enough

in

to

payments of sundus value

to

fund

this

endeavor.

for capitalists to balance
the.r potential supply
of commod.t.es with

consumer demand, the necessity

wages

of

all

for

workers-the

d.rect

producers-to ean,

cover the costs of their daily
reproduction, coupled with the

necessity of any capitalist
social fomration to expend
surplus value tn order to
prov.de
specific conditions

maintaining

its

of existence

for

its

class domination and

fundamental class process to occur
(such as

hegemonic

rule in that social fomiation),

it

is

apparent that these necessao^
tendencies will continue to interact,
contradict one
another, and overdetermine each
other in the developing globalized
capitalist world

economy. As

well,

it

is

arguable that

if large sections

of the globe are

to

be organized

in

a transnational social formation
under the direction of one national
segment of the
international extracting class, then
the particularity
likely generate the universality

of a

of such a universal arrangement

will

particular opposition. National
jealousies and

resentment towards the U.S. hegemon
for what most assuredly will be
perceived as the
usurpation of the nghts of self-determination
of nations are unlikely to be contained

under present conditions and understandings.

upon

Traditional

(i.e.

since

WWII)

reliance

either military dictatorships in Latin
America, authoritarian dictatorial rulers in

Asia, military strongmen or racial extremists
in Africa, or Emirs, Sheikhs, Sultans,

Crown

Princes, and

LIEO and

for U.S.

Shahs

in the

Middle East worked adequately

hegemonic ascendancy since WWII. With

Union and, hence, the departure from the scene of the U.S.’s

278

for the Bretton

Woods

the collapse of the Soviet

mam protagonist

representative of what ant,
-soviet partisans referred
to as ••itnpcr.ar
eotnnnnnsnt,

then-short of the

framework
post-Cold

is

revitalizat.on

of the -communist threat”-a
new ideological

definitely a log.eal necessity
for the maintenance

and expans, on of U.S.

War hegemony.

That

democracy and

,ts

particular development
under the conditions present
in

the U.S. capitalist social
formation, and especially as
a response to democratic

developments elsewhere
organizing mantra

in the

world

in the construction

in the last

two

eenturies, has

become

of this post-Cold War hegemony

the primary

is

understandable, given the apparent
acceptance of its contradictory
aspects and
definitions by successive
generations of the U.S. populace,
or so

those promoting this policy.
capitalist

The degree

to

which

we

are to believe

by

actual implantation of this
form of

democracy can be established and
sustained abroad

is,

arguably, of limited

duration, however, though perhaps
sufficiently so as to allow for
(re)organization of
existing or

etc.),

new

international organizations (e.g. the

IMF, the World Bank,

WTO,

the establishment and/or
consolidation of new regional economic
regimes (e.g.

NAFTA, APEC, FTAA,
state bureaucracies

the

EU,

etc.) in

conjunction with the diminishing of
existing

through the opening up of countries

to the unfettered

and investment, and the standardization
of business practices

of the

the

political void

in

How of trade

order to take advantage

opened up by the collapse of the Soviet Union and

its allies.

Some

notable contradictory effects contrary to the
U.S. goal of democracy promotion,

however, can be witnessed with governmental
power
back

to

Cuba,

communist party leadership

for

in

either

remaining with or reverting

Cuba, Belarus, Mongolia, and Romania.

example, Fidel Castro continues

to rule
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over a one-party communist

In

state with

a socialized econon,y
despite nunterous attempts
by the U.S. and the

and/or undenntne the

Chan Communist

United Nations calling on
the U.S.
years suggests that

many

[for

Israel voting against

end

As

rule.

Indeed, lops.de.l votes
in the

embargo against Cuba

its

countries support

perceived hegemonist.c
policies.

“The 1999 vote

to

Party,

Cuba

In

NED to oust

for the past etght

order to spite the U.S. for

its

a Pepperdine School
of Pubhc Policy study
stated

ending the Cuban embargo]
was 152-2, w.th only the U.S.
and

engagement.” The study concludes

essentially unilaterally against
Cuba, while

many of its

that

allies

“Amertca has been acting
have estabhshed formal

diplomatic ties and enjoy extensive
trade relationships with
Cuba” (McCormally

Skandera, April 2000). Another
example of outcomes contrary to

&

NED goals can

be

seen in Belarus, a former province
of the Soviet Union which
became an independent
state in 1991.

Since hts landslide election vietory

Lukashenko has ruled Belarus

NED supported groups to

as a soviet-style

in 1994, President

communist

state despite attempts

bolster a viable opposition in the
interim.

Europe/Radio Liberty reporter Tony
Wesolowsky
reason for hope for the opposition

in Belarus,

writes:

Alexander

As Radio

by

Free

“For years there’s been

little

where President Alyaksandr Ltikashenka

has kept the country locked in the
repressive Soviet pass” (Wesolowsky,
October

II,

2000). And, on July 3, 2000, in Mongolia,
the communist controlled Mongolian

People’s Revolutionary Party

(MPRP) swept back

Mongolia’s unicameral Parliament ousting the

had taken power
indeed, a

core

1

in

1

power winning 72 of 76

seats in

market oriented “democrats”

996 under the banner of the Democratic Union from

9-member delegation organized by

NED recipient

free

into

office.

who
And,

the International Republican Institute—

did “not observe any instances of systematic fraud or
widespread
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votmg

irregularities” ,n the

MPRP, which

Mongolian vote (Nicholson,
September

Morm.g Post, “was

against political gridlock
under the Democratic
austerity

riding a

Union

nation the size of Western
Europe (”Fonner

Communist
of the vote

p.

1

The

).

4,

2000; Rennie, July

Ion Iliescu

in this

Comehu Vadim

wave of popular anger

coalition

government and

measures imposed by the
International Monetary Fund
(IMF), which

have plunged many of Mongolia’s
2.4 million people

Power”, July

2000,

had ruled for seven
decades and had received
patronage from the Soviet

Union, stated the Sou,J, Chi,,
a

economic

1,

4,

into poverty” in this
landlocked

Communist Rulers Swept Back

2000).

And on December 9, 2000,

won Romania’s presidential

election

Into

former

gamering over 70 percent

country of 23 million people.
Facing an ultranationalist

rival,

Tudor, Iliescu secured the backing
of many “mainstream groups”

who

“pledged to back the former communist
functionaiy, fearing that Romania
could

become an

international pariah if Tudor

Romanian Vote”, December
capitalist

veiy

10, 2000).

NED agenda possibly

least, indicate that the

won”
These

(“Polls

anti-capitalist reactions to the pro-

foreshadow the

NED’s

Show Ex-Communist Wins

limits

of this U.S.-led crusade

path will have outcomes

at

or, at the

times contrary to the

intentions of its “democratic activists”.

In this latter regard, the question
arises as to the possible formation
of

hegemonic and counterhegemonic

blocs, in the

Gramscian sense, of either a broad

unification of intellectuals and masses in
support of NED-style

contrary, a widespread

movement organized

democracy

or,

on the

in opposition to this perceived “foreign”

import. In the case of the ouster of President
Milosevic in Yugoslavia in October 2000,

Zoran Djindjic, Democratic Party President and campaign
manager
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for the

NED-backed

successor ,o the Yugoslav.an
pres.dency, Vojislav Kostunica,
was able to unite 18

oppostbon parties which
garnered Kostunica an

.mo

a successful den, and
for Mtlosevic’s ouster

initial electoral

when

majority which united

the latter attempted to
hold a run-

off election. Suffering
from ten years of war and
western economic sanctions,
the U.S.

had created the material
conditions within Yugoslavia
which had given

rise to

Ideologies contrary to Milosevic
and his Socialist Party rule.
Previous opposition
leaders such as

Vuk Draskovic and Zoran Djmdjie

masses behind the pro-democratic

himself had been unable to
rally the

anti-socialist rhetoric

however, presented himself as a
Serbian

nationalist,

advocate of western conceptualized
democracy and

of the NED. Kostunica,

even though he was an ardent
liberal

economics.

A 56-year-old

former legal scholar, Kostunica
strongly supported Serbian troops
in Kosovo and

opposed
the

2000

to

NATO interference in

presidential campaign,

was matched only by

his

is

the traditional Yugoslavian
province. In fact, during

one

CNN reporter wrote that “his disdain for Milosevic

contempt for the United States” (Ratnesar,
October

6,

2000).

Kostunica’s nationalism combined with his
anti-U.S. rhetoric and the depressed

economic conditions of a war-weary Yugoslavian
population had produced
conditions for what Gramsci refers to as a
historical bloc, “[tjhat

is

the

to say the

complex,

contradictory and discordant ensemble of the
superstructures” reriecting “the ensemble

of the social relations of production” {PN,

p. 366).

In this linkage

of form and content.

ideologies and matenal forces, Gramsci echoes
Marx’s idea that “a popular conviction
often has the

same energy

as a material force” and writes:

To

the extent that ideologies are historically necessary
they have a
validity which is psychological”; they “organise”

human masses, and
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create the terrain on

which men move, acquire
consciousness of their

position, struggle, etc.
{PN, p. 377).

The

historical bloc is that
wielding together

.ntellectuals

of the would-be dominant group.

(and concretely) progressive
class”

etc.)

between

all

It is

who end up

social groups,” argues
Gramsci. In this

solidarity

of an ideological unity by the
class of
the intellectuals of the
“historically

“subjugating the intellectuals of
other

manner, “they thereby create a system
of

the intellectuals, with

bonds of a psychological nature

and often of a caste character
(technico-juridical, corporate,

manifesting itself “‘spontaneously’”
in
causes the whole society to

move

its

progressive penod,

etc.).”

when

At

(vanity,

first

the bloc “really

forward,” eventually, notes Gramsci,

soon as the dominant group has exhausted
its function, the
ideological bloc tends to crumble away;
then “spontaneity” may be
replaced by “constraint” m ever less
disguised and
[a]s

indirect forms,

culminating

Though

It

Kostunica

utilizes

IS still

is

m outnght police measures and coups d’etat (PN,

too early to

tell

pp. 60-1).

whether the social group which has fonned
around

100% homogeneous on

only to emphasize the very

the level of ideology, an extreme

real “existence

which Gramsci

of the objective conditions for the

revolutionising of praxis” and, hence, the creation
of an historical bloc, Kostunica’s

stunning victory nonetheless indicates that the
intellectuals around him have,

at least for

the near-term, supplanted the intellectual
moral leadership of Milosevic’s Socialist Party

(PN,

p. 366).

One month

later,

on November 25, however, Milosevic was reelected

lead his Yugoslavian Socialist Party,

counterhegemonic bloc, the task
through the

NED

which

is

now

in opposition.

To

to

create a

for Milosevic is to link Kostunica with U.S. funding

and to denigrate the

latter’s

Serbian nationalism as contrary to

Yugoslavia’s best interest and indeed as a pretense for continued U.S. transgression
of
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Yugoslavian sovereignty.
Gaging the success of such
hegemonic or counterhegemonic
blocs would require a
protracted long-tern, study
which
..

to say that the fonnation

soltdtfy,

As

well,

success of the

it

is

not undertaken here.
Suffice

htstortcal blocs will requtre
ntore than a

though nascent examples of
such development

Yugoslavia.

tntttal

of such

IS
i

few years

exists, as in the case

to

of

also noteworthy that in
the Yugoslavian case
above, the

NED-backed candidate

ts.

in part,

due

to hts exhibition

of a

virulent anti-U.S. rhetoric
and determined Serbian
nattonalism. elements which,
in the

long term,

may undermine

The push

the very

for capitalist

democracy

the U.S. seeks to create in
Yugoslavia.

“democracy” as the expected, nonnal,
developed and

destred form of govemment-the
apex of human achievement in
soetal relations-and
the institutions and practices
associated with this catchword by
the

U.S. attempt at providtng intellectual
and moral leadership

in this

NED represents a

New

World Order and

serves to provide a normative
trajectory of how social and
political development in

much of the world should

proceed. Backed up by

its

status as the singular

most

powerful superpower (both mtlitarily and
technologically), some would argue
current U.S. effort to promote
“democracy” abroad

hegemontc

by

the

rule outlined

by Gramsci

armor of coercton), and on

leadership, however,

is

(in the

falls

from

within the prescription for

fotmula of intellectual leadership
protected

this criteria alone they

likely to suffer

that the

its

would be

grounding

in

correct.

one particular

Such
state

of the

tntemational system, and charges of cultural
chauvinism, elitism, racism, sexism, and

imperialism

may grow

proportionally with every instance of the use offeree

necessary by the U.S. hegemon

(e.g. the

1999 Kosovo

conflict).

this likelihood that the political tendency for
the further
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It

is in

made

recognition of

development and enhancement

of inten,a,.onal governing
or

failrrre

ins.i.ut.ons will-i,, ,he
absence

of any sys.ennc dysfnnc.on

or nrajor aUerat.on of
,he developing globalized
eapi.alis, social fomra.ion-

l.kely gain

nromentum and

further poli.tcal efficacy

tnterpational extract.ng class
and

development

is

its

subsumed

amongst the members of the

class participants. That
such a

possible follows from the
capab.lit.es of the forces a.

work

tn the

present in.ema.tonal system
and eehpses the logic not only
of a s.ngle hegemonic center
(t.e.

the U.S.) but as well will
bring to the forefront baste
questions of political

obligation of the citizen to the
national state.
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